Episode 40: From NASA to the Pentagon, Commercial Space Takes Center Stage in “Rocket Dreams"

The Elara Edge Podcast

Intro/Outro: Scott King, Strategic Communications Manager, Elara Nova (SK) 

Host: Mike Dickey, Founding Partner, Elara Nova (MD) 

SME: Christian Davenport, Author, Rocket Dreams (CD) 

00:02 – 01:30 

(SK): When the Artemis II crew splashed down in the Pacific Ocean after their record-setting mission around the moon – America was watching. Just over 27 million peopleacross the nation’s largest television networks tuned in to follow their re-entry.  While the Artemis II mission was a precursor to America’s actual return to landing on the moon – it was aptly timed for Christian Davenport’s new book, Rocket Dreams: Musk, Bezos, and the Inside Story of the New, Trillion-Dollar Space Race, which chronicles the commercial dynamics and geopolitical tensions defining the modern day space race against China. 

Welcome to “The Elara Epilogues,” a special edition series of The Elara Edge podcast where the space industry’s leading journalists and authors join Elara Nova partners to discuss their published work covering today’s ever-evolving space environment. Founding Partner Mike Dickey, the former Chief Architect of the United States Space Force, is returning to the host seat today.  

Mike will be joined by Christian Davenport, the former Washington Post reporter and author of the 2025 book Rocket Dreams. Together, they’ll discuss how Rocket Dreams continues the storyline from Christian’s 2018 book The Space Barons, which we previously covered in the inaugural episode of “The Elara Epilogues.” A link to that conversation will be in the show notes.  

And on one additional note for our audience, this podcast was recorded prior to the SpaceX IPO. 

Thank you for joining us and onto the show… 

01:31 – 01:34 

(MD): Okay. Christian first, welcome back to the Elara Edge. 

01:35 – 01:38 

(CD): Hey, it’s so good to be back. Thanks for having me back a second time. I really appreciate it.  

01:39 – 01:53 

(MD): Yeah, that first time was over a year ago. And we were talking about Space Barons, which was your first space book. And in this interim period, it’s been long enough for you to have written and released another book, Rocket Dreams. 

I think September of 2025. Is that about right?  

01:54 – 02:48 

(CD): Yeah, that’s right. Rocket Dreams came out late last year. It’s something of a sequel of sorts to The Space Barons. I mean, the Space Barons, as you might remember, covered the early days of the commercial space industry. Elon and SpaceX and Jeff Bezos and Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic and Richard Branson and Paul Allen and you know, Mike, after that book came out in 2018, I thought at some point there would be enough material for another book. 

I just didn’t realize it would be within seven years or so. I thought it would be at least a decade. But there’s so much going on in this little industry of ours, and it’s moving so quickly that I looked up, called my agent. I said, ‘Hey, I think we have enough here for another book, because so much has happened and Rocket Dreams came out – and it comes out right before the Artemis II mission. And it seems like before too long there might be enough material for a third, so we’ll see.

02:49 – 02:59 

(MD): No, that’s right, it is definitely a dynamic time in this business. It’s not your first series of books that you wrote. Your first book was not about space. Can you maybe tell? I think our audience would like to hear about what you did there. 

03:00 – 04:29 

(CD): Yeah. So that was a book called ‘As You Were: To War and Back with the Blackhawk Battalion of the Virginia National Guard. And, you know, at the time, I was a metro reporter at the Washington Post after 9/11 and the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. And I was watching citizen soldiers, you know, service members from the reserve component, you know, the guard and reserve being called up in extraordinary numbers. 

We’re talking about firefighters and police officers and teachers and paramedics. And I was watching this strain that was putting on local counties and municipalities having so much of their workforce deploy. And we have big Pentagon reporters who were covering that. And we had reporters who were embedded with the 101st Airborne and 82nd Airborne and some of the big Marine units. 

And I was looking at it and was curious about the reserve component. So I embedded in Iraq with a unit from Virginia, they were a Blackhawk unit, and then toward the end of their tour and then came home with them and wanted to be sort of the first reporter to embed on the home front and to watch them transition back from being – we were in Anbar province at al-Asad Air Base – and then you process out through Fort Dix in New Jersey, and then the next day you’re civilian again and you’re not at some big Army base like Fort Campbell. 

They’re just home and trying to resume their lives again after just leaving Iraq. And so I wrote about that experience, which it was very rewarding. I’m still in touch with a lot of those soldiers to this day. 

04:30 – 04:36 

(MD): Oh, I bet. I mean intensely personal and not an easy ‘I’ll just jump back in and do my day job right.’ 

It’s not an easy transition psychologically.  

04:37 – 05:29 

(CD): No. And I wanted to highlight that particular sacrifice. And then also one of the bigger themes is the role of the citizen soldier. I mean, that goes back to the Revolutionary War and the citizen-based militia and the National Guard being part of the country’s fabric. And, you know, the 29th Infantry Division, which is the unit I was embedded with, fell under the 29th ID. 

And those units stormed the beaches of Normandy at D-Day. And we got away with that because they didn’t call up the guard and reserve during Vietnam, which was already a very unpopular war. And they had the draft. And then we saw in Iraq and Afghanistan, and without the draft, they kind of needed the guard and reserve component. And at the time, people remembering Vietnam was kind of like, hey, what’s going on? Why are we relying on these citizen soldiers so much? And the fact of the matter is that’s the way the founders actually created it. So it was done on purpose.

05:30 – 05:54 

(MD): Awesome. So then you go to the business desk, your financial desk at the post, right? And this is where you end up kind of getting into this space business. And so now you write Space Barons. You are a consulting producer on two TV shows, one of which won an Emmy. 

Congratulations on that. Not too many authors win Emmys. And then Rocket Dreams? So I personally am not a medical professional, but I think you have caught the space bug. So what gets you excited about this topic?

05:55 – 07:14 

(CD): It’s funny that, you know, I’ve covered the military. I had done a stint in covering politics and editing and the space thing really just grabbed me from the moment, the way it just does. 

And I use this quote, it’s a Jeff Bezos quote, and I use it with my kids. And I say, “You don’t pick your passions, your passions pick you. But you have to have your antenna up.” And, you know, I didn’t grow up a big space fan. I was born in 1973. So after the Apollo program, I don’t think I was riveted too much by the shuttle. 

Actually, my first space memory is Challenger exploding, and so I didn’t grow up a space nerd. But started watching what was happening in the commercial sector, and rockets that would fly to space and then fly back to Earth and land, and the space baron billionaires getting into it and the rivalries and just how NASA was changing and relying on these companies. 

And I thought, ‘You know, there’s something really here.’ And as a journalist, they say that old adage, ‘Follow the money.’ And I thought if the richest people in the world were putting their money into this, we should be paying attention to it. And it’s just really grown and expanded to the point where you have room for not just one book, The Space Barons, but now this other one, Rocket Dreams. 

And of course, others have written books as well. And we’ve seen, you know, a little bit of a boom in that, and it’s spreading now into national security space is something that’s become very, very important.  

07:15 – 08:06 

(MD): Yeah, no doubt this is where Elara Nova has at its roots is continuing to mature space security on a U.S. and a global scale. 

So if we go back to Space Barons and to our listeners who haven’t done their preparatory homework for this podcast, you should go back and listen to that podcast, in April last year, we talked about it. But Space Barons introduced us to four billionaires who all wanted in some way to drive a space agenda, really for their own reasons. 

Right? It wasn’t all the same. They all had their individual motivations. But now we get into Rocket Dreams, and it looks like it’s come down to a two person or two company race. Blue Origin and SpaceX, Bezos and Musk. And so 2018 is where the book starts. And there’s been sort of a lot of hype, but maybe not a tremendous amount of progress. 

So take us back to the start of the book and where we are at that point. And then what are some of the arcs in the story as you go through Rocket Dreams?

08:07 – 11:44 

(CD): Yeah, so I think the Space Barons, you know, which covered the early days of the commercial space industry and their interaction with NASA, I think it posed a question. 

The question was, you know, ‘is this sort of commercial paradigm for real?’ The public private partnerships that NASA was using — is this a viable industry? Is this going to have any kind of growth, or is it a flash in the pan? And the answer comes in Rocket Dreams and it’s clearly a yes. And you can see that manifested in the fact that you are putting astronauts on rockets and spacecraft that are owned and operated by the private sector and not by the government, then that’s a big deal. 

And NASA is obviously outsourcing human spaceflight to the commercial space sector. You’ve seen the growth of space tourism. We’ve seen a proliferation of the space industry beyond just the Space Barons. I mean, I focus on Blue Origin and SpaceX, but there’s a proliferation of that. And then third, what you see carrying through the theme of Rocket Dreams is, for the first time, NASA really having some momentum of building the Artemis program to return to the moon and having that program survive subsequent presidential administrations. 

And we haven’t had that since Apollo. We haven’t had a deep space human exploration campaign survive one administration to the next since the Apollo era. And so I tell a lot of that story here in Rocket Dreams. But yes, we revisit SpaceX and Blue Origin, aligning themselves to move forward with NASA on this moon program. And that’s where the story begins. 

It begins with the transition team. President Trump has just won the election, and he is meeting with various companies. And they’re telling them, ‘Hey, we want to go to the moon. And what can you do to help us go to the moon?’ And Blue Origin, which had been left behind SpaceX, had moved so far ahead and Jeff Bezos tells his team like, ‘Hey, we need to compete. 

Everything SpaceX goes after, we’re going to go after.’ And so as Blue Origin’s executives are meeting with the Trump transition team and they’re saying, ‘We want to go back to the moon,’ they say, ‘Okay, well, we’ve just landed our suborbital space tourism rocket, New Shepard, in the West Texas desert. And well, we can build something like that and land it on the moon. 

And the executives, they completely made it up. They did not have a moon program. They did not have a lunar lander. But they knew that Bezos and the leadership really wanted to align themselves with NASA and start winning government contracts, start bringing real revenue. So they make that pitch to NASA, and then they have to go back and tell their boss. 

At the time, it was Rob Meyerson, the president of Blue Origin, ‘Hey, you’re not going to believe what we just did. We just pitched NASA on a lunar lander.’ Rob calls Bezos and says, ‘You’re not going to believe what the guys just did.’ And Bezos loved it and went all in, even helping write the proposal for a lunar lander himself and then pitching it himself. 

And so you see that the lunar lander competition is sort of the central tension, I think, of the narrative, because of course, SpaceX bids on it as well. Everyone thought Blue Origin was going to win this contract, but they ended up losing it to SpaceX. But it really brings us to today, where now they’re opening it back up in this competition, and we’re seeing them compete. 

So the book really sets that up. And there of course, some subthemes about it with this space race with China and the role of NASA and others. But I think that’s sort of the general arc of the story. 

11:45 – 12:30 

(MD): So let’s pull on the NASA thread a little bit, because that culture has had to evolve a lot. And a lot of the agency’s energy in the human spaceflight program. They have people living and working in space on the International Space Station 24/7, 365 and getting resupply and crew back and forth, obviously, was their focus for many years. 

And now they find themselves sort of pushed by these companies instead of the government pulling and wanting to do things. These companies want to do things bigger. They want to do things faster. And so how do you see the evolution of the cultural piece of NASA and their willingness to embrace the private sector influence?  

There’s a great story in the book about the astronauts. They want a stick, they want to fly the spacecraft, and they don’t get a stick because it’s a private enterprise. So tell us about that.  

12:31 – 15:55 

(CD): Yeah. No. And that’s the story I was going to tell that here’s Elon and SpaceX trying to build a more futuristic spacecraft. And there’s no stick, which a lot of the astronauts that NASA has are former fighter jet pilots. 

They fly with the stick. Boeing, the other contractor that had the contract to fly humans to the ISS, their Starliner spacecraft had a stick. The lunar lander that Neil Armstrong piloted down to the lunar surface had a stick. And on SpaceX’s Dragon spacecraft, there’s  mostly it’s done by touch screen. 

And the very first time the astronauts went to SpaceX headquarters to fly it in a simulator and they’re flying it on the touchscreen, it did not go well. I mean, the software, it was sort of the first generation, and it wasn’t working very well and all but one of the astronauts crashed in the simulator. They crashed into the ISS. 

So a little bit of an ego blow there. And they turn around and they’re complaining to Garrett Riesman, who is a former NASA astronaut who at the time was working at SpaceX, and they’re telling him, like, ‘Hey, this doesn’t work, and you got to get it better.’ But over time, the SpaceX engineers just kept working on the software, and they went to 2.0 and 3.0, 4.0 and took all the input from the astronauts, and it just got better over time. 

And the astronauts just got more comfortable flying that way. And it worked. I mean, because the whole idea is that you don’t have to have all the skills to fly on a fighter jet that everyday people should be going to space.  

The other story I’ll tell real quick about NASA and the relationship with particular space and the commercial space sector was here SpaceX is vying for the contract, a very prestigious contract, to fly NASA’s astronauts to the International Space Station. And NASA goes to SpaceX and said ‘you’re going to dock your spacecraft on our space station, our $100 billion space station. They’re six people living there at any time. We don’t want you crashing into it. We want you to have a nice, soft park and docking. 

We built the docking system. We’ve tested it. It’s robust. It works. We’re going to give it to you for free. Just bolt it onto your spacecraft. And please use that.’  

And there’s a young engineer whose job at SpaceX was to review it. And he takes one look at it and it’s like, ‘Yeah, it’s actually not that great.’ It’s pretty heavy. 

There are these six mechanical arms. Each one has their own motor. Each one has their own software system. It’s heavy. You got six individual points of failure. He built something much simpler using springs. He actually used the springs in the prototype from the shocks of a mountain bike. And they called it the M(CD)ocker. And it’s pretty rudimentary and simple. 

And his boss loved it and immediately took it to Elon. And Elon studied it for a little bit, asked some questions. It was like, ‘Yeah, do this instead.’ And so now this poor young engineer has to turn around and tell NASA, ‘Yeah, hey, that docking system that you wanted us to use to dock to your space station. Yeah, we’re not going to use it. We’re going to reject it.’ And had to overcome their skepticism.  

And it was that more than skepticism. I mean, there I think their frustration and anger and say, ‘Why would you not do this? And you remember SpaceX had not yet even won the competition.’ And, ‘Oh, by the way,’ they were going up against Boeing, which was the big legacy contractor. But again, over time they were able to show that their system worked. It was reliable and won them over.

15:56 – 16:24 

(MD): So, at this time, the first NASA administrator that President Trump picks is Jim Bridenstine and you talk about him quite a bit, too, because, you know, he’s the first politician to take over the helm, and a lot of people had some concerns about that. 

But to your point about maintaining some sort of thread of continuity and being able to move forward and then being able to message in and tell the story about why this is important and then ultimately to embrace this continued move towards the commercial world. It seems like he had a real steadying influence there. Is that your outcome?  

16:25 – 18:19 

(CD): Yeah, he did and he was interesting for a couple of reasons, because, like me, his first memory of space was Challenger and imagine he’s the NASA administrator during the Commercial Crew program, where SpaceX now is at the point where they’re going to fly astronauts from U.S. soil for the first time since the space shuttle was retired in 2011. So this is a very big moment. 

President Trump goes to the launch. Vice President Pence is there. The pressure is on and all Jim Bridenstine can think is ‘What happens if something goes wrong.’ And so for the first part, he actually goes out of his way to hold SpaceX and Elon Musk accountable and really is concerned about the parachutes. He’s concerned about problems they had with their abort system. 

They had a spacecraft blow up, and he ordered a safety review of SpaceX. And he did try to treat them with respect. but also to hold them accountable. And then with respect to the Artemis program: here, he knows that George W Bush says ‘We’re going to the moon.’ 

Obama comes in and says, ‘Oh yeah, the moon. We’ve been there, done that. We’re going to go to an asteroid. We’re going to go to Mars.’ And then Trump comes and says, ‘No, no, we’re going back to the moon’. And the metaphor he used was like Lucy and the football. That every time we get it, we pull the football away and there’s no momentum and we can never get a clear shot. 

So he wanted to create a program that, even if a Democrat was elected, would survive. And he did that by numerous reasons. But creating the Artemis Accords and bringing in international partners and making it so much harder for any other subsequent presidential administration to kill it, and really casting this as a space race between the United States and China. So there’s a geopolitical influence in there as well.  

18:20 – 18:52 

(MD): So the book also briefly introduces us to a new billionaire, Jared Isaacman, Shift4 and, you know, makes it his own pile of money and buys from SpaceX a couple of commercial astronaut missions. 

The first time that’s ever been done. Inspiration Four and then Polaris Dawn a few years later. And now we find that he’s a NASA administrator. So how does his presence on the scene influence all of this, to have him come from that sort of dynamic Silicon Valley type of world that the rest of the gang does and now be in charge of this government bureaucracy that’s taking us back to the moon? 

18:53 – 20:49 

(CD): Yeah. And I think you see, in some ways, a lot of similarities between Jim Bridenstine and Jared Isaacman. I mean, they’re both great speakers. They do a lot of interviews, a lot of media that are out there really telling the story of NASA, telling the story of Artemis, telling the story of the next space age, and just very good at that. 

But you may remember that it was a little bit of a rocky road for Jared at first because he was nominated, then because of his ties to SpaceX chartering those two private astronaut missions. He sort of was collateral damage when Trump and Elon had their breakup. And then he lost it and then he came back. But he’s had a huge impact. 

And, you know, I’m grateful for him. I joked to him a few months ago that what NASA has done was a great set up for the book because initially SpaceX won that moon lander competition, which is such a prominent scene and storyline in the book, and then they beat out Blue Origin. But then, because of concerns about SpaceX’s timeline with their vehicle Starship, they opened it back up so that the Blue Origin can compete, and it’s just sort of the book sets that up so perfectly, but I think he’s a great champion for NASA and has a lot of credibility and has been able to win over people on both sides of the aisle, which I think is really important now.  

And you see it that space has always been not just bipartisan but nonpartisan. And I thought it was very telling that from Trump. 1.0, into Biden. President Biden lay waste to so many of Trump’s programs and policies, except for two and then the Artemis program and the Space Force, because they were able to see the importance of those programs. 

And now they’ve continued, obviously, under President Trump again, and they’re putting an emphasis on getting Artemis. The dates have slipped, but has had some momentum in the sustained focus from the White House ever since the first Trump administration.

20:48 – 21:16 

(MD): So, Chris, I’m sure like you, I was glued to the TV during the Artemis launch and the landing and many hours in between as they swung by the moon and I was getting texts from family and friends that don’t pay attention to this stuff normally. 

And it’s obviously sparked excitement in the public about space, again. There is some attention span issues sometimes with the American public. Do we have staying power this time and will this help accelerate the efforts?

21:15 – 22:47 

(CD): No. It’s such a great question. And I would say, first off, that NASA was so smart in who they picked for the Artemis II crew. 

That was an all star crew. I mean, they’re all good on TV and they had their huge media tour and I thought their staying power actually did last a little bit and made a lot of sense. I think to have the first African-American go to the moon, the first woman, the first non-U.S. citizen, and they clearly just gelled as a unit. 

And I think we saw at a time that’s very politically divisive, you know, real unity there. But we saw during the Apollo program that after the Apollo 11 moon landing, the American public’s attention soon faded away. And this is not going to be followed up soon with a landing on the moon. We now know that the next mission will just be a docking of Orion, with one or both of the lunar landers in low-Earth orbit, and then that mission would be followed by a lunar landing in 2028. 

Hopefully, but maybe not, since it doesn’t look like the next mission will happen until the end of 2027. So that’s a lot of time. And the American public they do have a short attention span. And so I think Jared Isaacman, the NASA administrator, is going to have to really do everything he can not just to keep the American public engaged, but to keep Congress engaged, to keep it funded, and to talk about the significance of the program and the space race with China while months go on in between these very important missions. 

22:48 – 23:18 

(MD): So now I’m going to ask you to put on your crystal ball here a little bit and think about: the architecture now has a little bit of the old, and a little bit of the new. 

We’ve got the SLS, the Space Launch System, traditional government run program using technology from the space shuttle program and Orion, which which came out of the previous version before where we’re at now, coupled with Starship and New Glenn and the landers that we’ve been talking about – how do you see that unfolding over the next couple of years? 

Is there still going to be this two part solution, or are we going to go all one way or the other? 

23:19 – 24:55 

(CD): I think in the near term, there’s going to be a two part solution that they’re going to use SLS and Orion. But over time, I think there will be more of a shift toward commercial. I mean, particularly away from the SLS rocket, I could see Orion existing in some fashion, but as you mentioned SLS is built on 1970s technology. 

It uses the RS-25 engines, which were literally developed in the 1970s for the space shuttle. They’ve been upgraded and modified and modernized since then, but it’s a very expensive vehicle. It’s not reusable, but right now there’s not an alternative. I mean, Starship isn’t ready. New Glenn has flown just a few times, [but] has had problems in and of itself. 

But Jared Isaacman has said that when there are commercial alternatives that are less expensive, reusable, more efficient, that NASA would go toward those. So I think he’s made that pretty clear.  

Jim Bridenstine and this is a scene in Rocket Dreams at one point, tried to sideline the SLS. Senator Shelby, who’s a big champion because it’s headquartered out of Alabama, pulled him into his office after Jim tried to do that and gave him a dressing down and threatened his career basically if he tried to sideline the SLS. 

But now, SLS doesn’t quite have, you know, Senator Shelby’s not there. And you’ve seen, I think, a shift politically where everyone is on board, that we are really in a space race with China. We need to move fast. We need to use the resources that we have. Especially if they’re limited and do everything we can to beat China. 

24:56 – 25:22  

(MD): Now, let me put a pin in that. I want to come back to that point in a couple of minutes. But one or two more questions for you on this. If we go back into Space Barons, there was a metaphor throughout that book about the tortoise and the hare, right? Blue Origin was the tortoise to SpaceX’s hare. 

In terms of who is going slow and steady? Who’s going fast? Does that metaphor still hold? Is it coming closer together? We talked about the lunar lander being opened back up to both companies. Where are we there?  

25:23 – 26:51 

(CD): Yeah. I mean, I think it still holds in the sense that SpaceX is far, far ahead. But Blue Origin is catching up. 

SpaceX is launching the Falcon 9 once every two or three days. They’ve had enormous success with that. They’ve shown that reusability is for real. That’s not even sort of a new novel thing anymore. And now they’re moving on to Starship, which is a big, complicated vehicle. They’ve had some problems with it. They’re now in version three. They’re going to have to show rapid reusability where it lands back at the launch site, they’re going to have to show that the spacecraft can be refueled in orbit. 

They’re going to have to show that they can launch a fleet of tankers to be able to refuel it within a short amount of time, 24 to 48 hours. So we’ll see. And meanwhile, yes, Blue Origin’s had some success with New Glenn. They are set as early as this summer or later this year to land their Mark-1 lunar lander on the moon’s surface. 

There won’t be any people on it, but that will be a big deal. We’ll see how they do. But we need to see: can they get their launch cadence up? They just have an anomaly, a problem with their second stage engines. Can they fix that? Can they get back to flying? Can they fly the lunar lander and can it land on the moon? 

Those are all big steps and those are all big question marks. So we’ll see. But now NASA has specifically pit Blue Origin against SpaceX. Whichever one of you is ready, you know, with your lunar lander to fly astronauts to the moon, you get the honor of doing that. So we’ll see.

26:52 – 27:13 

(MD): So one more kind of look back to Space Barons, because there was a couple other billionaires in there, right? 

There’s Paul Allen and Suborbital Tourism. And then Richard Branson took over after Paul Allen unfortunately passed away. Robert Bigelow wanted to do hotels. So that tourism in these commercial space stations is not as prominent in Rocket Dreams, but is it still prominent in the reality of our space program?

27:14 – 28:55 

(CD): Yeah. So for the suborbital space tourism, we’ll see. Virgin Galactic has paused. They are building, a whole new vehicle that was more economically viable and make for a sustainable business to be able to fly more frequently, fly more passengers. 

They’ve yet to fly. It’s been a while. We’ll see how they do. A lot of people are skeptical of it, but we are seeing the commercial space stations having some momentum, and there’s incentive for them to move forward because the International Space Station has been up there for 26 years continuously. It’s not going to last forever. NASA says 2030 or maybe a little bit longer, and they’re going to need to be successors. 

So you see companies like Axiom Space or even Blue Origin or Vast. And others, Voyager, building these next generation space hotels, if you want to call them that. And I do think those will ultimately be successful because it’ll be a national priority. And if the United States doesn’t have a presence in low-Earth orbit, we would cede that to the only other country that has a space station in low-Earth orbit and that’s China. 

So there will be a national priority for that. I do wonder Blue Origin, which had been up until several months ago flying its New Shepard suborbital tourism vehicle with some real frequency, actually put a pause on that so that they could focus on New Glenn and on their deep space and lunar programs and ambitions, which I think tells you how serious they are about all of that. 

I think a lot of people hope they come back to New Shepard, because I think they still have a lot of people who have signed up to fly on that thing.

28:56 – 29:43 

(MD): So that’s the second time you sort of talked about China and that competition and the space age nationally, as you were going to cast in that light, right? For prestige and then economic and other reasons as a new space race. 

And so the U.S. government’s primary stated objective is to want to beat China to the moon. But the military component of that, there’s also something a lot closer to Earth, right? Is the ability of China to make their military more capable through the use of space, like the U.S. has, to be able to do precision and lethality and communication and all those things that have made the U.S. military so effective and lethal. 

So how do you see the private sector part of this then leaking into the military and how the national security sector is capitalizing on that or not?  

29:44 – 31:46 

(CD): This is a great question, and I think it’s a very important one and I think the significance can’t be overstated that right now, as there you are obviously familiar with the term space superiority. 

 And then in order to achieve that, the Space Force and the Pentagon are going to need to rely on the commercial space sector for the kinds of technologies that we need. And ten years ago, when I was writing The Space Barons, the big breakthrough, the big innovation in space was the reusable rockets having the rockets come back and land so they could fly again. 

I think now it’s satellites and spacecraft that can maneuver in space. And when the satellite goes up, it’s moving very fast, but it stays on a fixed orbit. So you know where it’s going to be in an hour or a day or three weeks from now. But if you have spacecraft that can maneuver and can be refueled and have the propellant to be able to do that, so they can essentially dodge and weave and hide and sneak up or go high, go low — that is significant. 

And that’s necessary for space superiority. And I think there are a lot of companies that are working on that. I think also just the weaponry that we’re seeing and yes, we’re using the ‘W’ word now. I think more in space you’re seeing Space Force officials use that, that we’re talking about weapons. And I think a lot of it was Earth to space: firing missiles, these anti-satellite tests, which obviously were problematic because they created a lot of debris. I think now you’re seeing maybe more subtle attacks, you know, using high energy microwaves or laser or other kind of spamming or spoofing and jamming sensors, you know, again, space to space. And that’s the real change that it used to be satellites in space for all their purpose to look down. 

And now they’re looking up or they’re staying in space so their whole mission is in space. And the question is, can the Space Force really leverage and incentivize? And to really be clear with industry, this is what we need. This is where we’re going this is what we need to focus on and to build is an open question. And Golden Dome will have a huge impact on that, I think.

31:47 – 32:09 

(MD): Well, that’s right, because the idea is to use a lot of that things that are being funded and capitalized in the private sector to bring into military. It’s probably not a perfect analogy, but where NASA on the civil side, had a culture that needed to shift and begin to adopt a sort of private sector approach. Space Force was kind of in that role on the military side, where do you see the service in the adoption of the things that you’re talking about?  

32:10 – 33:33 

(CD): Yeah, and that we saw that in the beginning of the Space Force that they said we got to start from scratch. We should be more nimble, be more efficient, and avoid the kind of government procurement debacles that Senator McCain used to turn into theater in the Senate Armed Services Committee, and they didn’t want to have those. 

And I think there’s been some success. There have been some frustrations, some people are concerned that they haven’t been as successful in working with commercial, but they say the right things. I know that the motive at least, is there. But one of the things that I point to that I think is significant is talked about that, some of the war gaming scenarios, and they’re doing four of them, I think, this year that are focused in large part on that threat that we heard about from a couple of years ago of Russia developing a space-based nuclear weapon and the Space Force wargaming that, but bringing in the commercial side and making them part of that so they could see what are the challenges, what are the threats, what is the adversary doing and what are the technologies and the capability that we need? 

You know, I also think of Even Rogers from True Anomaly Space, being in the Air Force and the Space Force, and realizing that nobody in the commercial sector was building what the Space Force ultimately would need, so leaves and starts a company in order to do that. So I think we’re beginning to sort of see that nexus there.

33:34 – 34:09 

(MD): Yeah, I agree that this military doesn’t get to stop doing other things that they were doing right, and shift gears. So there’s a lot of things that the Space Force has to cover down on. We’ll see if you don’t want to say that, you know, money’s the answer to everything, that is definitely not. But, you know, the big jump in the Space Force budget coming in fiscal 27. You know, ultimately, whatever Congress appropriates, but it’ll be a boost.  

Can they then start moving a little bit more aggressively into some of these new areas that they’ve been a little slow to do in my opinion. So again, another metaphor, is there a tortoise and the hare metaphor between the U.S. and China on on the military side, national security side? 

34:10 – 35:38 

(CD): ‘Yeah, as much as I hate to say it, it sounds like China is really moving fast and far ahead. I saw a presentation at the satellite conference that the Space Force’s Chief Lurch gave about the number of satellites they’re putting up. We’ve seen China do, docking and geostationary orbit, a possible refueling there with the satellite that. Oh, by the way, a couple of years ago grappled a dead Bieduo satellite and pulled it out of GEO and moved it into a graveyard orbit. 

He talked about China developing satellites that use stealth that can’t be seen. They’re lunar and cislunar ambitions and the proliferated architectures that they’re putting up. By the way, the moon program, maybe not specifically, for the U.S. side, not a military program. But that doesn’t mean it’s not a national security program. And they’re moving toward the South Pole, the moon, and in cislunar space, they’ve got a rover on Mars. 

They may be able to return samples from Mars before we can. All of which spans from the hard core national security side and combat-like operations to the diplomatic soft power things that if they’re on the moon and we’re not, they’ll attract our allies. If they’re bringing back samples from Mars, the scientists from other countries will want to be allied with them. And so we see a comprehensive space program that they have. And it’s, in my opinion, a real race and the stakes are very, very high.

35:39 – 36:20 

(MD): And so some of that is scientific, some of it’s economic and the security piece. Actually, General Saltzman, the chief of space operations, I just heard him talking and say that making a historical analogy that everywhere that economy has gone, right? The U.S. Navy, it ended up protecting lines of communication and making sure those things could happen in a reasonable, normative way instead of just county option. 

Okay, so you were a business desk writer at The Washington Post. Big business news coming up in that SpaceX is headed for an IPO. And the numbers are incredible, right? $1.82 trillion valuation coming out. So what impact do you think that might all have on all of this? I mean billions of dollars getting freed up that might go somewhere else. 

36:21 – 37:34 

(CD): Yeah, and it just shows the the evolution and just the SpaceX is one of the biggest stories of American entrepreneurship of the last 100 years, moving from just being building rockets and spacecraft to a constellation of 10,000 satellites to now talking about orbital data centers and compute and working with artificial intelligence and xAI. You know, so, again, not just a rocket company, but an artificial intelligence company and internet provider, all of these things driving that. 

And I remember the old adage from it was only really like ten years ago when nobody wanted to invest in space, or the only people investing in space were just sort of hobbyists or very passionate people. And the saying, of course, was ‘the quickest way to become a millionaire in the space sector was to start out as a billionaire.’ 

And we’re seeing them drive enormous growth and attention – as to whether what are the downstream effects of that? Who can replicate it? We’ll see. SpaceX has shown that it is singular in a lot of ways, and that its success has not been able to be repeated. So yeah, it’s a fascinating time and then we’ll see what the stock does once it goes public. 

I mean, if there’ll be a spike or a drop or if it sustains over time.

37:35 – 37:46 

(MD): Do you think that the investor, the institutional, retail investors will rush to that stock, or will there be sort of a rising of all boats as people come to the space sector and pay more attention? 

37:47 – 38:37 

(CD): I do believe in the rising of all boats in that. I also think that as SpaceX has become so dominant from the U.S. government’s perspective, and this is NASA and the Pentagon. And the Pentagon, of course, has a much, much bigger budget, that there is a real desire for alternatives – that we cannot place all of our eggs into the SpaceX basket, and that we need New Glenn to work. 

We need Neutron from Rocket Lab. We need Stoke Space to stand up and all of these other companies to come to fruition. And SpaceX is just like I call it SpaceX University where they’ve graduated so many engineers who then go off and start their own companies or go to work for other companies and bring some of that SpaceX secret sauce with them and it’s proliferating. So I do think it’s the tide rises all boats.

38:38 – 38:51 

(MD): So we’ve already established that I am not a medical professional, but I think I know the answer to this question. Has the writing of these books and your TV shows, has that immunized you from the space bug or do you still got it? And if you got it, what are you doing next?  

38:52 – 40:04 

(CD): Yeah, no, I still have it. I am trying to broaden my horizons a little bit. I think it’s the Elon-Jeff stuff, which was sort of a theme of space barons or rocket teams. I’m moving on. I took a buyout from the Washington Post, as I know you know, but was able to stay on through the end of last year to finish a story about the Space Force and national security space. 

 And I’m really interested in delving into that deeply. I just don’t think the American public fully understands what the Space Force does, the importance of it, the great service that it does for our nation, the threats we are facing in space and the fact that this – it’s not new, it did not all of a sudden appeared in 2019 when President Trump created the Space Force. 

There’s a long history and I think it’s only going to accelerate in the years forward. I mean, you mentioned the huge increase that the Space Force budget is getting. I think there is going to be an acceleration of the threats, the proliferation of spacecraft, our reliance on them. And then, as you said, that next frontier, if we’re going to the moon or into cislunar space, we’re bringing American assets and the American economy and American values that the United States is always going to defend, and it will always defend all of that in any new frontiers. What it’s always done. 

40:05 – 40:46 

(MD): This allows me to close with and this is the origin story of Eara Nova, right? Those of us who were in this national security space world for decades and have been through all the changes and all the threats, as you rightfully talk about and when, when we are here to try to to help companies, to help the financial markets, to really all come together and continue to accelerate our capabilities and our ability to protect the nation and to be a leader on the global stage in space and the space economy. 

So I really appreciate you as an author and having read your books, they are very engaging and really easy reads because of the storytelling that you obviously from this podcast are so good at. Thank you for coming on the podcast again. We look forward to the next time we can do this. And I’ll leave you with the last word. 

40:47 – 41:12 

(CD): And I would just say that in the past couple of years, I think what you’ve done at Elara Nova is incredibly important. It’s a great service to the American industry, to the Pentagon and to the nation as a whole. I don’t think I was fully aware of that. Even a couple of years ago when you started out on this journey. 

And now that I am, you realize just how significant it is. So I would just turn back to you and say thank you for everything that you’re doing. It’s a great service and we’re grateful. 

41:13 – 41:53 

(SK): This has been an episode of “The Elara Epilogues,” a special edition series of “The Elara Edge” podcast. Elara Nova is the trusted global security partner delivering decisive advantage.  

As a strategic advisory firm, Elara Nova builds expert teams uniquely tailored for client needs to deliver actionable results. With the trusted insight to deliver your decisive edge, Elara Nova is your source for expertise and guidance in global security. 

If you liked what you heard today, please subscribe to our channel and leave us a rating. Music for this podcast was created by Patrick Watkins of PW Audio. I’m your host, Scott King, and join us next time at the Elara Edge. 

From NASA to the Pentagon, Commercial Space Takes Center Stage in “Rocket Dreams”

New Book Explores the Commercial Dynamics and Geopolitical Tensions of the Modern Day Space Race 

America was watching when NASA’s Artemis II crew splashed down in the Pacific Ocean after their record-setting mission around the moon. An estimated 27.17 million people across six of the nation’s largest television networks tuned in to follow Artemis II’s return to Earth, while another 650,000 followed along on NASA’s YouTube livestream. The Artemis II mission was a precursor to America’s actual return to landing on the moon, but it was aptly timed for Christian Davenport’s new book, Rocket Dreams: Musk, Bezos, and the Inside Story of the New, Trillion-Dollar Space Race, which chronicles the commercial dynamics and geopolitical tensions defining the modern day space race against China. 

“The central tension of the narrative is the lunar lander competition for NASA’s Artemis program,” Davenport said. “Initially, SpaceX won the lunar lander competition when they beat out Blue Origin. But because of concerns over delays with SpaceX’s Starship vehicle, NASA reopened [the competition]. Now, the next Artemis mission will test the docking mechanism of one or both of the lunar landers in low-Earth orbit in 2027, before an eventual lunar landing in 2028.”  

This evolving commercial space dynamic follows Davenport’s 2018 book The Space Barons, which recounts the emerging ambitions of America’s commercial space sector backed by billionaires like SpaceX’s Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos’ Blue Origin. 

“Space Barons posed the question on whether the public-private partnership between commercial space companies and NASA was actually viable,” Davenport said. “The answer in Rocket Dreams is clearly a ‘Yes.’ Astronauts are now being put on rockets and spacecraft that are owned and operated not by the U.S. government, but the private sector. That’s a big deal.” 

Bridenstine and NASA’s Artemis Program 

A key figure in Rocket Dreams is Jim Bridenstine, the NASA administrator from the first Trump administration, who was tasked with overseeing NASA’s Commercial Crew program just as SpaceX was preparing to fly astronauts from U.S. soil for the first time since the space shuttle was retired in 2011. 

“Bridenstine’s first memory of space was the Challenger explosion, so he goes out of his way to hold SpaceX accountable over their parachutes, abort systems, etc.,” Davenport said. “At the same time, SpaceX was developing its Dragon spacecraft to dock on the International Space Station. But the ISS’s docking mechanism had six mechanical arms, each with their own motor and software system that essentially created six potential points of failure. SpaceX rejected that legacy design in favor of their own that used springs from a motor bike, while having to overcome NASA’s skepticism in the process.” 

The Artemis program was originally designed to deliver NASA astronauts and their Orion spacecraft to the moon through the Space Launch System (SLS), which is an expendable, single-use rocket. But this intention was counter to the emerging re-usable rockets the commercial industry was developing, namely SpaceX’s Falcon 9 and Blue Origin’s New Glenn. 

These re-usable rockets created an opportunity for NASA to leverage commercial solutions in their ambitious return to the moon. 

“At one point, Bridenstine even tried to sideline the SLS until Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama [intervened],” Davenport said. “But now, there’s widespread recognition that we need to move fast and use the resources we have to beat China back to the moon. So while the near-term solution is to use both SLS and reusable rockets, [current NASA administrator] Jared Isaacman has said that when commercial alternatives are less expensive, reusable and more efficient, that NASA would go toward those and away from SLS.”  

Ensuring the Continuity of Artemis 

The success of the recent Artemis II mission was only possible, in part, by the actions Bridenstine took to insulate the NASA program from the political whims of changing presidential administrations.  

“George W. Bush said we’re going to the moon, only for Barack Obama to switch gears to focus on an asteroid or Mars,” Davenport said. “When Trump came in and returned focus to the moon, Bridenstine wanted to create a program that would survive [a change of administrations]. So he created the Artemis Accords and brought in international partners by casting this program as a key tenet in the space race between the United States and China.” 

Similarly, the United States Space Force has also received bipartisan support through recent administration changes since its inception during the first Trump administration.  

“Two of President Trump’s policies that President Biden continued were the Artemis program and the Space Force, because he recognized their importance,” Davenport said. “China also has ambitions for cislunar space, the lunar South Pole and Mars, all of which have national security implications. They have already demonstrated docking maneuvers and even potentially refueling in geostationary orbit, years after they already grappled a defunct Biedou satellite and moved it to a graveyard orbit. ” 

The Space Force and Commercial Engagement 

Likewise, the emerging Chinese threat in space and the opportunity to leverage innovative solutions from the commercial space industry has captured the attention of the Space Force. 

“In order to achieve space superiority, the Space Force needs to rely on the commercial space sector for the kinds of technologies that we need: reusable rockets, maneuverable satellites, on-orbit refueling,” Davenport said. “Space Force officials are now openly talking about weapons in space, [ranging from] anti-satellite tests to more subtle attacks like jamming and spoofing. All of those capabilities are necessary for space superiority and a lot of companies are currently working on that.” 

That’s why the Space Force has been engaging its commercial partners publicly, particularly through published documents like the 2024 Commercial Space Strategy. 

“From the beginning, the Space Force has aimed to be more nimble, efficient and avoid the government procurement debacles that Senator McCain used to turn into theater in the Senate Armed Services Committee,” Davenport said. “The motivation to incorporate commercial partners is there. One significant action they’ve taken is bringing [industry] into war-gaming scenarios, like the one focused on Russia’s development of a space-based nuclear weapon, so they can better understand the challenges and threats.” 

Despite the emerging relevance of potential solutions and capabilities provided by commercial space companies, questions still remain. 

“SpaceX is launching the Falcon Nine once every two or three days, showing that reusability is real,” Davenport said. “But they’re also going to have to show that [Starship] can be launched and refueled in orbit, which will require a fleet of tankers. Meanwhile, Blue Origin is also set to land their uncrewed Mark 1 lunar lander on the moon later this year. But while Blue Origin has had some success with its New Glenn rocket, can they resolve its recent second stage engine anomaly and get their launch cadence up?” 

The success of U.S. ambitions in space, for both NASA and the Space Force, will be contingent in part on their commercial partners. But the implications for national security space will be a narrative that Davenport intends to pursue in his next project. 

 “The American public doesn’t fully understand the Space Force and its importance in facing the rising threats from China, Russia and others,” Davenport said. “But the national security space problem isn’t new, either. It didn’t suddenly appear when President Trump created the Space Force in 2019, there’s a long history that goes back decades and that’s only going to accelerate in the years ahead.” 

Translating Public Interest into Financial Backing 

So while space captivated the American public’s attention for the ten-days of Artemis II, the responsibility now falls on the leaders of NASA and the Space Force alike to translate that public interest into sustainable financial backing for their mission-critical space programs.  

“We saw the American public’s attention fade away after the Apollo 11 moon landing,” Davenport said. “After the Artemis II mission, NASA has momentum behind a return to the moon for the first time since those Apollo missions. So NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman is going to have to keep not only the American public engaged, but also Congress engaged to fund the new space race against China.” 

The dual-use potential of commercial space systems seems to have captured the attention of the investor community. SpaceX is seeking a $1.75 trillion valuation for its initial public offering (IPO) later this year, one that some estimates suggest could raise $75 billion. 

“SpaceX is one of the biggest stories of American entrepreneurship of the last 100 years, moving from building rockets to [operating] a constellation of 10,000 internet satellites,” Davenport said. “Now they’re looking ahead to orbital data centers and artificial intelligence. But the Pentagon also has a real desire for alternatives in the space launch market – they need New Glenn to work, Neutron from Rocket Lab, Stoke Space to stand up, all of these companies and their capabilities need to come to fruition. The need is proliferating, so the potential for greater investments is a rising tide that can lift all boats.” 

However, it remains to be seen if the growing public interest will likewise be met with financial backing from the U.S. government. While the Space Force has put forward a record-setting budget proposal of $71.1 billion for FY2027, how much will be appropriated from Congress remains to be seen. 

NASA, on the other hand, is looking at an $18.8 billion budget — a 23% reduction from the prior year despite a renewed emphasis on human exploration through programs like Artemis. 

“The United States is always going to defend its values and assets in any new frontier,” Davenport said. “But even with a huge increase in the Space Force budget, threats in space will only accelerate with the proliferation of spacecraft and our reliance on them. If the United States doesn’t have a presence in low-Earth orbit, cislunar space or the moon, we would cede all of that to China.  

Elara Nova is the trusted global security partner delivering decisive advantage. Learn more at elaranova.com 

Episode 39: Space Force Initiates a “Campaign of Learning” to Develop its Objective Force

The Elara Edge

Host: Scott King 

SME: Mike Dickey, Founding Partner at Elara Nova (MD) 

Lt Gen (Ret) Bill Liquori, Executive Partner at Elara Nova (BL) 

00:02 – 01:12 

This past spring the United States Space Force published two highly anticipated, forward-looking documents: Future Operating Environment 2040 and Objective Force 2040. When Chief of Space Operations General B. Chance Saltzman unveiled these documents at this year’s Space Symposium, he declared the service’s intention for them was to “drive questions, not provide answers.” 

Now, the Space Force wants not only its guardians, but its international and industry partners to engage, debate and provide feedback on the ideas laid out in these two documents — in what can be deemed a ‘campaign of learning’ — to evaluate what the future space domain might look like and help define the Space Force’s future force design requirements needed to operate and succeed in a rapidly-evolving and unpredictable domain.  

Welcome to The Elara Edge. We have two guests today, here to share their perspective on how we got to this pivotal moment, the driving force behind these documents, and where the Space Force’s international and industry partners should go from here. 

First we have Mike Dickey, Founding Partner at Elara Nova and the former Chief Architect of the United States Space Force.  

Mike, welcome to the show!

01:13 – 01:17 

(MD): Hey! Thank you, Scott. These are always great fun and hopefully of great use for our audience.  

01:18 – 01:33 

Yes, thank you, Mike. And then also joining us today is retired Lieutenant General Bill Liquori, an Executive Partner at Elara Nova and the first Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Strategy, Plans, Programs and Analysis for the United States Space Force. 

Sir, welcome back to the show.  

01:34 – 01:44 

(BL): Hey, it’s great to be back, Scott. And it’s even better this time to be partnered up with Mike. He and I have done many partnering across our time in government, and we get to continue to do it in retired life. 

So this is good.  

01:45 – 01:57 

Great. Well, before we get into these two forward-looking documents, let’s take a look into how we got to this moment.   

Where did the need to look at the future operating environment in space – and make force design plans accordingly – first begin? 

01:58 – 04:40 

(MD): You know, if I had to put a stake in the ground of when this all started, Scott, I would pick April of 2015. Because in April of 2015, General Hyten, who was the Commander of Air Force Space Command at the time, where most of the military national security space activities happened.  

He went on 60 Minutes and he talked on that 60 Minutes program to the American public and to the world about the threats that were emerging out of near peer adversaries at the time, Russia and China, how important space was to the American military and American society and what the impact might be if those things collided. 

And it really brought into the public consciousness the place where we were at, which is now really needing to consider how to operate a national security space architecture in the face of a threat. So that kicked off this small group of people that went off and did a study. 

And in April of 2016, which coincidentally, is at the Space Symposium, ten years before the release of these documents, the 2026 version, they released something called the Space Enterprise Vision. And the Space Enterprise vision was a product of this small group of folks who thought about the threat and thought conceptually about how the military space architecture would need to evolve to continue to operate in the face of that threat. 

And that was really the start of what is a robust effort now, and has been increasingly robust across the previous decade. So the space enterprise vision set that tone. And really in the fall of 2018 was the first big programmatic change that really changed one of the legacy programs. And it was a missile warning in this case and changed it to a different architectures for the future to be more resilient to that threat. 

It was all based on how the architecture that is used to support the joint force, which is, you know, things like communications, position, navigation and timing, missile warning, how all those things that were being fielded would stand up to the counter space offensive threat that the adversaries were building. So that analysis then started to inform force design for the future. 

And in December of 2019, when the Space Force was formed after the president signed the National Defense Authorization Act, that force design activity became organizationally institutionalized. So there’s an organization called the Space Warfighting Analysis Center, and it’s got a partner organization called Space Security and Defense Program. And they became the center of doing the force design analysis for the new service. 

And one of the documents that you mentioned is first designed for 2040. In this document, then is really a compilation of the work they’ve been doing over the last several years in all the different mission areas that they describe.

04:41 – 07:56 

(BL): If I was to add anything to what Mike said, I mean, he captured it very well. These two documents could be described as a natural evolution of where we have been, but with an eye towards how different the environment is today versus if we go all the way back to when Mike talked about in 2015, the early force design work that the new service did. 

As the Space Force’s 5 and 8 on the staff. I had teams that were part of informing the inputs to those on the requirements side, and then certainly the budget teams that were working to build our first independent budgets used the analysis from those force designs to feed our early budgets. But I would say those early force designs were by mission area. We couldn’t do them all at once so the Chief of Space Operations prioritizes which ones to go after or our national leadership prioritizes some of those.  

But I would describe them as heavily hardware focused. In other words, what were the on-orbit and ground system capabilities required to deliver a certain mission area? I think what was unique in that era was that not only were we looking at capability and effects delivery in the mission areas, but also what is the cost to do that and what is the most resilient way to do that?  

These two new documents are now that forward looking natural evolution. They take a look at where will the threat and technology evolve? The objective divides it into three areas. Conceptually, General Saltzman talks about routinely. We have our fielded force. That’s all of the people in the hardware that are fielded today delivering capability on behalf of the nation. Then we have the programmed force, which is informed by the program objective memorandum that my old office develops now, and that’s where the president’s budget has said we will put money. But if you leave it at just that, that doesn’t meet all the requirements. 

And so these two documents combined together are helped to get us to that objective force. And that is, you know, the force that we need, we have the force that we have, we have the force that we’ve budgeted for, and then we have the force we need. That’s that objective force. And that’s kind of how he broke them out for purposes of moving forward with the service. 

The other thing that I think these documents do even better than we have done in the past, I mentioned the force designs by design, they were heavily hardware focused. What was the hardware both on orbit and on the ground, required to deliver these mission capabilities? General Saltzman, as the chief, and General Raymond before him and all of our senior leaders, even before a separate service, had to wrestle with, ‘Okay, those are the widgets, but it takes more than just widgets to deliver an actual effect to a warfighter or to the nation.’ 

What these documents do is really spell out, ‘Hey, it’s not just those widgets. They also focus on what is the infrastructure required to make those things successful? What is the staffing required? What is the test and training capability required to bring these to fruition?’ And so I think it’s a way for our second service chief as he benefits from what the first chief did to really tie all of these together in one place.

07:57 – 08:09 

General Saltzman openly solicited feedback from the Space Force’s international and industry partners. 

What will the process look like as the Space Force looks to incorporate the feedback it receives into future iterations of these documents? 

08:10 – 10:29 

(MD): Yeah, the Space Force, just in the last month or so, has made a move to institutionalize organizationally how they think about this future force in the way they’re going to do that is they’ve created something called the S9, which is the Force Design and Analysis group. It’s a directorate on the space staff. And what that S9 director is going to be made up of three parts is really sort of the life cycle of how you develop these force designs. 

And there’s already a group in the Space Force that thinks about lessons learned and military doctrine and concepts that are out in the future. And one example that comes up that I’ll just use to sort of illustrate the point is, what is the Space Force’s role as our nation and many nations head out to the moon? Should we be paying attention to the things that are happening there from a space domain awareness perspective? 

Is there a role to set up position, navigation and timing infrastructure out beyond the earth? Like can we have a GPS? Is there G.P.S. for the moon? So the concepts group thinks about these sort of big things and futuristic types of issues and make some recommendations, and maybe they’ll conclude that there’s a role for the Space Force. Maybe there’s not. 

But let’s presume they think there is a role. So now we start to think about what that role might look like. And it’s tested in war games and tabletop exercises. And that’s really the second part of this life cycle of the future force design. So is to do that experimentation. And before you’re spending a lot of money on it, you’re doing these tabletop exercises and games. 

Maybe you’re using computers and doing simulations to look at these different futures and different force structures, how they might help you satisfy the concept that you came up with. And then you get through that and then you’re at step three. So now we have a concept that we believe in and that we’ve tested through these war games. And now it goes to a force design activity in the Space War Fighting Analysis Center in the SWAC.  

And that’s really the third part of the lifecycle. And that’s to say what would that look like from a hardware perspective? What types of capabilities you need in space? What types of systems do you need on the ground? And once that’s complete, then we push it over to Bill’s old office and programing. And the programing folks then have to work the budget and put money in across the years to move towards the force that’s envisioned from the force design. 

So the S9 new organization on the space staff, made up of three subordinate activities that feed this life cycle of thinking about the future force. 

10:30 – 11:34 

(BL): Yeah, I think I would amplify the S9 certainly seems to be a likely place that will have a big hand in the assessment of how things are going, if you will. Specifically, in the intro to the documents, General Saltzman talks about how I’m paraphrasing. 

These aren’t the be all, end all answer, but they’re designed to posit what the future will look like and what the Space Force will need to succeed in that future. But ultimately, they’re designed to start a campaign of learning that the service will go through with its partners and others to truly shape what does that objective force look like? How does it modify over the years? 

Certainly the S9 team in those different sub elements will have a hand in that, but the entire service will have a hand in how is this going? Where do we need to evolve? As a matter of fact, there’s part of the document that specifically calls out for our planners, this is what you should be doing with this document. For our programmers, think about these things when you read the document for our capability deliverers and on and on and on.  

11:35 – 12:27 

(MD): And if I could amplify General Liquori’s amplification, these questions the document asked, and this campaign of learning and putting that out in the public for everybody to read and to see is not just for inside the service consumption. It’s also a signal there to the industrial base is going to have to create these things and the ability for industry to see what the service is thinking about, where they’re headed, and start to think themselves about where they want to put some research dollars, where they might want to involve capital markets, which of course is super prevalent now in the space industry, where they might need that capital come in and help create the capabilities that would achieve the concepts that are underpinning this. Look at the future in 2040. So those are super important questions that involve everyone that’s associated with bringing a future force to reality. It’s not just a service, it’s all the services. It’s a defense industrial base. It’s the capital markets and everything that goes into that. 

12:28 – 12:41 

Now, let’s dive deeper into each of these respective documents, starting with the Future Operating Environment 2040.  

What are your take-aways from this document? And how does the Space Force prioritize its needs based on the emerging threat environment in space? 

12:42 – 14:59 

(BL): I’ll start at the Future Operating Environment. Very well described. It’s designed to be forward looking out into 2040. But holy cow, what’s going to happen between now and then? I don’t think any of us has the exact crystal ball. And that’s kind of the challenge that every military service wrestles with is: how is the environment going to change for my specific domain?  

And the Space Force is no different. Our environment has been changing at a very rapid pace of late, and so that does make it a challenge. I think probably the most insightful line in the combination of the two documents, is in the intro that General Salzman wrote to the Future Operating Environment, and that was, “[t]he inability to predict the future does not relieve the Space Force of the requirement to plan for it.” 

I think that was a message to all of the people that will read this document to say, ‘If we wait for the future to be here, it’ll be too late and our government processes to be able to be prepared for it will be behind the power curve. right?’ 

So then you think of, ‘Well, gosh, there’s so many different things out there that could change between now and then. The threat continues to grow. Technology is changing. The political environment is changing.’ All of those things. And so what’s interesting here, they allude to it in the beginning of the document and it says that the service used this methodology where they looked at four alternative futures out there and had groups of people wrestle with each of those four alternatives and then go through and look at all the publicly available data that would inform the different elements of those alternatives. 

They tested the theories of each alternative, the limits of technology defined in each alternative, and then used that to identify trends both from a technology perspective as well as how the military may evolve. And then they workshopped each of those scenarios with a group of people. And those people included, as we were sort of talking about earlier military, civilian and commercial representatives, to get the full spectrum of how will the space domain evolve over time? And so I think that’s how the service has decided to tackle this uncertain future, but with an eye towards ‘Okay, we need to make some decisions now. What’s the best way to do that?’ 

15:00 – 16:22 

(MD): It’s interesting that in the document it talks about some of the future threats, you know, the machine learning and AI. There’s also a discussion about China having a 21,000 satellite constellation. Well, we talked about the history of where all this started. And ten years ago in the space enterprise vision and some of that early work, those two things were not part of the conversation. 

That was not on the threat picture. And so, you know, in ten years, it’s changed quite a bit. And then the next 15 years out to 2040, it’s going to change again in ways that you can’t predict. So what General Corey says is absolutely essential. And it’s why I think the Space Force has created this organization to really be able to think about the threats as they evolve and to make changes on a more frequent basis to the architecture that they field into the forces that they need to support that architecture. 

So, Scott, you asked about how do you begin to prioritize? And really, I think you have to prioritize with time. What’s the most pressing threat? What do we see right in the near-term future that we have to deal with? And that’s typically not a force design conversation, because the force designed by its nature, is supposed to be looking out into the future beyond the current 3 or 4 or five year time frame. 

But that is the lens you have to look at from the start, you know, what are the things coming up like? We’ve mentioned, like, I like large proliferated Leo constellations, and now we have to start bringing into these force design conversations. And so if we need to change the force structure or tactics or we have to shift where we’re investing our money. 

16:23 – 16:36 

Let’s turn to the Objective Force 2040, which was essentially presented as an answer to the Future Operating Environment 2040 document. 

What are some of the mission areas described here and are these mission areas an appropriate starting point at this point for the objective force? 

16:37 – 18:52 

(BL): Yeah, sure. I mean, I think the short answer is we’re doing missions today. Those are the missions that make sense to capture here as a starting point. So yes, but they’ve pinned them by the Space Force’s core and enabling functions.  

So the Space Force core functions of space control that has the mission areas of orbital warfare, electromagnetic warfare and cyber warfare. Then we’ve got global mission operations which has satellite communications, space based sensing, and targeting, missile warning, missile tracking, navigation warfare.  

And then there are the access mission areas as well, like satellite control. The requirement to be able to talk to your satellite and get data from it. Lift obviously, to put any of our satellites in orbit. And then in order to do that lift, we’ve got to have a launch range that we can control. And so all of those fit in there.  

But then it also captures the enabling functions of intelligence, cyber operations, command and control and space domain awareness. So we’ve got quite the huge subset of missions that the service has got to tackle and I do think this is the right place to start.  

I think one of the things that stood out to me is not so much mission area by mission area, because who knows, in 2040 we may have additional mission areas, but in the objective force design document, I think one of the things that stood out to me are the actual design principles that cut across all of those mission areas, right? 

And so things like warfighters first, hybrid by design. That’s some of the work that the early predecessors did that guided us into this hybrid approach for many of the current force designs and that continues. It’ll be interoperable by design, integrating partner and the advantages of commercial. We’ll get to resilience in multiple ways. But one of those that’s called out specifically is by distribution. 

Competition is kind of the new norm – that was another one that’s in there. Also, I’d flag something that we’ve been talking about since the service stood up and we said we were going to be a digital service first. Well data as a warfighting advantage is that next natural evolution of a design principle here and then distributed command and control, modularity and cyber resilience fits right back into that digital by design as well. 

So I think those design principles called out that are cutting across all the mission areas – that stood out to me. 

18:53 – 21:08 

(MD): I would say that this hybrid architecture approach is key and it comes across in both documents, especially in the objective force document of how diversifying missions across different orbits and different constellations, bringing in partners, bringing in commercial. That is a significant shift. And it’s one that is not easy to do, right? 

When you’re talking about interoperability, which raises issues and concerns about cybersecurity and how do you connect different networks to each other? But that is a key force design principle going forward that the Space Force and everyone that supports it is going to have to figure out: the idea of hybrid architectures with interoperability and command and control across that hybrid nature. 

And the other important thing that comes across is that this new proliferated Leo constellations. I mean, this is something, again, ten years ago, we weren’t really thinking about. So one of the mission areas that’s talked about is space based sensing and targeting. And that’s kind of a new area for the Space Force. There was always some element of environmental monitoring. 

But now we’re talking about moving missions that typically had been done in the air domain up into the space domain. So airborne moving target indicators. You think Awacs is the air version of that ground moving target indicators and J stars. These are things that have been done in the air domain historically, but the air domain is also more and more at risk and difficult to operate in the face of all the threats that that they have to worry about, too. 

And so those missions are coming to space and those proliferated constellations do the things that are best served by being close to the Earth. And those things are new to the Space Force. So that’s going to be an interesting evolution to watch. And really, I think the focus in a lot of these areas as it moves from the conceptual into acquisition is the military component, right? 

So the understanding of the information is not necessarily flying the satellite, but understanding information, the use of that information for targeting in this case less important is the management and day to day operating of constellations and keeping them in the right place. That’s something that’s done in the commercial sector. It’s done in the military. But I see a more and more a connection between industrial partners with letting the commercial market do those types of things, fly the constellation while the military people sit on top of that and make the military decisions that are based on information coming out of the constellations. 

21:09 – 21:34 

Now, the Space Force has made a clear and concerted effort to incorporate commercial partners and capabilities into its architecture over the past several years, namely through efforts like the Commercial Space Strategy and the Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve. 

So what does this hybrid architecture – made up of both government and commercial systems – look like in practice? And how does the service go about delegating which mission areas commercial partners can focus on first?

21:35 – 22:29 

(MD): Yeah. Good question. I think one of the most important things that you have to do is think about military essential functions. What are the things that have to be decided by military people, people that are in under a chain of command all the way up to the commander in chief, which is things like pulling a trigger. You never give a commercial provider the ability to pull the trigger on any kind of a weapon system. And that analogy fits here in space too. 

So what you’re going to do with that information, what decisions get made with that information. Those military essential functions have to be pieced out before implementing the things that you’re talking about of commercial can do some of this stuff. So commercial now provides a lot of information through electro-optical sensing and radio frequency spectrum sensing and that information is provided to the military and then military people decide what to do about that information.  

So it’s a well-worn path here. This is not something that is brand new. We just got to make sure we know where those bright lines are. And then aportion accordingly. 

22:30 – 23:54 

(BL): I would say my hope with the two documents, the forward looking nature of them and how they specifically speak to different partners, if you will, across the government and industry side of things, is that by publishing these and putting them out there and General Saltzman even talks about it in his introduction. 

He wants not only his guardians to wrestle with these ideas, debate these ideas, and argue these ideas. But he wants all those other audiences to do the same thing. And my hope would be that by publishing these, it enables those other partners external to the service, if you will, whether they be in government, in the joint force, in other parts of the executive branch, the legislative branch, commercial partners, allies, to wrestle with those things, so that ideally, when they come to engage with the service, they do it armed with the information that’s in these documents and knowing what the service is wrestling with, so that it’s earlier in our process that we begin to say, ‘Who’s got the best fit for this piece of a particular mission? How can we provide resilience or redundancy, or how can we be complementary? And I’ll do a piece of this mission and you do a piece of this mission.’ 

We’ve been getting better over the years, but I think by publishing these two documents and the level of details that are in them, it will enable us to do that even better and I think that’s required for success out in the 2040 timeframe. 

23:55 – 24:12 

Earlier we spoke to the forward-looking nature of these documents and how General Saltzman explicitly stated these documents are meant to, “drive questions, not provide answers.” 

What do you see as those major questions that these documents are driving towards? And what’s the value in posing questions, rather than just delivering answers? 

24:13 – 26:49 

(BL): Ultimately, the first one is written to define the environment, right? The second one is written to describe what is the force that we need. What is that objective force? So that’s the ultimate question it’s trying to answer.  

But as with many of the strategic level documents that both General Raymond and General Saltzman have published, again, the desire is that the workforce and our partners wrestle with the ideas, debate the ideas, because generally speaking, when you do that, you come out with a better answer than just a single person taking a look at something and saying, ‘Here’s the answer.’  

And I think the other thing General Saltzman wisely realizes is if he published a document that says ‘this is the answer.’ It was good for when he reviewed what he was doing when he wrote it. But then people just challenged the document. Well, he wrote a document so that that could happen and didn’t say, ‘This is the answer.’  

He does specifically call out some of the questions, like: What organizational constructs would best help the service deliver on these mission areas. It goes back to the point I was making earlier, that our force designs originally were highly focused on hardware and software, and now these documents recognize, ‘Hey, we’ve got to have organizational constructs that are going to be best set up for success in these mission areas.’ 

We talked about hybrid architectures. One of the questions that gets spelled out in here is: what are the hybrid ground architectures look like that give us our best set of resilience and how would we manage those? Is it a combination of government and industry architectures and who operates which parts of those?  

There’s another question on: how does the Space Force validate its readiness in each of these mission areas?The more diverse, the more hybrid a mission area becomes, the harder it becomes to define readiness. But that doesn’t relieve us from having to capture. Are we ready in this mission area in a contested environment? Or are we not? And so that’s a question that’s out there as the service continues to wrestle with these documents moving forward.  

And then the other one that is flagged in there specifically talks about what emerging concepts will offer the highest value opportunities for this service? This goes back to something Mike was alluding to earlier within that S9 directorate. And this idea of a concepts and technology arm of that organization, there’s probably a limitless number of concepts that people could come up with as they look at these documents and how the environment will unfold.  

Unfortunately, the budget is never limitless, so the service really needs to wrestle with, okay, if we have ten concepts out there that we’re tackling right now, which ones are going to be the most value added to our end user and to the nation when it comes to securing our nation’s interest?  

26:50 – 27:13 

(MD):Yeah. And by putting these questions out there in the public, you sort of unleash all of the think tanks and industry and practitioners in this environment who are going to have great ideas too, and who hopefully can pull those ideas into this campaign of learning and then the conceptualizing and the wargaming and the force designing or it it just becomes a flywheel and it just makes the answers that you get better and better. 

The more people that can provide input. 

27:13 – 27:24 

Now Mike, going back to the hybrid architecture approach that you talked about.  

Can you elaborate on the significance of having these types of conversations with commercial partners this early in the process? I mean, we’re talking 15 years in advance? 

27:25 – 28:28 

(MD): When you finally come to the point of wanting to apply taxpayer money against the problem, the more mature you’ve brought the concept and the technology, the better off you always are. And fielding a combat effective system. So as the industry thinks about what it means to be hybrid, what it means to be interoperable, there are technology things involved in that. 

There are policy things involved in that. There are things like intellectual property and business models that are involved with that. And those debates and conversations don’t get resolved overnight.  

And those debates and conversations don’t get resolved overnight. These are things that, again, you have to pressure test, debate and work through a number of different processes and then as the concepts mature, then you start feeling more confident that you can start to apply money against actually now building prototypes and building systems.  

So I think that’s an important aspect of this hybrid world is really understanding across all of those different vectors, the challenges that are involved in bringing dissimilar things together, things that are owned by other people together, you know, crossing international boundaries. This is all hard. 

28:29 – 30:07 

(BL): If I could build on what Mike was saying. So two groups of people that routinely engage with our Space Force, certainly at the senior levels, our allies and partners internationally and industry, and those conversations often start with on the Allied side, it’s, ‘Hey, if I could spend €1 more or one pick your currency more on a space capability that would help the United States and us together as an allied force be better. Where should we spend that money? That’s a question that comes up often. 

On the industry side. Hey, if I was going to spend some of my own internal dollars from the company, where would it be most beneficial to you as a service for me to do some research? Or what is the toughest problem you have as a service so that I know as an industry partner what capability to go build? 

Well, now there’s a set of documents that you can review before even going into those conversations, so that it starts that conversation in a more informed place and ideally gets us to the heart of the matter, which is, ‘Well, if we combine the Space Force capability with this particular allied capability, now we might really be somewhere, ‘Hey, let’s get some of our teams together and wargame this. Let’s get some of our teams together and explore this concept multilaterally. Or hey, let’s get a few industry partners together as we do this next force design, informed by the objective force and informed by the future operating environment. And see where the combined government industry solution can get us.’  

Does it put us in a better spot?  

30:08 – 30:32 

And Bill, you mentioned these documents get into some of the organizational steps the Space Force needs to employ to deliver on its mission.  

The Objective Force calls for the Space Force to double its personnel over the next ten years. But given the Space Force was originally designed to be intentionally lean and digital first from the beginning, is this doubling of personnel a contradiction of the founding vision for the Space Force? Or is that more of a natural evolution as the service matures? 

30:31 – 31:37  

(BL): I believe it’s absolutely a natural evolution of the force as it matures. There’s a lot of things that went into why that service was stood up as a lean service. I mean, I think for the foreseeable future, we’re still going to be the smallest service in the Department of War. But this idea that we need to double the force over the next decade is a natural evolution from the fact that of all the things that we talked about and all of the things that are posited in that future operating environment, there is going to continue to be increasing demand for space capabilities. 

There are going to be an increasing and more diverse number of threats, which means we’re going to need to have an increased amount of resilience and capability in those types of things.  

You don’t get those for free. And so there’s a natural evolution that we’ll need additional capabilities. We’ll need additional organizations to operate those capabilities, which will mean we’ll need additional personnel to be able to do that. We’ll need additional personnel to be able to train those capabilities. We’ll need additional personnel to be able to test those capabilities. So yeah, I look at it as a natural evolution.  

31:38 – 33:01 

(MD): And the country is asking the Space Force to do more than the country was asking the Space Force to do in December of 2019. There are new missions. 

 We’re talking about bringing airborne moving target indicator into space, ground moving target indications in the space. Golden Dome has a space based interceptor layer in space that has to be managed and operated.  

So a lot of new missions are coming to the Space Force. And sort of it at the base is also this counterspace mission, right? The ability to fend off adversary hostile actions and protect US assets and as that threat matures, that gets more complicated, that requires additional capability and additional force structure. 

So yes, absolutely. A natural evolution of what the country is asking the Space Force to do. And, you know, I’ll say it, you know, doubling the size of the Space Force still makes it the smallest service in the military, right? So it doesn’t relieve the service of doing things in manpower efficient ways. So there’s still absolutely an element of the digital piece, right?   

And so cyber is a huge part of this. The modeling and simulation, live virtual constructive training, the interoperable architectures and being able to design those in model-based ways before you actually start bending metal and committing big dollars. All those are still at the core of what the Space Force is doing. But the missions have expanded and therefore the personnel, resources and other resources have to expand. 

33:02 – 33:28 

There’s also the prevalent and well-known challenge of bureaucratic inertia that can bog down government agencies, including military services and the Department of War as a whole. 

So if the Space Force is actually able to scale and double in size over the next decade. How can General Saltzman, and his eventual successors leading the service, make sure they do so efficiently and effectively while also mitigating the risk of adding bureaucratic inertia and slowing down what the service can actually do? 

33:29 – 34:24 

(BL): That’s a great follow up question, Scott, because we talked about, ‘Hey, this service started as a lean service.’  

We still need to be a lean service. The Secretary at War has started a couple areas throughout the entire department that the Space Force has absolutely got to be a key piece of. And that’s acquisition transformation, transformation from the old JCIDS system. So requirements transformation. Those are all designed to get leaner, not just from the perspective of having less people do it and do it cheaper, but it’s about speed. 

The adversary is evolving their threat capabilities at incredible rates. We need to stay ahead of that. And the only way to do that in the 21st century and the threats that we face, is to be able to iterate on requirements faster, to iterate on capability delivery faster. And so we still need to be lean. But that doesn’t mean we have to stay at the levels that we were at when the service was founded. 

34:25 – 34:59 

(MD): Some of this is about empowering people in positions of leadership, too, right? And one example I’ll give is the Chief of Space Operations. That position has been named by the Department to be responsible for space requirements across all of the joint force. And so the CSO can break ties and make decisions on what’s going to happen to support the joint force from a space perspective. At some point somebody has to move that decision forward and in this case, the CSO has the ability to move space decisions forward in that role that’s been given to him by the Department.

35:00 – 35:24 

There was another recent announcement that will factor into how these documents move forward. The Department of the Air Force has submitted a record-setting budget request for the Space Force for Fiscal Year 2027 at a total of just over $71 billion — more than double what the service had in the prior year.  

What does that number, if fulfilled and appropriated by Congress, do for the Space Force in developing its objective force for the future?  

35:25 – 36:29 

(BL): As the former budget guy, I guess first I would start this answer with, I don’t think you will find a service chief or a service programmer that would ever say, ‘That’s all we need. Thank you.’  

Now, is that a great down payment on moving forward to where we need to go? Absolutely. And as the Space Force, very appreciative of that budget increase, whatever the final amount ends up being in the appropriations side.  

Absolutely. And then they know they have a responsibility to make the best use of that money going forward. But to the point Mike made earlier, the nation continues to ask the service to do more than it did originally, and I would anticipate that will continue.  

And therefore, in the future versions of these documents and the objective force that gets defined in the future, I would anticipate there will be a need for increased budget. Just like the Department of War’s budget has continued to increase over time based on the threats that are out there and the security that the nation requires.  

36:30 – 37:29 

(MD): I would say that the budget request is exactly that. It’s a budget request. So it’s the administration asking the Congress to appropriate this money.  

These two documents are key to that conversation. These two documents allow the Space Force and the Department of War to message to the Congress and to the appropriators what we’re facing in our space security arena, right? And the resources that are going to be required to really get ahead of the threat and stay preeminent in space security.  

So I think we can tie those two things together. These documents really sort of are laying out the challenges. And you can read it. There’s a couple hundred pages of material here, and you can see the challenges being faced and the decisions that have to be made, and the force structure that’s going to have to be created to achieve what the nation is asking the Space Force to do. 

So it’s absolutely a down payment [for] incorporating all these new missions and these threat challenges are going to require the Space Force to grow and they will have to grow and be sustained at some higher level than it is today. 

37:30 – 37:38 

What do you think is unique about the transparency underlying these documents? 

What does that do for facilitating engagement between the Space Force and its partners? Both in scope and in scale? 

37:39 – 38:29 

(MD): There’s a line at the end of the objective force document, I think that says that this set of documents need to now be sort of put into action. And I think that the conversation with international partners is a really important part of that. 

Combatant Commands, you know, live in geographic regions and are with their international partners all the time, but I think there’s an opportunity to make these international conversations more robust, more meaningful, more impactful that I hope the Space Force will grab on to and take that opportunity. Because there is, you know, with NATO committing additional resources to future space sovereign capabilities that they have or capabilities they can contribute to this coalition. 

We need to take them up on that and I would really encourage the Space Force to use these documents to have those conversations in a more robust way than they’ve been able to in the past.  

38:30 – 40:54 

(BL): Yeah, I guess my comment on the transparency, I think, like everything else with these documents, my guess is that was malice of forethought. It’s an acknowledgment that in today’s era, in the 21st century, there is far more information available than ever before. 

And so you combine that with – it was really only March of 2018 – is the first time that in an unclassified setting, we would talk about space and warfighting. Prior to that, prior to the publishing of the National Space Strategy in March of 2018, the conversation of space and warfighting had to happen in a classified setting. The challenge with that is it makes it hard for some of those that need to provide support to understand what it is actually that you need. 

Now, obviously, there are several members of Congress that are cleared, but the entire Congress isn’t. The general public obviously doesn’t all have a security clearance. But in 2018, we made the decision to say, ‘This has happened. We need to acknowledge it so that we can have a more fulsome discussion about the benefits that the nation gets from space, as well as the threats that are out there to contest that.’ 

And I think by publishing these documents to the level of detail that has been done, it’s a natural continuation of that, so that the support from the general public is there. So that all of our members of Congress understand the complete and comprehensive picture of exactly what our nation’s vital national interests in space are, as well as what are the threats that are out there to counter them? 

And therefore, what is the objective force we need to be able to succeed in that environment? As Mike alluded to, it’s infinitely easier to have conversations with allies if you’re in at least to start with in this unclassified setting.  

Industry – the same thing. Some of industry has clearances and some don’t. And so the starting point that I would imagine that the service wrestled with and said the compilation of information that we’ve captured here is unclassified, and we’ll move forward with that. And that will give us a very good baseline to start our conversations with.  

There will still be a need for classified systems, capabilities and conversations, and those will happen in the appropriate spaces. But these two unclassified documents give a great baseline to really move forward in this allied and partnered and hybrid fashion.

40:55 – 41:07 

So if you were to put yourself in the shoes of an executive at an industry partner or even a senior leader for an allied or partner nation — what are your takeaways from these documents and the messages and questions posed within them? How would you move forward from here?  

40:08 – 42:47 

(BL): Yeah, I think if I’m an allied, a senior leader that’s engaging with the Space Force in whatever forum that may be, if it’s an individual one on one meeting, if it’s a group forum. If it’s a series of workshops. 

I now have, at least again, as I described it, a really good baseline of how the United States Space Force thinks about the space environment and how it will evolve into 2040. And I also have a really good feel for what is the Space Force focused on in this objective force design on what they need to be successful in defining that objective force. 

So now if I’m an allied partner, I can take a look and I can say, ‘This is what they’re going after in the navwar area, or this is what they’re going after in the orbital warfare arena. What capabilities do I have that could either augment or help improve the resiliency, the redundancy, the ability to reconstitute those types of things?’ 

And so it’s: I’m not guessing any more about what I think the service is looking for, based on combing through every speech that’s given by every senior leader in the Space Force, they have now documented it for me in a baseline document, and I know they’re going to be updating it. So I have an opportunity to inform that. They specifically asked me to wrestle with the ideas and come forward with thoughts. 

So I just think it provides for a much more informed discussion. And I think you could make the same case for industry senior leaders as well. You’re much more informed going into the conversation so that it doesn’t start with two people across a table saying, so what do you need from me? What do you have to offer? It starts in a much further place down the road.

42:48 – 43:46 

(MD): If I’m the CEO of the startup, or mid tier or prime – it doesn’t matter, right? The document helps me to go to my investors, to my board of directors and to say, ‘Look at where the Space Force is headed.’ I need to put my company in front of that wave and here’s how we intend to do it.  

They’ve written down their challenges. They’ve written down their questions. We’ve got an answer to some of these questions. And we’re going to put some money against this. And then in the context of that document, in the context of the things that they said they need. Go back and talk to the Space Force about what it is we can provide. So many times, especially sort of in the tech world, they come up with a widget or a technology and say, ‘I have this technology, right?’ 

Well, okay, help me understand how you’re going to use that technology to solve one of my problems. Well, here’s the list of problems in these documents. And so you have a better chance of putting your solution in the context of something that solves a national security problem as you bring it forward and hope to get it adopted in some force design.

43:46 – 43:55 

Now that the Space Force has laid out this vision and looks ahead to iterate on the five, ten and fifteen year mark to 2040 — what does success look like for the objective force? 

43:56 – 44:58 

(MD): As I look back having been at the beginning of this ten years ago in 2016, I’m encouraged by what I’m seeing happen now. We’re starting to move in that direction. The things that we talked about in the Space Enterprise Vision, you can see being unfolded through some of the systems that are being deployed today, you see proliferated LEO architectures. You see  disaggregation of putting everything on one satellite that’s a fragile architecture. But breaking those functions up amongst a number of satellites, that’s more resilient, that’s happening.  

So some of these concepts and principles have begun, and that’s rewarding to see. Well, today, actually, you know, if I look up, I still basically see the same architecture we’ve had for a long time. But I think that is starting to move. It’s starting to pivot. 

And I think five years from now, if I can look up and see a more hybrid architecture, things that are dissimilar, things that are connected as we’ve talked about in this conversation. Solving that problem I think it gives us a step up in resiliency and capability and that’s one of the things I’ll be looking for five years on. 

44:59 – 46:08 

(BL): I would add ideally success means we continued this journey a few steps further. I don’t think any of us at the era that we were in the military space business was completely satisfied with where we were. And so these documents are a good indicator of continued progress, but success in the future years takes several forms. 

I think whoever the senior leaders of the Space Force are in 5 or 10 years from now, ideally, they’re enjoying more fulsome conversations with their allies and partner  and their industry counterparts.  

Ideally there will be some proposed answers to some of the questions that are posed in these documents. I say proposed because that’s the idea, right? Propose some answers, develop some concepts that go with those answers. Wargame them. Test them out. Maybe the first proposed answer isn’t the last one but ideally we’re moving forward and trying some things out.  

And then lastly I would say to the point of these documents being unclassified and out there for everyone. I believe success will be that our guardians continue to be more informed, more capable, and more recognized for what they do to secure the nation’s interests in, to and from space. 

46:09 – 46:22 

And where does Elara Nova factor into this?We have these documents that are now publicly released and available for the world to see.  

You’ve both already put yourselves in the shoes of international and industry leaders. So where does Elara Nova fit into this path forward? 

46:23 – 47:53 

(MD): Well our team at Elara Nova is chock-full of the leaders who have been involved in these conversations and debates and decisions since the conversation started a decade ago. I use as exhibit A my friend and colleague General Bill Liquori, who got his street cred as a weapons and tactics officer. Flew satellites for the intelligence community. Was responsible for space operations of basically the entire military space architecture. Helped write that National Security Space Strategy in 2018 from the White House and then was responsible for all the first independent budgets of a new military service. 

So these are the kind of people and people that have been in all of the six mission areas and the enabling functions and led those areas. Those are the people that we’ve surrounded ourselves with at Elara Nova and have all the scar tissue and the successes and the failures that they are ready to pass on to other people who are doing this work. 

And we continue to stay engaged in all aspects of this as we go about our work. You know, I’d say we’re all personally invested through our individual 20 or 30 or 40 year professional careers in the direction that the country is taking in space and how important it is for our security and our economy to get this right. 

So we can help our friends in the government. We can help strengthen and focus the industrial base, and we can help international partners contribute their own space capabilities, as we’ve talked about here today. And we can talk to the capital markets about where their investments ought to be focused to really be most impactful. So that’s how we founded Elara Nova that we can continue to contribute and we love doing that every day.

47:54 – 48:20 

(BL): Yeah, and all I would add is obviously the four co-founders, as they said, there’s a need for a space consultancy company and now even evolved beyond just space. They had the foresight to go out and find and hire a workforce that has an incredibly diverse skill set and set of experiences that certainly help inform the way forward, specifically with documents like these two as well as many others.

48:21 – 48:57 

This has been an episode of The Elara Edge. Elara Nova is the trusted global security partner delivering decisive advantage.  

As a strategic advisory firm, Elara Nova builds expert teams uniquely tailored for client needs to deliver actionable results. With the trusted insight to deliver your decisive edge, Elara Nova is your source for expertise and guidance in global security. 

If you liked what you heard today, please subscribe to our channel and leave us a rating. Music for this podcast was created by Patrick Watkins of PW Audio. I’m your host, Scott King, and join us next time at the Elara Edge.

Space Force Initiates a “Campaign of Learning” to Develop its Objective Force

New Documents Offer Unique Transparency into the Space Force’s Needs

This past spring the United States Space Force published two highly anticipated, forward-looking documents: Future Operating Environment 2040 and Objective Force 2040. When Chief of Space Operations General B. Chance Saltzman unveiled these documents at this year’s Space Symposium, he declared the service’s intention was for them to “drive questions, not provide answers.” As such, Guardians, the Joint Force and the Space Force’s international and industry partners were encouraged to engage, debate and provide feedback in a ‘campaign of learning’ to evaluate what the future space domain might look like and define the Space Force’s future force design requirements.  

“This campaign of learning is centered on transparency, where these documents are out in the public for everyone to read and see,” said Mike Dickey, Founding Partner at Elara Nova and former Chief Architect of the United States Space Force. “It signals to the defense industrial base what the service is thinking, which enables them to think strategically about applying research dollars and engaging capital markets to create the capabilities that the Space Force needs. Now industry can better present their product or service as a solution to the national security space problems that need to be addressed.”  

Force designs for any military service can be understood in three ways: its fielded force, its programmed force and its objective force.  

“Our fielded force includes all of the people, hardware and software that is delivering space capabilities on behalf of the nation,” said Bill Liquori, Executive Partner at Elara Nova and the first Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Strategy, Plans, Programs, and Analysis for the United States Space Force. “Our programmed force accounts for what will be fielded through the program objective memorandum that outlines the next five fiscal years, in addition to the president’s budget. But together, these two force designs still don’t meet all of the Space Force’s future requirements, that’s why these two documents present the objective force that the Space Force will need to build toward for the future.” 

But in order to develop that objective force, the Space Force first needs to understand what the future operating environment might look like. That’s why these documents were released in tandem: so that the Space Force’s partners can not only understand what the operating environment is expected to look like, but also the steps the service is taking to organize itself to achieve its mission. 

“These documents present a baseline for how the Space Force thinks about the space environment and how the service will evolve into 2040,” Liquori said. “Our force designs traditionally focused on hardware and software, but it takes more than just capabilities to deliver a space effect on behalf of the nation. These documents recognize we need organizational constructs and hybrid architectures to enable future success across mission areas, which means the Space Force also needs the infrastructure – with the appropriate staffing, testing and training – to employ those capabilities successfully.”  

A Decade-Long Journey in a Rapidly Evolving Environment 

The public release of these documents can be traced back to over a decade ago and marks the latest iteration of how the Department of War is responding to a rapidly evolving space environment. 

“These documents reflect a compilation of actions that began with General John Hyten’s appearance on an April 2015 episode of 60 Minutes to speak to the American public about the emerging threat environment in space,” Dickey said. “A year later, the Air Force published a study called the ‘Space Enterprise Vision,’ which thought conceptually about the military space architecture that would be needed to operate in the face of the emerging threat. Then the Space Force was formed in December 2019, followed by the Space Warfighting Analysis Center in 2021 to develop its force design.” 

Both documents look ahead to 2040 on a 15-year time horizon. But the space domain is quickly evolving in unexpected ways, particularly as technologies advance. That’s why the Space Force has stood up a new SF/S9 Force Design and Analysis staff group to re-evaluate and update these projections on five-year intervals.   

“The S9 office will oversee the life cycle of these force designs in a three-step process,” Dickey said. “By bringing together some existing pockets of talent, they will first develop conceptual approaches to how the Space Force can solve operational challenges. Second, they’ll test those concepts in wargames, tabletop exercises and computer simulations to evaluate their potential effectiveness. Step three will see the Space Warfighting Analysis Center model and build a more specific set of technical capabilities that becomes the objective force design.” 

Regularly re-evaluating these documents will enable the Space Force to accommodate and address unexpected changes in the space domain. 

“The Future Operating Environment 2040 document explores the strategic arc of potential future military and geopolitical states but cannot predict specific threats and capabilities,” said Dickey. “For example,  AI and China’s deployment of a 21,000 satellite networking constellation weren’t in the Space Enterprise Vision that was published over ten years ago, which demonstrates how quickly space is changing in ways we can’t predict. So the Space Force created this new S9 office to make changes to the architecture and the forces they field on a more frequent basis.” 

Mission Area Expansion and Projected Budget Growth 

Both documents come at a time when the Department of the Air Force recently put forward a record-setting $71.1 billion budget request for the Space Force, while officials also call to double the service’s personnel by 2030. 

“These two documents allow the Space Force to signal to Congress what threats the country is facing in space and the budget request starts that conversation,” Dickey said. “The emerging threat environment will require new capabilities, so the FY27 budget – no matter how much will ultimately be appropriated – will be a down payment for incorporating all of these new mission areas that the Space Force will inevitably have to grow into.” 

While the Space Force was founded as an intentionally lean and digital first military service, its anticipated growth in personnel and resources reflects the growing demands being placed on the service.  

“The nation is asking the Space Force to do more than it was asked to do when it was founded in December of 2019,” Dickey said. “The Department is talking about tracking ground and airborne moving targets from space, a mission set largely accomplished in the air domain today.  Golden Dome will have a space-based interceptor layer in space that has to be managed and operated. As these mission areas expand, so too does the need for additional personnel and resources. At the same time, doubling the size of the Space Force doesn’t relieve the service of doing things in an efficient way.”  

Creating Opportunities for Proactive Partner Engagement 

In order to effectively deliver on these increasing demands and wide-ranging missions, the Space Force will need to leverage capabilities provided by its international and industry partners. That’s where these documents will play an integral role. 

“Two groups of people routinely engage with our Space Force at senior levels: international and industry partners,” Liquori said. “They often want to know what they should spend their money on to develop or acquire capabilities that will be most beneficial to the service. These documents will enable a more informed starting point for them to develop and test capabilities that will ultimately provide resiliency, redundancy and the ability to reconstitute the Space Force’s capabilities.” 

As the Space Force incorporates the feedback it receives from stakeholders across the national security space enterprise, the service is initiating this campaign of learning to facilitate better engagements moving forward.  

“These documents are a good indicator of the Space Force’s continued progress, but success in the future takes several forms,” Liquori said. “Success means whoever the senior leaders of the Space Force are in five or 10 years from now, will be enjoying more fulsome conversations with their allies and industry counterparts. Success means there might be some proposed answers to the questions posed in these documents that are then wargamed and tested out. But ultimately, success means that our guardians will continue to be more informed, more capable and more recognized for what they do to secure the nation’s interests in, to and from space.” 

This cross-functional collaboration, however, also requires the expertise and connections available to streamline the development of the Space Force’s future objective force. That’s where Elara Nova exists to help the Space Force and its international and industry partners achieve that end goal. 

“Elara Nova is full of the leaders who have been involved in these force design conversations, debates and decisions since these conversations started a decade ago,” Dickey said. “These are the people that have been enabling the core functions across key mission areas. They have all the scar tissue from the successes and failures of previous efforts, which is necessary to help the government, strengthen the industrial base, and empower our international partners to contribute their own space capabilities.” 

Elara Nova is a trusted guiding partner that builds tailored teams to illuminate unseen opportunities and deliver impact across every domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/  

Episode 36: Digital Infrastructure Modernization to Lay Foundation for Zero Trust, AI

The Elara Edge Podcast

Host: Scott King 

SME: General (Ret) Tim Haugh, Senior Principal Advisor at Elara Nova, former Commander at U.S. Cyber Command and Director of the National Security Agency 

00:02 – 01:34 

When we think of the word “infrastructure,” things like roads, bridges, and the power grid often come to mind. But there’s also “digital infrastructure,” which the National Institute of Standards and Technology defines as ​​”the ability to store and exchange data through a centralized communication system.” 

The Department of War kick-started the year with a series of steps to enhance the resiliency and reliability of its digital infrastructure that underpins military operations. In early January, the United States Space Force announced it will be overhauling computer networks at each one of its bases, according to a $12.5 billion task order through the Base Infrastructure Modernization program.  

Also in January, the National Security Agency released the first two products of its Zero Trust Implementation Guideline, while the DOW launched its Artificial Intelligence Acceleration Strategy. Altogether, these actions demonstrate the growing imperative to prepare the military’s digital infrastructure to take advantage of emerging technologies and counter evolving threats. 

Welcome to “The Elara Edge” here to discuss the modernization of the Department’s digital infrastructure is retired General Tim Haugh, Senior Principal Advisor at Elara Nova. With over three decades of military service with the United States Air Force, General Haugh previously served as the Commander of United States Cyber Command, Director of the National Security Agency, and Chief of the Central Security Service.  

Sir, welcome to the show!  

01:35 – 01:36 

I’m excited to be here. Scott. Thanks for having me.  

01:37 – 02:03 

We’re excited to have you and looking forward to the conversation today. Let’s begin with a look at the role of digital infrastructure in modern day military operations. Perhaps one of the best ways to understand this is by taking a look at the relationship between the space and cyber domains.  

From your perspective: how do the space and cyberspace domains interact when it comes to military operations? And how did this relationship factor into the early days of standing up the United States Space Force? 

02:04 – 03:48 

Yeah absolutely, Scott. They are inextricably linked. When we think about what it looks like to warfight space, the foundation of that is also what’s happening terrestrially on the ground: how we control satellites, how we leverage technologies in space to sense, to communicate, and to fight. All of those are tied to how we operate within cyberspace, both to leverage those capabilities on space, to be able to control them, but also to ensure that they’re secure. And foundationally, when we think about what space does as part of our warfighting doctrine across all domains, having security in cyberspace is absolutely essential. 

At the time, I was the 16th Air Force Commander and in support of Space Force leadership, as they stood up the service. And one of those decisions was how will the Air Force provide support to the Space Force in terms of the Air Force network and then being able to support space operations? 

And as the choices were being made, one of the most critical were what were the sets of expertise that the Space Force would need? And one of those choices in terms of the career fields that were identified as essential to the future of the Space Force is cyber and clearly building out expertise was critical and that will only become increasingly important.  

As we’ve seen in the recent conflicts that have occurred, particularly within Ukraine, the contest for the ability to have assured command and control, through both terrestrial and through space – absolutely essential – and that really drives towards what infrastructure that then needs to be built, sustained, operated and defended to have assured operations in both space and cyberspace. 

03:49 – 04:01 

The Space Force task order to modernize its digital infrastructure follows a similar task order to do the same for Air Force bases across the Pacific.  

Can you describe what the Space Force and Air Force are looking to do here? 

04:02 – 07:02 

In this case, and what the Space Force wants to modernize in their digital backbone is all of the infrastructure that allows every Guardian to be able to interconnect, whether that’s to the Internet, whether it’s the services that are available inside of the Department of War networks or the ability to connect and operate through the domain, through both unclassified and classified networks, and then making sure that infrastructure is well positioned to be able to provide the right capabilities to the Space Force and every Guardian – in terms of routers and switches that interconnect networks and interconnect bases to the broader network – is an investment that’s clearly being made through the Base Infrastructure Modernization program.  

It is also the computing infrastructure that every Guardian and Airman leverage every day when they come to work. It’s also the infrastructure that runs our hospitals and runs space operations and runs air operations on a flight line. 

So all of those require the ability to have relevant technology to be able to drive not only the capabilities that are required to fight and win, but also provide a user an experience that allows them to come to work, log on, get to work and be successful and that requires investment. 

And the investment and the priority to be able to ensure that infrastructure is in place is also going to be the foundation for how capabilities like artificial intelligence will be integrated and the compute power that is required at the network edge to be able to operate and do that, particularly as we think about contested environments. 

At first, it needs to provide the foundation to be able to meet the mission needs of the Space Force and the Air Force for the contract in the Pacific. So it has to be sized, it’s got to be capable enough and then the support to be able to operate and ensure the maintenance of all of those systems – uptime and resilience to be able to make sure those missions run – has to be one of the first priorities.  

The second component is ensure the architecture is defendable and is in compliance with the direction that the Department of War is taking in terms of the policies of how we modernize networks, how we secure them, and ultimately how we build them using a zero trust-based approach, because the adversaries are relentless in cyberspace. 

What that looks like today, whether that’s China, Russia, North Korea, Iran all bring different subsets of capability. But particularly China is focused on being able to take away strategic capability from the United States and having resilient infrastructure is the foundation to ensure that can’t happen.  

And I think the approach, as we talk through today of that mixture of improving the underlying base infrastructure, building out in zero trust principles and setting a foundation for the integration of AI, it really does start with the foundational infrastructure that is secure and defended.

07:03 – 07:20  

We’ve heard General Stephen Whiting, the Commander of US Space Command, previously refer to cybersecurity as the “soft underbelly” of military operations. 

What do you think makes cybersecurity and digital infrastructure particularly vulnerable to either state-backed or adversarial attacks?  

07:21 – 08:40 

There are a number of factors, that particularly within military services that have brought vulnerability. One of those is lack of investment. So at key times, if we don’t upgrade these capabilities, you can fall into a situation where the vendor no longer supports them and that technology debt brings risk. It also brings less functionality. So these investments are critical.  

The other is how do we integrate weapon systems into these architectures and ensuring that there is coherence in how the services think about the interaction with the defense industrial base and set a clear set of standards on what is expected as we build and field new capabilities and ensure that they can immediately integrate into an architecture that doesn’t create seams. 

And then finally, we’ve got to be able to build this in a way that can adapt to the threat environment and in how we secure things like the identity of every individual and every agenetic AI capability that we intend to deploy. We’ve got to be prepared for a changing architecture in demand signal based off of the emergence of these technologies and ensure that they can be integrated in a coherent way that maximizes the opportunity and doesn’t bring additional risk. 

08:41 – 08:46 

I’d like to emphasize that idea of risk. What would an attack on the digital infrastructure of military bases look like? 

08:47 – 11:50 

Yeah, I think at that point, first and foremost is we have to be able to have situational awareness in both our space and our cyber domain in a way that’s commensurate with what we’ve learned in air, ground and the maritime. That is the first thing a commander needs. They have to have situational awareness so they can make good decisions about risk. 

The second component in this discussion is around resilience because we’re certainly going to be targeted in an area of tension and in crisis. We’ve got to be resilient and expect that there are going to be very aggressive attempts to compromise our networks and compromise our partners, both in industry and our foreign partners and Allies.  

The approach that China has taken to targeting the critical infrastructure of the United States is a really good example of the types of things we would see targeted on military bases: things like water treatment, energy generation, critical functions inside of telecommunications or networks. 

They have shown that if there are vulnerabilities that they will continue to attempt to enumerate those vulnerabilities and take advantage of them if they exist. And then once in a network, they will look to compromise the identity of key system administrators that have privileged accounts that allow them to move laterally and ensure that they would be able to have deep access if we ever are in a crisis. 

We’ve seen that in our critical infrastructure. It’s been well articulated in various reports done by the intelligence community and by Homeland Security and those are things that we understand that methodology and how to defend it.  

One of the key things that they would attempt to exploit are vulnerable aging systems and so upgrading those is critically important. And then the ability to implement zero trust would be the area that would defeat or make more difficult the ability to take on different identities within organizations and networks. So we will see adversaries looking at every one of these networks. They’re going to be looking for vulnerabilities now enabled increasingly by artificial intelligence and they will take advantage of them if they see them. And that is the environment we live in every day would only be accelerated in a crisis.  

We’ve learned a lot of lessons in our support to Ukraine about what does resilience look in a modern warfare environment. And we have to know that we can scale, because certainly all of the domains rely on space to be able to deliver situational awareness, communications, particularly in extended range environments and so we need to ensure that the ground segment, the terrestrial component, the cyber elements of spacecraft are secure and resilient because they will certainly be aggressively targeted. 

And I think these types of initiatives that we’re seeing, in terms of foundational investment and direction on AI and zero trust are going to be things that are going to be really important to implement aggressively to buy down that risk.  

11:51 – 12:06 

Now, the task order was designed as a quote “Enterprise IT as a Service” solution to be delivered through an Indefinite Delivery-Indefinite Quantity or IDIQ contract. 

What exactly does this mean and why is that important? 

12:07 – 13:47 

The idea behind enterprise IT as a service is being able to leverage the strengths of the industry to bring current technology and resources to be able to build and maintain networks. In essence, be able to say, take an area that previously would have been maintained by an Airman or Guardian, bring in expertise from industry, and allow them to both operate and sustain that base infrastructure to allow Guardians and Airmen to be focused on other types of operations that are critical to our warfighting missions. 

And this is a further expansion of what the Air Force has done at a number of bases. Now building it out at each of the Space Force bases, and also bases across the Pacific for the Air Force. This is an extension of that approach. It’s giving them flexibility in terms of the number of potential vendors they could leverage that they’ve already identified as qualified to do the work against a pretty high ceiling of $12.5 billion. 

So it’s a commitment to building out the infrastructure, putting the resources behind it, and then having a bench of vendors that are qualified to do the work to ensure that as the Air Force and the Space Force expand this approach, that they’ve got the right expertise. The opportunity within the contracts is to also clearly state what the cybersecurity standards are and what’s expected of the day-to-day of how the network should be configured, how it should be defended, and then also what happens when an incident occurs. 

And I think the build out of this model based off of the previous work, should allow for a deep understanding of how to do that. Now it’s going to be about scaling, underneath this particular contracting approach. 

13:48 – 14:06 

At the same time this modernization effort is underway, the National Security Agency, released the first two products of its Zero Trust Implementation Guideline.  

At a basic level, can you define for our audience what zero trust means and then walk us through these two initial implementation products: Primer and Discovery phase? 

14:07 – 16:51 

Zero Trust is an approach to security that does take time to implement and is complex.  Previously, when we thought about defense of a network, we thought about the perimeter, the network edge. What zero trust brings is an assumption that that perimeter is going to be breached. 

And how do you defend your network, your data and your users in an environment where you give least privileged access – only giving access to data, applications, tools, infrastructure for the things that an individual is authorized to do and only for the period of time when it’s authorized. This approach, when implemented, gives an opportunity to make sure that not only are you secure at the network edge, but you can be secure internally against very aggressive threats. And if one member of your team is compromised, you don’t lose the security of the entire network.  

And what NSA has done in terms of implementation guidance is to break that down into five parts for services and commands to implement zero trust. 

In the first release is a Primer – helping organizations understand what all goes into organizing as a zero trust architecture, and which modules make most sense for those organizations to begin with and lay out how to implement and mature those areas to be able to meet what the expectation is from the Department of War. 

The second component, which is part of the first phase of implementation, is what NSA has identified as discovery – create visibility and understand the data, applications and the assets that are within your architecture, and then begin to set policies that implement authority guidance for every function in the network. It really does set a baseline for how zero trust can be implemented, and then sets the conditions for the phases that follow to meet the Department of War expectations. 

As the implementation guidance is put out as the DOW CIO continues to clarify exactly what expectations are, there are opportunities for individual programs and vendors to be lead turning these and thinking about ensuring that they put the baselines in place that will allow for implementation and integration of capabilities, platforms, technologies, applications into these networks using a zero trust approach. 

And that’s going to require continued discussion between industry and government. But clearly setting the roadmap for where zero trust goes. There’s an opportunity for industry to follow. 

16:52 – 16:55 

And what will zero trust ultimately look like in a military operation? 

16:56 – 17:51 

Well, what we’d see in an effective zero trust operation? As an example, if a vendor is going to provide an update to a capability that’s on a base – today, that in different programs and different bases, they might have different authorities.  

Under zero trust their authorities would be very narrow and would only be authorized during the window of time that they are upgrading that system or doing some form of maintenance function. Very similar to how in if you’re maintaining a system on the flight line, you’re going to tag in and tag out. You’re only going to be operating on that aircraft in certain windows when you’re authorized.  Zero trust provides the same type of approach that you only have authority to manipulate that system in windows of time and within your span of authority. That reduces risk to the overall architecture, but still allows that system to be updated and maintained. 

17:52 – 18:08 

This brings us to the third element of our conversation, and that is the Department of War’s recently released Artificial Intelligence Acceleration Strategy. 

Certainly AI become a major talking point in national security circles in recent years,  but generally speaking, how does AI factor into this conversation about digital infrastructure? 

18:09 – 21:39 

I think it’s really at the forefront. The Department’s strategy to accelerate implementation of artificial intelligence requires capable infrastructure that is secure and needs to continue to grow the compute capacity that fuels the implementation of artificial intelligence.  

The idea behind what artificial intelligence can do, the running of algorithms, the use of agents, the autonomous use of capabilities, all of that needs computer power to operate. 

And depending on the scope and scale, the amount of data and the expanse of simultaneous things that you’re going to ask those agents and capabilities and algorithms to do requires an increasing number of computing power. And you can get that computing power through a couple of different ways. One can be on-premise, computational power that are investments in servers and data centers that allow for control of that. 

The other can come through any of the number of cloud providers that are a part of the architecture and how you choose to organize that really becomes important in terms of what’s available to every Guardian and Airman in terms of computational power to run models and algorithms and agents and it also is an incredible bearing on cost.  

If portions of the infrastructure are going to be inside of the military services, then you have to have all of the infrastructure from data centers, the ability to cool those data centers and ensure their operations have power, water, cooling, to be able to operate. So that’s an additional infrastructure that has to be sustained. 

If it’s chosen to leverage our large, managed service providers and cloud providers for that computing capacity, you’re going to fund them. But they have to build out that architecture and sustain it. So those are choices that don’t have to be made completely. It’s likely a balance of the two that will ultimately be relied upon.  

But if we’re going to build out more infrastructure, there will be more requirements for things like water, cooling, power that will be critically important and have to be sustained and defended inside of the Department’s architecture. 

And increasingly, that’s going to have to be at the network edge, not just at the center of a network. And this will be an evolution of how we’re able to make that compute available to every Guardian and every Airman, regardless of the type of contested environment they’re in. This is really foundational and these are areas that are going to be really important as the Department determines what those investments look like.  

The document really sets out aggressive intent from the Secretary of War to first move out on pace-setting projects that are really about setting conditions to in terms of ensuring that the infrastructure is in place, thinking about the data that is required, the models and the policies to accelerate the use of artificial intelligence across warfighting, intelligence, and the broader enterprise within the Department. 

This will certainly drive investment. It’ll drive planning, and then it will drive the services to think about where artificial intelligence will be most effectively integrated to enhance capabilities within their respective service.

21:40 – 21:52 

Thank you, Sir. And I’d like to go through the three pace-setting projects laid out in the strategy: warfighting, intelligence, and enterprise.  

Let’s start with the first one: warfighting? What is this one about?  

21:53 – 22:44 

I think the big picture of this – this is really about where does artificial intelligence fit in the ability to execute the warfighting missions across the Department? And this will be very foundational when we think about how we gain situational awareness, how commanders make decisions, how we communicate those decisions, and the autonomy that we give to platforms and weapons. 

And this pace-setting project will really bear out in terms of what are those areas that also now need to be invented in terms of how we test these capabilities and that partnership between industry and government as the acceleration of artificial intelligence isn’t just done inside the services, but inside vendors and inside of capabilities that will be delivered.

22:45 – 22:51 

And how about the second pace-setting project: intelligence. Can you elaborate on what the Department of War is aiming to do here? 

22:52 – 23:44 

The Department is setting some clear benchmarks to think about how intelligence will be integrated closer to the edge as a warfighting capability. This is an area of a tremendous advantage for the United States: our ability to sense and make information available to commanders around the globe. The challenge set forth by the Secretary is not only to do that in real-time operations, but also to accelerate the work that brings together that intelligence and capability development. 

So two major, I think, directions will be how to make different sets of intelligence fuzed for commanders at all echelons. And the second being, how does that intelligence really get integrated more quickly in capability development earlier for individual capabilities to be able to be enhanced and infused with artificial intelligence as a core capability.

23:45 – 23:47 

And how about the third one: enterprise?

23:48 – 24:25 

This is thinking about how does the entire department come together and leverage these sets of capabilities and building out the not only just the ability to have the infrastructure available, but it’s how do artificial intelligence bring more capacity and capability to the broader enterprise of warfighting that occurs across all of our military domains, and to be able to capitalize on that and do it faster than an adversary in a very contested environment. 

So I think these three areas of warfighting, intelligence and enterprise, are a clear set of a foundation and intents laid out by the Secretary of War.

24:26 – 24:34 

So now that this strategy is out there – what happens next? What steps are being taken to implement the strategy and then, ultimately, what does success look like? 

24:35 – 26:43 

Well, I think first is each service and command has been given some clear direction to build plans to establish AI integration leads within their organizations and then evaluate their mission for where artificial intelligence makes sense and can be rapidly infused in the areas the Secretary has outlined.  

The next phase of that is in those areas – where will dollars go? What will the investment look like? And that investment will have to span across the ability to generate the requisite compute, the ability to ensure that the right data is available and is accessible at the right level for models and algorithms, and then ensuring that the Department and each service has the talent to execute it. And I think those areas are going to definitely require investment and they’re going to require significant collaboration with industry. 

Given the fact that many of these technologies are still being invented and the rapid evolution of models and what agents are going to look like, there’s a tremendous opportunity for investment in key areas. The Secretary laying out the set of priorities will now begin to get into individual projects, as services and commands start to identify their key requirements and the areas that would most benefit by infusing artificial intelligence. 

Inside those opportunities are places for investment. There’s places for experimentation and then aggressive implementation to ensure continued advantage. So I think you’re going to see those emerge and then success looks like the ability for us as a warfighting organization to be able to deliver capabilities at speed, to be able to integrate data for decision, and also to have weapons that have new capabilities across all domains that we can ensure operate consistent with the overarching intent and policy and guidance that exists across the Department in terms of warfighting, consistent with our laws and our values.

26:44 – 26:57 

Our interview today covered three elements pretty comprehensively: digital infrastructure, zero trust, and AI.  

The Department of War is actively taking steps toward these ends. So what do these actions signal to industry? 

26:58 – 27:54 

I think each of these provides an intent, and I think that’s the best thing that the government can do is clearly articulate intent and share that with industry. So in this case, whether it’s here’s the intent for the future of the architecture. Here is the intent for what it will look like in terms of how the government wants to secure that architecture using zero trust principles and with an expectation that all capabilities are going to be infused by artificial intelligence. 

They’re setting the roadmap and that is probably the most important thing that, in terms of the public private partnership, is a clear understanding of intent. And that intent should only become more clear, as the Department articulates priorities inside of Golden Dome, inside of other major programs that are going to be driving and implementing those things that are consistent with the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy.

27:55 – 27:57 

Can you elaborate on how Golden Dome ties to this conversation? 

27:58 – 30:12 

Where the Golden Dome program needs to start in terms of the types of priorities that the President has given them, and then building in the resilience and speed necessary to be able to make those decisions within really incredible timelines. 

The challenge of being able to identify, any and all threats, to the homeland and then to be able to act on those threats. 

 It’s all about speed and the ability to identify the threat, understand it, give orders, and then have capabilities that can respond with requisite speed to be able to mitigate those threats. We have known how to do this as a nation and been prepared to do it in very specific scenarios. But now those scenarios are so diverse and growing in terms of the threat and the speed of the threat.  

It really does demand a command and control structure that is always on, always available, and integrated with the right data sources to have situational awareness that can provide the right data to the decision-maker, and then the ability to execute command and control in a way that can be executed very quickly from decision-maker to shooter, and to be able to assure that not only can you track and have custody of of every one of those threats, but you also understand your effectiveness in real-time to mitigate those threats.

So I think speed is one of the clear tenants that comes from the demand signal. The other is, of course, it’s got to be secure. These will be foundational capabilities in defense of the homeland. It must be built on a bedrock foundation and then it’s going to also require just incredibly resilient communications to ensure its availability.  

The digital infrastructure is what ties it all together: every sensor, every base, every shooter, every command and control node in a way that gives that situational awareness and gives that power to be able to make decisions, create outcomes, and understand the results of those operations. And the resilience and the capability that are provided through that infrastructure can be an accelerant to the command and control for Gold Dome. 

30:13 – 30:25 

Thank you Sir, and what opportunities exist for commercial and industry partners to contribute solutions to anything we’ve discussed today: whether that be digital infrastructure, zero trust, AI, or command and control in Golden Dome? 

30:26 – 31:25 

There’s a menu. A large part of this is thinking through resilient communications in many different ways. That’s leveraging different parts of the spectrum. It’s leveraging different technologies. 

It’s about being innovative at every vendor to implement quantum resistance. It’s about how we think about the applications that are required to knit it together. And then what’s the underlying compute that allows it all to operate at speed?  

Those are all opportunities that allow for ensured resilient communications in ways that we can continue to evaluate, whether that’s in the space segment, whether that’s within traditional RF bands or if it’s leveraging a diversity of our managed service providers in terrestrial networks. All of those have to be meshed together in a way that assures command and control and assures availability for the leaders that are going to be empowered to make those decisions. 

31:26 – 31:37 

Now, in addition to serving as a Senior Principal Advisory at Elara Nova, you’ll also have a guiding hand in the firm’s new Cyber, Data & Communications sector. 

What should our listeners know about its new CDC sector? 

31:38 – 32:35 

Yeah. I think everything we’re thinking about now is how do you integrate capabilities faster? How do our domains interoperate and how do we ensure within the defense industrial base and with broader industry, how do those capabilities be brought to bear in a way that they can be effective from the outset and meet the demand signal that’s coming from the Department and from each of the services? 

Elara Nova brings a really deep portfolio of cyber experts that have served across all elements of our intelligence community and the military services and when combined with all the other expertise that exists in air and space that both have served in the Department and are current in state of the art of what’s happening in industry is invaluable to be able to accelerate that work in a way that will produce an outcome that really brings back the best capability for the nation. 

32:36 – 33:10 

This has been an episode of The Elara Edge. As a strategic advisory firm, Elara Nova is the trusted guiding partner that builds tailored teams to illuminate unseen opportunities and deliver impact across every domain.   

With the trusted insight to deliver your decisive edge, Elara Nova is your source for expertise and guidance in national security. 

If you liked what you heard today, please subscribe to our channel and leave us a rating. Music for this podcast was created by Patrick Watkins of PW Audio. I’m your host, Scott King, and join us next time at the Elara Edge. 

Digital Infrastructure Modernization to Lay Foundation for Zero Trust, AI

An Upgraded Network to Better Integrate Emerging Technologies, Counter Evolving Threats

The Department of War (DOW) kick-started the year with a series of steps to enhance the resiliency and reliability of the digital infrastructure underpinning military operations. In early January, the United States Space Force announced it will be overhauling computer networks at all 14 of its bases under the Base Infrastructure Modernization program. Then the National Security Agency released the first two products of its Zero Trust Implementation Guidelines, while the DOW launched its Artificial Intelligence Acceleration Strategy. Altogether, these actions demonstrate the growing imperative to prepare the DOW’s digital infrastructure to take advantage of emerging technologies and counter evolving threats. 

“Space and cyberspace are inextricably linked: the foundation of warfighting in space is dependent on having a secure digital infrastructure on the ground,” said Gen (Ret) Tim Haugh, a Senior Principal Advisor at Elara Nova and the former Commander of United States Cyber Command. “Digital infrastructure is the computing infrastructure that every Guardian and Airman leverages when they connect to the Department of War networks. If the Department doesn’t upgrade these systems, they can become vulnerable where a vendor can no longer support them, which adds risk through technology debt, less functionality and an inability to integrate weapon systems into national security architectures.” 

According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, “digital infrastructure” is defined as ​​”the ability to store and exchange data through a centralized communication system.” As such, the Base Infrastructure Modernization program aims to create a unified and secure network and communication system across all Air Force and Space Force bases worldwide.  

“Whether it’s to conduct space operations or air operations on the flight line, those capabilities require a digital infrastructure that is powerful enough to win the fight and provide a user experience that enables success,” Gen (Ret) Haugh said. “This investment is critical because it sets a clear set of standards for the defense industrial base to build and field new capabilities as the threat environment changes. Modernizing the digital infrastructure will also lay the foundation for integrating future capabilities like artificial intelligence and establishing the compute power required at the network edge.” 

The Vulnerabilities of an Aging Digital Infrastructure 

Space Force leaders recognize that threats in cyberspace are constantly emerging and evolving, heightening the imperative for resilient and reliable systems. General Stephen Whiting, Commander of United States Space Command, once referred to cybersecurity as the “soft underbelly” of space operations. 

“One of the key elements adversaries would exploit are vulnerable and aging systems, and that’s why upgrading them is critically important,” Gen (Ret) Haugh said. “China has shown that if vulnerabilities exist, they will take advantage of them. We would likely see similar attacks on our military bases that we’ve seen China take against critical infrastructure in the United States: going after infrastructure like water treatment, energy generation and critical functions inside of telecommunications or networks.” 

The task order for the Space Force’s modernization efforts, to the tune of $12.5 billion, follows a similar task order for Air Force bases to receive advanced wired and wireless technology upgrades that will enhance connectivity, cybersecurity, interoperability and data readiness at bases across the Pacific theater. It will be processed as an Enterprise-IT-as-a-Service solution through an Indefinite Delivery-Indefinite Quantity contract designed to streamline modernization to adapt to a quickly and constantly evolving threat. 

“The idea behind Enterprise-IT-as-a-Service is to leverage industry expertise to bring in current technology to build and maintain our digital infrastructure, allowing Airmen and Guardians to focus on other critical warfighting operations and missions,” Gen (Ret) Haugh said. “The first component to these upgrades is to provide the foundation to meet the mission needs of the Space Force and the Air Force and ensure the network can support their operations. Then the second component is to ensure the architecture is defendable and in compliance with Department of War policies for cybersecurity.” 

An aging digital infrastructure also increases the vulnerability of a “zero-day” attack that can be difficult to detect and often lead to data breaches and compromises, much like the recent disclosure by Ivanti that affected several government agencies and Allied partners.  

“Increasingly enabled by artificial intelligence, adversaries are going to be looking for vulnerabilities at every one of these networks and they will take advantage of them if they see them,” Gen (Ret) Haugh said. “Once inside a network, adversaries will look to compromise the identity of key system administrators that have privileged accounts to move laterally and ensure that they would retain deep access to our networks for future targeting. This is the reality of today’s operating environment, so it’s critical to upgrade our digital infrastructure and implement zero trust to defeat or complicate their ability to take on different identities within DOW networks.” 

A Foundation for Zero Trust and AI 

The modernization effort will also lay the foundation for implementing a new zero trust framework to enhance the resiliency and reliability of the Department of War’s network.  

“Zero trust is an approach that is founded on the assumption that your perimeter is going to be breached,” Gen (Ret) Haugh said. “Zero trust creates an operating environment with the least privileged access, which means only giving access to data, applications, tools and infrastructure to an authorized individual only during the period of time in which they’re authorized to operate.  

This approach makes sure that not only are you secure and resilient at the network edge, because you still won’t lose security of the entire network if one of your team members is compromised.” 

Toward this end, the National Security Agency (NSA) recently unveiled its Zero Trust Implementation Guidelines, beginning with its two initial phases: Primer and Discovery Phase. 

“NSA has coordinated all the necessary activities to implement a zero trust architecture into five parts,” Haugh said, who previously served as the Director of the National Security Agency. “The first phase, Primer, helps organizations understand which modules to begin with for laying out zero trust implementation to meet the Department’s expectations. The Discovery Phase is about creating visibility and understanding the data, applications and the assets that are within your architecture.” 

A fully implemented zero trust architecture can then create pathways for integrating emerging technologies like artificial intelligence in a way that will be reliable and secure. That’s in part why the DOW simultaneously released its Artificial Intelligence Acceleration Strategy that laid out seven “Pace-Setting Projects” across three mission areas: Warfighting, Intelligence, and Enterprise. 

“The Department’s strategy requires a secure and capable digital infrastructure to grow the compute capacity needed for greater implementation of artificial intelligence,” Gen (Ret) Haugh said. Gen (Ret) Haugh said. “Everything AI does – from running algorithms or using agents and autonomous capabilities – requires the power to compute. You can get that compute through on-base servers and data centers or cloud providers that are part of the overall architecture. This strategy intends to make that compute available to every Guardian and every Airman, regardless of the type of contested environment they’re in.”  

Digital Infrastructure and Golden Dome 

Artificial intelligence and the autonomous processing of trusted, effective and secure data will also be instrumental to future military operations, particularly for homeland defense initiatives like Golden Dome.   

“The biggest challenge for Golden Dome is the diversity of threats: the Department is prepared for specific scenarios of certain threats, but the nature and speed of those threats are diversifying,” Gen (Ret) Haugh said. “But Golden Dome demands a command and control structure that is always on, always available and integrated with the right data sources to have situational awareness that can provide the right data to the decision-maker, enabling the ability to execute command and control in real-time to mitigate and defeat those threats. The digital infrastructure is what will tie every sensor, base and shooter to deliver the command and control structure necessary for Golden Dome.” 

General Mike Guetlein, the Director of Golden Dome, has expressed that command and control is his first priority. Like all space and military operations, command and control requires a trusted and secure digital infrastructure at its foundation. That’s why Elara Nova has now established its Cyber, Data & Communications business sector to support industry in delivering the secure and trusted solutions that will empower the warfighter to deliver on mission requirements across domains.  

“Elara Nova offers a deep portfolio of cyber experts that have served across all elements of our intelligence community and military services,” Gen (Ret) Haugh said. “When combined with all of the air and space experts in our portfolio, Elara Nova brings a unique set of talents to bear on hard, cross-domain problems like Golden Dome. Our experts have served in both the Department and industry, which makes them an invaluable resource to accelerating integration of data and emerging technologies in a way that will produce a successful outcome for our nation.” 

Elara Nova is a trusted guiding partner that builds tailored teams to illuminate unseen opportunities and deliver impact across every domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/.    

Department of Defense Budget Must Realign to Space-Based Threats

Resourcing Strong and Capable Space Force Begins with Budget Reform

The United States Space Force requested $29.4 billion for Fiscal Year 2025 (FY25), a two percent drop from the previous year. The final budget, however, has yet to be passed as the federal government is operating under a continuing resolution that expires in mid-March. While the Space Force was foundedin response to the actions of near-peer competitors in space that threatened the United States’ national and economic security, declines in funding for the Space Force, compounded by the inherent restrictions of continuing resolutions and the financial burdens of legacy defense programs, are compromising the Space Force’s ability to effectively resource against the space-based threat. 

“A continuing resolution means we don’t have a budget for this fiscal year, and so we have to comply with last year’s budget limits and existing programs,” said General (Ret) John E. Hyten, Senior Principal Advisor at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy. “This means no new start programs can begin and any other programs that require a budget increase to deliver a needed capability can’t be executed. Therefore, several space programs are consistently delayed and this inefficiency wastes billions of taxpayer dollars.” 

The Space Force has been in existence for a little over five years, or about 60 months. For roughly half that time, the Space Force has been operating under a continuing resolution. This can provide significant barriers for a new military service seeking to adopt rapidly evolving technologies. 

An Underfunded Space Force 

But even if a budget for FY25 was passed by now, the traditional approach to developing the Department of Defense (DOD) budget means the Space Force would still only receive a marginal amount of funding it needs. 

“Traditionally, the DOD budget is typically carved out in thirds,” said Lieutenant General (Ret) Nina Armagno, executive director of international partnerships at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy. “One third goes to the Department of the Army, another to the Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps, and a final third to the Department of the Air Force, which includes funding for the Space Force and the intelligence community. But this approach means the Space Force only garners about three percent of the overall DoD budget – that’s harmful to our national security.” 

Space capabilities underpin joint force and military operations in other domains, and recent adversarial actions demonstrate they are developing their own space capabilities to threaten the United States’ national and economic security. That’s why, in a recent Opinion Editorial co-written by Gen Hyten and Gen Armagno published by SpaceNews, they argued it’s time for the DOD budget to refocus away from outdated legacy programs to reflect the modern, space-based threat. 

“The defense budget should be all about responding to the threats right now, and the most significant threat is China building strategic air and space capabilities to challenge the United States in the Pacific,” Gen Hyten said. “The second is Russia, which is probably even more concerning in the near-term. Russia has realized the American way of war depends on space capabilities and that’s why President Vladimir Putin has threatened to deploy and perhaps employ a nuclear weapon in low-Earth orbit.” 

A Changing Threat Landscape in Space 

Russia’s threat to deploy a nuclear weapon in space comes in response to the United States’ shift toward proliferated architectures in the domain.  

“Russia spent an enormous amount of treasure and time building a direct ascent anti-satellite [ASAT] capability that would take out one satellite,” Gen Hyten said. “But then in the early stages of the Ukranian conflict, a commercial company with a proliferated satellite architecture essentially rendered the ASAT capability useless. Now, Putin has to threaten that capability with a nuclear weapon because he’s got nothing else in the inventory, so we need to pay attention to what our adversaries are doing to fill any voids.” 

Therefore, as the nature of warfare and the threat landscape has changed, so too should the budgeting process. 

“The first thing an adversary will do is take out the ‘eyes and ears’ of the United States in space,” Gen Hyten said. “This will be followed by cyber influence and chemical or biological warfare that will insert doubt into the American population about our military’s ability to achieve its objectives. Then an adversary will challenge the United States with military force because now the doubt is across the American people. That’s how conflict could start and defending ourselves against those threats should be the highest priorities reflected in the budget.” 

Defense Spending Declines Undercut Strategy 

Further exacerbating this shortfall in necessary funding, however, is the broader decline in recent defense spending by the United States Congress. In 2022, U.S. defense spending came in at just over 3.4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the Congressional Budget Office forecasts this decrease will continue toward 2.5% GDP by 2034. For context, these percentages are lower than the running 4.2% average for total defense spending in the United States over the past half-century.  

“The FY25 budget request being essentially flat was a huge failure, and even Former Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall said the Space Force budget should probably double,” Gen Armagno said. “Every indication is that the Space Force budget needs to grow, because the Space Force is acquiring new capabilities and new technologies for new missions. Any delay to those Space Force programs is significant, particularly for its support to the entire joint force.” 

The budget process begins with developing a strategy based on the threat, but when there is not enough funding to acquire the capabilities needed to fulfill the strategy’s broader goals, difficult decisions must be made on prioritizing certain programs or capabilities. This results in program cuts that can compromise the joint force. 

“We learned in the early days of standing up the Space Force that there were tough choices for funding the new service,” Gen Armagno said. “For example, we prioritized Space Domain Awareness under a strategy called ‘Pivot to SDA.’ But we soon realized that there were competing space priorities and requirements from the other military services and Congress, against limited available funding. Without the appropriate funding, our budgets for ground-based radars and optical telescopes necessary for SDA got cut.” 

DOD, Congress Can Overcome Budget Challenges 

However, solutions exist for Congress and the DOD to effectively adapt its budget and force structure so that the United States can secure its national and economic security interests in space. 

“Congress writes the law that the president signs into action, but any law can be changed,” Gen Hyten said. “People think the acquisition program is inflexible. But the Federal Acquisition Regulations are the compilation of all the laws that have passed over the decades, and Congress can change the law for the benefit of the country. If the DOD educates Congress on what they’re trying to accomplish, Congress will do their utmost best to include those imperatives in the budget.” 

Gen Armagno points to two recent examples that reflect how the DOD and Congress previously worked together to overcome budget challenges to acquire necessary space capabilities: the Space Force’s Silent Barker program and former Secretary Kendall’s request for “Quick Start” approval for Resilient-GPS under a continuing resolution.  

“When I worked space programs in the Air Force, we successfully communicated with Congress and their staffers regarding a space-based situational awareness program called ‘Silent Barker,’ so Congress understood its priority and the acquisition strategy before the program was even announced,” Gen Armagno said. “Then another example is former Secretary Kendall working with Congress to get an exception to the ‘no new start’ rule under a continuing resolution for Resilient-GPS in the FY24 budget. It was a great idea, and more of that work needs to happen in working with the Hill, because laws can be changed.” 

Iron Dome Highlights Need to Fund Space Imperatives 

Now, a recently issued executive order from the Trump administration, “The Iron Dome for America,” will also require significant investment in space-based capabilities that must be incorporated into the Space Force budget. This new effort only strengthens the imperative for adapting the DOD’s budget and force structure according to the modern threat environment.  

“You can’t shoot anything you can’t see, so the first priority will be to build an integrated terrestrial and space-based surveillance system to see and characterize all the ballistic and hypersonic cruise missiles that threaten America,” Gen Hyten said. “Then you have to build a capability to attack multiple targets with ground-based, naval-based and air-based systems to neutralize those incoming threats, so you don’t have to respond in kind with nuclear weapons.”  

General Hyten points to further solutions already proposed in the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States in 2023. 

“The Missile Defense Agency needs to divest itself of all production and sustainment programs to the appropriate Military Departments. This means the Missile Defense Agency can just focus on the research and development for the long-term missile defense capabilities of the future. This can be done in the FY26 budget, but not if a majority of the MDA is focused on production sustainment and not on innovative moves toward the future.” 

Balancing the national security needs against the threat, so that they’re reflected in the budget, represents the complex problems Elara Nova and its partners are prepared to provide solutions for.  

“The budget must reflect the threat that’s out there today, and we need Space Force Guardians that understand the entire space enterprise,” Gen Hyten said.  “Elara Nova partners fill a critical void in providing that experience, expertise and analytic capability to developing the enterprise approach necessary for establishing the United States’ national and economic security in space.” 

Elara Nova is a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/. 

Episode 22: Department of Defense Budget Must Realign to Space-Based Threats

The Elara Edge: Expert Insights on Space Security

Host: Scott King

SME: Gen (Ret) John E. Hyten, Senior Principal Advisor at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy (JH)

Lt Gen (Ret) Nina Armagno, Executive Director of International Partnerships at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy (NA)

00:02 – 01:43

The United States Space Force requested $29.4 billion for Fiscal Year 2025, a two percent drop from the previous year. The final budget, however, has yet to be passed as the federal government is currently operating under what’s known as a “Continuing Resolution.” 

This is a reality the Space Force has become familiar with. For half of its existence – or about thirty of the past sixty months since the Space Force was founded – the military’s newest service has been operating under a Continuing Resolution.

The Space Force was founded in response to the threatening actions of near-peer competitors in space. But without the appropriate funding to build and maintain a strong and capable Space Force, the national and economic security of the United States remains at risk.

However, even the traditional Department of Defense approach to building and resourcing its force structure, which begins with the budget, leaves the Space Force with only a marginal amount of the funding it needs. 

Welcome to the Elara Edge: Expert Insights on Space Security,” I’m your host Scott King. I’m joined today by retired General John Hyten, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Senior Principal Advisor at Elara Nova: The Space Consulantcy, as well as retired Lieutenant General Nina Armagno, the first director of staff with the United States Space Force and executive director of international partnerships at Elara Nova.

Together, they co-wrote a recent opinion editorial, published by SpaceNews, stating that it’s time to re-focus the DOD budget away from legacy programs to resource against the modern, space-based threat.

General Hyten, Sir, welcome to the show!

01:44 – 01:46

JH: It’s great to be here.

It’s great to be with General Armagno, always.

01:47 – 01:49

And General Armagno, thank you for taking the time to be here today.

01:50 – 01:51

NA: Thank you. Scott.

01:52 – 02:14

As of our recording today, Congress and the DOD are operating under what’s known as a “Continuing Resolution.” This is in lieu of a passed budget for Fiscal Year 2025. 

Now, many in our audience are likely familiar with Continuing Resolutions, but for those who aren’t, let’s set the table here:

What is a Continuing Resolution? And how does it affect the Space Force’s overall budgeting and planning process?

02:15 – 03:12

JH: So a Continuing Resolution real simply is the fact that we don’t have a budget for this fiscal year. Therefore, the Continuing Resolution said we will comply with last year’s budget limits and budget programs, which means no new starts can happen.

Which means any changes in budget can’t be done because we have to operate at last year’s budget level. That means any relatively new program that started the last couple of years probably has a required budget increase that is needed in order to deliver the capability. That budget increase can’t be executed because it hasn’t been passed by Congress.

Therefore, all of these programs are delayed. The inefficiencies waste of billions of dollars of taxpayers’ money, and most importantly, from our perspective, you can’t deliver the required capability that we need for the nation because we can’t fund the programs and so many space programs in today’s day and age, are in that – that category of we need additional funding in order to execute and we can’t execute them.

03:13 – 03:52

NA: And if you look at the Space Force budget in particular, you’re probably looking at about a $4 billion deficit, but that doesn’t tell the full story. The full story is the impact on the new starts as General Hyten just mentioned. And for a new service trying to consolidate capabilities from across the other services – that’s one thing.

But what the Space Force is really working on are new capabilities, using new technologies for new missions and the impact to delaying those programs is significant, not just for the Space Force, but the entire joint force and our nation.

03:53 – 04:23

JH: It’s kind of a little bit of a Catch-22.

We actually build our budgets assuming that Congress passes a budget on time. So that come the 1st of October, with the new budget, the new program is executed on the 1st of October. Here it is, the middle of February, soon to be March, and there’s no budget. That means the last six months we’ve been wasting time and money because of the law that says there will be a budget on the 1st of October, we build our budgets assuming that there will be there on the 1st of October. So it’s a little bit of a Catch-22 because they’re never there.

04:24 – 05:02

NA: And so guess what the entire Pentagon has been working on assuming the new budget’s going to be passed? They’re already working on 2026. I mean, that whole thing’s probably being blown up by new presidential priorities, of course. But traditionally the approach is it’s typically carved out to be a third, a third, a third. A third goes to the Army, a third goes to the Department of the Navy, which includes the Navy and the Marine Corps. A third goes to the Department of the Air Force, which is Air Force and Space Force, roughly. But the newest service in town only garners about three percent of the overall DOD budget and has been flat over the last year. This is harmful.

05:03 – 06:06

JH: And the other piece of that puzzle that really hurts the Department of the Air Force is that the Air Force in their budget, is the only service that has a pass-through element of the budget.

That pass-through element I think in the 25 budget was roughly $45 billion. That goes straight to the intelligence community. That doesn’t come to the Air Force. It was put in the Air Force a long time ago when that budget was hidden from the world. Nobody knew that budget exists. Everybody knows that budget exists right now. In fact, we can pull out the Air Force budget, and look at it.

So when you go one third, one third, one third, the Air Force one third includes $45 billion for somebody else. So we actually don’t have, we the Department of the Air Force, don’t have one third. We have about one fifth and when you actually are trying to build an Air Force, that’s why we have ancient airplanes. I mean, the newest B-52 is like 63 years old.

We can’t build our new space capabilities because they’re paying other people’s bills, and it’s almost untenable. But you basically can’t have an Air Force and you can’t have a Space Force unless you change that fundamental structure.

06:07 – 06:29

Funding for the Space Force has increased year-over-year since its inception. The outlier, however, is the latest budget request for Fiscal Year 2025, which came in at about $600 million less than the previous year. 

If passed that way, this budget request would still put funding for the Space Force at around $29 billion. But even so, is that enough?

06:30 – 07:33

NA: No, it’s not enough. What is the actual number? Well, I don’t have it. But I’m sure it’s not enough. This is a service that’s barely five years old. Every indication is that it needs to grow. 

I hear today there’s a ceiling on the Space Force budget. We are flat-lined and I know decisions are very difficult within the Space Force and within the Department of the Air Force.

But I don’t believe that flat-lining the Space Force should have been one of those decisions. I know Secretary Kendall has said right before he left that the Space Force budget should probably double, but perhaps he had an opportunity to, at the very least, put some more funds into 2025. There are nuances. I know there’s a story behind the story, I get it.

But the service hasn’t been around long enough to have those deep relationships with staffers on the Hill, or within the Pentagon. And I think some of that lack of experience contributed to this flat budget.

07:34 – 08:51

JH: To me, the defense budget should be all about ‘How do we respond to the threats of the world? Right now, the most significant pacing threat that we have is China. China is basically building air and space capabilities and strategic capabilities to challenge the United States in the Pacific.

The second one is Russia. Probably even more concerning in the near term. They’re building the same thing. Why have they been building those things? They’ve been building those things because they realized the American way of war depends on air and space capabilities, period.

Therefore, seems to me like the threat demands an increase in air and space capabilities, an increase in naval air and deployment capabilities. And the third priority would be the United States Army. If you look at the numbers, it’s actually the reverse, which means, and don’t get me wrong, the Army is critical in the Middle East, will be critical in anything to do with Russia. 

But if we’re going to deal with the threats we have to do, you shouldn’t see a declining budget. You should see an increasing budget. 

And so it bothers me when the threat does not drive our requirements. When it’s all about the threat. I would expect to see a robust capability to defend the capabilities we have on-orbit and deny adversaries the use of capabilities against our forces on the ground, at sea, and in the air and I don’t see that.

08:52 – 09:04

And with respect to the role of space-based capabilities in joint military operations, how might an under-resourced or under-funded Space Force adversely affect its ability to support the other services like the Army and the Navy?

09:05 – 09:53

NA: Space is used in every operational mission. Certainly every joint operational mission. Every single day, the other services use capabilities from space. Just think of satellite communications, GPS, weather, missile warning. These are fundamental capabilities that all of our operations, our plans. We rely on the fact that they’re going to be there. With a flat budget and other priorities coming down, especially now from a new administration.

And I’ve seen those hard choices. I’ve seen the Space Force and the Air Force have to make very hard choices about those capabilities. You know, what gets funded? So you certainly can’t make everybody happy. But it’s even worse when you’re not even starting on a level playing field.

09:54 – 10:49

JH: So you kind of put two and two together and you see it as up to three.

And the reason is because the bills that General Armagno just described for PNT, comm, missile warning, all of those bills have to be paid and they have to be paid upfront because every military service requires them. Now we’ve moved into a contested world in space where we have to worry about somebody threatening us in space, threatening those capabilities that I just described that are the must-pay bills. 

And so the Space Force lays in the capabilities that are needed to go do that offense, defense, fires however you want to describe it. They lay in those capabilities. And then we can’t get a budget, because Congress won’t pass a budget and so all of that money that is programmed can’t be used.

And then the waste in the Space Force budget is astronomical, no pun intended, because of that same issue. That’s why when you add two and two, you get three because you have the must-pay bill and then you have the inefficiencies put in, because we don’t have a budget.

10:50 – 11:04

And, Sir, you mentioned the need for the DOD to pay their bills upfront – which leads into my next question.

Can each of you elaborate on the role that Congress plays in this process, and how can the DOD work with Congress to streamline these efforts to receive the funding that it needs?

11:05 – 12:54

NA: The budget gets sent over to Congress. But then what Congress says, and I think to this day, though, they will tell you – they get the president’s budget and they throw it in the trash and they start over with their own priorities. The president’s budget is not literally in the trash. I mean, it is the foundation of what the executive is posturing for and supporting and trying to get Congress to align.

Then come posture hearings where the Department of Defense and all the other, most senior leaders of our government, come to the Hill and it’s a parade of briefings. 

Following that is lots of engagement and what I found in trying to fight for programs and advocate for budget, for the space programs in the Air Force when I was part of AQS. General Hyten and also led AQS earlier in his career, the acquisition for space, essentially in the Department of the Air Force. I found that bringing them in early, bringing the staffers into program briefings, your acquisition strategies and plans to help them understand what you’re going after.

I found that to be very helpful. We did it very deliberately with a program called “Silent Barker,” which is space-based space situational awareness. So satellites in-orbit that can also monitor that very domain and I found that this was a program that the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office were working together at the direction of Congress.

The best thing we did, was we went to the Hill, talked to staffers before the program was even announced, or certainly approved, and they certainly felt like – and they were – part of the program from day one and part of the decision-making.

12:55 – 14:51

JH: So Congress’s number one job is the power of the purse to pass a budget. That’s their job, not the president’s job, not the Supreme Court, the Congress of the United States, the Senate and House of Representatives together have to come up with a budget.

Now, they’re supposed to come up with a budget by 1 October. So they lay in a series of briefings. General Armagno called them “posture hearings.” They lay those posture hearings, usually for a Combatant Command like STRATCOM or Space Command or Central Command or Indo-Pacific Command. They lay those posture hearings in usually early March. You have the Secretary of Defense usually comes in the posture hearings in late February or early March kind of leading the way.

Then you have the Combatant Commanders after that, then you have the services come in. And the job of all those people, the SECDEF, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Deputy Secretary, the Vice Chairman, all the Combatant Commanders, and then the services is to defend the president’s budget to Congress. The schedule is the schedule. You’re going to go ahead and schedule those things.

I can’t tell you how difficult it is as both a major command commander, then a Combatant Commander, and then the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to have to go testify to Congress on the president’s budget when no president’s budget was submitted to Congress, because the schedule is going to be the schedule, and everybody thinks the budget’s going to be there other then it’s not, then you have to stand and answer all their questions on these future programs when you have no budget. So when the budget does come over, then you basically have to do it all again.

What General Armagno described is a great way to do it. You bring the staffers over, you educate them as fast as you can, but you’re behind the game trying to get to October 1st, and then you do this every year.

So the waste that goes to the taxpayers is horrible. But the education of the Congress, which is the job of the Department, I mean, we don’t lobby, but we have to educate Congress on what we need – that is damaged tremendously when the leadership of the Department can’t talk about their priorities to Congress because they don’t know what they are yet, because the president hasn’t decided. So it’s, it’s just a raw mess.

14:52 – 15:07

Here I’d like to lean into each of your respective careers and experiences working with the budgeting process.

Starting with General Hyten, Sir, can you share some insights from your experience as the former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

How can we overcome some of these budget challenges?

15:08 – 16:15

JH: The first thing I’ll say is that as a whole, Congress has become dysfunctional the last ten years. But the amazing thing to me that surprised me in all my three four-star jobs, Space Command, Strategic Command, and Vice Chairman was how much each member of Congress, Senate and House of Representatives were interested in educating themselves and trying to do the right thing to build the budget that they have to do.

And when you take the time to go talk to the members and talk to their staffs on a frequent basis, they will work hard to do the right thing for the country, and things will end up in the bills that you think are impossible, because they really it’s just this tight margin between the Republicans and Democrats in Congress.

It makes moving things as a whole very difficult. But if you take the time to actually go across the river and explain to Congress what you’re trying to do, they will do their absolute upmost best to include those things in the budget, and you can move these things forward. We could actually move fairly quickly, if we could solve this overall problem of passing the budget on time.

16:16 – 16:22

Thank you, Sir. And to take it one step further – is there a particular program or specific experience that really encapsulates this effort?

16:23 – 17:34

JH: An initiative that we had when General Ellen Pawlikowski was Commander of Space and Missile System Center. I was AQS, head of acquisition of the Pentagon. Our desire was to buy more than one satellite at a time in production and that was against the law. The law said, if you go to production, you have to fully fund that program.

Well, fully funding a satellite program back then, it was a multi-billion dollar satellite. And I’ll just make up numbers. And it was for the Space-Based Infrared System, the Advanced EHF system. If we paid for one, it would cost roughly $2 billion. If we paid for two, it cost us $3 billion.

In other words, a billion and a half dollars a satellite. So we could save the taxpayer $1 billion each on both of those programs. So we could save the taxpayer $2 billion if we could just spread the funding out to buy two. But that would cause a change in the law. But General Pawlikowski and I, we spent tons of time on the Hill educating both the staff and the members of Congress.

What would happen if we did that? And son of a gun. When the law came out, they changed the law to allow us to do that for those programs. That was remarkable.

17:35 – 18:05

NA: Another example, last Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary Kendall, worked with Congress on the law that says there should be no new starts under a Continuing Resolution and he was able to get an exception.

There was a new program the Space Force wanted to start. I think it was a Replacement GPS or some smaller program, and that was being used to kind of test out the new exception to the law and more of that kind of work needs to happen, because laws can be changed.

18:06 – 18:47

JH: That’s the thing to remember, because the Congress writes the law, the president signs them into action. Any law can be changed. People think the acquisition program is inflexible, that there’s only one way through the process. This is the way it’s going to be.

If you actually read the Federal Acquisition Regulations, which are basically the compilation of all the laws that have passed over the last number of decades, on how you buy things, pretty much every way you want to buy something is included in the law. 

And oh, by the way, if it’s not, all you have to do is get Congress to change it, which means the right person, or the right military leader has to go over and explain. And then Congress can and does on many occasions change the law for the benefit of the country.

18:48 – 19:01

Now, General Armagno, you served as the first director of staff at the United States Space Force, where you had a hand in crafting the very first Space Force budget. 

So, Ma’am, what perspectives can you share from this first-hand experience?

19:02 – 21:06

NA: Well, it was really difficult to build the first Space Force budget because there was really nobody in the Pentagon yet. General Thompson was leading a team of maybe 30 of us.

I was asked to come over as a two-star to help him and everyone else, all of our expertise, all of our ‘budgeteers,’ if you will. Was back at Air Force Space Command in Colorado Springs. So we really had to communicate well. It starts with a strategy. You start with trying to fulfill your overarching strategy and goals for the service.

Brand-new service. A lot of that wasn’t yet defined. As a service, you start with budget guidance. Now, we did get that guidance from General Raymond. You take the guidance and then you realize when you’re done with this process, there’s way more that you want to pay for that you want to do than you could ever possibly finance it.

So there’s a lot of competing requirements coming from other services. Congress as well, has their favorite programs and projects. 

And so one example of how hard it is to pivot your budget. There was a recognition, especially during that time, that space domain awareness was so crucial and important for our new Command, U.S. Space Command.

It was important to their planning, to their missions. And the Space Force coined a term ‘Pivot to SDA.’ But I saw, especially in those budget deliberations, I saw that SDA, especially the ground-based radars and optical telescopes, were talking about space-based systems as I just mentioned, Silent Barker. I saw those budgets get cut. I mean, they just couldn’t stand up to the pressure of the other things that the Space Force was trying to do so early on snd so even if your strategy and the guidance is written as ‘Pivot to SDA,’ if there’s no money behind that, there’s not much of a pivot.

21:07 – 21:47

Thank you, Ma’am. Now this declining budget request is also indicative of a broader trend that we’ve been witnessing in defense spending over the years.

In 2022, U.S. defense spending came in at just over 3.4 percent of our GDP, or Gross Domestic Product. The Congressional Budget Office forecast that this spending will continue to decrease by another percentage point by 2034. 

That would put our defense spending at nearly half of the running average of 4.2 percent of GDP Congress has traditionally allocated for defense spending over the last half century. 

From your perspectives, what has triggered these broader declines in defense spending from Congress?

21:48 – 22:51

NA: The national debt is a problem. We also see rising non-discretionary fund needs. We see an aging population that needs to be cared for. And when you see how large the defense budget is, there have been efforts along the way to decrease the DOD budget. I remember something called “Sequestration,” back in 2012, 2013, 2014 time rame, which was a ten percent budget cut for ten years that the Congress passed into law.

Yeah, I know the DOD has a big budget, but I can tell you from somebody, a commander on the ground, it was really difficult basically cutting programs that were non-mission, but they were the the essence of what made a base, a community, for example, or the Air Force feel like they were part of a community.

And I think today you see just different changing congressional priorities and you see a focus on the perceived and probably real bloat across our entire government budget. That’s what I see.

22:52 – 24:30

JH: I see it that way, plus a little different. I agree with everything that General Armagno said. But the little different comes from, well, two things. And these are things that former bosses taught me.

And since I’m going to quote them, I’ll tell you they were. General Mattis once said, “America’s the richest country in the world. We should be able to afford survival. We should pay the bills that we have to pay in order to do that.” 

But then it was General Bob Koehler when I think he was at STRATCOM, when he said that because the budget at the time was $700 billion, he said, you know, if you talk to the average guy in the street and and say, you know, the defense budget is $700 billion, 700 billion with a ‘B,’ they would assume that we have a pretty darn awesome defense for the $700 billion.

We’re approaching a trillion now and right now, we are the least efficient acquisition bureaucracy that I’ve ever experienced. We pay sometimes ten times more than we need to for something. We keep things around much longer than we need them. We waste enormous amounts of money through Continuing Resolutions, and if we actually spent our money correctly, that amount would be plenty to build a defense.

But there’s so much waste and you started this discussion with the Continuing Resolution. That’s money you never get back. That’s just gone. So we got to stop wasting money. We got to get rid of bloated bureaucracies. We have to delegate decisions down to lower levels so people can make decisions and move quickly and effectively energize our budget. 

So number one, we should pay the money we need to pay for survival. And number two, when we see waste, we should kill it.

24:31 – 24:40

So where do we go from here? What needs to happen not only with regard to the budget for FY25? But for the defense budget process as a whole moving forward?

24:41 – 25:22

JH: You know, everybody thinks that the president’s budget is the budget. It’s not, it’s just the start of the discussion. So the actual budget, what goes to space in FY25 will be decided by the Congress. I know that the current administration is going through a quick re-look at the 25 budget to come up with what I would hope they make some different recommendations that were in the previous version.

And then Congress has the opportunity to change things, and I would hope they would do it strategically with regard to the threat. And if they do that, the budget will align where it needs to be. But there’s a lot of political pressures from local communities all the way up to the companies that actually have the work, that will put huge pressure on it.

But if I had one thing to say, it would just be focus on the threat. If it doesn’t respond to the threat we shouldn’t be doing.

25:23 – 25:57

NA: I totally agree with that. And I just wanted to highlight that Representative Bacon, who as a Congressman in Nebraska, he wrote an opinion recently where he says enough about talking about innovation and working on new technology.

And I think it kind of goes along with what General Hyten and saying he wants tough choices to be made based on priorities. Those priorities should be based on the threat. But he says it’s time to actually set priorities. Congress fund those priorities and move out quickly on producing systems.

25:58 – 26:32

JH: If I was Secretary of Defense, and thank goodness I’m not, but if I were Secretary of defense and I went to my posture hearing before a budget was even submitted, perhaps I would do nothing but talk about the threats and the capabilities that are required to deal with the threats.

Somehow we forget that that’s what we’re all about. Our job is to defend the nation against all threats. Everybody that wears the uniform, everybody that serves in government, swears an oath to the Constitution and embedded in that is the ability to defend the United States.

And if we’re doing things that don’t. I would say stop that and reprioritize against the threat that should inform Congress where the budget has to go.

26:33 – 27:02

NA: And as the threat changes, which we’ve seen it change over the last ten years to the point where there’s a theory that the next war will begin in space, the next war will begin in cyber. It’ll be unseen. It won’t be somebody crossing a border. It won’t be a build up along a border.

It won’t be a bullet fired. It will be in the space domain and therefore a restructuring of our national defense is probably in order here.

27:03 – 28:25

JH: If I was an adversary like China or Russia, looking at the United States, you don’t have to be a military scholar or a historian to say, if I was going to start a conflict with the United States, what’s the first thing I have to do?

It’s not actually attack the United States. The first thing I have to do is I have to insert doubt into the American population about our ability to achieve our objectives. I don’t do that with a military confrontation because the American people – rightly – believe and trust the United States military will dominate anybody on a battlefield. And oh, by the way, we will.

That’s not the way you start. First you take our eyes, ears, that’s space. Then you influence cyber to incur doubt. Then you attack the United States through chemical and biological warfare that nobody can see. Nobody can figure out where they’re coming from. And if you look at the way we responded to COVID in the not very coordinated activity we had responding to a COVID virus, all you have to do is insert that doubt, and then you challenge the United States with military force because now the doubt is across the American people.

So it’s not through the Army or the Navy or even through the Air Force originally. It’s through space, cyber, chemical and biological warfare that’s unattributable and those things we actually don’t do very well defending ourselves right now and that should be one of the highest priorities we have, because that’s how conflict would start.

28:26 – 28:41

Thank you, Sir, and in response to how the nature of warfare is changing. 

What are some of the technologies, capabilities, and mission areas that the Space Force needs to prioritize in communicating with Congress so their funding efforts can be resourced appropriately?

28:42 – 29:33

NA: Well, you can look at it in basically two buckets. One bucket, what is needed to fight tonight in space, but in support of every other domain. That would be capabilities like anti-jam communications, protected PNT – position, navigation and timing.

And then there’s another bucket. What about a war that extends to space? What about a war in space? Those technologies definitely are being discussed at classified levels, but we can talk about the vulnerabilities of satellites and vulnerabilities in the space domain. 

Satellites have no defenses. Zero. None. Well, one technology would be on-board sensing – an on-board sensor that could simply provide a satellite its own warning or its own sensing of something nearby or an approaching threat.

29:34 – 30:51

JH: So I was lucky enough to serve at the four-star level for a long time, through three different administrations. And without going into detail, which would be inappropriate for so many reasons, classification as well as discussion with presidents, I’ll say with the three presidents I worked for directly: President Obama, President Trump and President Biden.

At some point during that time, I had a discussion with them about offense and defense. At some point in the discussion, they would look at me and say, all three of them, right? Now think, President Obama, President Trump, President Biden, three different people as you can imagine, but they would look at me and hold me accountable, rightly so in saying, ‘Didn’t you tell me years ago that we needed to build a more resilient space architecture because we don’t have the ability to defend ourselves? And then that would change the whole discussion about offense and defense, if we had a resilient space architecture. How come you haven’t built a resilient space architecture?’ 

And by the time I got to President Biden, that had been going on for like ten years. But it was the same question from three different presidents, three different things.

You said multiple times, we need a resilient architecture, and then you don’t build it. Now we’re building it, slowly because the status quo still wins in the discussions. But, again, it’s all about the threat.

30:52 – 31:27 

NA: And looking at the threat, it’s also very difficult to defend 1 v 1. So Russia, China proliferating on the ground, for example, anti-satellite capabilities, jamming capabilities, to counter 1 v 1 would be a fool’s errand. It would be very expensive.

And so it’s out-thinking your adversary out-maneuvering your adversary and putting capabilities in motion and funding them, most importantly to counter. But it can’t be platform centric. It has to be mission-area centric.

31:28 – 32:59

JH: So I’m looking at some of the things are adversaries do and learning from that is important.

A couple years ago, in the early phases of the Ukraine crisis, Vladimir Putin threatened to deploy and perhaps employ a nuclear weapon in low-Earth orbit. Everybody says that’s nuts. Why would he do that? Well, let’s think about what they’ve been trying to do in counter space. They spent an enormous amount of Russian treasure and time building a direct ascent anti-satellite capability that would take out one satellite.

And then they deployed that basically to threaten us. And then in the early stages of the Ukrainian conflict, a commercial company proliferated across the heavens, is being used against them. And that direct ascent ASAT they spent enormous treasure to build – tens or hundreds of millions of dollars to take out a ten or $100,000 satellite that doesn’t do anything to damage it.

So what’s the only option he has to actually threaten that capability? A nuclear weapon in low-Earth orbit, which is the dumbest thing in the world to do. It impacts them. It impacts us, impacts the world – it’s horrible. He’s got no way else to threaten us. 

We need to pay attention to what they’re doing, what works and what doesn’t work, and fill the void in the criteria so we never are in the point where we would ever consider what we did in the 1960s, which was build a nuclear-tipped ASAT capability. We did that in the 60s. That’s horrible. But we need to be smart about what we do and learn from our adversaries.

33:00 – 33:21

NA: And, you know, it’s not 1 v 1. It’s not space versus space. We can counter our adversaries from other domains.

We can counter our adversaries by using the levers of national power, like diplomacy, information – yes – military might, but also economic power. So there are many, many ways to get after this problem.

33:22 – 33:42

JH: There’s no such thing as war on space. There’s only war and all tools of the government, so if somebody attacked us in space, I want the adversary to know we may not come back in like we come back in a different way that will be more damaging to you than what you just created to us, because the goal is to win the conflict. The goal is not to win the battle.

33:43 – 34:11

Thank you. 

Now, I want to leave time for another major recent development that will have significant budget implications. And that is the Trump administration’s executive order, titled “The Iron Dome for America.” 

This order directs an assessment for a missile defense system for the United States homeland, while also signalling that space will play a big role in this initiative.

So can each of you elaborate on the role of space and what Space Force programs might be involved in this Iron Dome?

34:12 – 36:27

JH: So the first thing to say is that I would recommend that anybody listening to this go back and look at the Strategic Posture Commission Report of 12 bipartisan people that met a couple of years ago and came up with recommendations for missile defense that even talked about coercive threats against Russia and China, that we needed to have a defensive capability for that.

And a lot of that has turned into what President Trump is calling an Iron Dome for America and I think that’s good. But the first thing you have to realize that if you’re going to have any kind of missile defense capability, you can’t shoot anything you can’t see.

So the first thing you have to do is be able to see the threat and characterize it. Right now, the threat is moving from just a ballistic threat that we can see pretty well to cruise missile and hypersonic threats that we can’t see very well. So the first priority to deal with those threats will have to be to build surveillance systems to deal with that.

Now some of those surveillance systems will be terrestrial, but most of those will be space-based, and they’ll have to be changed. And some of those, by their very nature, will have to be low to see the dim targets that are going to be cruise missiles and hypersonics. So coming up with an integrated architecture of ground and space to be able to see and characterize all the missile threats that threaten America is the first step to an Iron Dome.

The second piece is that we have to go after the rogue states, the North Koreas and Iran and make sure we can defend ourselves against that. And then the coercive threat from Russia and China, which is a low number of low-yield weapons, threatened to be used like in Ukraine to change the equation because we don’t have a like capability to respond to that.

Wouldn’t it be great if we had a small number of defense capabilities in order to take out those capabilities, so we didn’t have to respond in kind with a nuclear weapon? 

Now, those capabilities can be broadly built, using ground -based, air-based, naval-based systems in order to deal with those kind of threats, but ultimately to get to an Iron Dome for America, you have to get to a capability that can attack many targets with one capability, because otherwise you get to the problem we were talking about earlier with the ASAT capability.

You’ll never be able to build enough interceptors, so ultimately, on the weapons side, to achieve the vision that President Trump has defined, you’re going to have to move into space.

36:28 – 37:12

NA: From what I’ve read, the Defense Department is taking this in phases. They know they can’t build the whole thing today with today’s technologies and today’s budget.

So we know that current systems will certainly participate in the Iron Dome. Our current missile warning systems, even though they can’t see all threats. Those will be part of this architecture. Our strategic communications systems in space will be part of this architecture. The Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture that the Space Development Agency is building will be enhanced and part of this architecture as well.

So it remains to be seen exactly how it all will fit together in the end. But they do realize that they’re going to use what we have and build upon it.

37:13 – 37:37

JH: That’s why I recommend the Strategic Posture Commission and I have to admit, I was one of the authors.

So, you know, it’s somewhat self-serving. But what we laid out was the phased approach. What you do near-term, what you do in the mid-term, and then what you do in the far-term in terms of technologies to change the game and everybody on the commission agreed with those recommendations, which tells me that’s a pretty good starting point.

37:38 – 37:58 

Now, the executive order also states that funding for this Iron Dome for America should be included in the Fiscal 26 budget request. As we mentioned before, we currently don’t even have a budget for 2025. 

So what needs to happen to make this a reality to incorporate such a monumental effort such as this Iron Dome, into the Fiscal 26 budget?

37:59 – 38:42

JH: So the first thing that has to happen is the Missile Defense Agency needs to divest itself of all production and sustainment programs, period. Which means they don’t do any production sustainment, all they do is research and development. Then the services responsible for producing, sustaining THADD, Patriot, ground-based interceptors. All those capabilities that are out there and the Missile Defense Agency can just focus on: ‘What do we need in order to get to the long term future?’

And you lay in the capabilities of applied research and technology, basic research and technology all the way through in order to build that, you can actually do it in the 26 budget pretty easily, but not if 80 percent of your people are doing production sustainment, because if that’s your organization, your culture is production and sustainment, not innovative moves to the future.

38:43 – 39:20

NA: And to be sure, this will be very disruptive for the status quo that the Pentagon is used to and to some extent, the other services.

And if you bring it back to the role of Congress that we talked about as well. I read that Senate Republicans are proposing a $150 billion more for the defense budget for 26. 

Will that all go to the Iron Dome? Doubtful. And even if it did, there will still have to be tough choices and programs and projects that are killed among all services to afford to do what this very ambitious project is asking us to do.

39:21 – 40:11

JH: I assume it’s going to be the Missile Defense Agency. But however this team is formed, the Space Force needs to have active members on the team.

If you look at the UCP that’s out there right now, this integrated global surveillance mission is a Space Command mission, and therefore the Space Force is the primary service provider for that capability. So the Space Force needs to be heavily involved in that. 

And then as the threat gets played out in this group, the smart people in the Space Force should look at and say, you know, I’ll look at directed energy, I’ll look at kinetic energy, and I’ll look at all those things and they can do trades pretty quick because they have the capability to do that and say, this is what space could provide in those areas.

And then you could say, what is the technology readiness of it? So what would it take in order to improve technology readiness levels of those capabilities and lay those programs in to do that? If you have the right people in the room from the Space Force, they can lay all those pieces out and you can have an integrated approach.

40:12 – 40:20

Together, you also wrote an OpEd that was published recently by SpaceNews. What was the motivation behind writing that OpEd and why release it now?

40:21 – 41:20

JH: So, Scott, you can probably get my answer. It’s all about the threat. And we’re not responding to the threat, and the budget doesn’t reflect the threat that’s out there today. And we’re not making the right decisions as a nation for how are we going to deal with that threat? And because we’re not making the right decisions, we’re lagging in the capabilities as we need to deter this kind of threat. 

The last thing anybody in this country should want or anybody in this world should want, would be a war between the United States and China, or a war between the United States and Russia. 

Nothing good can come from that. But in order to deter you actually have to have real capabilities, and those capabilities have to be seen by the adversary, and they have to strike fear into the adversary, so they decide when it’s an opportunity to act or not. They make the decision, “Not today.” And that’s got to be every day going on to the future. 

And so the reason we we wrote the OpEd was to emphasize the point that resources are not being put in the right place, and we need to adjust where we’re putting the resources.

41:21 – 42:10

NA: They’re not. And actually, you know, failure to act is not an option. 

What China is doing in space: intercepting our satellites. That is a maneuver that brings us one satellite closer to another. It’s not stopping a mission or intercepting and turning something around like you would think in the air domain. An intercept is a very close pass. They’re doing this all the time to our satellites. They are practicing tactics and techniques.

They’re getting ready to do this to the United States. We can see not only their build up, we can see them practicing their TTPs. The threat is so very real and can be seen. Now the budget needs to be re-prioritized and re-worked to meet this reality.

42:11 – 42:28

Now, each of you represent Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy in various capacities. So how is Elara Nova and its team of partners and consultants, prepared to provide the experience and expertise necessary to build and maintain a strong and capable Space Force – a process that begins with the fiscal budget?

42:29 – 43:13

JH: I tell you what, we have some pretty spectacular Guardians right now that understand the pieces of the space capability.

But what we don’t have in large numbers are Guardians that understand the entire enterprise. What Elara Nova understands through the leadership and the folks that we’ve hired, is we understand the entire enterprise and how to bring enterprise capabilities together and integrate the “eaches” to build something that is much broader. We have consultants that do that. We have advisors that do that.

When you use Elara Nova, you get all of that capability. Right now, I believe, and I wouldn’t be involved with Elara Nova if I didn’t believe this, that we fill a critical void and the capability by providing that enterprise approach. I think that’s the unique thing that Elara Nova provides.

43:14 – 43:50

This has been an episode of The Elara Edge: Expert Insights on Space Security. As a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space domain, Elara Nova is your source for expertise and guidance in space security.

If you liked what you heard today, please subscribe to our channel and leave us a rating. Music for this podcast was created by Patrick Watkins of PW Audio. This episode was edited and produced by Regia Multimedia Services. I’m your host, Scott King, and join us next time at the Elara Edge.

The Rise of Commercial Space in Christian Davenport’s “The Space Barons”

Washington Post Reporter to Release New Book, “Rocket Dreams,” in 2025

Christian Davenport, a space industry and NASA reporter for The Washington Post, has announced a forthcoming book: “Rocket Dreams: Musk, Bezos, and the Inside Story of the New, Trillion-Dollar Space Race.” The new book, set to be released in the fall of 2025, picks up where his previous book “The Space Barons: Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos and the Quest to Colonize the Cosmos,” concluded seven years ago. While his journalism career began as a metropolitan reporter and editor covering local politics in Washington, D.C., it was Davenport’s experience as an embedded reporter in Iraq and Kuwait that enabled him to recognize a unique story idea that led to writing “The Space Barons,” during a 2014 press conference. 

“I was assigned to cover the military-industrial complex when, in 2014, Elon Musk held a press conference at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., to announce he was filing a lawsuit against the Pentagon, specifically the Air Force, for the right to compete for national security launch contracts,” Christian Davenport said. “But Musk started the press conference by talking about building a re-usable launch vehicle that would bring the booster back by catching it. I wrote the story about the lawsuit, but during my research into SpaceX’s efforts to develop reusable rockets I found that Jeff Bezos and Blue Origin were trying to do that, too.” 

At the time, the idea of a re-usable launch vehicle that would return to Earth was unproven. But Davenport took to heart an old journalism mantra that harkens back to Watergate: “Follow the money.” 

“If the richest people in the world are investing their money in space exploration and advancing state of the art launch technology, then we should be paying more attention to that,” Davenport said. “So I interviewed Elon, Jeff, as well as Richard Branson and Paul Allen, for ‘The Space Barons.’ But while each of them approached their space companies with very different mindsets, there is a common thread through all of them: to lower the cost of access to space.” 

A Starting Point for Commercial Space 

The billionaires’ ambitions were diverse: Musk wanted to colonize Mars, Bezos wanted to reduce human impact on the Earth and Branson licensed technology from Allen’s StarShipOne to establish suborbital tourism. Each of them self-funded their space company’s efforts to varying degrees, but it was Allen’s original aspirations to win the Ansari X prize that today is viewed as a catalyzing moment for commercial space. 

“The Ansari X Prize was a contest to see if a commercial venture can send a vehicle to the edge of space and back – twice – without government money,” Davenport said. “When Paul Allen and Burt Rutan, the famous inventor and aerospace engineer, came up with SpaceShipOne and won the Ansari X Prize, it was heralded at the time as a breakthrough moment for commercial space. But while it showed it could be done, we don’t have regular people going to the edge of space like originally envisioned.” 

Davenport’s “The Space Barons” also takes readers inside a 2006 Valentine’s Day conference where the billionaires gathered together to brainstorm how to move the commercial space industry forward.  

“Back then, it would have been fair to look at these space barons and say, ‘Commercial space is never going to happen,’” Davenport said. “Space is such an expensive and difficult proposition that requires immense expertise. So there were a lot of skeptics who thought space was always going to be an exclusively government enterprise. Yet, over time, the space barons persisted.” 

The motives behind the Valentine’s Day conference meeting have clear repercussions that still resonate today. 

“In a sense, they posed a question: ‘Is there a commercial space industry?’” Davenport said. “Well, the next book, Rocket Dreams, answers that question with a resounding ‘Yes,’ because anytime you put human beings in a commercially owned and operated rocket is a big deal. Today, we’re seeing a proliferation of a space market and a space economy beyond just the billionaires.”  

The Government’s Role in Commercial Space Growth 

A key shift in making today’s space market possible, however, was the actions government agencies made to facilitate the commercial space industry’s growth.  

“There was a willingness from the government, from NASA and the Pentagon, to outsource some tasks and space missions to the private sector,” Davenport said. “Today, that outsourcing seems routine, but that was a revolutionary change to trust the private sector with vital space missions that had always been part of the national enterprise. That was a significant paradigm shift that enabled the space industry to take off.”  

It took key government figures like NASA’s Mike Griffin or DARPA’s Tony Tether and Steve Walker to advocate for the government to embrace what was – at the time – a budding space industry.  

“In the context of the time, there were two space shuttle disasters and the end of the space shuttle program, which meant the United States government would rely solely on Russia to get our astronauts to the International Space Station,” Davenport said. “So government officials began thinking about doing something radically different to access space. It started with industry partners flying cargo and supplies to the International Space Station before flying astronauts – but it was an incremental approach that developed over time.” 

The Modern Commercial Space Industry 

Today, that once-emerging commercial space market has established itself as a projected $1.8 trillion space industry by 2035. As such, government agencies will be looking more and more to their commercial partners for a variety of space missions. 

“We’re seeing the space enterprise understand that if the commercial sector can fly astronauts to the space station, then maybe they should be the ones who land astronauts on the moon and build uncrewed spacecraft for scouting missions,” Davenport said. “The government can also get investors involved to help subsidize the cost of these missions. However, the commercial sector works by experimenting to move faster, which means at times they’re going to fail. So it will be interesting to see what the government tolerance level is for that.” 

The balance of success and failure can perhaps be described by two recent commercial space endeavors funded by NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) program. In early March, Firefly Aerospace landed their Blue Ghost spacecraft for a successful two-week mission, but Intuitive Machines’ Athena spacecraft had an imperfect landing that left much of its mission goals unfulfilled. 

“It’s a balance of how much risk are we willing to take, because whether it’s astronauts on-board or even the cargo and supplies needed to service those astronauts – the government requires success,” Davenport said. “Even SpaceX has recently had problems with its Falcon-9, Dragon and Starship spacecraft. So while we often celebrate the success of American innovation, some of these setbacks call into question how much government oversight there should be.”  

A New Space Race 

The government has a vested interest in the success of commercial space companies, primarily because the United States has once again found itself in a modern-day space race. 

“China has shown amazing progress for moon landings, as they are the first country to go to and bring samples back from the far side of the moon,” Davenport said. “They have a space station in low-Earth orbit and have operated a rover on Mars. But what many people don’t realize is there are no longer American flags on the moon. The flags from the Apollo era have been bleached white by the radiation and vacuum environment, meanwhile China has planted two flags: one made out of composite material specifically designed for space and another made with in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) technology so it can withstand the harsh space environment.” 

In “The Space Barons,” Davenport catalogued how the commercial space industry rose up to meet today’s space race needs by delineating the book in three sections: Impossible, Improbable, Inevitable. But now that the commercial space industry is well on its way, “Rocket Dreams” will showcase how these companies will reach their destinations and achieve their goals in the modern space race. 

“‘Impossible, Improbable, and Inevitable,’ encompass the narrative of ‘The Space Barons,’ but also the journey of space exploration in the commercial space sector,” Davenport said. “This next book, ‘Rocket Dreams,’ takes a more symbolic approach to its three sections: on the ground, on-orbit, and to the moon and beyond. The book ends more on ideas, because there’s a lot of questions being asked and certainly progress that is being made, but these unpredictable variables are what makes it an exciting time to be a part of the space industry.” 

Elara Nova is a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/. 

Episode 21: Quantum Technologies to Reinforce Position, Navigation and Timing Capability

The Elara Edge: Expert Insights on Space Security

Host: Scott King 

SME: Major General (Ret) Kim Crider, Founding Partner at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy (KC)

Lieutenant General (Ret) Harry Raduege, Partner at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy (HR)

00:02 – 01:52 

China’s rapid rise in quantum technology has triggered a call-to-action for the United States to accelerate their own investments in quantum research and development. According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Critical Technology Tracker, China surpassed the United States in quantum research back in 2021 and has been growing their lead ever since. 

This lead in published research can be an early indicator that China is on a faster pace toward adopting and deploying quantum technologies in space – which, in fact, China already demonstrated in 2016, when their MISIUS satellites used quantum technologies to encrypt its communication links. 

Now, nearly ten years later, China’s quantum efforts continue to advance – with plans to launch more quantum-equipped satellites in 2025. 

That’s why the United States must respond in kind. According to the Quantum Economic Development Consortium – or QED-C – a stakeholder group founded under the Quantum Initiative Act of 2018 – the United States must make greater investments in quantum research and development – and pointed to the immediate ways quantum technologies can specifically reinforce our Position, Navigation and Timing – or PNT – capabilities. 

Welcome to “The Elara Edge: Expert Insights on Space Security.” I’m your host, Scott King, and we have two guests today that are here to help us understand what quantum technology is – and how it can be applied to PNT and other space mission areas.  

Our first guest is retired Major General Kim Crider, Founding Partner at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy. General Crider previously served as the Chief Technology and Innovation Officer for the United States Space Force, and is returning to the show as one of our resident experts on emerging technologies like quantum.  

General Crider, welcome to the show! 

01:53 – 01:54 

KC: Thanks, Scott. It’s great to be back with you. 

01:55 – 02:16 

It’s great to have you back, Ma’am.  

And also joining us is retired Lieutenant General Harry Raduege. Before becoming a partner at Elara Nova, General Raduege served for 35 years in the United States Air Force, where he held roles as the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency, and Manager of the National Communications Systems. 

Sir, thanks for taking the time to join us today. 

02:17 – 02:18 

HR: Thanks for having me, Scott.

02:19 – 02:43 

Our primary topic today stems from a recent report by the Quantum Economic Development Consortium – titled “Quantum Sensing for Position, Navigation and Timing Use Cases.”  

But before we get into exactly what quantum technology is, I’d like to fully define the Position, Navigation and Timing mission, first. 

So what is PNT and how does it relate to a United States Space Force mission area?

 02:44 – 04:39 

KC: Yeah, thanks Scott. So position navigation and timing – PNT – is what it stands for. There are actually a number of technologies that we use to determine location, orientation and time associated with a particular asset. So when we think about position, we think about an asset’s location or orientation, either in two or three dimensions. 

When we think about navigation, we think about its current and desired position  – where it’s heading and any corrections to the course or to the orientation and the speed.  

And then when we think about timing, we need to understand a specific point in time, such as a coordinated universal time. We all  have these time standards. UTC is one time standard. So PNT applies different technologies through a variety of systems and processes to do just that, establish position, navigation and timing. 

Now, the primary way we do this is through what’s called the “Global Positioning System,” or GPS, and GPS is essentially a U.S. government system of satellites in space and receivers the ground, that when linked together – provides our PNT capability. G.P.S. basically transmits broadcast signals from satellites in space that contain, precise time information which allows GPS receivers on Earth to calculate its own position in terms of latitude, longitude, altitude, and then by measuring the travel time of those signals from multiple satellites, and does what we call a ‘triangulation,’ to pinpoint its location and enable synchronization with those satellites, and with those transmitters. 

So GPS is that system provided by the United States Space Force that delivers position, navigation and timing, but it’s driven by allowing receivers to calculate where they are and the time at which they are, and triangulate that from a variety of signals that are presented from that GPS constellation. 

04:40 – 06:00 

HR: Yeah. Scott, let me just add to that – in the military of PNT, we use it for tracking of friendly or what we refer to as ‘blue forces.’ We use it in accuracy and in precision bombing in the military against combatants, and very importantly, to avoid hitting civilians or historic places and monuments or other invaluable assets. 

We always think of GPS because we refer to it all the time when you’re driving your car, you’re in your boat, or you’re just on the ground hiking, you want your GPS receiver to receive that signal on your position. However, I learned a while back, during the Y2K roll over. 

That timing – it is actually the most critical part of GPS satellites. And let me just mention the fact that we move all the finances of the world economy using the timing of GPS and so seconds or small parts of seconds, difference in timing and clocks when you’re moving tens of thousands, trillions of money each day across the world economy, it would make a big difference if the timing is off just slightly. 

06:01 – 06:07 

So what threats exist to our GPS systems today? And how can these threats compromise our PNT capability? 

06:08 – 08:08 

KC: There’s a number of threats to position navigation and timing and to the systems that provide that. I’m sure General Raduege can speak on this as well, given his experience in operating these systems and ensuring their availability to joint operations. You can imagine that position, navigation and timing is absolutely critical to warfighting operations in addition to all of those industry sector needs that General Raduege was referring to: the ability to accurately know where troops are on the ground or at sea, the ability to communicate effectively in a time-synchronized environment, the ability to assure precise targeting is really important to all of our joint operations, to be able to work effectively and collectively, we need to have really strong PNT. 

But PNT is vulnerable to a number of threats. We know for certain that our GNSS, our Global Navigational Satellite System, which is essentially the system that delivers that capability through the Global Positioning System satellites – that that is jammed every single day. There’s jamming and spoofing of those signals every single day, where there is intentional interference with those signals that I was talking about earlier by relatively low-cost jammers that are not easily tracked, so that’s a real problem. 

Cyber attacks is also a challenge and we’ve seen that, you know, denial-of-service is a real challenge to PNT. And then of course, because these signals emanate from space, you’ve got a lot of challenges just by virtue of the fact that you’re operating in the space environment. There’s space weather that can be a factor.  

And then there’s the supply chain, which is certainly a challenge for many of our space systems that we rely on a very secure and assured supply chain for these capabilities. These satellites themselves, as well as the receivers on the ground or in the other domains. General Raduege, what else would you add? I’m sure you’ve seen some of these threats play out.

08:09 – 09:03 

HR: Sure. Absolutely. While all the ones that you’ve mentioned are with us every day, but we’ve had over the years, I have to say we’ve had constant improvements to our GPS system, but it’s still vulnerable and susceptible to both natural and man-generated negative effects. 

And General Crider has mentioned a number of those. I think the only thing I could actually add is the fact that GPS is susceptible to not being received in underground or underwater, or in valleys or canyons, in the polar regions, and sometimes even just being indoors where you have a roof or cover over your head and that’s where the satellite signals can’t penetrate. So that can also be a threat to you not being able to receive needed PNT updates. 

09:04 – 09:23 

Thank you, Sir. And to bring it back to today’s topic of quantum technology – the QED-C report introduces this idea that quantum sensors can be leveraged for PNT. 

But what exactly is a quantum sensor? And how can this technology provide a solution to some of these PNT challenges that we were just discussing? 

09:24 – 10:07 

KC: A quantum sensor is really a sensor that is able to precisely measure changes in electric or magnetic fields. What is unique about quantum technology is that it collects data. It makes its measurements at the atomic level – very, very, very finite, precise changes in the way atoms act in these sorts of fields, which are not necessarily discrete changes. 

They change in a waveform and so if we can understand these atomic level changes, we can have a much more precise understanding of what’s going on with more precision and more accuracy about what’s happening in the world around us. That’s, in a nutshell, what quantum sensors do.  

10:07 – 10:47 

HR: Yeah. Let me just add the fact that quantum sensors can really provide this precise navigation and information that General Crider has just described, but also to provide that where GPS signals are unavailable and unreliable, as we talked about just earlier. 

But they can also better resist jamming and spoofing, which is one of the big problems today that we’re experiencing with our GPS satellites. And frankly, quantum sensors can provide a very necessary backup and an alternative to our PNT information that complements our traditional system that we use today. 

10:48 – 11:06 

And to that last point, Sir, the QED-C report goes another step further by identifying four specific types of quantum sensors. 

I’d like to start with the first two: which the report identifies as quantum magnetometers and quantum gravimeters.

What exactly are these technologies and how do they work?

11:07 – 12:41 

HR: Well, Scott, let me begin by saying quantum magnetometers, can detect and measure minute changes in magnetic fields, which allows for a more precise means of navigation that we commonly refer to as “MagNav.”  

Similarly, quantum gravimeters can also detect and measure minute changes – but in gravitational fields. When applied for navigation purposes, we call this “GravNav.” 

And what’s unique about both of these technologies is that they offer new ways of mapping the planet so that our forces can understand where they are in a given operational environment.  

Now, the QED-C report points out an important distinction – and that is that these technologies are passive. Which means they can operate at any time and in any weather conditions. And this can have a major influence on joint force operations, particularly when they’re operating in remote or what the report calls “featureless” environments like an ocean or a polar region. 

I’ll also add that they can serve commercial applications as well, such as monitoring changes in polar ice caps, locating areas of offshore wind power, detecting wildfires from space and in mining critical resources such as hydrogen, helium and numerous other rare materials. 

12:42 – 14:01 

KC: These are very interesting technologies and General Raduege is pointing out some interesting applications of them where they’re really best-oriented towards whether it’s navigation or positioning. But what’s interesting about these kinds of sensors in my mind is that they rely on looking for anomalies in either the magnetic environment or in the gravitational environment. They look for anomalies, and they match these anomalies to known gravitational maps or magnetic maps. 

That’s the approach that General Raduege was referring to when he was talking about MagNav and GravNav. These are really interesting approaches that, as he mentioned, are passive. They’re not impacted by weather, which is certainly a big difference to what we see in the traditional PNT environment provided by GPS – that it’s an active system. It’s transmitting and receiving, and it’s therefore affected by things that are happening around it.  

These other quantum sensing technologies are passive. They’re listening. They’re sensing what’s happening in the Earth’s environment and that, in and of itself, allows for it to operate in a way that can provide some benefits that GPS currently can’t. 

14:02 – 14:11 

The other two technologies the report identifies are quantum accelerometers and quantum gyroscopes.

How might these technologies apply to PNT?

14:12 – 15:33 

HR: I’ll start this one again, Scott. Quantum accelerometers can measure changes in both the movement of an object – and the speed with which it moves – or its “acceleration.” 

And likewise, quantum gyroscopes can detect the object’s orientation – or the angle in which it might be rotating.  

An important feature to note here is that these technologies can actually be networked together to identify and detect not only where an object is moving, but also how quickly it’s going to get there.  

So whereas the first two technologies we mentioned offer ways to understand where our forces are by mapping the surrounding environment, these technologies have the potential to provide highly accurate measurements of our movements within those surroundings – as well as those of our potential adversaries. 

I’ll also just mention that this can have outsized implications for other mission areas like space domain awareness. Where we can use these tools to understand another satellite’s position, orientation, and movement in relation to our own assets in space. 

The same applies to other assets, systems, and forces in other domains, as well.

 15:34 – 16:49 

HR: Yeah, that’s a great example. And to add another perspective about this idea of a quantum accelerometer is that it’s measuring acceleration. So it’s really trying to understand the changes in motion of something which gives us a whole other set of information than we might not get otherwise. 

Let’s say that you have a US naval vessel, whether it’s a ship or a submarine, maybe it’s operating in the polar region where there is limited availability of GPS, or there is a very specific GPS outage that those vessels are contending with. 

So as that ship is moving along, it’s going to need some additional support. If there was a quantum sensing device on the ship, it could create a picture of the gravitational field. Now, we’re getting back to gravimeters, and the GravNav approach that we talked about earlier, which could sense the gravitational field around the ship. 

As the ship moves along, those sensing devices and the computers that they’re connected to could overlay maps of the Earth’s gravitational field to determine the ship’s precise location as it’s moving. So that’s a very specific example of how quantum sensing with gravimeters can be networked together with an accelerometer to provide position, navigation and timing support to a US naval vessel operating in a remote or contested region where GPS might be compromised. 

16:50 – 17:05 

Thank you, Ma’am. 

Now, the QED-C report really seems to emphasize that these technologies are complementary in nature. 

In other words, they should be integrated into our legacy systems like GPS, as opposed to outright replacing them. 

Why is this an important distinction to make?

17:06 – 19:00 

KC: Certainly, it’s important that these are complementary for a variety of reasons. One, while some of this technology is out there and is being applied, it’s still very much emerging.  

So we need to let this technology emerge and we need to continue to figure out best ways to apply it where we can. As these technologies emerge and as we put these sensors in place, and we begin to best determine how to use these capabilities to support PNT in a networked capability, and then networking it with our more traditional systems, we get that added resiliency, which is always critical to joint military operations: having a variety of different capabilities, from a variety of different types of technologies, providing the critical position, navigation and timing that we need.  

And so that’s really important that as these technologies come along, we’re integrating them in and we’re getting that added resiliency.  

And then the third thing, of course, that I would reinforce is that GPS, GNSS and the systems that provide the same sort of capabilities as GPS does around the world. There are other capabilities around the world that provide GPS. We continue to work towards the ability to have standards and have the ability to operate with these other systems.  

There’s infrastructure, there’s investment in that infrastructure that’s in place today. We need to be able to leverage that as we’re continuing to look to integrate these new technologies. So leveraging our current investments in the US capabilities and with our international partners, taking advantage of the resiliency that a network of PNT-provided technologies can offer and allowing these technologies to emerge, I think, are the three reasons why, we’d want to see these capabilities act in a complementary way. 

19:01 – 20:06 

HR: Yeah. Let me just foot stomp and reinforce the fact that quantum technologies can be very complementary and should be to legacy PNT technologies. First off, as I mentioned earlier, current PNT technologies are still very useful and are continually being upgraded. One example of that is M code that has been added to resist jamming that has been a problem. 

And in reality, however, most legacy and even new systems have become susceptible to new threats, or vulnerabilities and other shortcomings. So it’s good to have a complementary capability, especially in such a critical area of endeavor and need.  

Also, the fact that critical infrastructures and of course, our nation has identified 16 critical infrastructures. They require and demand alternative means and systems for providing reliable performance and service to all of us. 

20:07 – 20:34 

And on this note of quantum sensors working with legacy PNT systems in a complementary way – the report indicates one such example being that quantum sensors can provide a level of verification – or validation – that the information our forces are receiving from GPS is both reliable and secure. 

Can you elaborate on how quantum technologies can verify that our legacy PNT systems, like GPS, are functioning as they should? And are not compromised in any way? 

20:35 – 21:39 

KC: Yeah, it’s a really great point, Scott, and I’m glad you brought that up, because, as we pointed out earlier, our traditional GPS system that provides position navigation timing is subject to a number of threats to include jamming and spoofing and interference from space weather, obstructions of the signal if we’re in highly congested areas where the signals just can’t be picked up. 

So these are real challenges. When those signals are disrupted in whatever manner, or if they’re subject to some sort of a cyber attack as well, these quantum sensors can provide verification that those signals are correct and that the traditional system is working as it should to provide position, navigation and timing to the systems that are relying on them. 

So you might go into a GPS-dark area, but these other sensors are still working. So when you get back up and connected to traditional GPS, you can continue to move on. I think that that is a really critical piece of the resiliency puzzle.

21:40 – 22:17 

Thank you, Ma’am.  

Now, the QED-C report also called for the federal government to make greater investments into the research and development for photonic integrated circuits or “PICs,” a core element to quantum technology. 

Specifically, the report calls on the government to provide “size, weight, power and cost” standards for these PICs, which essentially function like microchips that the QED-C suggests will help establish the economies of scale necessary to accelerate the use of quantum sensors across industries.   

So how can the government help standardize this key part to a quantum sensor? 

22:18 – 23:16 

KC: Yeah, I mean, I think the government can certainly look for ways to invest in the development of PICs. Similar to a microchip and how we’ve seen the government get behind ensuring that we have a foundry in the US, that we have capability to have an assured supply chain to build out these photonic components, such that we can create the PICs that would provide the capability that we need for these sensors in a very low size, weight and power context is really, really important. 

So for the government to get behind that, maybe put some legislation in place to reinforce funding for development and distribution of PICs, certainly within the US as kind of a critical resource that we need to be able to have access to, as we continue to drive towards the application of quantum technologies is going to be very important. 

23:17 – 23:53 

HR: Let me just add that General Crider makes a great point. And frankly, the government must work with others, like the Quantum Economic Development Consortium, to actually encourage these market studies, and that could benefit various technology developers and we’ve always found that pilots and testbeds that are sponsored by the government and others are so helpful. 

And frankly, all you need to jump start everything and a big development is one big success story that comes out of a successful pilot and a testbed. 

23:54 – 24:13 

Thank you, Sir. 

So this next question applies specifically to the testing and validation of these technologies – which General Raduege, Sir – you just referenced in that the government can do through these pilots and testbeds. 

But what are some of the ways the government can support the development of these standards to vet the effectiveness of these emerging technologies? 

24:14 – 25:45 

HR: Standards and validation methods are absolutely critical in establishing a foundational framework for benchmarking standardization, testing and validating performance of technologies. And user confidence will then accelerate adoption of things that are successful. And let me mention that it was DARPA’s Quantum Benchmarking Initiative that aims to verify and validate if any quantum computing approach can actually achieve utility scale operation, meaning that its computational value exceeds its cost, and to do this by 2033.  

And let me just add one last point here. The National Institute of Science and Technology – or NIST – has done magnificent work for our nation and frankly, the world in standards and validation. But their Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Project, which they established in 2016 to develop algorithms that would protect federal agency machines from encryption-breaking tools of tomorrow, I think is absolutely critical work because we all know that encryption is very, very important to be able to maintain the security of our nation and everything we do today.

25:46 – 27:20 

KC: Yeah. The only thing I’ll add there, Scott as General Raduege has hit on on so many important points is that the federal government certainly wants to continue to reinforce the emergence of these really important quantum technologies, and will do so by ensuring that there is funding provided for these kinds of organizations that General Raduege mentioned, as well as other government labs, research institutes, FFRDCs, academia as well, who can all get behind and be part of: ‘How do we drive out the standards for these solutions? How they’re going to work. How they’re going to interoperate. Verifying them and their capabilities. Having testbeds to test them out, to test out the performance standards.’  

These are all really important areas that our research labs and academic institutions and other organizations like NIST are getting involved in, but by having federal funding and push and integration and certainly, within the DOD, there are organizations that can work at the OSD-level and down into the services to do that management collaboration that needs to be done to assure that we can get these standards built in and these processes for tests and verification and validation against standards built in. And do that, in a very organized and focused manner so that we can get these capabilities into production and into actual application and use to support our warfighting operations. 

27:21 – 27:38 

Aside from establishing standards for testing, there’s also an opportunity for the government to serve as an early investor in quantum technologies.  

But what are some ways the DOD can leverage the capital markets and institutional investors to also financially support some of these quantum research and development efforts? 

27:39 – 29:44 

KC: Yeah, Scott. Similar to how the DoD has leaned in on reinforcing the importance of artificial intelligence, for example, and the application of AI to provide competitive advantage by providing small business investment dollars, by standing up organizations that can look for those emerging technologies and those companies that are providing those solutions in early stage concepts and prototypes, and working through the SBIR-STTR process and the funding that goes along with that. 

We want to do the same thing with quantum solutions, as they continue to evolve. In doing so, the government can apply its innovation funding, Small Business Innovative Research – or SBIR – dollars, science and technology research dollars – STTR – and working closely across agencies like DoD, the Department of Energy and NASA as General Raduege  pointed out, really engage that innovation community.  

And now that we’ve got specific programs like STRATFI and TACFI, where strategic and tactical level investments that can be made, are matched by the industry partners and their investors, we can further incentivize the investment community to get involved, because they see the dual-use commercial applications of these technologies for example, to enable position, navigation and timing in a variety of commercial and government use cases. 

Just as General Raduege pointed out in the very beginning of this episode: PNT is not just for military purposes, although that’s absolutely critical for what we’re trying to address here at Elara Nova. But it’s also very critical to just position and navigation and timing that’s so important to a variety of industry sectors like transportation, finance, and agriculture. 

We need these quantum capabilities to enable PNT and augment PNT in all of the industry sectors. So industry investors want to get on board with that, and they want to invest in these technologies. They’re looking for signals from the government that the government is equally investing and looking to put its Small Business Innovative Research dollars behind them. 

And then government and industry investors can come together through these STRATFI and TACFI programs and match the investments to get a bigger bang for the buck, if you will. 

29:45 – 30:22 

HR: Well, these areas that General Crider has just mentioned really do point out and reinforce the fact that quantum really is transformational. 

And General Crider mentioned AI or artificial intelligence, and it’s something that seems like in many ways was suddenly thrust upon us not too long ago. But, you know, as far as I see quantum in comparison with AI, it seems like quantum seems to be arriving more subtly, more deliberately, and perhaps even more impactfully as the future goes on.

 30:23 – 30:51 

Now, General Crider, I want to ask you about some parallels in this discussion, with one of our previous episodes in which Founding Partner Mike Dickey and Dr. Brad Tousley, an Elara Nova partner and a member of the Defense Science Board, discussed a recently-published Defense Science Board report that called on the government to strike a delicate balance when investing in emerging technologies.  

Can you elaborate on how this delicate balance the DSB advocates for – applies here to quantum? 

30:52 – 32:16 

KC: Yeah, it’s a great episode talking about the recommendations from the DSB.  

And as you point out, Scott, one of the important recommendations is that the government can be an anchor tenant for very important emerging technologies and should be an anchor tenant, but also has to be very mindful of avoiding vendor lock.  

Essentially, as the government can go in early, can lean in and should lean in, in many cases to ensure that certain important technologies like what we’re talking about here, quantum in general, photonic integrated circuits that are really important to enabling all of these quantum technologies that we’re talking about, including sensing, can be developed, can be accessible in the U.S., in particular.  

So the government go in early, assure that these solutions are being developed, that they’re being tested and verified and standardized in some manner, that there is an assured supply chain for them. But by the same token, provide on-ramps for others. So be mindful of the fact that there needs to be a way for other providers of these technologies to come in. You can’t go in so much with an early provider that it locks everybody else out. And so that’s, I think, what we have to be careful of. And I think that the prior episode does a really good job of talking through that – it certainly applies here.

32:17 – 32:33 

Thank you, Ma’am.  

Now, General Raduege, this report also comes at a time when China is believed to be leading the United States in quantum.  

How does this report – and its findings – reinforce the imperative that the United States be the first to develop and adopt these technologies?

32:34 – 33:44 

HR: Many have been saying that China is ten years ahead of the U.S. in quantum. And I’ve also heard the Chinese believe that whoever wins the race to quantum – wins. That’s a pretty bold statement, but it’s also a big challenge for the United States and I want to give an example of how the Chinese might be ahead of the United States. 

China has already successfully demonstrated the use of quantum communications between satellites and ground stations through the MISIUS satellite, and this was the first quantum satellite that they actually launched and it’s marking a crucial milestone in the development of secure space communications. This was launched by the Chinese in 2016 and operates in a sun-synchronous, nearly polar orbit and that is a development that has been going on now for quite some time in the all-important area of quantum communications for the future.  

33:45 – 35:46 

KC: That’s exactly right, General Raduege. As we talked about earlier, we need resiliency. We can’t rely on one single solution, one single set of technologies. We need resiliency to create competitive advantage and you can be certain that our adversaries, in particular, China, is looking to invest in quantum technologies for the same reasons. So wants to be able to assure position, navigation and timing, because of how important it is to military operations, and is looking to make sure that it’s got the kinds of quantum sensing solutions that we were talking about here to provide that added resiliency. 

Let me just reinforce a couple of points here too, that having quantum capabilities can certainly be a competitive advantage to reinforce position navigation and timing, create that resiliency, and really to create that degree of precision and accuracy that is going to be a game-changer. I mean, quantum solutions are going to be a game-changer. 

It’s a whole other way of applying technology to get much more precision in our ability to sense, in our ability to establish position, navigation and timing, in our ability to communicate and in our ability to compute data. Once quantum computers come online and our ability to encrypt and safeguard systems from being hacked and provide cybersecurity. So quantum solutions are going to be a game-changer. 

If the United States does not invest in quantum research and continues to cede to China that advantage, we will be left behind, we will lose our ability to compete effectively, given what quantum solutions will be able to do in terms of that added precision and accuracy that’s so important to targeting, to understanding the environment, to being able to create effects.

35:47 – 36:04 

Thank you, Ma’am. Now, Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy has positioned itself at the forefront of national security and commercial space.  

So how can the space consultancy you’re both a part of support the growing investment, development and integration of emerging technologies like quantum – for the space domain? 

36:05 – 36:37 

HR: General Crider and the other Elara Nova founders have, assembled an impressive group of educated, experienced, smart, resourceful partners who also have vast individual networks of connectivity and collaboration and that assists us in allowing Elara Nova to meet these challenges of the future in space and beyond in all domains of technologies and industries. Thank you. 

36:38 – 38:13 

KC: Thanks, General Raduege. Yeah, we certainly are very honored and fortunate to have such a team of experts, including General Raduege, amongst our partners who bring experiences from across space operations, all of the space mission areas I alluded to previously, across air, ground, sea and cyber mission areas as well from a joint context, working very closely with space throughout their careers, from both a military perspective, the intelligence community, as well as individuals on our team who just come from the industry sector themselves and have been building and applying technology solutions to meet the needs of both military and intelligence community requirements. 

As these new technologies come forward, Elara Nova sits in the center and really works to try to help identify where the best applications of these technologies will be, how to engage the entire community of industry, government, academia to work through the various issues that we touched on from a quantum perspective, how to bring these capabilities forward into the innovation systems and processes that the government has established. 

That’s what Elara Nova does. We work with industry partners around the world. We work with the tech innovation community, we work with the investors, and we work with the government to bring all that to bear and we are excited to help drive emerging technologies forward, like quantum, to enable the needs of our nation and to assure our space superiority and that of our allies as we continue to leverage space for our national security interests. 

38:14 – 38:50 

This has been an episode of The Elara Edge: Expert Insights on Space Security. As a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space domain, Elara Nova is your source for expertise and guidance in space security. 

If you liked what you heard today, please subscribe to our channel and leave us a rating. Music for this podcast was created by Patrick Watkins of PW Audio. This episode was edited and produced by Regia Multimedia Services. I’m your host, Scott King, and join us next time at the Elara Edge.