Episode 21: Quantum Technologies to Reinforce Position, Navigation and Timing Capability 

Host: Scott King 

SME: Major General (Ret) Kim Crider, Founding Partner at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy (KC)

Lieutenant General (Ret) Harry Raduege, Partner at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy (HR)

00:02 – 01:52 

China’s rapid rise in quantum technology has triggered a call-to-action for the United States to accelerate their own investments in quantum research and development. According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Critical Technology Tracker, China surpassed the United States in quantum research back in 2021 and has been growing their lead ever since. 

This lead in published research can be an early indicator that China is on a faster pace toward adopting and deploying quantum technologies in space – which, in fact, China already demonstrated in 2016, when their MISIUS satellites used quantum technologies to encrypt its communication links. 

Now, nearly ten years later, China’s quantum efforts continue to advance – with plans to launch more quantum-equipped satellites in 2025. 

That’s why the United States must respond in kind. According to the Quantum Economic Development Consortium – or QED-C – a stakeholder group founded under the Quantum Initiative Act of 2018 – the United States must make greater investments in quantum research and development – and pointed to the immediate ways quantum technologies can specifically reinforce our Position, Navigation and Timing – or PNT – capabilities. 

Welcome to “The Elara Edge: Expert Insights on Space Security.” I’m your host, Scott King, and we have two guests today that are here to help us understand what quantum technology is – and how it can be applied to PNT and other space mission areas.  

Our first guest is retired Major General Kim Crider, Founding Partner at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy. General Crider previously served as the Chief Technology and Innovation Officer for the United States Space Force, and is returning to the show as one of our resident experts on emerging technologies like quantum.  

General Crider, welcome to the show! 

01:53 – 01:54 

KC: Thanks, Scott. It’s great to be back with you. 

01:55 – 02:16 

It’s great to have you back, Ma’am.  

And also joining us is retired Lieutenant General Harry Raduege. Before becoming a partner at Elara Nova, General Raduege served for 35 years in the United States Air Force, where he held roles as the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency, and Manager of the National Communications Systems. 

Sir, thanks for taking the time to join us today. 

02:17 – 02:18 

HR: Thanks for having me, Scott.

02:19 – 02:43 

Our primary topic today stems from a recent report by the Quantum Economic Development Consortium – titled “Quantum Sensing for Position, Navigation and Timing Use Cases.”  

But before we get into exactly what quantum technology is, I’d like to fully define the Position, Navigation and Timing mission, first. 

So what is PNT and how does it relate to a United States Space Force mission area?

 02:44 – 04:39 

KC: Yeah, thanks Scott. So position navigation and timing – PNT – is what it stands for. There are actually a number of technologies that we use to determine location, orientation and time associated with a particular asset. So when we think about position, we think about an asset’s location or orientation, either in two or three dimensions. 

When we think about navigation, we think about its current and desired position  – where it’s heading and any corrections to the course or to the orientation and the speed.  

And then when we think about timing, we need to understand a specific point in time, such as a coordinated universal time. We all  have these time standards. UTC is one time standard. So PNT applies different technologies through a variety of systems and processes to do just that, establish position, navigation and timing. 

Now, the primary way we do this is through what’s called the “Global Positioning System,” or GPS, and GPS is essentially a U.S. government system of satellites in space and receivers the ground, that when linked together – provides our PNT capability. G.P.S. basically transmits broadcast signals from satellites in space that contain, precise time information which allows GPS receivers on Earth to calculate its own position in terms of latitude, longitude, altitude, and then by measuring the travel time of those signals from multiple satellites, and does what we call a ‘triangulation,’ to pinpoint its location and enable synchronization with those satellites, and with those transmitters. 

So GPS is that system provided by the United States Space Force that delivers position, navigation and timing, but it’s driven by allowing receivers to calculate where they are and the time at which they are, and triangulate that from a variety of signals that are presented from that GPS constellation. 

04:40 – 06:00 

HR: Yeah. Scott, let me just add to that – in the military of PNT, we use it for tracking of friendly or what we refer to as ‘blue forces.’ We use it in accuracy and in precision bombing in the military against combatants, and very importantly, to avoid hitting civilians or historic places and monuments or other invaluable assets. 

We always think of GPS because we refer to it all the time when you’re driving your car, you’re in your boat, or you’re just on the ground hiking, you want your GPS receiver to receive that signal on your position. However, I learned a while back, during the Y2K roll over. 

That timing – it is actually the most critical part of GPS satellites. And let me just mention the fact that we move all the finances of the world economy using the timing of GPS and so seconds or small parts of seconds, difference in timing and clocks when you’re moving tens of thousands, trillions of money each day across the world economy, it would make a big difference if the timing is off just slightly. 

06:01 – 06:07 

So what threats exist to our GPS systems today? And how can these threats compromise our PNT capability? 

06:08 – 08:08 

KC: There’s a number of threats to position navigation and timing and to the systems that provide that. I’m sure General Raduege can speak on this as well, given his experience in operating these systems and ensuring their availability to joint operations. You can imagine that position, navigation and timing is absolutely critical to warfighting operations in addition to all of those industry sector needs that General Raduege was referring to: the ability to accurately know where troops are on the ground or at sea, the ability to communicate effectively in a time-synchronized environment, the ability to assure precise targeting is really important to all of our joint operations, to be able to work effectively and collectively, we need to have really strong PNT. 

But PNT is vulnerable to a number of threats. We know for certain that our GNSS, our Global Navigational Satellite System, which is essentially the system that delivers that capability through the Global Positioning System satellites – that that is jammed every single day. There’s jamming and spoofing of those signals every single day, where there is intentional interference with those signals that I was talking about earlier by relatively low-cost jammers that are not easily tracked, so that’s a real problem. 

Cyber attacks is also a challenge and we’ve seen that, you know, denial-of-service is a real challenge to PNT. And then of course, because these signals emanate from space, you’ve got a lot of challenges just by virtue of the fact that you’re operating in the space environment. There’s space weather that can be a factor.  

And then there’s the supply chain, which is certainly a challenge for many of our space systems that we rely on a very secure and assured supply chain for these capabilities. These satellites themselves, as well as the receivers on the ground or in the other domains. General Raduege, what else would you add? I’m sure you’ve seen some of these threats play out.

08:09 – 09:03 

HR: Sure. Absolutely. While all the ones that you’ve mentioned are with us every day, but we’ve had over the years, I have to say we’ve had constant improvements to our GPS system, but it’s still vulnerable and susceptible to both natural and man-generated negative effects. 

And General Crider has mentioned a number of those. I think the only thing I could actually add is the fact that GPS is susceptible to not being received in underground or underwater, or in valleys or canyons, in the polar regions, and sometimes even just being indoors where you have a roof or cover over your head and that’s where the satellite signals can’t penetrate. So that can also be a threat to you not being able to receive needed PNT updates. 

09:04 – 09:23 

Thank you, Sir. And to bring it back to today’s topic of quantum technology – the QED-C report introduces this idea that quantum sensors can be leveraged for PNT. 

But what exactly is a quantum sensor? And how can this technology provide a solution to some of these PNT challenges that we were just discussing? 

09:24 – 10:07 

KC: A quantum sensor is really a sensor that is able to precisely measure changes in electric or magnetic fields. What is unique about quantum technology is that it collects data. It makes its measurements at the atomic level – very, very, very finite, precise changes in the way atoms act in these sorts of fields, which are not necessarily discrete changes. 

They change in a waveform and so if we can understand these atomic level changes, we can have a much more precise understanding of what’s going on with more precision and more accuracy about what’s happening in the world around us. That’s, in a nutshell, what quantum sensors do.  

10:07 – 10:47 

HR: Yeah. Let me just add the fact that quantum sensors can really provide this precise navigation and information that General Crider has just described, but also to provide that where GPS signals are unavailable and unreliable, as we talked about just earlier. 

But they can also better resist jamming and spoofing, which is one of the big problems today that we’re experiencing with our GPS satellites. And frankly, quantum sensors can provide a very necessary backup and an alternative to our PNT information that complements our traditional system that we use today. 

10:48 – 11:06 

And to that last point, Sir, the QED-C report goes another step further by identifying four specific types of quantum sensors. 

I’d like to start with the first two: which the report identifies as quantum magnetometers and quantum gravimeters.

What exactly are these technologies and how do they work?

11:07 – 12:41 

HR: Well, Scott, let me begin by saying quantum magnetometers, can detect and measure minute changes in magnetic fields, which allows for a more precise means of navigation that we commonly refer to as “MagNav.”  

Similarly, quantum gravimeters can also detect and measure minute changes – but in gravitational fields. When applied for navigation purposes, we call this “GravNav.” 

And what’s unique about both of these technologies is that they offer new ways of mapping the planet so that our forces can understand where they are in a given operational environment.  

Now, the QED-C report points out an important distinction – and that is that these technologies are passive. Which means they can operate at any time and in any weather conditions. And this can have a major influence on joint force operations, particularly when they’re operating in remote or what the report calls “featureless” environments like an ocean or a polar region. 

I’ll also add that they can serve commercial applications as well, such as monitoring changes in polar ice caps, locating areas of offshore wind power, detecting wildfires from space and in mining critical resources such as hydrogen, helium and numerous other rare materials. 

12:42 – 14:01 

KC: These are very interesting technologies and General Raduege is pointing out some interesting applications of them where they’re really best-oriented towards whether it’s navigation or positioning. But what’s interesting about these kinds of sensors in my mind is that they rely on looking for anomalies in either the magnetic environment or in the gravitational environment. They look for anomalies, and they match these anomalies to known gravitational maps or magnetic maps. 

That’s the approach that General Raduege was referring to when he was talking about MagNav and GravNav. These are really interesting approaches that, as he mentioned, are passive. They’re not impacted by weather, which is certainly a big difference to what we see in the traditional PNT environment provided by GPS – that it’s an active system. It’s transmitting and receiving, and it’s therefore affected by things that are happening around it.  

These other quantum sensing technologies are passive. They’re listening. They’re sensing what’s happening in the Earth’s environment and that, in and of itself, allows for it to operate in a way that can provide some benefits that GPS currently can’t. 

14:02 – 14:11 

The other two technologies the report identifies are quantum accelerometers and quantum gyroscopes.

How might these technologies apply to PNT?

14:12 – 15:33 

HR: I’ll start this one again, Scott. Quantum accelerometers can measure changes in both the movement of an object – and the speed with which it moves – or its “acceleration.” 

And likewise, quantum gyroscopes can detect the object’s orientation – or the angle in which it might be rotating.  

An important feature to note here is that these technologies can actually be networked together to identify and detect not only where an object is moving, but also how quickly it’s going to get there.  

So whereas the first two technologies we mentioned offer ways to understand where our forces are by mapping the surrounding environment, these technologies have the potential to provide highly accurate measurements of our movements within those surroundings – as well as those of our potential adversaries. 

I’ll also just mention that this can have outsized implications for other mission areas like space domain awareness. Where we can use these tools to understand another satellite’s position, orientation, and movement in relation to our own assets in space. 

The same applies to other assets, systems, and forces in other domains, as well.

 15:34 – 16:49 

HR: Yeah, that’s a great example. And to add another perspective about this idea of a quantum accelerometer is that it’s measuring acceleration. So it’s really trying to understand the changes in motion of something which gives us a whole other set of information than we might not get otherwise. 

Let’s say that you have a US naval vessel, whether it’s a ship or a submarine, maybe it’s operating in the polar region where there is limited availability of GPS, or there is a very specific GPS outage that those vessels are contending with. 

So as that ship is moving along, it’s going to need some additional support. If there was a quantum sensing device on the ship, it could create a picture of the gravitational field. Now, we’re getting back to gravimeters, and the GravNav approach that we talked about earlier, which could sense the gravitational field around the ship. 

As the ship moves along, those sensing devices and the computers that they’re connected to could overlay maps of the Earth’s gravitational field to determine the ship’s precise location as it’s moving. So that’s a very specific example of how quantum sensing with gravimeters can be networked together with an accelerometer to provide position, navigation and timing support to a US naval vessel operating in a remote or contested region where GPS might be compromised. 

16:50 – 17:05 

Thank you, Ma’am. 

Now, the QED-C report really seems to emphasize that these technologies are complementary in nature. 

In other words, they should be integrated into our legacy systems like GPS, as opposed to outright replacing them. 

Why is this an important distinction to make?

17:06 – 19:00 

KC: Certainly, it’s important that these are complementary for a variety of reasons. One, while some of this technology is out there and is being applied, it’s still very much emerging.  

So we need to let this technology emerge and we need to continue to figure out best ways to apply it where we can. As these technologies emerge and as we put these sensors in place, and we begin to best determine how to use these capabilities to support PNT in a networked capability, and then networking it with our more traditional systems, we get that added resiliency, which is always critical to joint military operations: having a variety of different capabilities, from a variety of different types of technologies, providing the critical position, navigation and timing that we need.  

And so that’s really important that as these technologies come along, we’re integrating them in and we’re getting that added resiliency.  

And then the third thing, of course, that I would reinforce is that GPS, GNSS and the systems that provide the same sort of capabilities as GPS does around the world. There are other capabilities around the world that provide GPS. We continue to work towards the ability to have standards and have the ability to operate with these other systems.  

There’s infrastructure, there’s investment in that infrastructure that’s in place today. We need to be able to leverage that as we’re continuing to look to integrate these new technologies. So leveraging our current investments in the US capabilities and with our international partners, taking advantage of the resiliency that a network of PNT-provided technologies can offer and allowing these technologies to emerge, I think, are the three reasons why, we’d want to see these capabilities act in a complementary way. 

19:01 – 20:06 

HR: Yeah. Let me just foot stomp and reinforce the fact that quantum technologies can be very complementary and should be to legacy PNT technologies. First off, as I mentioned earlier, current PNT technologies are still very useful and are continually being upgraded. One example of that is M code that has been added to resist jamming that has been a problem. 

And in reality, however, most legacy and even new systems have become susceptible to new threats, or vulnerabilities and other shortcomings. So it’s good to have a complementary capability, especially in such a critical area of endeavor and need.  

Also, the fact that critical infrastructures and of course, our nation has identified 16 critical infrastructures. They require and demand alternative means and systems for providing reliable performance and service to all of us. 

20:07 – 20:34 

And on this note of quantum sensors working with legacy PNT systems in a complementary way – the report indicates one such example being that quantum sensors can provide a level of verification – or validation – that the information our forces are receiving from GPS is both reliable and secure. 

Can you elaborate on how quantum technologies can verify that our legacy PNT systems, like GPS, are functioning as they should? And are not compromised in any way? 

20:35 – 21:39 

KC: Yeah, it’s a really great point, Scott, and I’m glad you brought that up, because, as we pointed out earlier, our traditional GPS system that provides position navigation timing is subject to a number of threats to include jamming and spoofing and interference from space weather, obstructions of the signal if we’re in highly congested areas where the signals just can’t be picked up. 

So these are real challenges. When those signals are disrupted in whatever manner, or if they’re subject to some sort of a cyber attack as well, these quantum sensors can provide verification that those signals are correct and that the traditional system is working as it should to provide position, navigation and timing to the systems that are relying on them. 

So you might go into a GPS-dark area, but these other sensors are still working. So when you get back up and connected to traditional GPS, you can continue to move on. I think that that is a really critical piece of the resiliency puzzle.

21:40 – 22:17 

Thank you, Ma’am.  

Now, the QED-C report also called for the federal government to make greater investments into the research and development for photonic integrated circuits or “PICs,” a core element to quantum technology. 

Specifically, the report calls on the government to provide “size, weight, power and cost” standards for these PICs, which essentially function like microchips that the QED-C suggests will help establish the economies of scale necessary to accelerate the use of quantum sensors across industries.   

So how can the government help standardize this key part to a quantum sensor? 

22:18 – 23:16 

KC: Yeah, I mean, I think the government can certainly look for ways to invest in the development of PICs. Similar to a microchip and how we’ve seen the government get behind ensuring that we have a foundry in the US, that we have capability to have an assured supply chain to build out these photonic components, such that we can create the PICs that would provide the capability that we need for these sensors in a very low size, weight and power context is really, really important. 

So for the government to get behind that, maybe put some legislation in place to reinforce funding for development and distribution of PICs, certainly within the US as kind of a critical resource that we need to be able to have access to, as we continue to drive towards the application of quantum technologies is going to be very important. 

23:17 – 23:53 

HR: Let me just add that General Crider makes a great point. And frankly, the government must work with others, like the Quantum Economic Development Consortium, to actually encourage these market studies, and that could benefit various technology developers and we’ve always found that pilots and testbeds that are sponsored by the government and others are so helpful. 

And frankly, all you need to jump start everything and a big development is one big success story that comes out of a successful pilot and a testbed. 

23:54 – 24:13 

Thank you, Sir. 

So this next question applies specifically to the testing and validation of these technologies – which General Raduege, Sir – you just referenced in that the government can do through these pilots and testbeds. 

But what are some of the ways the government can support the development of these standards to vet the effectiveness of these emerging technologies? 

24:14 – 25:45 

HR: Standards and validation methods are absolutely critical in establishing a foundational framework for benchmarking standardization, testing and validating performance of technologies. And user confidence will then accelerate adoption of things that are successful. And let me mention that it was DARPA’s Quantum Benchmarking Initiative that aims to verify and validate if any quantum computing approach can actually achieve utility scale operation, meaning that its computational value exceeds its cost, and to do this by 2033.  

And let me just add one last point here. The National Institute of Science and Technology – or NIST – has done magnificent work for our nation and frankly, the world in standards and validation. But their Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Project, which they established in 2016 to develop algorithms that would protect federal agency machines from encryption-breaking tools of tomorrow, I think is absolutely critical work because we all know that encryption is very, very important to be able to maintain the security of our nation and everything we do today.

25:46 – 27:20 

KC: Yeah. The only thing I’ll add there, Scott as General Raduege has hit on on so many important points is that the federal government certainly wants to continue to reinforce the emergence of these really important quantum technologies, and will do so by ensuring that there is funding provided for these kinds of organizations that General Raduege mentioned, as well as other government labs, research institutes, FFRDCs, academia as well, who can all get behind and be part of: ‘How do we drive out the standards for these solutions? How they’re going to work. How they’re going to interoperate. Verifying them and their capabilities. Having testbeds to test them out, to test out the performance standards.’  

These are all really important areas that our research labs and academic institutions and other organizations like NIST are getting involved in, but by having federal funding and push and integration and certainly, within the DOD, there are organizations that can work at the OSD-level and down into the services to do that management collaboration that needs to be done to assure that we can get these standards built in and these processes for tests and verification and validation against standards built in. And do that, in a very organized and focused manner so that we can get these capabilities into production and into actual application and use to support our warfighting operations. 

27:21 – 27:38 

Aside from establishing standards for testing, there’s also an opportunity for the government to serve as an early investor in quantum technologies.  

But what are some ways the DOD can leverage the capital markets and institutional investors to also financially support some of these quantum research and development efforts? 

27:39 – 29:44 

KC: Yeah, Scott. Similar to how the DoD has leaned in on reinforcing the importance of artificial intelligence, for example, and the application of AI to provide competitive advantage by providing small business investment dollars, by standing up organizations that can look for those emerging technologies and those companies that are providing those solutions in early stage concepts and prototypes, and working through the SBIR-STTR process and the funding that goes along with that. 

We want to do the same thing with quantum solutions, as they continue to evolve. In doing so, the government can apply its innovation funding, Small Business Innovative Research – or SBIR – dollars, science and technology research dollars – STTR – and working closely across agencies like DoD, the Department of Energy and NASA as General Raduege  pointed out, really engage that innovation community.  

And now that we’ve got specific programs like STRATFI and TACFI, where strategic and tactical level investments that can be made, are matched by the industry partners and their investors, we can further incentivize the investment community to get involved, because they see the dual-use commercial applications of these technologies for example, to enable position, navigation and timing in a variety of commercial and government use cases. 

Just as General Raduege pointed out in the very beginning of this episode: PNT is not just for military purposes, although that’s absolutely critical for what we’re trying to address here at Elara Nova. But it’s also very critical to just position and navigation and timing that’s so important to a variety of industry sectors like transportation, finance, and agriculture. 

We need these quantum capabilities to enable PNT and augment PNT in all of the industry sectors. So industry investors want to get on board with that, and they want to invest in these technologies. They’re looking for signals from the government that the government is equally investing and looking to put its Small Business Innovative Research dollars behind them. 

And then government and industry investors can come together through these STRATFI and TACFI programs and match the investments to get a bigger bang for the buck, if you will. 

29:45 – 30:22 

HR: Well, these areas that General Crider has just mentioned really do point out and reinforce the fact that quantum really is transformational. 

And General Crider mentioned AI or artificial intelligence, and it’s something that seems like in many ways was suddenly thrust upon us not too long ago. But, you know, as far as I see quantum in comparison with AI, it seems like quantum seems to be arriving more subtly, more deliberately, and perhaps even more impactfully as the future goes on.

 30:23 – 30:51 

Now, General Crider, I want to ask you about some parallels in this discussion, with one of our previous episodes in which Founding Partner Mike Dickey and Dr. Brad Tousley, an Elara Nova partner and a member of the Defense Science Board, discussed a recently-published Defense Science Board report that called on the government to strike a delicate balance when investing in emerging technologies.  

Can you elaborate on how this delicate balance the DSB advocates for – applies here to quantum? 

30:52 – 32:16 

KC: Yeah, it’s a great episode talking about the recommendations from the DSB.  

And as you point out, Scott, one of the important recommendations is that the government can be an anchor tenant for very important emerging technologies and should be an anchor tenant, but also has to be very mindful of avoiding vendor lock.  

Essentially, as the government can go in early, can lean in and should lean in, in many cases to ensure that certain important technologies like what we’re talking about here, quantum in general, photonic integrated circuits that are really important to enabling all of these quantum technologies that we’re talking about, including sensing, can be developed, can be accessible in the U.S., in particular.  

So the government go in early, assure that these solutions are being developed, that they’re being tested and verified and standardized in some manner, that there is an assured supply chain for them. But by the same token, provide on-ramps for others. So be mindful of the fact that there needs to be a way for other providers of these technologies to come in. You can’t go in so much with an early provider that it locks everybody else out. And so that’s, I think, what we have to be careful of. And I think that the prior episode does a really good job of talking through that – it certainly applies here.

32:17 – 32:33 

Thank you, Ma’am.  

Now, General Raduege, this report also comes at a time when China is believed to be leading the United States in quantum.  

How does this report – and its findings – reinforce the imperative that the United States be the first to develop and adopt these technologies?

32:34 – 33:44 

HR: Many have been saying that China is ten years ahead of the U.S. in quantum. And I’ve also heard the Chinese believe that whoever wins the race to quantum – wins. That’s a pretty bold statement, but it’s also a big challenge for the United States and I want to give an example of how the Chinese might be ahead of the United States. 

China has already successfully demonstrated the use of quantum communications between satellites and ground stations through the MISIUS satellite, and this was the first quantum satellite that they actually launched and it’s marking a crucial milestone in the development of secure space communications. This was launched by the Chinese in 2016 and operates in a sun-synchronous, nearly polar orbit and that is a development that has been going on now for quite some time in the all-important area of quantum communications for the future.  

33:45 – 35:46 

KC: That’s exactly right, General Raduege. As we talked about earlier, we need resiliency. We can’t rely on one single solution, one single set of technologies. We need resiliency to create competitive advantage and you can be certain that our adversaries, in particular, China, is looking to invest in quantum technologies for the same reasons. So wants to be able to assure position, navigation and timing, because of how important it is to military operations, and is looking to make sure that it’s got the kinds of quantum sensing solutions that we were talking about here to provide that added resiliency. 

Let me just reinforce a couple of points here too, that having quantum capabilities can certainly be a competitive advantage to reinforce position navigation and timing, create that resiliency, and really to create that degree of precision and accuracy that is going to be a game-changer. I mean, quantum solutions are going to be a game-changer. 

It’s a whole other way of applying technology to get much more precision in our ability to sense, in our ability to establish position, navigation and timing, in our ability to communicate and in our ability to compute data. Once quantum computers come online and our ability to encrypt and safeguard systems from being hacked and provide cybersecurity. So quantum solutions are going to be a game-changer. 

If the United States does not invest in quantum research and continues to cede to China that advantage, we will be left behind, we will lose our ability to compete effectively, given what quantum solutions will be able to do in terms of that added precision and accuracy that’s so important to targeting, to understanding the environment, to being able to create effects.

35:47 – 36:04 

Thank you, Ma’am. Now, Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy has positioned itself at the forefront of national security and commercial space.  

So how can the space consultancy you’re both a part of support the growing investment, development and integration of emerging technologies like quantum – for the space domain? 

36:05 – 36:37 

HR: General Crider and the other Elara Nova founders have, assembled an impressive group of educated, experienced, smart, resourceful partners who also have vast individual networks of connectivity and collaboration and that assists us in allowing Elara Nova to meet these challenges of the future in space and beyond in all domains of technologies and industries. Thank you. 

36:38 – 38:13 

KC: Thanks, General Raduege. Yeah, we certainly are very honored and fortunate to have such a team of experts, including General Raduege, amongst our partners who bring experiences from across space operations, all of the space mission areas I alluded to previously, across air, ground, sea and cyber mission areas as well from a joint context, working very closely with space throughout their careers, from both a military perspective, the intelligence community, as well as individuals on our team who just come from the industry sector themselves and have been building and applying technology solutions to meet the needs of both military and intelligence community requirements. 

As these new technologies come forward, Elara Nova sits in the center and really works to try to help identify where the best applications of these technologies will be, how to engage the entire community of industry, government, academia to work through the various issues that we touched on from a quantum perspective, how to bring these capabilities forward into the innovation systems and processes that the government has established. 

That’s what Elara Nova does. We work with industry partners around the world. We work with the tech innovation community, we work with the investors, and we work with the government to bring all that to bear and we are excited to help drive emerging technologies forward, like quantum, to enable the needs of our nation and to assure our space superiority and that of our allies as we continue to leverage space for our national security interests. 

38:14 – 38:50 

This has been an episode of The Elara Edge: Expert Insights on Space Security. As a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space domain, Elara Nova is your source for expertise and guidance in space security. 

If you liked what you heard today, please subscribe to our channel and leave us a rating. Music for this podcast was created by Patrick Watkins of PW Audio. This episode was edited and produced by Regia Multimedia Services. I’m your host, Scott King, and join us next time at the Elara Edge.

Chinese Advancements Raise Stakes for Faster Adoption of Quantum Sensors 

China’s advancements in quantum technology have triggered a call-to-action for the United States to accelerate their own investments in quantum research and development. According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Critical Technology Tracker, China surpassed the United States in published quantum research in 2021. China’s lead in published research can be interpreted as a faster pace toward adopting and deploying quantum technologies in space for military purposes, which China already demonstrated in 2016, with plans for launching more quantum-equipped satellites in 2025. In response, the Quantum Economic Development Consortium (QED-C) is similarly advocating for more research and development to support quantum technologies in space, specifically to reinforce the Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) mission.  

“PNT is a combination of technologies that determine location, orientation and time associated with a particular asset,” said Major General (Ret) Kim Crider, Founding Partner at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy. “Currently, the United States Space Force delivers PNT capability through the Global Positioning System (GPS) of space-based satellites. By broadcasting signals between satellites in space and receivers on Earth, GPS systems can calculate an asset’s position, while tracking and predicting its movements according to a given time standard.” 

The Military and Commercial Value of PNT 

While GPS is owned and operated by the United States government, it is just one satellite system providing PNT capability under the broader Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). Allies and adversaries alike have fielded similar PNT capabilities under GNSS and through satellite systems of their own: Russia’s GLONASS, the European Union’s Galileo constellation, China’s BeiDou, Japan’s QZSS and India’s IRNSS/NavIC.  

But the PNT capability provided through each of these systems are widely seen as ‘dual-use,’ serving both commercial and military purposes.  

Consequently, these systems are subject to near-constant attack.  

“There are jamming, spoofing and cyber attacks against our GPS signals every single day, in addition to the changing space weather conditions that can also compromise these systems,” Maj Gen (Ret) Crider said. “Each of these threats create denial-of-service challenges for the Space Force, particularly because PNT is critical in warfighting operations to accurately understand where troops are on the ground or where ships are at sea, while enabling effective communication between forces in a time-synchronized environment.” 

Quantum Creates Resiliency for PNT 

That’s why the QED-C, a consortium of quantum industry stakeholders established under the National Quantum Initiative Act of 2018, published a recent report that underscored the immediate implications quantum sensors can serve in reinforcing compromised PNT capabilities or support forces in GPS-denied areas.  

“GPS signals may not be able to reach assets that are underground, under water, in valleys or canyons and sometimes even indoors, where a roof provides a cover that the satellite signals can’t penetrate,” said Lietuenant General (Ret) Harry Raduege, partner at Elara Nova.  “The polar regions can also be a GPS-denied area because of their extreme and remote location, while also becoming more globally contentious as potential areas of future conflict.” 

Quantum sensors, however, are inherently more resistant to jamming or spoofing than legacy GPS systems. 

“While GPS actively transmits and receives signals, these quantum technologies passively sense changes in the Earth’s environment,” Maj Gen (Ret) Crider said. “Quantum technology collects data and makes measurements at the atomic level, which means they can track precise changes in the way atoms interact in electric or magnetic fields. Therefore, these sensors can create a more precise and accurate understanding of what’s going on in the environment around an asset in a way that GPS currently can’t.” 

Quantum Sensors and How They Work 

The QED-C report describes two types of quantum sensors that support mapping and navigational efforts: quantum magnetometers and quantum gravimeters.  

“Quantum magnetometers and quantum gravimeters can detect and measure minute changes in magnetic fields and gravitational fields, respectively,” Lt Gen (Ret) Raduege said. “So these technologies offer new ways to map the planet, particularly for remote and featureless environments like oceans and the polar regions.”   

With these sensors, operators can identify and orient military assets through what the QED-C report calls “magnetic anomaly-aided navigation (MagNav),” and “gravitational anomaly-aided navigation (GravNav)”. 

“These sensors look for anomalies in the magnetic or gravitational environments, and can match these anomalies to known magnetic or gravitational maps,” Maj Gen (Ret) Crider said. “For example, a U.S. naval vessel operating in the polar region with limited GPS availability can rely on gravimeters to detect anomalies in the gravitational field around the ship and verify any changes with previously known maps of Earth’s gravitational field.” 

Quantum technologies can also go beyond mapping capabilities for PNT verification, to also include quantum accelerometers and quantum gyroscopes that measure an asset’s changes in motion and angle of rotation, respectively.  

“Quantum accelerometers and quantum gyroscopes can be networked together to dramatically improve the accuracy and reliability of our sensing capabilities for measuring an asset’s movement,” Lt Gen (Ret) Raduege said. “These tools can also be directly applied to the space domain to provide highly accurate measurements of a satellite’s position and orientation, as well as objects in its surrounding environment to support the space domain awareness mission.”  

According to the QED-C report, quantum sensors are particularly valuable in how they can be integrated with legacy GPS systems to enhance their accuracy and reliability. 

“It’s important that we network these emerging technologies into our traditional GPS systems to get that added resiliency in providing PNT capabilities to joint military operations,” Maj Gen (Ret) Crider said. “When GPS signals are disrupted or compromised, these quantum sensors can verify the accuracy of those GPS signals while also providing an alternative PNT capability for joint forces operating in those GPS-denied areas.” 

Quantum sensors are relevant to various commercial industries as well, such as agriculture, transportation, communications, financial management and even mining for critical resources. As a result, the QED-C proposed several recommendations for the federal government and its industry partners to invest in greater research and development of quantum technologies in a way that facilitates the broader industry’s growth. 

Investing in Quantum R&D 

One priority is investing in the research and development of photonic integrated circuits (PICs), or microchips that transmit, process and sense information through light-based particles called ‘photons.’ PICs are viewed as faster and more efficient than traditional electronic microchips, which primarily transfers information through electrons. 

“The government can invest in the development of PICs similar to how they have taken steps to establish a foundry for electronic microchips in the U.S.,” Maj Gen (Ret) Crider said. “We have to ensure there is a supply chain for developing these photonic components, such that we can create the PICs necessary for quantum sensors.” 

The QED-C report also emphasizes the role of partnerships between the government and the quantum community to identify opportunities for standardizing the size, weight, power and cost (SWaP-C) criteria of PICs used in quantum technology.  

“Reducing the SWaP-C elements of PICs would enhance their reliability and facilitate the economies of scale needed to broaden the application and commercialization of quantum sensors across industries,” Lt Gen (Ret) Raduege said. “The government must work with organizations like QED-C, academic institutions, think tanks and other industry stakeholders to encourage market studies, pilot programs and test-beds for developing quantum technology.” 

Further, by providing third-party validation and verification requirements, like those coming out of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Quantum Benchmarking Initiative and National Institutes of Standards and Technology, the government can ensure that the quantum technologies it adopts has been proven to be accurate and reliable.  

“The federal government can fund organizations supporting standardization and validation measures of emerging technologies, and also support the research labs and academic institutions that provide test-beds for establishing these performance standards,” Maj Gen (Ret) Crider said. “Then the DOD can work with the military services to facilitate the integration of quantum capabilities into warfighting operations.” 

Quantum, PNT, and the Joint Fight 

With the effective development and deployment of quantum sensors, particularly with legacy PNT systems, the implications for supporting joint force operations across domains can be significant. 

“Quantum sensing technologies can support the military across all the different elevation levels that joint forces operate in: from the subsurface to the surface level, which includes both maritime and land domains, as well as the air and space domains,” Maj Gen (Ret) Crider said. “We need that resiliency to create competitive advantage, particularly as China is investing and developing quantum technologies for the same reasons.” 

Enabled by the expertise in emerging technologies from the likes of Maj Gen (Ret) Crider and Lt Gen (Ret) Raduege, Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy is particularly equipped to support partnerships that facilitate the development and adoption of quantum sensors across space mission areas. 

“Elara Nova can identify the best applications for these emerging technologies and how to engage the entire community of industry, government, academia partners to work through these issues from a quantum perspective,” Maj Gen (Ret) Crider said. “Together, we can bring these capabilities forward into the innovation systems and processes by establishing standards, developing early prototypes, and integrating these technologies into new and legacy systems to create effects that assure space superiority and preserve our national security interests.” 

Elara Nova is a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/. 

SBIR Funding Demonstrates Growing Imperative for ‘Space Cyber’ 

In response to an evolving threat landscape where cyberattacks can manipulate and compromise a satellite’s data, the United States Space Force is heightening its focus on “space cyber,” or the cybersecurity of space systems on-orbit. One emerging solution toward this effort is the Cyber Reslience on-Orbit (CROO) tool, a software program that focuses on not just securing the links between satellites and the terrestrial networks, but on the cybersecurity of the satellite itself. Funded in part by an AFWERX Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Direct-to-Phase II contract, the CROO tool will leverage innovative technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML) and digital twin modeling and simulation in a way that demonstrates how the Space Force is adapting to a more dynamic and contested ‘space cyber’ environment.  

“CROO essentially acts as a ‘nervous system’ to indicate that something isn’t right with the satellite,” said Maj Gen (Ret) Kim Crider, the former Chief Technology and Innovation Officer with the Space Force and Founding Partner at Elara Nova. “It starts with building a complete digital model of a satellite, including its subsystems and components to learn the normal behavior of the system. CROO then uses AI and synthetic data to model attacks against one or more subsystems or components. By learning how the digital twin satellite reacts to simulated attacks, the CROO tool can learn to detect or infer real attacks on real satellite systems by knowing what attack indicators to look for. This ultimately will give satellite operators more ways to diagnose when an anomaly is in fact an attack.”  

CROO is being designed to recognize and detect the broad range of current and emerging cyber threats.

“CROO is a next generation cybersecurity tool specifically designed for space systems,” said Brig Gen (Ret) Chad Raduege, the former Chief Information Officer with U.S. European Command and President of Elara Nova’s Cyber, Data and Communications sector. “By using the digital twin model to explore how the satellite might behave under a cyberattack CROO indicates what may happen when an intrusion or unauthorized access is taking place, where a bad actor is making malicious commands or tampering with the code in a way that results in an abnormal behavior. It’s also looking at its signals for software compromises like the different spoofing techniques an adversary or hacker can employ.”  

In doing so, CROO both embodies the convergence of emerging technologies like AI/ML and digital twin modeling and simulation and reinforces the inherently integrated and operationally vital relationship between the space and cyberspace domains. 

Ensuring Cybersecurity Across Domains 

While the United States government has been putting satellites on-orbit for decades, it’s only been in relatively recent history that it’s had to protect those assets from cyberattacks. But protecting satellites from cyberattack isn’t as easy as protecting networks on the ground.  

“Different strategies are required beyond our traditional cybersecurity approaches,” Gen Raduege said. “Cyber defenses for terrestrial networks like firewalls, patching and perimeter defenses, don’t necessarily translate well into space. You can’t just plug and play with different assets like you can on the ground, so cybersecurity defenses have to be designed and built in before the system is even launched. You have to have redundant and resilient systems in space, and that’s why other types of defensive approaches like AI/ML, digital twins and the automation activities of CROO will be important.” 

Further complicating matters is the inherent interconnectedness of space and cyber technologies, which means the Department of War must consider how it will protect its networks across its whole system of systems.  

“We have to keep in mind that when it comes to space cyber, the ground infrastructure and their data links to on-orbit assets create a complex, interconnected ecosystem across domains,” Gen Raduege added. “Terrestrial network defenses can be regularly accessed and updated with patches or fixes, whereas we don’t have direct access to space cyber networks that exist in a hostile and distant space environment. Space cyber is an end-to-end system across a distributed environment that blurs the boundaries of operational and information technologies. That’s a unique challenge to have to protect.” 

It’s also where a cybersecurity tool like CROO will play an outsized role, particularly as satellites function as physical, control-oriented systems that rely heavily on IT for complex software, data processing, communication and data transport. 

“CROO becomes incredibly important when it comes to monitoring a satellite’s behavior because satellites are just one set of endpoints in the entire system of systems,” Gen Crider said. “These satellites are assets we can’t afford to lose, and they’re operating thousands of miles away and traveling at incredibly fast speeds. So we’ve got to think through how we’re going to deal with potential compromises, delays or anomalous behaviors with that satellite and protect the rest of this system it’s connected to.”  

Space Force Investing in Cybersecurity Solutions 

As the nation’s newest military service, the Space Force recognizes its role beyond a facilitator and enabler of joint force operations. Its leaders understand that the service was stood up to protect and defend strategic assets on-orbit in response to a growing counterspace threat environment, which specifically includes cyber threats. 

That’s why the government is creating avenues for companies to cross the ”Valley of Death” and bring innovative, dual-use solutions to the fight. CROO is one such example of this emerging public-private investment.  

“This example demonstrates the government sees operational value in the CROO concept, because these Direct-to-Phase-II SBIR contracts are intended to transition a credible idea into an operational prototype as quickly as possible,” Gen Raduege said. ”The AFWERX SBIRs program and other innovation contracting approaches in general, are explicitly designed to attract startups with operationally feasible and relevant ideas, even from non-traditional defense contractors. These programs enable researchers to develop solutions that can close an operational gap.” 

The influx of funding dollars capabilities like CROO also reflects the emerging priority that is “space cyber.” 

“CROO signals that the Space Force is serious about ‘space cyber’ and is willing to put money behind it,” Gen Crider said. “The Space Force wants a framework for equipping a space system and monitoring it for threats and anomalous behavior. CROO now creates an opportunity that’s not just a one-off capability, but one that can be expanded across the Space Force’s mission areas over time.” 

Leveraging Commercial Innovation and Collaboration 

The successful development of CROO further demonstrates how the government is using the SBIR program to initiate high-level conversations about its needs and its willingness to explore commercial solutions to meet those needs. This can be an innovative break from traditional approaches, when the government oftentimes would receive different capabilities from different industry partners and would ultimately be responsible for integrating them together into a comprehensive solution themselves.  

Instead, the SBIR program is creating an opportunity for industry partners to contribute their own respective strengths to deliver the most advanced capability – already fully integrated – to the warfighter.  

“CROO is an example of the power of collaboration between innovative commercial companies, where Proof Labs, BigBear.ai and Redwire Space all came together to develop a solution,” Gen Crider said. “Proof Labs focuses on cybersecurity testing and analysis, while BigBear.ai delivers modern AI/ML techniques, and RedWire Space understands how satellite systems are developed and integrated into end-to-end systems. This resulted in a capability that incorporates all three of these strengths: cybersecurity, AI/ML technologies and space systems.” 

An Evolving ‘Space Cyber’ Threat 

The space environment, and particularly the space cyber environment, will only continue to evolve rapidly as technologies and adversarial threats advance. Therefore, the need to secure and protect space systems, and other systems across operational domains, becomes an increasingly significant imperative.  

That’s why Elara Nova is also evolving to meet this emerging requirement, by standing up its new Cyber, Data and Communications business sector to ensure the cybersecurity resiliency of technologies and systems across operational domains.  

“The Cyber, Data and Communications sector is focused on what our warfighters need across multi-domain operations,” Gen Raduege said. “Data exchanges through communication nodes that connect one domain to another require the right cybersecurity applications. Our objective is to help government and industry alike translate commercial technologies into solutions that meet the government’s needs, and can be integrated into the current operational environment.” 

For Gen Crider, as one of the four Founding Partners at Elara Nova, the new CDC sector demonstrates a natural evolution for the strategic advisory firm.  

“Elara Nova’s core focus from the start has been: ‘How do we help advance the national defense and security capabilities of the United States and its allies?’” Gen Crider said. “This requires a team of experts with deep experience across the specific domains of military, commercial and civil operations that are becoming more and more complex, interconnected and integrated together through data networks. We need the appropriate software and cybersecurity constructs to assure this spectrum of technologies can perform with assured protection across domains. So Elara Nova’s CDC sector is a natural evolution of how we help our industry partners satisfy and meet government requirements for operating in these complex environments and supporting how the government thinks about leveraging the capabilities industry brings forward.” 

Elara Nova is a trusted guiding partner that builds tailored teams to illuminate unseen opportunities and deliver impact across every domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/.  

Episode 34: Cyber Resilience On-Orbit a ‘Nervous System’ for Detecting Threats

Host: Scott King 

SME: Maj Gen (Ret) Kim Crider, Founding Partner at Elara Nova (KC) 

Brig Gen (Ret) Chad Raduege, President of Cyber, Data & Communications at Elara Nova (CR) 

00:02 – 01:17 

In response to evolving cyber threats that can manipulate and compromise a satellite’s data, the United States Space Force is heightening its focus on “space cyber,” or the cybersecurity of space systems on-orbit. One emerging solution toward this effort is the Cyber Reslience On-Orbit tool, or CROO, a software program that focuses on not just securing the data links between satellites and their terrestrial networks, but on the cybersecurity of the satellite itself. Funded in part by an AFWERX Small Business Innovation Research Direct-to-Phase II contract, the CROO tool will leverage innovative technologies like artificial intelligence, machine learning and digital twin modeling and simulation in a way that altogether demonstrates how the Space Force is adapting to a more dynamic and contested ‘space cyber’ environment.  

Welcome to ‘The Elara Edge.’ Our topic today is the Cyber Resilience On-Orbit tool and the broader emergence of the space cyber imperative. We have two guests returning to the show today.

First, we have retired Major General Kim Crider, the first Chief Technology and Innovation Officer with the United States Space Force and a Founding Partner at Elara Nova.  

Ma’am, welcome back to the show.

01:18 – 01:20 

(KC) Thank you. Scott. It’s a pleasure to be here.  

01:20 – 01:48 

It’s a pleasure to have you. 

Also returning to the show, albeit in a different capacity than before, is retired Brigadier General Chad Raduege, the former Chief Information Officer at Headquarters U.S. European Command. While General Raduege has been with Elara Nova for several years, he joins us now as the President of Elara Nova’s new Cyber, Data and Communications business sector, which we’ll get into a little more later on in the show. 

Sir, welcome back! 

01:49 – 01:54 

(CR) Yeah. Scott, it’s great to be back and thank you for pulling together this important conversation.  

01:55 – 02:12 

Now, we’ll kick-off today’s discussion with the story at-hand, which is the Space Force has recently contracted with Proof Labs, a national security space startup, and two other industry partners to deliver the Cyber Resilience On-Orbit tool.  

What is this software program and how is it designed to work? 

02:13 – 03:38 

(CR) Yeah. Thanks, Scott.  I’ll jump in and, and take this first question and come out of the chutes. The Cyber Resilience On-Orbit, what we would call CROO. 

It’s really one of those next generation cybersecurity tools specifically built for space systems that integrates in a very meaningful way – advanced AI and machine learning. And essentially what it does is it provides continuous monitoring, the ability to learn to detect cyber threats for the ongoing challenges of the on-orbit environment. 

I think there’s a couple of important aspects associated with CROO. One is the on-orbit monitoring. What CROO does – is it watches the operational behavior of what is going on in the satellites and instead of just protecting the terrestrial networks or those encrypted links that we think about, it actually monitors the actual system in space and so I think that that’s a unique role of CROO.  

It also provides what we would call intrusion detection and anomaly detection. And it does this by comparing what’s normal versus some of those threats that can come in. So you’re going to start hearing terms like digital twin technology. That’s how it does it. It establishes a digital twin model to allow those systems to test how they behave. I think an important note for CROO is while it’s being built for military application, it’s certainly going to have some dual-use.  

03:39 – 05:25 

(KC) It really is, as Chad said, kind of the next generation of what we need to be doing in securing our space assets. 

What’s so powerful about it, is its application and use of artificial intelligence and machine learning and being able to understand and assess how a satellite system is supposed to be working and how it’s supposed to be responding to contacts from the ground and then what some of the anomalous behavior signals might be indicating, some of the potential on-orbit system compromises. If that system is not performing as expected, if the responses to ground contacts and engagement are not as expected, or if there’s an anomaly that occurs on orbit that creates some sort of alert, the system of CROO essentially acts as like a nervous system to provide an indication that something just isn’t right. Something isn’t performing the way it’s supposed to.  

And if we have a digital twin, as Chad described, and we can talk about that a little bit more, we can compare that on-orbit activity, that on-orbit behavior, to what normal behavior would look like and really start to pinpoint where the problem is in a way that is much more comprehensive than what we can do today.  

And as Chad mentioned, the other thing that I think is very powerful about this capability, is its ability to be able to support both military applications, government applications, commercial applications across the board. 

So I think it’s going to be a very powerful capability and it’s very exciting to see the Space Force getting behind this.

05:26 – 05:33 

I’d like to dig further into the idea of a digital twin model. Can you speak a little bit more to what that means and why it presents an advantage? 

05:34 – 06:36 

(KC) The idea of a digital twin is that you would use artificial intelligence to be able to describe a digital version of an asset, whether it’s a static asset where you wanted to create a digital representation of that asset, and you might use different sensors to understand what that asset looks like. 

If there are certain operational parameters that you would expect or behavioral parameters, if you will, that you would expect that specific asset to accomplish and you would create a digital representation of the asset. 

And that specific twin is then continuously updated and maintained to represent how that asset is changing in the environment within which it is operating. 

And then in this case, of the CROO, might be compared to an anomalous activity of that asset that is outside of the norm, outside of the established performance parameters of the digital asset. 

Let me turn it over to Chad for additional thoughts.

06:37 – 07:17 

(CR) Yeah. Kim, I like the word that you used or the phrase that you used about operational parameters. And digital twins are being used to enable the operators to experiment a little bit to see what the art of the possible with the different sensors and tools and technologies and processes really would look like.  

They’re able to learn, they’re able to apply different ideas, different hardware and software configurations to learn and really develop a best practice list of capabilities and how the live operational environment should look and so digital twins, as alluded to, have been around for a while, but I think we’re going to see more and more of this because it’s just such a powerful concept. 

07:18 – 07:29 

Now, the U.S. government has had assets on orbit for decades. But what does the continued development and maturation of artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies enable now that wasn’t possible before? 

07:30 – 09:08 

(KC) With artificial intelligence, we have so much more capability to create an understanding of a system in its environment without actually being there. We can capture data about the real world environment in space, and how a particular asset that we may have created a digital version of is performing, is responding to that environment with real world data. 

But if we want to understand the possible scenarios, the possible attacks, the possible challenges that might impact an asset in the environment, we have to create synthetic data. We have to synthesize what that potential attack might look like, or what that potential reaction might look like in an environment that we might have to emulate through synthetic data and artificial intelligence can allow us to do that.  

It can allow us to envision and establish: here is the asset. Here is the digital version of that asset in its established operational environment, and we would feed that synthetic version with realistic attack data once we have that in a range sort of scenario where it can be compared to what an attack might do to the asset. So it’s a process of using data and models to not just represent what is, but to represent what could be and to represent responses and actions that could be taken if and when an anomalous behavior or an anomalous activity occurs.

09:09 – 09:14 

And Sir, what are some of the anomalous behaviors or cyber attacks that CROO is being designed to detect and prevent? 

09:15 – 10:54 

(CR) I love the way that, that Kim described the use of data, both with what we currently have [with] the large data models that are out there of what does a normal operation look like, but also that infused with synthetic data of what might an attack look like so that you can you can look at that data and learn from that and anticipate.  

 And so, Scott, to your question specifically of what types of cyber attacks CROO is designed to look at and developed to prevent. There’s a couple of things. 

One would be intrusions and unauthorized access. So detecting when some sort of outside infiltration of the systems are taking place. It could be spotting malicious commands or any tampering or deviations in the code that are part of the normal behavior. 

Kim used the term “the nervous system.” And I think that that’s a very good grab on the type of thing the CROO is designed to prevent. It’s looking at full signals and different spoofing techniques that an adversary or a hacker may be employing. It’s looking for things like software compromise. What is actually on board and what corrupt software states come in. It could be kind of the engine light warning in your car that’s popping up saying, ‘Hey, alert, there’s something going on here.’  

And then finally, I would say that it detects some of those anomalous operational patterns. So things like changes in real time, things that are outside the norm – going back to the data that it has been fed, things that create what a normal environment would look like and what would a simulated attack look like and it can pick up on that. So that’s where I think CROO is going to help us prevent. 

10:55 – 11:09 

Now Charleen Laughlin, the Space Force’s Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Cyber and Data, has noted in the past that there is an inherent difference between defending terrestrial networks and on-orbit networks.  

Can you elaborate on the difference between the two? 

11:10 – 13:57 

(CR) Yeah. Scott, I love that question. And I’d like to start by just acknowledging it’s great to have Char Laughlin, as the first stand alone S6, if you will, for our Space Force. I think her placement on the U.S. Space Force front office staff focused directly on cyber and data is a strong indicator of the type of talented leader she is. 

She comes from a very strong joint and coalition experience in her previous role down in the Joint Staff, J6. And so she comes in and has been able to pinpoint in a very succinct way the difference between what you’re talking about of terrestrial, where we think about focusing on the network and how you physically control it, how you regularly update it.  

Whereas, space cyber defenses, what I’ll call ‘space cyber,’ must protect things that we can’t necessarily touch. Once you put that in orbit, it’s operating in an area that we don’t have direct access to. Often in a hostile environment and it’s very complex given the distance that it is from us. So there’s a couple of things that I think feed into that ‘space cyber’ definition, if you will. 

One is just the complexity and the architecture. Think about this. You know, it’s not just the ground infrastructure and not just the data links that we’re used to on the terrestrial side. But now you add in that orbital asset, and the interconnected ecosystem that that creates. So now you have different endpoints in different domains where you can get one by hand, but you can’t get the other and so that creates complexity.  

It also limits the physical access as you can’t touch that once that’s already been launched. So those satellites and those orbiting systems are really out of our control. It also creates a very distributed environment. There are vast differences. I mean, we’re talking a long way up into space to even have that ability to work with it.  

Final point that I will make is that there is a unique role that this ecosystem creates when you have those ground stations, those uplinks and downlinks and then all of those connections that are taking place. We’re really seeing a real blurring of the terrestrial IT environment. So the things that we can touch. Now, it’s on an asset that’s in space and so that begins blurring in and bringing in the boundary of operational technology and that’s really where the hardware and the software is processing. It’s the control, it’s the physical environment that is operating in space and so a real blurring of IT and OT and so that’s unique as well. So Char Laughlin’s description I think is spot on. It’s different and more complex.

13:56 – 14:13 

And given these differences, the imperative to have the appropriate cybersecurity measures in place remains ubiquitous across operational domains.  

So can you speak to how the government must take different defensive approaches to account for the cyber threat across these different operational domains? 

14:14 – 16:00 

(CR) I think there’s a couple of things that come to mind when you talk about that defensive approach and the way that we’re thinking about space cyber. One is that it’s an imperative to be built in from the start. This is one of those things that cybersecurity is built-in by design, before it is even launched into space and so that’s unique.  

Different strategies are required beyond our traditional IT security. What we talked about with things like firewalls, or patching, or perimeter defense, all of those things that we are very involved in and very deliberate upon on the terrestrial side, once you get up into space that doesn’t necessarily translate well. 

Now you’re having to think about things like remote detection and built-in resiliency. You can no longer just plug and play different assets like you could on the ground. You’re now having to have built-in, redundant systems and resilient systems in the event that something happens.  

You also happen to figure out, even before you deploy what sort of hardening activities, you put on those systems. 

We spent quite a bit of time already talking about AI and ML and I think that that is another example of the types of defensive approaches that the digital twins and automating activities like CROO is doing. And then finally, I would just say that I think that there is a role in this of thinking about the whole of system and what that integration looks like. 

Earlier I used the term the ecosystem, but I think that that is a foot stomp to this whole conversation. It’s not just the exchange of data by way of uplinks and downlinks. It’s the spacecraft, it’s the ground systems. It’s all of that and you can’t treat those all individually. You have to think about the entire data flow, from ground to space and back. 

16:01 – 18:31 

(KC) You really do need to, more than ever, think about the engineering up front, and emphasizing the resilience up front, really working through the architecture of that entire space system as Chad’s talking about not just the on orbit asset, but the the links and the connections and the ground system and how it all works together and where and how the resilience is going to be built-in and across that entire entity, that entire end-to-end system. 

And this is where something like CROO becomes so important is when you’re thinking about the end-to-end system [and] the monitoring of its behavior. How do you expect this system to behave across the board? And where are you going to be potentially seeing compromises in that system? We’re talking about endpoints, these space satellite systems that are operating at thousands of miles, tens of thousands of miles away, whether they’re in LEO about 1,200 miles away or in GEO 22,000 miles away. These assets are far away. They’re moving around very, very quickly in space and they’re entities that we can’t afford to necessarily lose.  

So we have to be really mindful, even before the asset is launched. How could that system potentially be compromised? And what are we going to do if it is, what’s going to be the playbook on dealing with remediation? How are you going to get to the last normal mode of operation? And roll back in some manner to a level of operation that you can control and command the spacecraft with.  

And so you’ve got to be able to think through how you’re going to deal with potential compromises, potential delays, potential needs to rekey or reconfigure and remediate any potential anomalous behavior in that on-orbit system and the entirety of this system that it’s connected to.  

I’ll add one more point. I mean, oftentimes, as much as we’re concerned about the on-orbit asset and I’m glad that we’re thinking through this and how to be able to understand it better and assess anomalous behavior – we can’t overlook the ground system. The ground system is connected to the terrestrial network and it has so many potential attack vectors associated with it. 

We need to be thinking about the entirety of the network, the entirety of the system, and the entirety of where the ground system could potentially be compromised as well, because quite frankly, that is still a very, very vulnerable point in our overall space end-to-end system.  

18:32 – 18:53 

Now, getting back to CROO. This software tool was partially funded through an AFWERX Small Business Innovation Research or SBIR, Direct-to-Phase II contract. 

What does this demonstrate about SBIR as a contract vehicle for a capability the government is interested in? And further, what does this example signal about the government’s emerging cyber priorities? 

18:54 – 20:37 

(CR) I think what’s unique about the Direct to Phase Two SBIR contract that was put in place: the government doesn’t mess around on this stuff. Often, we’ll have an idea. We’ll get started with research by giving out some funds to allow researchers to go and be curious to look at the types of solutions that we could provide and then really bring it back to the government for us to evaluate. 

I think in this case, when we’re talking about directly to a phase two, what this is signaling is that the government already sees strong operational value and relevance and credibility in this CROO concept. And so that’s a salute to CROO, that we’ve already bought into the idea. Now it’s just bringing it to light.  

From our innovation societies in general – AFWERX, the SBIRs program – those are explicitly designed to attract startups with great ideas, nontraditional defense contractors. We’re looking for agile companies with innovative ideas. Innovation often is more important than anything. Speed matters. We’re trying to close an operational gap that we are seeing.  

In this case, I think the Department of War is probably saying, ‘Hey, we’re willing to take some calculated risks on this.’ There’s enough vulnerability to what we’re seeing in space and down on the ground that we’ve got to get after this right now. 

And so the whole idea about those phase two SBIRs is transitioning to a program of record as quickly as possible. And so for industry this is a real pipeline to real contracts. And so that’s a little bit of the incentive and a little bit to your second question of how industry should look at this.

20:38 – 22:08 

(KC) Yeah, I’ll just add that I think that with what this signals, is that the Space Force in this particular case is very serious about space cyber. It’s willing to put some money behind it. It wants to see what can be done. It really wants to see a real prototype of what can be done in this area of digital twin of a space asset and using artificial intelligence and machine learning as we talked about, to be able to not only build out the digital twin and understand its performance parameters under normal conditions, but be able to detect anomalous behavior and have a framework for doing that.  

 Have a framework for really, tooling the system, monitoring the system, assessing anomalies, and then being able to use that as a basis for: how do you really defend against those challenges? And providing a basis, as I said earlier, for what we might be able to do with any type of mission system. This becomes an opportunity to create a capability that’s not just a one-off. 

We can reuse these methods that are being built out here, to be able to expand and extend into all of the mission areas of the Space Force over time. So I think it’s a very powerful way to use the Small Business Innovative Research program to have a capability developed, to get a real usable prototype that can be extended and expanded across a variety of different mission sets.  

22:09 – 23:06 

(CR) Yeah. Hey, Scott, if I can just piggyback on Kim’s great response. Often the government is put in the role of integrator. We have stovepipe solutions that are delivered to us and then we in the government are forced to try and figure out how to bring those capabilities together. 

In this particular case, with this SBIR, it’s really forcing a higher level conversation about solving the system of systems problem set and and being the integrator. And so for the example of CROO, we had three different companies that came together and said, ‘We’re going to take that integrator role off of you, and our engineers are going to tackle this and look at it from end-to-end and figure out how to how to bring in AI and ML and bring in cybersecurity aspects of things and bring in our engineering design, all of that together in a whole of system approach.’ And so that’s just a real kudo in this case. 

23:07 – 24:03 

(KC) It’s so interesting. In this particular case, you’ve got Proof Labs, Big Bear AI, and Redwire, all coming together. Again, the power of that collaboration, the power of that teaming of commercial innovative companies, a company very much focused on the application of AI and ML testing and assessing from a cybersecurity standpoint in Proof Labs. A leading AI company in Big Bear AI that is bringing modern AI techniques and machine learning. 

And then a company that understands the space environment and the space components, and how satellite systems are developed and built out and the end-to-end system and particularly the on-board asset’s space components that RedWire brings to bear. So three really important capabilities coming together: cybersecurity, and the testing and analysis of it. 

It’s a very powerful collaboration here.

24:04 – 24:30 

CROO was also a topic of conversation at The Value of Space Summit, an event hosted last fall by the Space ISAC (or Space Information Sharing and Analysis Center).  

 The Space ISAC also recently announced that it’s expanding its watch center operations to the United Kingdom and other Allied countries. We’ve discussed the Space ISAC on the show before, but to briefly reiterate, can you share the role of the Space ISAC and its watch centers, particularly in context of the cyber threat? 

24:31 – 25:41 

(CR) I’ll take a first go at this and I’ll tell you that ISACs in general. So you described it: information sharing and analysis centers. These are stood up all over the environment. There’s sector specific threat sharing organizations that are meant to improve the cyber resilience by indicating when there are compromises, sharing best practices, sharing information between each other, [and] getting stronger as a group. 

Typically these are member-based organizations, as is the case of the Space ISAC, which is one of those again, specific sectors. So our Space ISAC is headquartered in Colorado Springs. It’s a nonprofit industry consortium, but it’s also a membership. And so you can choose to be part of this. And, when you come in, you’re part of the broader space ecosystem that includes space companies, different government partners that are there. There are higher education research institutes and now, as you alluded to, there’s some allied contributions, and it’s all about sharing information about the security threats and vulnerabilities that are out there against our space systems.  

25:42 – 27:25 

(KC) Yeah, the Space ISAC has been around for a while now and I think they’ve really started to figure out ways to expand and grow into the international community with the expansion to the UK and Allied countries. They’ve found that it not only is important to bring those industry partners in, but as Chad mentioned, bring other countries in so that they can be able to leverage the information and insights, threat intelligence that Allied partners can provide around the globe on specific threats to the space domain. 

What the Space ISAC does is it collects threat information. The members share information about vulnerabilities that they are observing to their space assets, threats to their space assets, and incidents occurring in space, whether those be cybersecurity incidents or environmental space anomalies that are impacting their systems. 

And if you expand that to take advantage of the global reach of Allies and partners around the world, now you’re starting to really understand, how those assets might be impacted anywhere, from any vantage point of those assets from the globe, and from the perspective of different types of members who have assets operated from their different countries. 

It provides a much broader understanding of what’s happening, much more potential threat vectors, against those space assets. And a lot of collaboration and coordination reinforcement, between U.S. commercial partners, international commercial partners, and U.S. and Allied government partners that are all interested in and collaborating on the Space ISAC. 

27:26 – 28:29 

(CR) You know, Scott, my last duty assignment was with European Command, so I had an opportunity to work quite a bit with our Allies and partners in the NATO environment. 

We used to have a saying called ‘Stronger Together.’ And that was really a foot stomp of what these multinational Ally and partner cooperations look like. And so, thinking back to the Space ISAC and now that they’re going global, I think there’s some very easy takeaways for our audience to understand. Now you have more regions and more time zones that threat intelligence is flowing from and to, you have a ‘follow the sun’ monitoring model. 

And so there may be something that you see happen in one part of the globe and through the interconnectivity of the Space ISAC they’re able to see that and perhaps even get the word out for others to protect themselves. I also think that it helps from an international perspective of dialing in, not only the response for anything that’s been detected, but building in some resiliency through some of the best practice programs that are out there.  

28:30 – 28:46 

Also at around this time, the Department of War announced a new cybersecurity framework, known as the Cyber Security Risk Management Construct, or CSRMC. Can you introduce us to this new construct and what does it aim to do differently from its predecessor: the Risk Management Framework? 

28:47 – 31:13 

(CR) Oh, Scott, you said the bad word of ‘risk management framework.’ RMF has been, one of those four letter words that I’ve known most of my career as I was in, different senior level jobs, near the end of my career, it was – I won’t say the bane of my existence – but it was a tough environment, as innovative and agile leaders at the Pentagon were trying to drive us to be more cyber secure through RMF, which was just a tough model.  

RMF had its role. It was based in industry standards and NIST standards. It provided a framework to get to your authority to operate or your authority to connect. And so it did have an important role. But what I like about this new cybersecurity risk management construct is this is a new framework that’s built on a different set of values. 

They have five different phases associated with this framework where they’re designing, building, testing, on-boarding and then operating. And so what does this look like?  

RMF used to be one that was more of a compliance focus, [whereas] the new model was one of continuous operational risk management. Exactly what our warfighters are looking for, exactly what commanders are looking for when they employ systems. The RMF model used to be one where you have periodic assessments. We used to be on a schedule every year or two years or three years, depending on your authority to connect and authority to operate. 

Now, this new framework, this new construct is built on real-time monitoring and dashboards. So now it’s not a static PowerPoint chart. Now it’s a live operational dashboard that’s showing you the true cybersecurity presence in real time.  

What used to be a snapshot in time is now continuous and dynamic. It allows for real-time risk evaluation. It used to be limited and now there’s a real central emphasis on coming together and thinking about and managing our cyber risk as a community. Those that are responsible for evaluating it and those that are responsible for fielding and operating it. And so, I’m excited to see where this is going to go. I think it’s a real indicator that there is a shift, again, in the cybersecurity culture of our department. And I’m cautiously optimistic – how about that? 

31:14 – 33:46 

(KC) And Chad’s exactly right in terms of everything he described with regards to what’s different about the Cyber Security Risk Management Construct. [It] certainly puts us in a position to emphasize some of the things that we’ve been talking about here all along. The continuous assessment, the monitoring, versus, the sort of checking the boxes, paperwork-based approach that we had before. 

And I think this is really what industry needs to think about when it comes to this new approach. That it really is about ‘show me the data,’ prove that there is a continuously measured security posture in place for a particular system or asset, and do that through evidence, through providing these digital twins that we talked about before that can really demonstrate how secure a system will be in the face of threats and how that system will be monitored and how that system will react in the face of threats.

It doesn’t call specifically for digital twins, but that is one way to certainly present a continuously measured and secure posture for an asset that can be supported with some evidence, with some data, with some provability. Industry needs to ensure that systems are built for reciprocity, that they are providing information and evidence and controls that show how they’re leveraging established controls and established secure methods for monitoring those systems that will reinforce its posture. 

And then it’s communicating specific risk to mission, not just specific risk from a cyber perspective, from a technology perspective. But what does that risk mean? What is that cybersecure vulnerability that that system is designed to protect against? How is that reinforcing the mission security? The mission posture? And so how does that system design understand, and account for protecting the mission and assuring that the controls that are in place are oriented around a mission focus, versus just a focus on a specific component of the system. 

Those would be some of the things that I think industry should be taking away from this new approach, and be leaning into as it looks to seek to support the Cyber Security Risk Management Construct. Chad, what would you add to that?

33:47 – 34:11 

(CR)  I think mine would just be a footstomp. This is going to become the new norm and industry needs to understand that. I was just reading an article this morning where we now have a confirmed DoD CIO, who is very interested in this new construct and what that will look like for weapons systems across the Department of War. 

So, it’s going to be the norm, get used to the buzzwords and deliver accordingly.  

34:12 – 34:32 

So we’ve covered a lot of recent changes in the “space cyber” realm of national security. But here at Elara Nova, there have also been some recent developments.  

General Raduege, you are now spearheading a new line of business for Elara Nova, the Cyber, Data and Communications sector, as its new president.  

What are some of the goals and objectives of Elara Nova’s new CDC effort? 

34:33 – 37:48 

(CR)  Scott, I’d be happy to. First of all, let me just say I’ve been with the Elara Nova team for several years now. Always been impressed with the way that they operate, the types of people that they have assembled as part of the Elara Nova family. I am just thrilled and honored to now pick up a more expanded role in this.  

So we’re calling it the Cyber, Data and Communications sector. I’m very excited to see how those three things interact.  

First of all, I would tell you that I’m thinking in terms of multi-domain. There is, there’s some real things that our warfighters are in need of, we have the terrestrial environment, we have air, we have space. And how do you tie all those things together to exchange data from one location to another through the communications nodes that we’ve assembled, and then make sure that you’ve got the right cybersecurity applications applied to that? So I mean, really, that’s going to be the focus moving forward. 

We really do have an objective as we initially get started to help industry and government alike cut through the complexity of everything that’s out there. We’ve spent a lot of time today talking about systems of systems and architecture and cutting down on silos. This is a way of getting after that. We’re really thinking in terms of creating a strategic edge for our warfighter.  

We’re focused in this new sector on industry: helping them understand really, what are the government requirements looking for? What are they asking? How do you interpret that? How do you enable your technology toward that? How do you message the capabilities that you have put together? 

You have great tech, but it requires somebody that can help translate that great tech and that great vision into the requirements that the government is looking for. And then it’s figuring out how to engage the right leaders at the right time. Where does the acquisition community fit in this? Where does the Combatant Commander fit into this? How about the services? Where are the authorities? Who are the right people to get visibility and get that capability recognized?  

But we’re also focusing on, on the government as well. How do we help them in the very demanding environment that they have? It’s just a look across the environment right now to see all of the military operations that are ongoing around the world and those that are in uniform and serving in the Department of War currently have a lot to figure out how to employ the capabilities of today, while trying to envision the future.  

And Elara Nova will have a role in that: helping them think about that future construct, aligning the right capabilities, with the right technology and helping figure that out, interpret what industry has out there and how that may plug into the current environment. 

So I’ll stop there, Scott, and just say, I’m really excited to see how this Cyber, Data and Communications play will all come together. You’re going to be amazed at the type of experts that we’ve been able to assemble into this new sector and we’re just really looking forward to making a difference for our nation. 

37:49 – 38:07 

And Ma’am, as one of the Founding Partners at Elara Nova, can you take us behind the scenes on what prompted the decision to stand up the CDC sector? 

And how does expanding Elara Nova’s services in this way reflect the growing imperative to ensure government and commercial systems are cybersecure not only in space, but across operational domains? 

38:08 – 41:14 

(KC) These questions go hand in hand, really. You know, Elara Nova’s core focus from the start, is and continues to be: how do we as a company help advance the national defense and security capabilities of the United States and its Allies? And in doing so, how do we bring our team of experts who have deep and wide backgrounds and experience in and across specific domains of military operations, intelligence community operations, commercial operations, civil operations? How do we bring that expertise to bear so that we can ensure that the United States and her Allies have the absolute best capabilities that industry can bring forward and apply?  

And in doing so, we recognize that those operations that I mentioned across the board are becoming more and more complex. They’re becoming more and more interconnected. They’re becoming more and more integrated. They’re becoming more and more multi-domain across space, air, ground and cyber. And the application of technology has to be able to perform in those very complex environments. And what connects all of those environments is, in fact, software, networks, data, and the cybersecurity constructs that assure protection in and across those domains. 

It’s a natural outcome for us as a company to be thinking about having a sector that’s going to focus on not only advancing space capabilities for our nation and her Allies, but the cybersecurity components that go along with that: the data architectures, the interconnected communication systems in space, from space, to space, and with all domains that goes along with that. 

And the interconnectivity, if you will, across those three assets: cybersecurity, data and communications. It’s only natural for us to think about the air domain and how air and space have to work well together to reinforce and enhance operations for each domain, across each domain, and with all the other domains of operation that our joint warfighting Combatant Commanders need to be able to assess and therefore also the cybersecurity data and network communications that needs to occur in the air, from the air, and between air and the other domains. 

It’s just a natural evolution of what we, as Elara Nova, bring to bear and the expertise that we want to assure can be brought forward to help our industry partners satisfy and meet government demands of operating in those complex environments and help our government think about what kinds of capabilities are needed and how to leverage those capabilities most effectively with and in support of, all the other capabilities that they’re bringing forward.

41:15 – 41:54 

This has been an episode of The Elara Edge. As a strategic advisory firm, Elara Nova is the trusted guiding partner that builds tailored teams to illuminate unseen opportunities and deliver impact across every domain. 

With the trusted insight to deliver your decisive edge, Elara Nova is your source for expertise and guidance in cross-domain security. 

If you liked what you heard today, please subscribe to our channel and leave us a rating. Music for this podcast was created by Patrick Watkins of PW Audio. This episode was edited and produced by Regia Multimedia Services. I’m your host, Scott King, and join us next time at the Elara Edge. 

Integrated Mission Deltas, Inter-agency Agreements Extend Readiness Across Time Horizons

In the spirit of the United States Space Force’s Line of Effort #3 – Partner to Win, Chief of Space Operations General B. Chance Saltzman announced last year the Space Force was creating “Integrated Mission Deltas,” or IMDs, a new organizational structure designed to integrate teams of specialized personnel focused on specific space mission areas. The new IMD model was a break from traditional Department of Defense (DOD) organizational structures, which favored delineating responsibilities based on their functional purpose, like operations and acquisition. Under the traditional model, operations and acquisition personnel would operate in a separate and independent manner to achieve their respective outcomes, often against different readiness time horizons: operations personnel prioritized sustaining capability for the near-term threat, while acquisitions personnel prioritized funding for developing future capabilities. Now, the innovative IMD model demonstrates one of the many ways the Space Force – and the DOD writ large – is initiating new partnerships to ensure mission readiness across time horizons to be responsive to the threat. 

“In the traditional model, having operations and acquisition personnel in two different organizations creates gaps between priorities,” said Major General (Ret) Kim Crider, Founding Partner at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy. “Now, the IMD’s ability to prioritize mission requirements under one leadership chain has proven to be highly valuable, not to mention the cultural benefits in creating an esprit de corps and unity of effort around a specific mission set.” 

The first space mission areas to serve as prototype IMDs were Space Delta 3 for Space Electromagnetic Warfare (EW) and the Provisional Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) Delta.  

Prior to these IMDs, Space Operations Command (SpOC) was responsible for assigning personnel and training across the Space Force, while Space Systems Command (SSC) oversaw the acquisition and sustainment of the systems those personnel used. But now, operations and acquisition personnel work side-by-side under a single Delta Commander to ensure readiness for a specific space mission area. 

“An Integrated Mission Delta empowers the Commander to be more decisive in how their forces prioritize and respond to the threat,” Gen Crider said. “Acquisition personnel can now collaborate directly with the system operators and industry partners within the Delta to sustain their system with new improvements. So the IMD approach enhances readiness across the spectrum by rapidly integrating new innovation for their deployed capabilities.” 

New Partnerships within the Space Force 

The IMD model is the leading example of how the Space Force is internally creating new partnerships within its mission areas. The EW mission was chosen as a prototype IMD because Delta 3 already had a team responsible for capabilities like the Counter Communications System (CCS) Block 10.2, a portable EW system that reversibly denies adversary satellite communications. 

“Delta 3 operates with deployed teams and equipment responsible for maintaining both defensive and offensive electronic warfare capabilities,” Gen Crider said. “Now, those teams are formally built into an organizational construct that can reinforce that Commander’s responsibility for not just sustaining that capability, but also evolving it as well.” 

The IMD concept, however, goes beyond integrating personnel from operations and acquisition, by including other specialized functions like cybersecurity and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). Due to the inherently integrated nature of the space domain, cybersecurity and ISR personnel can provide critical threat assessments that inform how the Delta Commander prioritizes mission requirements. 

For example, squadrons from Space Delta 6 for Space Access and Cyberspace Operations and Space Delta 7 for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, can each have personnel embedded within Delta 3 to apply their specialized skills explicitly for the purpose of preserving capability in an ever-changing EW threat landscape. 

“Delta 3 already had an ISR unit connected to the EW team, but they weren’t officially part of that command structure as a specific squadron underneath the Delta 3 Commander,” Gen Crider said. “Now, ISR personnel within that Delta are steeped in the EW mission area to ensure any threats to the mission are driven back into the planning, testing, training, operating and sustaining of the EW capability.”  

In the year since its implementation, the new IMD models have largely been praised as a success by their respective Commanders. As such, the Space Force recently announced missile warning and space domain awareness as the next mission areas for IMDs.  

“By all accounts, IMDs have been successful in facilitating higher performance and readiness levels, rapid response to changing requirements and added flexibility for the Commander to determine priorities,” Gen Crider said. “So expanding the IMD model to space domain awareness is a high priority because we have to know what’s going on in the domain to respond to the threat, and integrating cyber and ISR into missile warning is critical to preserving the capability of those systems, as well.”  

New Partnerships with Combatant Commands 

The Space Force, however, is not limiting its new partnerships to just internal efforts, as the military’s newest service is actively standing up space components to support various Combatant Commands across the DOD. While initially prioritizing service components to Space Command, Indo-Pacific Command and European Command, among others, the Space Force also announced it is exploring what a space component to Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) might look like in the future. 

“It will be interesting to see how the Space Force will bring a service component to Cyber Command, because most of its current service components today are focused on delivering warfighting capacity to attack or defend in cyber,” said Lieutenant General (Ret) Kevin McLaughlin, Partner at Elara Nova. “So now, the Space Force has the chance to mature its capability to defend cyber-related terrain in the space domain, as well as the potential to augment that defensive cyber capability with an offensive capacity.”  

As the Combatant Command responsible for incorporating cyber capabilities into the planning and operations for the military services, CYBERCOM can serve as a critical partner in preserving space capabilities against an incessant and evolving cyber threat.  

According to the Space Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC), there’s over 100 cyber attacks a week against critical infrastructures directly supporting space systems. This poses an indirect but very real threat to mission readiness in the space domain, particularly because it often exists outside the immediate purview of the Space Force’s cybersecurity personnel. 

New Partnerships across the DOD 

To this end, the DOD’s Combatant Commands are initiating their own partnerships with supporting agencies to further enhance mission readiness. One primary example is a recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between CYBERCOM and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The agreement aims to apply DARPA’s integrated teams of academic, industry and government partners to streamline the development and adoption of innovative cybersecurity technologies. 

“DARPA has traditionally embraced the development of advanced technology for more long-term challenges,” Gen McLaughlin said. “They develop cutting-edge solutions for problems that they say are ‘DARPA hard,’ or where the technological challenges aren’t easily addressed by military service Science and Technology accounts. DARPA conducts rotations of talented industry personnel working alongside service members to develop these new, cutting-edge capabilities.” 

As an example, the agency was originally founded in response to the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and has directly supported the development of groundbreaking capabilities such as the Internet and embedding GPS receivers into consumer devices. Therefore, DARPA has a history of developing technologies that can be leveraged at the cross-section of space and cyberspace. 

“This agreement elevates DARPA’s role within CYBERCOM, so they can leverage this innovative agency against more urgent cyber threats,” Gen McLaughlin said. “DARPA knows what the latest technology trends are and can bring them immediately into the warfighting architecture for CYBERCOM and its service components. So this agreement is a powerful step in building out a broader ecosystem in which DARPA will be a key element for developing cybersecurity solutions.” 

New Partnerships with Industry and International Partners 

These various efforts demonstrate the innovative and creative ways the Space Force and its DOD partners are initiating new partnerships across the national security apparatus. But to further ensure mission readiness, particularly across space mission areas, these new partnerships must also incorporate industry partners.  

“Nothing the DOD does can happen without a strong industry base that can bring these capabilities to bear as a part of these integrated teams,” Gen Crider said. “Industry partners are valuable in thinking ahead to address future needs and create new competitive advantages, so continuing to tap into that industry innovation is an important piece of what the Space Force needs to do.”  

Furthermore, the Space Force is taking steps to include international partners in support of mission readiness, as well. The Space Force is modernizing its classification policies for space programs and recently appointed the service’s first foreign officer to hold a position on the headquarters staff. 

“The arrival of Air Marshal Paul Godfrey to the Space Force will help in many mission areas,” Gen McLaughlin said. “Our Allies can often assist in ways that are outsized beyond the size of their units and contribute to any objective a Space Force component or Combatant Command might have. So when there’s an opportunity to include a willing partner, then we can add them into these new partnerships and continue learning from them.” 

These wide-ranging efforts represent the complex challenge that comes with ensuring readiness across space mission areas, and the delicate balance of sustaining capability across domains to prepare for both modern and future threats. However, Elara Nova and its team of consultants bring first-hand experience leveraging partnerships like these at the various cross-sections of national security space.  

“Elara Nova was established to work in the seams of the space community,” Gen Crider said. “We are leaders that come from across the space enterprise and can bring unique experiences and perspectives to new approaches like the Integrated Mission Delta. But we also look for opportunities to expand collaboration and bring organizations together to solve problems and deliver advantages that may exist in those seams, that’s why challenges like the cross-section of space and cyber are a critical focus for us.” 

Elara Nova is a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/. 

Episode 17: Space Force, DOD Initiate New Partnerships to Enhance Mission Readiness 

Host: Scott King 

Subject Matter Experts: Major General (Retired) Kim Crider, founding partner at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy (KC)

Lieutenant General (Retired) Kevin McLaughlin, partner at Elara Nova (KM)

00:02 – 02:13 

In the spirit of the United States Space Force’s Line of Effort #3 – Partner to Win, Chief of Space Operations General B. Chance Saltzman announced one year ago that the Space Force was creating “Integrated Mission Deltas,” or IMDs – a new organizational structure designed to coalesce specialized personnel, such as acquisition and operations, together – to collaborate on providing capabilities within a specific space mission area.  

The new IMD model marks just one way the Space Force is organizing itself with strategic partnerships in mind. 

The Space Force is also establishing partnerships across the broader Department of Defense, as it stands up service components to the various Combatant Commands. To this end, the Space Force recently initiated a review of what a future space component to United States Cyber Command – or CYBERCOM – might look like. 

And considering the inherently integrated relationship between the space and cyber domains, CYBERCOM itself is redefining some of its own partnerships, as the Command recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding agreement with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency – or DARPA – to support CYBERCOM’s adoption of cutting-edge cyber technologies. This MOU re-imagines DARPA’s traditional role for a modern age, when the warfighter is increasingly reliant on both cyber and space-based capabilities. 

Welcome to the Elara Edge: Expert Insights on Space Security. I’m your host, Scott King. We have two guests today, here to shed light on how each of these initiatives – both within the Space Force and across the broader DOD – demonstrate the various ways General Saltzman’s “Partner to Win” edict is being realized to enhance mission readiness in space security. 

Our first guest is retired Major General Kim Crider, Founding Partner at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy. As the first Chief Technology and Innovation Officer with the United States Space Force, General Crider has over 35 years of experience managing multibillion-dollar global operations at the cross-section of space and technology. 

General Crider, welcome to the show! 

02:14 – 02:15 

KC: Thank you. Scott.  

02:16 – 02:43 

Also joining us today is retired Lieutenant General Kevin McLaughlin, Partner at Elara Nova. 

As the former Deputy Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, General McLaughlin was responsible for defending the DOD’s information networks by providing full-spectrum cyberspace capabilities that facilitate military planning and operations, and when directed, defending U.S. critical infrastructure from cyber attack. 

General McLaughlin, thanks for taking the time to join us today. 

02:44 – 02:48 

KM: I’m really glad to be with both of you. Thanks, Scott. And Kim, I’m looking forward to being with you today, as well. 

02:49 – 03:07 

So let’s go ahead and jump right into the discussion.  

At this time last year, the United States Space Force moved toward creating the first Integrated Mission Deltas, or IMDs.  

General Crider, can you describe what these Integrated Mission Deltas are? And how they’re different from the DOD’s traditional organizational structures? 

03:08 – 05:43 

KC: It is a really interesting concept, Scott. There’s nothing that exists like the Integrated Mission Deltas. It’s very unique to the United States Space Force.  

When the Space Force stood up, it was established to be a very small, lean, mission-focused service. As a mission-focused organization, the Space Force leadership decided that it wanted its warfighting units to be oriented around this concept of a Delta. 

And the Delta is somewhat equivalent to the numbered air forces in the Air Force, meaning that a Delta commander reports directly to the field command, and has a responsibility for ensuring the readiness of the personnel in that organization and the ability of those, combat-ready personnel to be presented to Combatant Command Commanders, in support of missions around the world, predominantly to U.S. Space Command. 

Now, having said that, a Delta Commander therefore has a lot of responsibility and authority, given that there is a rapidly emerging threat in the face of great power competition with very aggressive adversaries who are actively investing in space capabilities, most notably China. 

We talk also about Russia. But both Russia and China are considered regional peer actors when it comes to competition in space, as well as competition in cyber.  

We needed to be able to ensure that these Deltas could actively and rapidly respond to the threat. So an Integrated Mission Delta gives that Commander more breadth of responsibility to be decisive in terms of what their priorities are, to ready their forces and to be responsive to the threat. Integrating space operations, ISR, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, and cyber in the Integrated Mission Delta, as well as acquisition responsibilities for the ongoing sustainment of deployed capabilities. 

So having some responsibility within their Delta and squadrons within their Delta that acquire capabilities to continue to improve and enhance and sustain deployed capabilities. Programs that have been operationally accepted into the ops community and now can go through test and training and continuous sustainment and evolution of that operational capability. 

That’s what an Integrated Delta – Mission Delta – does. 

05:44 – 06:24 

Thank you, Ma’am. 

So it seems the primary way the Space Force is emphasizing partnerships through the IMD model, is by placing operations personnel – who traditionally prioritize sustaining a capability for the near-term threat – alongside acquisition personnel – who tend to favor developing capabilities for the future, more long-term threat. 

But as you suggested, IMDs go beyond partnering operations and acquisition personnel. So can you elaborate on how IMDs go a step further by incorporating other specialized personnel – like those in cyber and ISR – to ensure mission readiness within a specific space mission area? 

And how can the Space Force learn from this integrated approach?

06:25 – 07:45 

KC: Well, first and foremost, it comes down to enhanced readiness. To know where that threat is, where that threat is going, what that threat is doing – that’s where the ISR piece of that comes into play.  

For each mission area to know what the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, personnel within that Delta who are now very steeped in that mission area, whether it be EW or position, navigation and timing. 

Where are the threats? And ensuring those threats are driven back into the operations, the training, and planning this next evolution of that sustained capability.  

And, of course, a big portion of that threat is the cyber threat as well. So how do you defend that cyber terrain that those space systems operate within? 

So creating the Integrated Mission Delta reinforces the ability to enhance readiness across the spectrum. It also enhances the ability to rapidly integrate new innovation, work with acquisition professionals within the Delta to go collaborate with the industry partner that is there, helping them sustain their system to look for new improvements as part of their ongoing evolution and sustainment of their operationalized capability is another way in which the Delta stays ahead of the threat, stays continuously improving itself. 

07:46 – 09:26 

KM: As General Crider mentioned, where it’s really innovative and different is it’s taking the operational elements of the Space Force, making sure they’re integrated across the highly specialized areas of things like cyber and ISR. 

And it’s adding acquisition into it, which those communities have worked closely together. But they had a very specific relationship and this is changing that to make them sort of integrated from the beginning, focused on a mission area. 

The Integrated Mission Delta has, I think, the great potential to maybe go another level or two on the integration concept into where now, what’s presented to warfighters from the Space Force is actually a much more capable operational unit when it comes to both defending and defeating threats. 

There might be other Department of the Air Force things that you would integrate into an Integrated Mission Delta because the Air Force owns all the base infrastructure that might support a mission. There might be things with coalition partners, because we have lots of infrastructure around the world that doesn’t sit on U.S. sovereign soil.  

There are more and more of those that instead of integrating at the end when you’ve run out of your own slits, is you think about building that conceptual culture, task-organized from the beginning. 

And then I think with companies, as well. That’s probably the hardest thing to do is figure out how do you bring industry in as a stakeholder versus just sort of a vendor? So that’s how I kind of see – is assess what their first order goals and objectives are and then maybe with a hat towards warfighting, what additional things might you expand the concept of an IMD to include other things to integrate in the next maturity levels of an IMD, you could work to them quickly, but in a deliberate way. 

09:27 – 10:45 

KC: I do agree that the first order of assessment is to look at how they’re doing today with the current Integrated Mission Deltas that they’ve put in place, as you mentioned, Scott, these were announced literally a year ago. 

By all accounts, have been very, very successful because they’ve already started to see some of the benefits that they had hoped an Integrated Mission Delta would drive toward: higher performance, higher readiness levels, the ability to respond more quickly to changing requirements, added flexibility on the part of the Commander. 

We all know that operations and acquisition, there’s certainly a desire to work together. But when you’re in two completely different stovepipe organizations, you’ve just got different priorities. So the ability to work together and prioritize things under one leadership chain has already proven to be highly valuable, not to mention the cultural benefits of something like an Integrated Mission Delta where everybody just feels part of the same team, organized around a mission set, creates a huge esprit de corps. 

But to General McLaughlin’s point, if an Integrated Mission Delta was really organized fundamentally to drive unity of command and unity of effort, well, that unity often has to involve a lot of other external agencies as well. 

10:46 – 11:13 

For the initial IMD models, the Space Force selected Space Delta 3 – Space Electromagnetic Warfare – or EW – and the Provisional Position, Navigation and Timing – or PNT – Delta.  

Why were these Deltas, and their respective EW and PNT mission areas, well-suited to be the prototype IMDs? And after their first year of implementation, where does the Space Force go from here? 

11:14 – 14:02 

KC: It’s been stated by the Space Force that they specifically looked at Delta 3, EW, because the way in which Delta 3 operates, both its defensive and offensive EW capabilities, they are the primary and the single Space Force Delta that deploys with its equipment. 

So in doing so, they already have teams that are maintaining and sustaining capability, built into that organizational construct. They could build upon that, and really reinforce the responsibility of that Commander, not just to be responsible for maintenance and sustainment, but how do we evolve this capability and formalizing that, I think, was an important piece of it. 

One aspect of EW, however, that had not been fully integrated, which really became their testbed for that specific IMD was the integration of ISR and cyber. 

Of course, they had an ISR detachment already connected to the EW folks, but they weren’t officially part of that command structure and so bringing that ISR detachment in and making them a very specific squadron underneath, the EW Delta Commander was another important piece of it and then with a defensive cyber ops component as well. So that whole activity now becomes the Integrated Mission Delta.  

Position, navigation and timing, came out of what was Delta 8. Delta 8, when the Space Force was established, was position, navigation and timing and SATCOM. Two very large mission areas, very critical mission areas under one Delta commander.  

So here we saw a real opportunity to pull out the PNT mission area and let it stand on its own. And PNT, as I’m sure General McLaughlin knows, has had a long-time concern relative to cyber threats to our entire GPS enterprise. So having defensive cyber, teams already focused on GPS and PNT capabilities, integrating ISR experts into that area as well, and then looking at how do we start to plan for the future of that whole PNT enterprise and now would have the continuous oversight of that Delta Commander for the ongoing deployment and implementation of that future ground system for PNT, for GPS.  

So that gave that Commander now more oversight over what was going on operationally and what was going on from an acquisition standpoint. And here again, the reports that I have heard really from both these Commanders, Delta 3 and the PNT Delta, is that it’s been highly successful and extremely efficient and effective at bringing people together to solve problems faster. 

14:03 – 16:07 

KM: I would just say backing up to what General Crider mentioned, they were very wise in the ones that they picked first. It was important that the first things that they tried were successful and they are being successful. 

But I think the Space Force experts that had lived in these communities, they already knew where some of the problems were. It was organizational barriers and so I think they knew we could solve some of those problems right off the bat by creating a team from the beginning. So I applaud them being wise in what they selected. But if you were going to further mature it, I would keep doing the same thing.  

What are the next level out of key dependencies that are required for mission success, both in how you organize, train and equip and train your people and build new capability, but even more so how you are effective in warfighting?  

And so the EW mission, just think about what the next level might be. It might be a strong tie to the 16th Air Force and they’re the component to U.S. Cyber Command. So U.S. Cyber Command, they’re used to creating connectivity between their service component elements and the services.  

The U.S. Space Force sort of didn’t exist when Cyber Command and the other services started creating their structure. But they’re all used to being very, very tightly coupled, and so I think growing into an IMD might be an on-ramp into that for the Space Force. And I’ll tell you, I know the EW mission in many cases it’s sensitive and it’s hard. There’s a lot of things we do just U.S.-only. 

But I wouldn’t lose sight of the fact that our Allies often had the ability to assist in ways that are beyond the size of their units. And I think, as General Saltzman just brought in Vice Air Marshal Godfrey to be on his staff as an actual exchange officer. 

And so I think the arrival of Godders into the team will help in many mission areas and so that might be another thing to think about is, at what time would it make sense to have some connective tissue between the Delta 3 and maybe some coalition partners or the Combatant Command might have? So I would look in those areas and figure out which ones are the easiest to do well and where you have a willing partner, and then add that into the construct and then learn from it. 

16:08 – 18:24 

KC: I do think that the Space Force intent is to apply this approach across all of the Mission Deltas. They’ve said that they are moving in that direction. 

They are planning to take the lessons learned, and, you know, integrating it back through. I would say that part of it is not just at the unit level, though. Integrated Mission Delta is proving to be very successful. The prototypes have been successful. They want to expand. 

But in order to be really effective at that expansion, you’ve got to now go to the next level up and say, ‘Okay, what does the field command do to enhance the Integrated Mission Delta? Space Operations Command is ultimately responsible for readiness of all the Mission Deltas and the presentation of forces to U.S. Space Command.  

So what does the field command need to do? How does the field command need to organize itself? How does the field command need to, perhaps re-think some of its processes to really drive the success of these Integrated Mission Deltas based on the lessons that have been learned? And what about the other field commands?  

I mean, Space Systems Command still has acquisition responsibilities for new programs, for large systems that are being developed that will ultimately be deployed into these Integrated Mission Deltas. 

The Integrated Mission Delta does not do away with Space Systems Command. There’s still a tie between these IMD’s and now what’s called “System Deltas” that are planning the future of next generation capabilities that will ultimately get operationally accepted and deployed and then sort of fall under the sustainment responsibilities of the IMD. How does SSC orient itself around the Integrated Mission Deltas? They’ve started to do that, but that’s going to continue to evolve.  

STARCOM, Training and Readiness Command, will also have to think about with its training deltas, ‘How does it integrate well with the Integrated Mission Deltas, and how does it organize itself?’  

And then finally, Space Force has said it’s working to stand up a Space Futures Command that will stand up this calendar year and be responsible for new concepts, concepts and technologies, war-gaming, as well as the Space Warfighting Analysis Center. So how does that new command orient itself? So the orientation of the field commands relative to the Mission Deltas is another piece of driving effectiveness.

18:25 – 19:00 

This brings us to the next aspect of our conversation. The United States Space Force is also initiating partnerships across the DOD’s Combatant Commands, as the service is currently resourcing space components to Space Command, Indo-Pacific Command, and European Command, among others. 

But the Space Force also announced it’s creating a mission analysis team to assess what a space component to U.S. Cyber Command might look like sometime in the future.   

So in light of the interconnected nature of the space and cyber domains, what are some factors the Space Force should consider as it explores a service component to CYBERCOM?

19:01 – 22:43 

KM: Well, as we read in the press, the US Space Force are creating service components at the various Combatant Commands. You know, Cyber Command’s on that list. I would also say, while, the Space Force isn’t a Combatant Command, it’s a service that organizes, trains and equips for global capabilities and it will be interesting to see how the Space Force will actually bring a component to U.S. Cyber Command, because they have components today. Most of those components are focused on delivering warfighting elements in the cyber mission force that they use either to attack or defend in cyber. 

And so I think in this case, the U.S. Space Force has the chance to do the same. And the question would be, we’ve talked a lot about defensive-related things. So I think augmenting and really maturing the ability to defend cyber-related terrain in the U.S. Space Force will be something the U.S. Cyber Command folks will value and treasure. 

And so, on the operational real-world experience…when I was at U.S. Cyber Command as the Deputy Commander, my last assignment, initially we had, I’d say limited authority over operating and defending DOD networks. There were large parts of what is today called the DOID and the DOD Information Network that we had no responsibility for. We had no authority and no forces, etc. And the operational experience that I have from that, as soon as we had some compromises and like, really bad intrusions from a nation-state actor. 

I’ll just say in some defense agencies that we had no responsibility for the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman did not call my Combatant Commander and say, ‘I realize you don’t have any responsibility here. I’ll work it with them.’ He called the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, Admiral Mike Rogers, and said, ‘What are you doing about it?’ 

And we didn’t say, ‘We don’t have authority to do it.’ We went and did something about it, but we immediately started working on what do we do to change authorities and others and that resulted in broad responsibility across the DOID and we created a three-star led component that was dual-had with the DISA director.  

The reason I mentioned that story is that the first time a U.S. Space Force mission capability does not work because of a cyber attack against a non-U.S. Space Force-owned thing. They’re going to have to say, ‘Yes, sir. I know we need to get the missile warning capability back up,’ and they’re going to be running around and go try to figure all that out. 

And that’s what the adversary is going to attack. General Crider and I both serve Chief Chairs, but I serve with her on the Cyber Committee of the Space ISAC – Information Sharing and Analysis Center and they just published something recently that said there’s 100 attacks a week against space system critical infrastructure. 

And so our adversaries, if they can take out a capability by going after some poorly-defended element, and they know it’s going to bring it down – why attack the element that’s heavily defended? So just conceptually, I think there’s an operational imperative. But I can tell you if we don’t do it, in conflict there will be a time in the future where we’ll wish that we had.  

But on just sort of the things that you could think about adding. I think having the Delta 6 put elements or squadrons in each of the Integrated Mission Deltas is just one example. The ISR would be the same. Each of those elements would then become highly expert on all of the infrastructure – we’ll use missile warning – space-based missile warning infrastructure has.  

If they owned that terrain and they were told that’s part of your job, you wouldn’t have to spend gazillions of dollars. It would be more about creating the partnerships and then perhaps identifying shortfalls in the skill sets or capabilities of some of those. And over time, they would be the glue that kind of holds the cyber defense side of an enterprise, of a broad mission. But it would require them to be sort of outside just the walls of the Space Force-owned IT and the mission infrastructure that they’re defending today.

22:44 – 24:19 

KC: And I want to foot-stomp some of what my good friend, General McLaughlin is saying here. The enemy is not going to come after us where we’re the strongest. Hello – Sun Tzu. They read Sun Tzu, too, for obvious reasons. So the enemy’s going to come after us where we’re the weakest and where we’re not necessarily thinking through all the dependencies. 

And our dependencies on cyber, if we’ve learned anything in the last 10 or 15 years is that everything’s connected to cyber, especially when it comes to space. And space is connected to critical infrastructure. Space hasn’t necessarily been designated a critical infrastructure yet. That’s still an ongoing topic, but it’s certainly connected to critical infrastructure and so there’s so much dependency there that has to be considered. 

So when you think about exercises, you think about studies, you think about doing that kind of terrain analysis that really thinks through your dependencies. That kind of threat analysis has to be and continue to be very extensive and very well-exercised, and war-gamed ways to address and cover down on those threats through integrated collaboration.  

Even though we recognize the importance of integrating defensive cyber into our daily activities within an Integrated Mission Delta, we’re not necessarily thinking about the broad cyber concerns, and how these things can come at us from second and third order, you know, attack vectors, so it’s just a really important mindset to cultivate.  

24:20 – 24:44 

Now, it appears the “Partner to Win” mindset is being realized in other ways outside of the Space Force, as well. U.S. Cyber Command recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency – otherwise known as DARPA.  

General McLaughlin, can you explain DARPA’s traditional role as it pertains to research and development for cyber capabilities? And how does this agreement change that role? 

24:45 – 25:55 

KM: I’ve worked with DARPA much of my career. Where they’ve positioned themselves officially, and it’s just been changing over time is to do, you know, they call it “DARPA hard.” What are the really hard technologies that are beyond the hard things that weren’t coming out of service RDT&E accounts? Research, development, testing, and evaluation accounts. 

And so DARPA, officially, kind of lived in that area. But over time, they began to work on things that had applicability in the more near-term. When I was at U.S. Cyber Command, there were a number of advanced research things DARPA was doing, but it wasn’t formalized in terms of the structure. 

And so, DARPA, typically was really far out, had very, very talented people from industry doing their rotations through DARPA with folks in the service. But they were some of the brightest minds in whatever the technology might be. We’re talking cyber here. 

So that’s kind of where they traditionally have lived and I think what we’re seeing here is I think we’re changing their role a little bit. We have the threats urgent right now and if there’s a national resource in the agency to help a near-term end, I think the government and the Department is starting to say, ‘Let’s leverage them in a different way.’ 

And I think the DARPA-Cyber Command relationship is one example of how that’s happening.  

25:56 – 27:05 

KC: Yeah, if I could just add an observation here. I mean, we started this conversation out today talking about Integrated Mission Deltas and the value of that and the importance of that and how a next step on that journey might be thinking about how do you integrate with others where you have key dependencies to always stay at the forefront of the threat and be highly effective and highly competitive. 

It’s the same concept here. When you’re thinking about at a Combatant Command level, a much higher echelon level, but still the value, the imperative really of integrated partnerships. So here’s U.S. Cyber Command at its level, actively partnering with DARPA. DARPA, wanting to be an active partner to U.S. Cyber Command, recognizing that it has something really important that it can bring forward, with its cutting-edge capabilities and going after those DARPA hard problems that nobody else has got the wherewithal to do. 

And can bring added value in creating that relationship where there’s going to be ongoing influence, ongoing integration, ongoing partnering together that really drives that culture in a whole new direction to be much more effective together. 

27:06 – 27:25 

So we’ve been exploring how a recent emphasis on strategic partnerships, both within the Space Force and across the broader DOD, are aiming to enhance mission readiness in the space domain. 

But what about industry partners, particularly those developing space or cyber capabilities? How might these stakeholders contribute to mission readiness? 

27:26 – 29:31 

KM: You ask a very short question, but there’s a lot packed into it. And so, now that I work in industry, I see the same thing. But it’s – what’s the opportunity for me in this new thing? And so it’s sort of kids chasing soccer balls, everybody runs to the new thing. There might be money, etc. and they should do it. 

That’s how they stay very closely attuned to new things like IMD’s and new things like DARPA and their role in technology. So where can they play? And we at Elara Nova live in that world and can help with that. 

But, I think we’re doing really well on incubating and bringing little companies into the Space Force. So that part I think – it’s going well. But where I still don’t see it necessarily are areas where industry big, small and medium – they know what they’re incentivized to do. They know why they build things the way that they do and it’s almost always because it reflects exactly what the government wants them to do. 

And, but we don’t ask them very often to participate as a stakeholder, to say, ‘If you wanted to motivate me to build for example, a cyber-secure system from the beginning, I have some ideas.’ Most of them do versus saying, ‘We’re just going to tell you what it is in a solicitation. You’re just going to need to be compliant with CMMC and compliant with whatever the acquisition director wants to balance her cost, schedule, performance and you do exactly that.’  

In fact, don’t do more than that because it might harm your ability to win an award and you’re not going to get reimbursed for that investment. So I think thinking about how industry can play as a stakeholder, while still maintaining the legal requirements to compete against their competitors and win and execute contracts is something that the government can do. 

And I think industry would be willing to do it. But I think that’s a government lead and I don’t see that part happening, yet. But there are some serious discussions in multiple places, not just in the Space Force about how we might bring that insight into the dialogue for things broadly across the Space Force. But in just specifically in some of the areas that we’ve talked about the last few minutes.

29:32 – 29:59 

KC: Yeah, I agree with you, General McLaughlin, I don’t think we certainly do enough to challenge industry to innovate in cyber and to bring their cyber innovations forward and to say, ‘Look, show us what you can do by creating a cyber-secure system that still meets our performance requirements. It still works within our cost-boundaries and you can still deliver it on time. See what you can do industry.’ 

We just don’t even put that out there. 

30:00 – 31:25 

KM: And I do think, if you think about other requirements and let’s just say in an airplane acquisition, the safety side of that. Those are not viewed as sort of functional bills. 

They’re viewed as mission requirements. The stealthy-ness of something you name it, all of those. Cyber is still kind of viewed as a non-reimbursed bill. I don’t know how we can continue to think about the cybersecurity of some new thing is not a mission requirement. But if it were, I think you would see the cost that we’re willing to pay – it would be elevated to some degree.  

And it wouldn’t need to be double the price – what’s double the price is building it in after you form an acquisition five years later. But if you built it in upfront and you said part of the competitive landscape of whether you win or not. You might win a contract because your cybersecurity approach is better than another vendor who has equal capabilities.  

But they’re going to have to be some increase of a cost, because these things aren’t free. And so that’s being discussed to some degree about how we might fundamentally alter even cost-estimating and the things that go into treating cyber as a mission requirement. 

It’s not going to be simple, but I do think, we all know this is a critical gap for us. So I think, done the right way. I think you’ll see that and then perhaps industry might actually be competing with themselves to build the best cyber-secure systems from the very beginning. And if they don’t, they don’t win.

31:26 – 31:54 

Now, both of you are partners at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy. General Crider, you are also one of the founding partners at the firm. 

Elara Nova has a team of consultants with a broad range of experience in both government and industry, and so can provide unique perspectives on how partnerships can enhance mission readiness.  

But how can the firm contribute to these ongoing efforts? Whether that be the future of IMDs or developing solutions at the cross-section of the space and cyber domains?

31:55 – 32:49 

KC: You know, Elara Nova was established to be an interlocutor, to work in the seams. We think about things across a variety of different perspectives because we’re a team of leaders and experts that have grown up in different parts of the space community and the communities that space touches and that touch space. 

So we come from these communities, and we can now look at space from all of these different perspectives and because we sort of operate in the seams, all the different ways that you need to bring a different perspective into an Integrated Mission Delta. 

What else does an Integrated Mission Delta need to think about and be connected to? And then thinking about how do you expand and extend that? So that’s what Elara Nova does. We work to bring organizations together to solve problems and so thinking about space and cyber, in particular, is a critical, critical focus for us.  

32:50 – 34:30 

KM: Elara Nova does bring a broad range of experts that have lived in those seams and I’d like to, leverage her word of ‘in the seams,’ there’s an increasing, focus and realization that some of the reasons that we find it difficult to build, basically acquire, sustain and operate cyber-secure, cyber-resilient systems, even though we’re spending a lot more money as a nation on it, is because of risk that live in the seams between groups. 

So everyone is functioning in their area and we use the word stovepipes at times. And everyone in those groups are operating according to the rules and the incentives that they have to do. So everyone’s doing what they’re supposed to.  

And what we don’t do very well is understand in those seams, looking at the actual risk that are either live in the seams between groups or that are passed between groups unknowingly. I’ll mention one simple just example. 

If you’re going to waive a cybersecurity requirement as an approving official, you need to coordinate with the owner of the mission that those things do. It might be multiple Combatant Commands or something so that they have a voice and the level of risk they think that they are going to be, it’s going to be pushed on them. 

That could become a discussion above, because the PMO just has too little money and too much capability they need to field and sustain. So it’s not that they’re not doing their job correctly, but they don’t necessarily think about the risk the same way that the organization that owns it. 

So that’s just one little example of how thinking about bringing insight at the seams that we bring as a company to this. I like that you use the word seams, because I think most of these changes that we could do better are non-material changes.

34:31 – 35:10 

This has been an episode of The Elara Edge: Expert Insights on Space Security. As a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space domain, Elara Nova is your source for expertise and guidance in space security. 

If you liked what you heard today, please subscribe to our channel and leave us a rating. Music for this podcast was created by Patrick Watkins of PW Audio. This episode was edited and produced by Regia Multimedia Services. I’m your host, Scott King, and join us next time at the Elara Edge.