Episode 38: New Enterprise Command and Control Program Office to Enhance Commander Decision-Making
The Elara Edge Podcast
Host: Scott King
SME: Air Vice-Marshal (Ret) Mark Chappell, Executive Partner at Elara Nova
00:02 – 01:20
As emerging technologies like artificial intelligence are increasingly leveraged to streamline and enhance command and control, the Department of War is expected to announce a new program office that will coalesce and coordinate information and communication pipelines that will empower commanders to make more timely and effective decisions.
While an official announcement from the Department of War is still forthcoming, DefenseScoop recently reported that the new Enterprise Command and Control Program Office will oversee current AI and data platforms like Maven Smart System and the Edge Data Mesh technology stack as part of a pending program of record for Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2). Collectively, this “Enterprise C2 Suite” will provide the latest iteration of technologies and tools available for commanders to implement their command and control responsibility.
Welcome to The Elara Edge! Our topic today is the Enterprise Command and Control Program Office and how it fits into the broader evolution of command and control systems.
Our guest today is retired Air Vice-Marshal Mark Chappell. After serving for 36 years with the United Kingdom Armed Forces, he retired as a Senior British Military Advisor to U.S. Central Command.
Sir, welcome to the show!
01:21 – 01:22
Thank you. Scott. Great to join you.
01:23 – 01:33
It’s great to have you.
As we get started, there can be some misconceptions around the term “command and control” or C2. So can you start us off by first defining what we mean by “command and control?”
01:34 – 04:11
Yeah. Of course, Scott. So through my career, I’ve been able to witness the evolution of C2 systems on both sides of the Atlantic and how they are increasingly helping warfighters in what is an ever complicated battlefield. So I think you hit on a really important subject to just talk about straight away and that is understanding what we mean when we say ‘command and control.’
I still witness lots of people confusing what C2 is, mixing it with communication systems and domain specific distractions. I always joke that a day without an argument about C2 is a day wasted. So it’s important to break the two words I think. Command is the authority given to somebody to execute the mission. And it’s usually passed to the commander by a higher, often political level authority. The next bit, the control bit is the direction given by that commander.
I don’t know why it’s so difficult. People do have a habit of over complicating this. And it depends – nation to nation. But, as I said, people confuse the definition of a commander giving direction, command and control, with the systems that carry the data. So I’ve seen papers written on command and control, but really they’re talking about the communication barriers.
It’s nothing to do with the authority in the person and the direction that they’re giving. And sometimes that confusion between what C2 is and the systems around it, which enable command and control, can make for a blurry gray conversation. And as always, if you don’t agree with what you’re talking about at the start, you can go off in slightly different directions.
Colonel John Boyd, who we’ll all be familiar with, primarily of the ‘Ooda Loop’ fame. And his command thesis thought, though, that the phrase C2 was unhelpful.
He preferred to frame the concept as “analysis and leadership.” In essence, look at what’s going on – the analysis part and then give some direction – the leadership part. And really, what we’re talking about with this command and control is just another articulation of his famous ‘Ooda Loop.’ So within that, the JADC2 strategy is phrased almost in a similar sense as sense, make sense, decide, and disseminate, which is pretty much the same thing.
And while these principles all still hold true, the proliferation of modern tech and the associated vast lakes of data that we’re seeing now, when that’s harnessed and processed effectively give the potential for first improving real-time understanding. And second, with the blend of improved training for commanders.And that’s really important. We need to talk about that a bit later on. With machine learning and AI advancements, the potential for better and faster decision-making is what’s emerging from this.
04:12 – 04:17
And how has the practice of command and control evolved over time, particularly as technologies have advanced?
04:18 – 07:21
Yeah. So, I think history would tell us that, for example, before World War Two, wars tended to be fought within a single domain. So tanks fought tanks, ships fought ships, and aircraft fought aircraft. And that was partly due to a commander only really having awareness within their own domain.
With the advent of blitzkrieg tactics. Arguably, this is where we first saw it. We saw the beginnings of a command and control change, and that was a blending and a morphing of multi-domain operations.
First time, really, where we were using systems, sensors, radios, if you like, to help direct across domains such that we could exploit potential advantages that we may or may not have had, or in those cases that the German forces had.
And that increased during the Cold War. Soviet forces presented us with a new problem, which was effectively being outnumbered. And to address this, the Army and Air Force proposed a new approach that truly combined air and land power for the first time by developing new technologies to identify enemy locations.
This concept was known as the air-land battle, and its three dimensional approach sought to use the advantages in ISR. So intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to see deep into the battle space and direct firepower onto potentially reinforcements.
Those deep strikes then complemented the ground forces’ ability to concentrate firepower at critical places, and that limited the adversary’s numerical advantage. However, in order to execute this, you need to know what’s going on to a higher level of information or fidelity.
The best way to visualize this is to break it down, really. And you can’t fight what you can’t see. That sounds quite simplistic, but our ability to sense what was going on in more than one domain and more than just with the eyeball became fundamental. So all of a sudden, the ability to see in different spectrums, different elements of the battlespace was key to this.
It was the start point. Often in this world, whenever you have a system, it won’t often give you a clear yes or no answer. It’s always something gray and it’s always something difficult. So there’s a degree of analysis required even now in modern day systems based on contradictory results on whatever interrogation that’s been done.
And then once you’ve got all of that together, it needs to be processed such that a commander or an individual can use that information effectively. And so to answer your question, our ability to see more and to process it, allowed the commander to make better, quicker decisions.
And this resulted in the development of new systems just two are JSTARS and [sic]. And that brought with it the need for improved communication networks, which in turn brought the space and cyber domains into the fight for the first time.
So with these systems, when they were combined, commanders were able to gain a quicker understanding of the battlespace and then improve the response time to direct fires onto the enemy forces.
07:22 – 07:34
And so how did this changing operational environment create a need for the Joint All Domain Command and Control (or JADC2) strategy, which was released by the Pentagon in early 2022?
And what progress has been made since the JADC2 strategy was first introduced?
07:35 – 11:06
Yeah, sure. So given the advances and changes in how we fight, it’s critical that all domains and services can communicate and interact with each other effectively.
Unfortunately and likely through a fair chunk of sod’s law, each of the military services set off and developed their own tactical network, which was in part or completely incompatible with those of the other services, i.e. the Army couldn’t talk to anybody else, and neither could the Air Force and neither could the Navy.
And with that in mind, the Joint All Domain Command Control JADC2 system, or concept, was brought together in the Pentagon to connect sensors from all of the military services into a single network across the 11 Combatant Commands while also using artificial intelligence algorithms to help improve decision making.
So what we’re really talking about here is a matrix. For this to work then, numerous activities need to take place and they’ve been broken into some five logical lines of effort.
The first one being the Data Enterprise. We talked about the large volume of data which is available now. Well, joint force and mission partners must be able to discover and access any data and information from all warfighting domains at all levels of warfare and this alone brings with it a significant standardization challenge.
The second one, equally important, is the Human Enterprise. Militaries, and particularly the commanders within those militaries need to be trained to fully harness these capabilities. And this includes what, where, when machine learning and AI can assist, plus, very importantly, where these aspects may add risk. There’s a whole large debate going on now about where AI and humans should play within a targeting cycle, particularly when we’re talking about lethal force.
The next one, I like to think of this one as the glue, is the Technical Enterprise. This is enormous. And it holds JADC2 to together and makes it work in the real world. And this LOE enhances, for example, the shared situational awareness, global collaboration, joint planning, visualization, which is usefully termed sometimes as the single pane of glass, predictive readiness and logistics, and then finally, real time synchronization of targeting. Within the targeting LOE, commanders require secure world wide communications in a degraded and contested electromagnetic spectrum.
And so LOE3 addresses the transport infrastructure of JADC2, and it provides the essential minimum features necessary to ensure continuous command and control – really.
Four is nuclear command and control and communications. You know, if we’re going to build an all singing, all dancing system, it’s certainly sensible to include the nuclear enterprise within that.
And then finally, number five, mission partner information sharing. If a war is going to be fought within a coalition, which it traditionally is, then all of that combined force will need to sense, make sense, decide and disseminate at the same pace. It would be farcical, really, to have some of the combined force making decisions from the single pane of glass on highly accurate information, while others are, potentially using PowerPoint slides with information on it, which is 48 hours old. It wouldn’t make any sense at all.
And that would probably force us down a de-conflicted way of operating rather than an integrated – which is where we’d rather be. So I would much rather be fighting in an integrated fashion rather than a de-conflicted fashion.
11:07 – 11:15
Now Sir, you used the expression ‘single pane of glass.’
From your perspective, how do you define that single pane of glass in the context of this conversation?
11:16 – 12:13
Yeah. So the single pane of glass is interesting. I find it a really useful phrase to visualize what we’re talking about here. Often people can consider 3D holograms with things flying around. That’s not really where we are just yet with the tech. We’re talking about a computer screen or computer screens. But the fuzing of all of this, all domain, all source data onto that screen such that it makes immediate sense, is accurate and allows quick comprehension about what’s going on such that better decisions can be made.
So within that, we might be talking about unclassified social media feeds right the way through to national technical means and everything in the middle. So really, how would all that information be appropriately presented? Not yet on a 3D hologram, but maybe in the future, how might that get presented? And the phrase ‘single pane of glass’ is there to sort of frame around: What are we talking about here? It’s really about how do you get it on screen or screens.
12:14 – 12:36
Can you elaborate on the role that AI and ML technologies have in JADC2? And can you bring us up to speed on the U.S. military’s historical relationship is with these emerging technologies?
12:24 – 14:26
The new clubs in the bag are certainly AI and machine learning. The background to this is it’s widely available on the web, but around 2017, a small team was put together under a Marine Colonel in the Pentagon. And he was tasked with accelerating AI adoption through what is known as or widely known as Project Maven.
The central motivation for all of this was, being out-thought at a quicker pace by adversaries who also embraced AI-enabled warfare. So China would be the best example for that. So the mission was to use AI where possible, to process the massive volumes of applicable data that we have all gathered, and we continue to sense quicker than a human could do that.
I can give you a fictitious example, where if there was a square of unprocessed ground which we needed to target, arguably it has to be ten kilometers by ten kilometers just for argument’s sake, and we put a team of analysts on it. It would take them a certain period of time to derive the majority of the targets within that ten by ten kilometer square.
With the advent of AI and machine learning, it’s possible to do that task in a much, much faster time. It is, however, really important to understand, and it’s improving every day. But where the AI and machine learning is liable to make mistakes, can make mistakes. And so the blending of the two goes into human oversight into the much greater and faster processing capabilities of AI and machine learning. Together, there’s a real synergistic effect just there.
Like I say, the AI is getting better, as is the machine learning aspect of that as well. But at the moment, it’s the ability to put the two together to make sure: one, we’re targeting what we think we’re targeting, but two, to harness the capabilities of the system. So AI is able to process information at a much clearly a vastly quicker rate than anything a human can ever do. And so that was the start point of all of this, Scott.
14:27 – 14:35
Now what are some of the ways that we can ensure that human oversight is there so that the data that the AI is running on is accurate and secure?
14:36 – 15:54
I mean, that’s a great question, Scott. There are numerous policy papers have been written about the moralistic issues surrounding AI and the implementation of lethal force. What is important, though, to understand, is it sort of depends, as it does always. And it depends on the type of fight a country is in.
Again, hypothetically, if one was in an existential fight for survival and time was everything for that fight, one might consider allowing machines to make more of the decisions than in a separate scenario where the fight wasn’t existential and we needed to ensure that what we were targeting, was therefore, exactly what we thought it was rather than what we thought it probably was.
And so that leads you to where do and how much input does a human have from within the loop? So, the targeting loop as it’s called, and sometimes it’s referred to a human in the loop, and sometimes it’s referred to as a human on the loop.
And that’s sort of semantic. At some point within the decision-making before lethal force is employed. Then in some scenarios, it’s wise to have a human to provide oversight over the decisions or the proposals is a better way to describe it that the AI is making, in this instance, a targeting suggestion.
15:55 – 16:13
There are two AI-related initiatives being developed by the Department of War in collaboration with its industry partners.
The first you’ve already mentioned, Project Maven, which today is now known as the Maven Smart System.
Can you explain how Maven Smart System became the next iteration of Project Maven and what does it do differently today?
16:14 – 17:22
Sure. Yeah. I mean, and it’s all related, isn’t it? The Maven Smart System, came from a development, where Maven itself was using an AI tool that detected objects, really? So stuff on the battlefield, vehicles, people, structures, and then it tagged and triaged huge volumes of that data to support human INT analysts working in the targeting flows. So effectively using AI to process vast amounts of data. Whereas today, Maven Smart Systems is a scalable and deployable AI system which works across multiple missions and data types.
So MSS or Maven Smart Systems has embedded AI across the entire kill chain now. So rather than just be an assistant to an INT analyst, it now embeds artificial intelligence across the whole enterprise.
A good example might be for example, in that logistics space, it’s possible to use artificial intelligence now to predict where logistics challenges might become apparent and therefore give suggestions that might help us get ahead of that problem before it actually materializes.
17:23 – 17:28
And Sir, just to clarify your use of the term “kill chain,” what does this mean in the context of command and control?
17:29 – 18:41
Yeah. I like to see them as separate in that – going back to our definitions of what we understand command and control to be, the commander is given that authority, the control is the decisions that he is making. Some of the decisions that he is making, maybe, to use lethal force.
So really, command and control is way broader than the use of lethal force. But it’s certainly something in modern warfighting where mostly commanders will be engaged in. But it won’t be the entirety of what he or she is making those command type decisions upon. So it’s a significant part, but they’re not one in the same. There’s sort of, lethal force is a subset of the authority placed in a commander for the job he’s doing.
So, for example, it might be a commander is not delegated the authority to execute lethal force. And that might be a high level commander is given that authority, but he hasn’t chosen to delegate that down.
That doesn’t mean that the subordinate commander isn’t executing command and control, it just hasn’t been delegated in this instance for our discussion, the ability to employ lethal force. Sometimes that’s held right at the top and sometimes that’s delegated a long way down and it usually depends on where we are in the spectrum of a particular conflict.
18:42 – 19:00
Thank you, Sir.
And the second initiative is the Edge Data Mesh technology stack (or EDM). The Pentagon’s Chief Digital and AI office completed the first successful demonstration of EDM in an exercise last year.
Can you share more about this technology and its relevance to command and control in a modern warfighting environment?
19:01 – 21:01
Yes. This is really important. So for the system to function properly at all levels and particularly at the tactical frontline is referred to as “the edge” more increasingly at the moment. So when it says ‘edge,’ it means the frontline really.
The warfighter needs to access all of this great AI/ML and the derived, much vaunted single pane of glass. It’s all well and good having it in a headquarters, for example, a CoCom, but at the edge where the warfighter is potentially engaging with the enemy, they need that as well.
What we’re talking about here is access to a cloud-like environment where the processing and the results of the processing is available. And in order to make it resilient, that cloud has got to be accessible through multiple routes.
For example, there’s no point having it purely on a Satcom link, because if the Satcom link gets taken out, you’re no longer using the benefits of it. So we might consider a Satcom link, a 5G link. A low frequency transmission, but a whole different selection of transmission systems to allow us to get around the likely jamming and disruption of passing the information backwards and forwards.
And given the sensible assumption, though, that warfighting is going to be conducted in a heavily degraded environment, the Edge Data Mesh or the EDM is experimenting on how that might be delivered. So sending the single pane of glass, as an expression all the way down to the edge, in an environment where it’s likely to be significantly degraded and it’s being done at the moment using multiple nodes, hence the phrase, meshes.
And it’s through multiple mediums and multiple formats and that provides the redundancy and scale, which in turn provides the necessary resilience. That’s really, really important because otherwise, I think we would be in danger of building a system, which is fine in theory, but it doesn’t actually function in the real world, which will be contested and degraded.
21:02 – 21:13
Let’s dig into the contested and degraded environment a little bit.
In what ways does electronic warfare, to include jamming and spoofing, complicate the threat assessment and decision-making process for a commander?
21:14 – 23:13
Yeah, I would say, Scott, that’s certainly not new. And that’s probably gone back since people started fighting each other. I think what we’re talking about here is the principle of deception. And really jamming and spoofing is using that principle, but putting it not just in this instance in an electromagnetic environment.
So electronic warfare is using, the principle of: if we know the signal that’s being used, how it’s being used, how it’s being transmitted, how it’s being received, then it’s entirely possible to either mimic that signal or overpower that signal or give it a spoof signal, such that, it makes either the picture unworkable or actually not exactly what it really is.
Now, in the basic sense, that can be a simple modulation of the signal altered and sent back to whatever’s transmitting it. But in more contemporary times, you can see electronic warfare taking far more subtle forms, spoofing, mimicking, making things appear where they shouldn’t appear, where they’re not, or increasing the size of something which isn’t there. So it’s much more complicated than it was originally. But that makes sense because our processing and computing powers have gotten much better.
And the danger with all of that is, you know, bravery and discipline will never compensate for flawed understanding at a command level, whatever that command level is. So because of a flawed picture based on, in this instance, jamming, a commander makes a decision which is a bad decision, then it doesn’t matter how brave or disciplined you are, you’re probably in trouble.
22:52 – 23:16
Now recent media reports indicate that the Department of War is looking to launch the new Enterprise Command and Control Program Office. I’ll preface this by saying that this has not yet been formally announced by the Department of War. But some reporting has indicated that an announcement toward this end is forthcoming.
But can you speak to the purpose behind the formation of an office like this? And how will this office bring about faster and better adoption of C2 technologies?
23:17 – 25:18
Sure. Yeah, I’ve heard about that, too. And in reality, it doesn’t surprise me at all, because despite what I would describe as yeoman efforts. To date, you know, we’ve struggled to put into place effective governance and architectures. They’re well-meaning that’s my point about yeoman efforts right, well-meaning formations, parts of the DoW have set their own path to deliver capability.
It’s all entirely well-meaning and it’s all been done to great effect. But there’s a point where those fragmented, experimentations, prototyping of things, does need to be brought back to the central tent. Such that we can sort of structure these things properly.
The danger is, we will almost go back a bit to the early days, where each service. Sort of for an analogy, we could find ourselves in a place where different parts of the all domain, military warfighting structure, they wouldn’t all be able to talk to each other if we don’t sort of bring this back to like a coherent start point. So with this new Enterprise C2 program office, I think the intent is to tighten down on the more fragmented elements of the program and therefore improve coherence in its outputs.
It’s also going to place CJADC2 and AI-supported warfare strategies onto a program of record with what all of that entails: so structure, funding, etc. How will that bring it forward? So if we can consolidate the disparate elements into a cohesive framework, the military is going to be able to significantly enhance its operational effectiveness in what is an increasingly complex world.
So the focus on real time analysis and AI integration sets the stage for a more dynamic and responsive military strategy in the face of what is a proliferation of more complex, more challenging modern threats. And if you like, that all takes us almost back to the start. This is talking about better decisions at a faster pace.
25:19 – 25:27
And how is the integration of AI technologies, combined with the consolidated oversight of this new Enterprise C2 Program Office, improve a commander’s decision-making process?
25:30 – 28:33
It’s not an insignificant task to understand the complexity in all of those environments, and to understand what capabilities are available within those environments. And then to command and direct them effectively. And we still do, in part, delegate down to a domain command, depending on how we structure our forces, but it’s usually overseen by a Joint Commander and he or she has a big task on.
So, training of that commander, his experience or her experience, the complexity of the task. And that’s where artificial intelligence really comes to the fore. It allows sensible proposals, if not decisions, to be taken based on that really broad landscape of disparate bits of data. So it’s not an insignificant task, anything that can be done to allow the commander.
And this is central to the whole discussion, really. Anything [that] can allow the command to make better, faster decisions is really what this is all striving towards. A part of that is how AI is going to assist that commander, but part of it is who that commander is and what experience and what training and truthfully how good that commander actually is.
But I think he’s going to have a better tool at his disposal. My assumption is, and quite rightly, if the program office can resolve some of the challenges within this, then back to our single pane of glass, what’s on that pane of glass?
The distillation and dissemination of all domain information is going to be better, faster, of a higher quality and will give the commander better proposals about courses of action available to him. One of the challenges is it’s not always immediately apparent whether or not a certain course of action in the commander’s mind is still available to them. There could be, for example, a fuel contamination incident could occur to take out a whole base somewhere.
That will eventually filter to the commander.
But if he doesn’t know that, he could be assuming that that particular air wing is available to conduct a particular tasking and it’s not, with AI very quickly that would be brought into play. And indeed, it might be able to make new suggestions about how to overcome the temporary reduction because of the fuel contamination. It is a simple example, but it gives you probably an example about how broad this thing can be, but also how AI can really assist in making the commander make better decisions. They’re not easier decisions. But they’re going to make better decisions.
And some of those decisions over time might be delegated to the machine. It would be fascinating to see how that develops. So whether, for example, in an air tasking order, if there is a better suggestion for a particular asset to take up a line within the ATO, then that might be something which is in the near term even delegated to a machine. And there’s just a human on the loop giving broad oversight to that particular decision or bit of execution.
28:34 – 28:56
In recent months we’ve had a unique test case for what command and control means in the modern operating environment.
As of this recording, there’s been a temporary ceasefire to what has been an active military operation playing out in the Middle East with Operation Epic Fury.
Can you kind of speak to how the technologies and systems that we’ve been discussing today, might factor into the command and control procedures for the operations in Iran?
28:57 – 30:06
Sure. Yeah. I mean, it’s a really good one, isn’t it? You know, we’ve heard in the media about the rate of target development and the execution tempo, how quickly we’re prosecuting those targets.
And in what has in essence, been? As I would describe as an air tasking order war or an ATO war. No doubt that artificial intelligence has been central to numerous elements that make this possible. The speed at which things are being completed, is a good indicator of where AI is helping at the moment.
For example, decisions on where the targets are, how most effectively and efficiently to prosecute them and what asset is going to be a direct consequence of digitizing the battlespace and its C2 infrastructure.
If we took it from the single pane of glass in the other direction, really, the amount of information which is being displayed on our single pane of glass, really, that comes from processed information. But we’ve got to collect that information first. That is the expansion, and the ability to process that has come from digitized data. So from the collection point right through to the visualization of it, that’s when digitized C2 has come to fruition and borne all of this fruit.
30:07 – 30:18
And Sir, earlier you also spoke of the risks that may come with AI and how ensuring there is a human in the loop, or on the loop, can help mitigate those risks.
Can you elaborate on that in the context of the operations in the Middle East?
30:19 – 31:40
Yeah, I think two that came to mind, were amongst many.
But the first one probably being how and where we might put a human in that decision making loop. That’s certainly not resolved yet. There are times and places for different levels of involvement of a human. And we just have to be conscious of that. All the very benefits that come from automation and AI within warfighting as a whole, also comes with the degree of risk and we just need to make sure that we understand that and manage that risk properly.
And the second one, again, we glanced off of this one Scott, but data integrity is key to all of this. I remember being in a lecture about the difference between the data, which might be kept by JPMorgan, which is broadly a bunch of ones and zeros, and the data which is going to be collected during Epic Fury. And that won’t be a bunch of ones and zeros.
It’s going to be noisy there. There will be things in there which are sort of not quite right. And so being able to assure that the data is accurate is going to be one of the biggest challenges in that. And I think that’s going to be key within the program office to ensure that’s part of the whole.
Because, I think that has to be built into the system as a whole. If we’re starting to make, again the same principles and if we’re making decisions on flawed information is usually a bad idea. And again, there’s a risk in that as we automate this increasingly.
31:41 – 32:11
Now earlier, we talked about the inherent complexity of a Commander going from a requiring situational awareness within a single domain to now having to incorporate how other domains factor into their area of responsibility.
But there’s also an added complexity of integrating allies and partners into this command and control process. And Sir, you may have a very unique perspective on this, having been the Senior British Military Advisor to Central Command.
So can you share more about the opportunities and the challenges with integrating an ally or partner nation into the command and control decision-making process?
32:12 – 34:33
Sure. Yeah. The thing about fighting in a coalition or with a coalition is, as you’ve highlighted, it brings different challenges and facets with it.
So there will be potentially different capabilities that are brought to the fight. There’ll be different policy permissions. And what I mean is that what are those assets are actually allowed to do as they get delegated by a government?
One government might allow a certain type of activity, while another one won’t. And then there’s actually how we operate, actually, is there something completely different about how a particular military does a certain task compared to another task?
So all of those things are essential to understand and the best way that we can address those issues is to exercise together to operate together, using the systems that we’re going to fight with because what that does, you can do as much theoretical work on this as possible if you like, but, you know, until we flush it out.
And the best way to do that is as close to the real world as possible is in exercises. Then you can understand where people bring capability, bring limitations, so policy restrictions, scale issues, logistics challenges, all of those things really need to be understood.
And it’s therefore I would suggest essential, that we keep exercising together and over time, the experience of the commander, not least of which he will be supported, for example, in CENTCOM with people like me who can advise him on where a particular nation might be able to bring something or have a limitation. Then the combination of the two is how that’s usually executed.
It is difficult, and it takes lots of effort and lots of work to make sure that you can be effective working in a combined sense.
But you will have noticed that over the course of the JADC2 journey, it’s morphed into Combined JADC2 because of the inevitability, of fighting as a coalition with other nations meant that whilst JADC2, when it was conceived, was quite rightly conceived as a US-only concept, it just changed its name slightly to to Combined JADC2 to give the nod to the fact that one of the challenges is about how you would integrate a different nation and that’s going to be the ongoing challenge of how we share releasable information at the speed of relevance. And if it’s not done properly, that can lead us down to some really inefficient ways of fighting.
34:34 – 34:48
So given the need for command and control in a modern day operating environment, what should industry’s takeaways be from this conversation about the significance of command and control and the complexity of implementing new technologies into the command and control process?
34:49 – 35:46
We’ve always needed and will always need some form of system to assist the commander to make good decisions, right? It’s a fundamental requirement for how we fight – if you look at the principal challenges of that in a digitized world, then standardization is going to be key.
If we, from an industry perspective, develop systems and products which can’t talk to each other, then we’re already starting, from behind the eight ball, really. So that’s something that would have to be sorted out. So key in all of this is to make sure that what’s being built has a degree of in-built resilience as well, because we aren’t going to be operating in a permissive environment.
And I really think the Enterprise C2 program office is exactly the approach that is needed, because it’s going to provide the direction the industry wants and needs. And it will give the funding to keep the thing moving along as fast as possible. So I think that approach is exactly what is needed. We’re hoping that as more information comes out about it, it does exactly that.
35:47 – 36:04
And Sir, you are an Executive Partner with Elara Nova’s Aeronautics & Mission Systems Sector. So from that perspective, what role can Elara Nova’s AMS sector serve in being able to bridge the gap between industry and government, as they seek to together bring these command and control capabilities to fruition?
36:05 – 37:02
Yeah, the team that Elara Nova’s Aeronautics and Mission Systems sector are uniquely placed to assist both industry and governments to maximize the potential that comes with digitized C2 and that vaunted ‘single pane of glass.’
We’ve got a vast amount of experience operating in modern day, complex, all domain environments. And so we know firsthand, the challenges and often the opaque decisions that are being faced every day by that warfighter.
So within AMS, we can guide industry partners in the development of their systems. And similarly, we’re able to assist governments in developing their digitized C2 policies, architectures, and ultimately the TTPs or tactics, techniques and procedures that go with it. So there’s a really experienced wrap-around package available within AMS to assist with the development of what is going to be the future or at least a significant part of the future in warfighting.
37:03 – 37:39
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New Enterprise C2 Program Office to Enhance Commander Decision-Making
Enterprise C2 Suite to Better Implement Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control Strategy
As emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) are increasingly adopted to streamline and enhance command and control, the Department of War is expected to announce a new program office that will coalesce and coordinate information and communication pipelines that will empower commanders to make more timely and effective decisions. While an official announcement from the Department of War is forthcoming, DefenseScoop recently reported that the new Enterprise Command and Control (C2) Program Office will oversee current AI and data platforms like Maven Smart System and Edge Data Mesh as part of a pending program of record for Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2). Collectively, this “Enterprise C2 Suite” will provide the latest iteration of technologies and tools available to commanders for command and control.
Air Vice Marshal (Ret) Mark Chappell, Executive Partner at Elara Nova, said “Systems that facilitate command and control have evolved over time to help warfighters in an ever complicated battlefield. Now, modern technology like artificial intelligence and machine learning can effectively harness and process terabytes of data to improve the real-time understanding and decision-making for a commander.”
The Evolution of Multi-Domain Operations
Up until the 20th century, commanders oversaw military operations within a single domain. But as technologies advanced and operational domains became more integrated, commanders had to adapt.
“Blitzkrieg tactics in World War II changed the nature of command and control as multi-domain operations emerged,” Chappell said. “This increased during the Cold War when the Soviet forces outnumbered Western allies, so the Army and the Air Force had to develop new intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance technologies to identify enemy locations, concentrate firepower and limit an adversary’s numerical advantage. Over time, these new systems also brought in the other domains to include space and cyber as the operational spheres expanded.”
Effective use of systems and technologies to facilitate command and control goes beyond just gathering information on the adversary.
“Our ability to sense what is going on across domains has become fundamental to how we operate,” Chappell said. “But that’s only the starting point: once you get all of that data, it needs to be processed quickly such that a commander can use that timely and high quality information effectively to make better, quicker decisions.
JADC2 and the Need for Integrated C2 Networks
Toward this end, each military service began developing their own tactical network to facilitate command and control. But each network was not necessarily compatible with those of the other services.
So in early 2021, the Department of War announced the Joint All-Domain Command and Control Strategy (JADC2) to better coordinate information-sharing and command and control functions across the Pentagon.
“The JADC2 concept was created to connect sensors from all of the military services into a single network across the 11 Combatant Commands to ‘sense, make sense and act,’” Chappell said. “It’s critical that all domains and services can communicate with each other effectively given the way we fight today. So this new JADC2 network further connects sensors with weapon systems while also using artificial intelligence algorithms to help improve decision-making for commanders.”
The JADC2 strategy lays out five Lines of Effort.
- Data Enterprise
- Human Enterprise
- Technology Enterprise
- Integrating with Nuclear C2 and C3
- Modernizing Mission Partner Information Sharing
“Data Enterprise is about the need to discover and access data from all warfighting domains at all levels of warfare, which brings with it a significant standardization challenge,” Chappell said. “The Human Enterprise means commanders within the military need training to fully harness the Technical Enterprise, which enhances information-sharing and cross-domain awareness in what’s often referred to as ‘the single pane of glass.’ The nuclear enterprise will naturally have to be included, and then modernizing mission partner information-sharing is required for effective joint force and coalition operations.”
Further, the complexity of effective command and control is increasingly expanding to include coalition partners from other nations, as well. Consequently, even the JADC2 concept has had to evolve.
“While JADC2 was initially conceived as a U.S.-only concept, it has inevitably changed to Combined JADC2 to acknowledge the integration of different nations into a coalition force,” Chappell said. “Different coalition partners will bring different capabilities to the fight, but they’ll also have different policy permissions delegated by their government. The best way that we can address those challenges is to exercise and operate together using the systems that we’re going to fight together with.”
Emerging Technologies: Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning
Altogether, the effort to address the complex challenge of collecting, digitizing, standardizing, processing and visualizing information for a commander on operational timelines is what Chappell refers to as ‘digitized C2.’ It’s also where emerging technologies like AI/ML can both improve and accelerate decision-making.
This imperative prompted the Department of War to initiate one of its earliest artificial intelligence programs in 2017, Project Maven.
“The central motivation to Project Maven was to use AI to sense and process the massive volumes of data to support human intelligence analysts working in targeting flows,” Chappell said. “Known as Maven Smart Systems today, it’s become a scalable and deployable AI system which works across multiple missions and data types. So rather than just be an assistant to an analyst, MSS now embeds AI across the whole enterprise.”
Another innovative capability is the Edge Data Mesh (EDM) technology stack, which completed its first successful demonstration in an exercise last year.
“EDM facilitates access to a cloud-like environment where the data is processed to deliver results,” Chappell said. “There’s also built-in resiliency within it: it will have multiple lanes of communication such as a SATCOM link, a 5G link and a suite of transmission systems to get around jamming and other disruptions at the tactical frontline, which is increasingly being referred to as ‘the edge.’ The warfighter needs to access all of this information just like a commander does, so EDM is experimenting on how that [capability] might be delivered given that warfighting is going to be conducted in a heavily degraded environment.”
These tools will be essential to any modern or future military conflict, not unlike the one that has played out in recent weeks in the Middle East.
“In what has essentially been an ‘Air Tasking Order’ war in the Middle East, AI capability is central to identifying targets and determining how to most effectively and efficiently prosecute them,” Chappell said. “But with all the benefits that come from automation and AI within warfighting, it also brings a degree of risk and we need to make sure that we understand and manage that risk properly by keeping a human in that decision-making loop.”
The Forthcoming Enterprise C2 Suite
Now, both Maven Smart System and EDM will be combined and expanded under the
under the new “Enterprise C2 Suite,” a forthcoming Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control program of record. The Enterprise C2 Suite will be under the purview of the future Enterprise C2 Program Office.
“The Enterprise C2 Program Office will be able to better integrate the more fragmented elements of command and control to improve the coherence of its outputs,” Chappell said. “It’s also going to place CJADC2 and AI-supported warfare strategies onto a program of record, which will include governance structure and funding to bring that forward. The growing focus on real-time analysis and AI integration sets the stage for a more dynamic and responsive military strategy in the face of what is a proliferation of more complex and challenging threats. Ultimately, this is about commanders making better decisions at a faster pace.”
But in order to develop and deliver these systems that will enable better command and control, the Department of War will have to communicate and collaborate directly with its industry partners.
“We always need resilient systems that can improve a commander’s decision-making, especially because a battlefield is not a permissive operating environment,” Chappell said. “In a digitized battlespace, standardization of disparate information is going to be key and the Enterprise C2 Program Office is exactly what is needed for this task. It will provide industry direction, along with the necessary funding to make this cohesion and integration of information systems possible.”
That’s also where Elara Nova’s Aeronautics & Mission Systems (AMS) sector has direct experience in both government and industry that can better support the development and adoption of systems for command and control.
“Elara Nova’s AMS sector is uniquely placed to assist both industry and governments to maximize the potential that comes with digitized C2 and that vaunted single pane of glass,” Chappell said. “Elara Nova’s AMS partners know firsthand the challenges and decisions faced by the warfighter every day. So we can guide industry partners in the development of their systems, and similarly assist governments in developing their digitized C2 policies, architectures and the tactics, techniques and procedures to go with it.”
Elara Nova is a trusted guiding partner that builds tailored teams to illuminate unseen opportunities and deliver impact across every domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/
Department of War Seeks Solutions for Emerging Counter-UAS Mission
Real-world Drone Attacks Demonstrate Imperative for an Integrated Command and Control Structure
Recent years have demonstrated the growing prevalence of drones in surveillance and military operations. In 2024, unidentified drones flew over a military base in Langley, Virginia. In 2025, Israel used drones to take out Iranian air defense systems in a coordinated attack, while Ukraine launched “Operation Spiderweb,” using drones to damage and destroy aircraft deep within Russian territory. But a new Department of Defense Inspector General report uncovered a series of challenges for defending the United States’ military installations from similar drone incursions or attacks. These potential vulnerabilities have prompted the Joint Interagency Task Force 401, an Army-led organization tasked with the counter-Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) mission, to release updated policy guidance that requires military installation commanders to prepare their own counter-UAS defense plans within the next 60 days.
“The Ukrainians’ and the Israelis’ use of small UAS’s showed how effective drones can be as part of a large, complex military operation,” said Lt. Gen. (Ret) David “Abu” Nahom, President of Elara Nova’s Aeronautics & Mission Systems sector. “That’s something we’ve got to be very attuned to now, especially when we had small UAS’s around Langley Air Force base a few years ago. We need to be able to quickly identify where they are, who they are and then apply a countermeasure to neutralize it.”
This series of escalating events demonstrates not only how UAS’s are changing the nature of military operations, but also the imperative to find new and innovative solutions to address the emerging counter-UAS mission.
The Air Force categorizes small UAS’s in five different groups based on size, operating altitude, and weight. However, despite these classifications identifying the source, capabilities and intent of each UAS is a complex task, particularly when it comes to determining the appropriate counter measure for an incursion or attack.
“Group classification is important because a weapon that could take out a Group One drone may not be effective against a Group Three drone,” said Col (Ret) JP “Spear” Mintz, Managing Director of the Aeronautics & Mission Systems sector at Elara Nova. “Size matters because a larger drone is easier to detect and a higher operating altitude often means higher speeds. Weight is particularly important for the collateral risk, because taking out a 1,300-lb. drone laden with explosives is vastly different from a 1/2-lb. quadcopter with a camera.”
Government Seeks New and Innovative Solutions
One emerging solution is the DroneHunter F700, a reusable, low-collateral counter drone system that launches tethered nets to capture intruding drones. The Joint Interagency Task Force 401 recently contracted for two of these DroneHunters for further operational testing.
Another potential solution may come from repurposing weapon systems the Department of War already has, namely, the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS). While originally designed for air-to-ground strikes, APKWS has proven effective in air-to-air combat in Ukraine.
This led the Air Force to consider ideas for how APKWS might be launched from a ground system to counter Group One to Group Three drone threats.
“There’s both a dollar and an inventory cost to using high-end, exquisite weapon systems like AMRAMM versus something like the APKWS for smaller threats,” Mintz said. “APKWS was not originally designed to target airborne threats, but it’s proven to be effective as a low-cost response to UAS’s. So instead of a fighter aircraft carrying the APKWS for the counter-UAS mission, the RFI wants to explore what a ground-based launcher for APKWS would look like.”
Lowering the Cost-Curve, Risk for Collateral Damage
While the RFI does not guarantee a contract for a ground-based APKWS launcher will materialize, it does demonstrate how the Air Force is considering lower-cost alternatives compared to other missile defense systems like the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAMM), the AIM-9X Sidewinder or the Phased Array Tracking Radar for Intercept on Target (PATRIOT).
“Previously, we were using expensive missiles on a very inexpensive UAS, and that’s a cost curve that we’re never going to win against,” Nahom said. “So if we can figure out a low-cost solution that can fire many rounds with low-collateral damage, this would make a lot of sense instead of having to launch an expensive and destructive PATRIOT missile. Rather, we can save the PATRIOT for something it was truly designed to defend against, like a theater ballistic missile. This RFI will help the Air Force get after that problem set.”
Minimizing collateral damage is a significant consideration when developing counter-UAS technologies, particularly because some military installations bases and airports are in close proximity to cities and civilian populations.
“Non-kinetic solutions, like GPS denial, cyber attacks, or directed energy can be used to shut a UAS down with less collateral damage,” Mintz said. “But even then, you have to think about what air traffic might be flying overhead or nearby because a directed energy laser can run the risk of inadvertantly affecting a commercial airliner. So even as these counter-UAS technologies develop, we’ll continue to see these other challenges emerge.”
The Command and Control Imperative
Determining the appropriate response, whether kinetically or non-kinetically, reinforces the imperative for a clear and effective command and control structure that can identify and respond to drone incursions or attacks in near real-time.
“Drone warfare underscores the absolute importance of being able to detect a threat, identify it, determine its intent, behind it and the command and control structure to match effectors to the targets,” Mintz said. “But to make that happen in such a fast manner, like in immediate-threat scenarios like Operation Spiderweb where decision times are reduced to near zero, really challenges the current air defense paradigm.”
Similarly, command and control was the publicly-stated number one priority for General Mike Guetlein, who has been tasked with orchestrating the Golden Dome for America.
“Golden Dome intends to defend the homeland against more conventional attacks like ballistic and cruise missiles, hyperglide vehicles and even weapons emanating from space, but it also has to account for threats from other domains,” Nahom said. “But like we saw with the Israeli strikes on Iran, UAS’s could be part of a complex and coordinated attack on our homeland. So Golden Dome’s command and control structure needs to be seamless across domains and that’s a great indicator for industry to focus on not just Golden Dome, but the counter-UAS fight, as well.”
Counter-UAS Solutions as a Dual-Use Technology
The need for counter-UAS technologies, and a command and control system to accommodate them, goes beyond just military applications. In 2019, a drone incursion at a nearby airport disrupted air traffic at Newark Liberty International Airport in New Jersey, while in 2025 a drone collision grounded and severely damaged a Canadian firefighting aircraft responding to the devastating Palisades wildfire.
The dual-use nature of counter-UAS technologies, particularly non-kinetic ones, could enable new entrants in the market for the government to work with.
“The small, cheap and proliferated nature of the drone threats means a lot of nontraditional and emerging companies can now compete in this market,” Mintz said. “In the past, nontraditional companies couldn’t really compete because of the exquisite, expensive, deeply technical nature of conventional threats. But the counter-UAS mission inherently encourages innovation from the smaller, nontraditional defense companies, particularly because this mission is not just a military challenge, it’s a law enforcement and a public safety challenge, as well.”
So while the Department of War seeks to go “commercial first” as part of its acquisition reform overhaul, the same opportunities apply to acquiring solutions for the emerging counter-UAS mission.
“If industry can come up with a way to keep UAS’s away from a busy airport in a downtown area like Newark Airport in New Jersey, the government can probably use that similar counter-UAS technology at Anderson Airbase in Guam,” Nahom said. “But that’s also where the ‘Valley of Death’ becomes very real for these companies. Government funding efforts like SBIRS and STRATFI present opportunities for small companies to find money to develop new and innovative technologies for things like counter-UAS. But since there’s both a commercial and military application for this technology, that means the technology is going to advance that much quicker.”
The Valley of Death, however, will continue to pose a significant challenge for these smaller, nontraditional companies to develop and deliver counter-UAS solutions to the government. But that’s also where the expertise of Elara Nova’s Aeronautics & Missions Systems sector can enable and empower these new entrants to sustainability.
“Elara Nova can be quite effective in helping these companies manage the Valley of Death,” Nahom said. “Evaluating solutions like pairing with another company or looking for other funding avenues to stay solvent while making sure the government recognizes how valuable and affordable their technology is to this fight is important because the secret sauce to the c-UAS mission is going to be in these small companies and their amazing technologies.”
Elara Nova is a trusted guiding partner that builds tailored teams to illuminate unseen opportunities and deliver impact across every domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/.