TraCSS Delivers Space Situational Awareness to Spacecraft Operators

New Space Traffic Management Program Lays Foundation for Future Space Capabilities

In 2009, an on-orbit collision between a defunct Russian satellite and an Iridium communications satellite created more than 1,800 pieces of debris and signaled an emerging need for a space traffic system. Since then, space has only become more congested with the rise of a commercial launch market that has enabled affordable access to space for commercial, civil and military space programs alike. The resulting influx of satellites on-orbit inspired the signing of Space Policy Directive-3 (SPD-3) during the first Trump administration, which declared the need for U.S. leadership in establishing a space traffic system to mitigate the risk of on-orbit collisions through a coordinated data-sharing effort between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Commerce. This joint effort produced a new program, the Traffic Coordination System for Space (TraCSS), which late last year achieved initial operating capability in cataloging assets on-orbit and delivering space situational awareness (SSA) to spacecraft operators. 

“TraCSS leverages government and commercial capabilities to provide actionable space situational awareness as a free basic service,” said Col (Ret) Charlie McGillis, Elara Nova partner and a currently-serving member of the TraCSS Independent Review Board. “Safety is paramount in space, especially considering there are tens of thousands of satellites on-orbit today. SPD-3 responded to the growing challenges posed by that increasing volume of space traffic and the greater risk it creates for more on-orbit collisions that can create orbital debris.” 

An increasingly populated and congested space domain not only increases the likelihood of collisions like the 2009 incident, but the orbital dynamics of space makes those collisions exponentially more damaging than collisions in other domains like land, sea or air. 

“Objects in space are traveling over 17,500 miles per hour, so any collision will create a huge debris field that could stay on-orbit for decades or even centuries,” McGillis said, who previously served as the former Director of Intelligence at 14^th Air Force (Space) and a former Senior Vice President at Slingshot Aerospace. “Even a small speck of debris can cause significant damage to other spacecraft and render it unusable. This creates a need for satellite operators to be able to maneuver their assets to avoid other spacecraft, as well as debris, to avoid similar collisions in the future.” 

Augmenting Government Data with Commercial Capability 

The new TraCSS program aims to replace the legacy government-run space traffic system: space-track.org.  

“The Department of Defense stood up space-track.org in response to that 2009 collision, because somebody needed to provide that data from a global perspective,” said McGillis, who currently serves as the Public Sector Vice President at The Provenance Chain Network. “But at the time, it wasn’t a huge drain on DOD resources because there weren’t as many satellites on-orbit as there are today. Now, as the number of satellites on-orbit has increased, so has the difficulty and drain on those DOD resources to serve this effort. The Space Force was founded to defend and protect our space assets, not provide a global space traffic system. That’s why the Office of Space Commerce was created to begin transitioning these capabilities from the Department of Defense to the Department of Commerce.” 

Today, TraCSS is building off the progress made by space-track.org by delivering basic space situational awareness data directly to civil and commercial spacecraft operators. 

“TraCSS has taken a methodical, iterative approach where commercial owner-operators provide their data directly, which was also done on the DOD system,” McGillis said. “A commercial vendor also built TraCSS’ cloud-based infrastructure, which takes DOD data and augments it with commercially provided data. But if you want access to that information as a commercial space owner-operator, you have to provide the ephemeris – or location – of your own assets in space.” 

Commercial Opportunities and Remaining Space Traffic Challenges 

TraCSS delivers its space tracking data through what are called conjunction data messages (CDMs), or standardized notifications about potential close approaches between space objects. Receiving a CDM is seen as a first step toward enabling a satellite operator to maneuver their spacecraft out of the way to avoid a collision. But other challenges remain in creating a safe and sustainable space environment through spacecraft maneuverability. 

“In today’s space environment, you need to be able to maneuver if there’s going to be a close approach,” McGillis said. “The CDMs can come in at a three-day or even seven-day notice, which would give you time to maneuver. But a risk still remains because some satellites on-orbit today don’t have the capability to maneuver, which begs the question about whether policy or regulations need to change to require spacecraft maneuverability.”  

In the meantime, TraCSS is seeking industry input to further augment its effort with other commercial capabilities that can help identify and catalog spacecraft on-orbit through a Collision Avoidance (COLA) Gap Pathfinder program. The COLA Gap Pathfinder program is intended to help tracking efforts adjust to the increased prevalence of “ride-sharing,” or using a single rocket launch to deliver several different types of satellites on-orbit. 

“The hardest part is tracking and cataloging those objects after they’ve been released from the rocket,” McGillis said. “When several objects are released on the same launch, it’s hard to discern which object is which – whether that’s satellite number 1001 or satellite number 1002. Bringing in a commercial capability to fill that need is huge because from a safety perspective, you want to detect, identify and catalog spacecraft as quickly as possible. So this is a great mission for the commercial sector to provide capabilities for.” 

Space Situational Awareness vs. Space Domain Awareness 

Offloading some of the basic space situational awareness capabilities to the commercial sector will also enable the DOD and the Space Force to focus on a similar, but distinct mission area: space domain awareness.  

“Space situational awareness is about knowing where a spacecraft is and the path of its trajectory,” McGillis said. “Space domain awareness adds intelligence information from a military perspective. What is the intent of that object? What are its capabilities? Is it hostile or not? What are its behaviors? Is that a bad actor? So you get into more of what is the intent and the capability of that specific object or satellite.” 

That’s why the TraCSS program’s design is one of the latest examples of how commercial space capabilities can be leveraged by the government to support national security objectives. 

“The government doesn’t want to build something that’s going to be costly, when they can just buy the same product or service directly from the commercial market,” McGillis said. “The way TraCSS is currently organized is in line with serving both national security and economic purposes. It uses commercial innovation to supplement government data and provide warning to those commercial space operators. It’s not unlike how the government manages air traffic control by first providing that data infrastructure and then supplementing that with commercial resources.” 

Opportunities for International Collaboration 

In serving both space situational awareness and space domain awareness missions, however, the need for a space traffic system also requires collaboration with international partners. 

“Space is global – it’s got civil, commercial and a variety of international government assets,” McGillis said. “It’s important that we engage our international partners, so that they understand the capability TraCSS brings to the domain. Likewise, we can coordinate our data with other space traffic systems like the European Union’s Space Surveillance and Tracking program that takes both national military data, but also commercial data. That coordination between the EUSST and TraCSS is a great example of opportunities for international collaboration.” 

Similarly, the need to establish data-sharing standards and other norms of behavior through international collaboration further reinforces the strategic imperative that the United States be the leader in space traffic management. As it stands today, there is no single, standardized global space traffic system.  

“The inherently dual-nature of space between civil and national security means some countries are not going to want to share their space tracking data to protect a national prerogative,” McGillis said. “China doesn’t share their information with us today, so the only way to track their satellites is through the capabilities that we have today – like TraCSS. So, the United States must take the lead on setting data-sharing standards and establishing norms of behavior, because even when an owner-operator shares their asset’s location, their data format may not be the same.” 

TraCSS as a Foundation for Future Space Capabilities 

In turn, the emergence of a leading space traffic system like TraCSS will enable a foundation for future space capabilities and mission areas that serve both economic and national security purposes. 

“TraCSS is the first step toward a future where spacecraft have the capability to do an ‘RPO,’ or rendezvous in proximity,” McGillis said. “Having a satellite come up to another satellite is an inherently complex mission that requires very exquisite data. But if you can accomplish an RPO effectively, that unlocks opportunities for capabilities like in-space assembly and manufacturing, orbital maneuverability and re-fueling, as well as cleaning up debris on-orbit. TraCSS can provide a foundation for those innovative space capabilities to emerge.” 

In support of the increasingly vital, but inherently complex challenge of space traffic serves as the latest mission area where Elara Nova’s team of experts are uniquely positioned to strengthen government and commercial efforts. 

“Elara Nova brings that voice to all the space conversations that we have, whether it’s in the commercial or government sector,” McGillis said. “Elara Nova can help commercial businesses understand what TraCSS is about and the capabilities that it provides. Whether you’re building a propulsion system or whether you’re launching satellites, you need to understand where you are in space. Everybody has a role in keeping space safe, and we need U.S. leadership in creating this foundational tracking system not only for our economy, but also for our national security.” 

Elara Nova is a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/. 

Episode 25: TraCSS Delivers Space Situational Awareness to Spacecraft Operators

The Elara Edge: Expert Insights on Space Security

Host: Scott King 

SME: Charlie McGillis, Elara Nova partner, former Director of Intelligence at 14th Air Force (Space); former Senior Vice President at Slingshot Aerospace; Vice President, Public Sector, The Provenance Chain Network; TraCSS Independent Review Board member 

00:02 – 01:44 

A 2009 on-orbit collision between a defunct Russian satellite and an Iridium communications satellite created more than 1,800 pieces of debris that signaled an emerging need for a space traffic management system. Since then, space has only become more congested with the rise of a commercial launch market that has enabled affordable access to space for commercial, civil and military space programs alike.  

This influx of on-orbit satellites inspired the 2018 signing of Space Policy Directive-3 during the first Trump administration, which declared the need for U.S. leadership in establishing a space traffic management system to mitigate the risk of future on-orbit collisions through a coordinated effort between the United States Department of Defense – or DOD – and the Department of Commerce.  

This joint effort also produced a new program, the Traffic Coordination System for Space  – or TraCSS – which late last year achieved initial operating capability in cataloging on-orbit assets and delivering space situational awareness – or SSA – data to spacecraft operators. 

Welcome to “The Elara Edge: Expert Insights on Space Security.” I’m your host, Scott King. Joining me today to discuss TraCSS and the broader challenges in space traffic management, is Elara Nova partner retired Col Charlie McGillis, former director of intelligence at 14th Air Force (Space). Charlie is also a former Senior Vice President at Slingshot Aerospace and currently serves as Public Sector Vice President at The Provenance Chain Network, as well as a member of the Independent Review Board for TraCSS 

Ma’am, welcome to the show! 

01:44 – 01:46 

Thank you! It’s great to be here with you. 

01:47 – 02:04 

It’s great to have you. Now, in September of 2024, the Traffic Coordination System for Space, or TraCSS, reached a big milestone in achieving initial operating capability. 

But let’s go back to the beginning. Can you describe what TraCSS is and what problem it’s looking to solve? 

02:05 – 05:16 

TraCSS is the first civil space traffic coordination initiative and it was mandated by Space Policy Directive-3, or what we call SPD-3. And this was actually signed by President Trump in 2018 during his first term and it had huge bilateral support. So it leverages government and commercial capabilities to provide that actionable space situational awareness.  

And it does it for free to both civil, commercial operators for space flight safety. And this has been transitioning these capabilities from the Department of Defense. And it’s important to note that this is a free basic service because whether you have one or 1000 satellites that are flying, safety is paramount. And the data is actually used by academia and industry too, to do research. 

But also the Office of Space Commerce through SPD-3 was charged with more than just TraCSS. They actually have a policy and advocacy role as well, where they work with industry, foreign governments, organizations to promote that safe and sustainable operations and to grow the U.S. space commerce. They also authorize and supervise the U.S. commercial remote sensing satellite operations, which has actually changed over the last five years. 

This directive, the SPD-3, it aims to address the growing challenges posed by the increasing volume of space traffic and orbital debris, ensure that safety, sustainability and also leadership in U.S. operations in space.  

And I would like to kind of go back for a minute, because I think it’s important for people to understand, why is this becoming a Department of Commerce mission [when] before what it was all done by the Department of Defense?  

It was actually back in February of 2009 where we had our first ever accidental collision between two intact satellites in orbit. One was a Russian defunct satellite. So not operating, but still up in space, and an active Iridium satellite. So a satellite communication satellite and no warning was issued, right?  

Think about two planes flying. Visual flight rules and not being warned that the other one was actually approaching each other. And, so this collision happened and I talked to the person from Iridium, and he goes, ‘Yeah, I get this call from the DOD and he’s like, you need to come to this classified place, right? Show up at what is Vandenberg now-Space Force Base and had no idea.’ They knew something was wrong with their satellite, but didn’t know that the collision had happened – so huge awakening.  

And at that time in 2009. Not a lot of satellites orbiting. You know, it was about 120 military satellites and about over a thousand active commercial satellites. This is what started what we know today as space-track.org where people can go and get the conjunction data messages and so that’s when those warnings actually started to happen was after that collision event. So it’s important to kind of know that.  

But now today, you fast forward. Tens of thousands of satellites are orbiting in space and so we have to keep that safety paramount and it’s both civil, commercial and government operating in that domain all at the same time.

05:17 – 05:29 

Now, just to add a little more context: can you share what makes a collision between any two objects, whether they be a spent rocket body, a satellite, or other debris, exponentially more harmful in the space domain?

05:30 – 06:29 

That’s a great point. You know, in space, when two objects actually collide. Think about them going over 17,000mph, which is huge and then they collide and it creates this debris. 

Well, that debris stays up there for decades, even could be 100 years. Now satellite owner-operators actually have to be able to maneuver and avoid that debris. And you can actually see I’ve been to the Air and Space Museum where I’ve seen small specks of debris hit like the Hubble Space Telescope or the ISS, and it can cause significant damage. 

Even something very small can cause huge damage to a spacecraft. And I actually liken it to if you have an oil spill and how it permeates the water. From a maritime perspective, that is going to continue and think about the millions of dollars, billions that it takes to clean that up, That’s what it is like in space. It’s that collision. If it happens in space it will have significant impact for decades. 

06:30 – 06:43 

It seems like the keyword that came out of SPD-3 and other supporting documents around TraCSS is “space situational awareness.”  

Can you define space situational awareness for our audience and explain its relevance to national security space interests? 

06:44 – 08:06 

From a space situational awareness perspective, it’s really just about knowing where that spacecraft is? What is its trajectory? Where is it going? 

It’s important to know those things. Just understanding where the objects are in space from a military perspective because you have both civil, commercial and government all operating in that same space and so you have to be able to determine who is who. 

If a conflict begins, you can’t just have like a no-fly zone like you do in the air domain or a maritime blockade. In space, you can’t do that. And so you have to be aware of wherever all those objects are and that’s what space situational awareness is. 

And I know some people kind of confuse SSA space situational awareness with space domain awareness. There’s a huge distinction between the two. When you talk about space domain awareness. 

It actually adds into, for a military perspective, that intelligence information: now what is the intent of that object? What is the adversary doing? Is it hostile or not? What are its behaviors? Is it a bad actor? And so you get into more of what is the intent and the capability of that specific object or that satellite? 

Those are two good distinctions between SSA and space domain awareness.

08:07 – 08:23 

Now civil, commercial, and government assets in space all serve a variety of purposes and missions.  

But why is understanding this difference between space situational awareness and space domain awareness an inherently important step toward protecting those assets in space – no matter their purpose? 

08:24 – 09:24 

I’m going to give a little critique for those of us that are such space nerds, but we don’t do a good job of talking about why space is important. I mean, those of us that are in the business, we understand it implicitly, but the global public doesn’t understand that you actually depend on space every day of your life. 

If you were on your phone, if you use your GPS to get from point A to point B. If you went to an ATM machine and took money out of it – that uses space. If you filled your car up with gas – that uses space. That is a critical piece from an economy perspective in order to understand that we use it every day. 

But it’s also important from a national security perspective. We use space for GPS and targeting and communications and trying to get intelligence like imagery and signals intelligence, missile detection capability, electronic warfare. So there’s a lot of military capabilities space enables – and so we need to protect and defend those assets. 

09:25 – 09:48 

The space traffic management mission began as a responsibility of the DOD. But the TraCSS program actually operates under the Office of Space Commerce, which is housed within the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration – or NOAA. 

Can you elaborate on how TraCSS is part of this broader trend of transitioning the space traffic management responsibility from the DOD to the Department of Commerce?

09:49 – 12:35 

You know, as we talked about the historical piece of it with the collision in 2009. Basically, the DOD stood up and said, ‘Hey, somebody needs to do this, from a global perspective and so we didn’t have as many satellites on-orbit. 

It wasn’t a huge drain on DOD assets. But as we’ve seen that number of satellites increase difficulty, not just from a government perspective, but also a commercial perspective, having over 10,000 satellites. It’s a huge responsibility to have that global safety of flight perspective. Between the DOD, they said, ‘Hey, this isn’t really our mission to do this – safety of flight. It’s to protect and defend those assets, those military assets, and provide those capabilities for national security.’ So that’s when the decision was made. ‘Hey, somebody else needs to do this mission.’ That’s when the Office of Space Commerce was stood up, with the direction of SPD-3. 

And then later let’s track through history that that’s when it was just a year later that the Space Force and U.S. Space Command was stood up too, in realizing that there’s more going on in space from a competitive, contested perspective that we’re seeing with China, especially in Russia. From a national security perspective, we need to be able to protect and defend our space assets.  

What we’re seeing happen on orbit today is troubling, not only with the number of satellites China has launched, but the capabilities that they’ve launched. And because you can see it, it’s not like it’s hidden because you can track it in space and you can track that behavior and that intent, whether China has – they have a grappling arm, you know, and they’re able to move a satellite from one position to another and take it to a graveyard or, just recently they, we call it a mothership and a baby. 

You know, they have a mother satellite and they release another object out of that satellite. That’s huge to be able to track those capabilities, the intent of that, if we knew everybody was doing things for public good, we wouldn’t have to worry about it. But we know that’s not the case. 

From a commerce perspective, the decision-making was, ‘Hey, DoD assets that we use today to do space tracking. So today we use radar assets, we use optical assets. And then there’s actually some space capabilities, as well. But it doesn’t give you 24/7 coverage from a space safety kind of perspective. 

And so the thought was, ‘Hey, we need to also use commercial providers in order to do this and to support those commercial operators. It was in order to be able to provide that capability from a commercial perspective and bring it and support a strong commercial aspect of a space ecosystem.

12:36 – 12:45 

Now, Ma’am, you mentioned radar and other optical assets. But can you speak to how the U.S. government, and specifically the DOD, traditionally monitored the space environment? 

 12:46 – 13:54 

The DOD actually uses that same assets as commercial uses: radar, optical, and space-based. They use a system, a legacy system called SPADOC – Space Defense Operations Center system – that analyzes that data and processes it. 

DoD is trying to modernize that infrastructure with a new system called ATLAS — Advanced Tracking and Launch Analysis System. It’s still not operational yet, but my understanding is it’s on track to achieve initial operational capability (IOC) by the end of 2025. It’s been a long road. 

But, let’s be clear: DOD wants to focus their efforts on adversary satellites. And this is why the Commercial Integration Cell was first stood up, which is what I was a part of for about three years and it was brilliant. General Raymond was the Commander at Vandenberg now-Space Force Base, and he goes, “Hey I’m having to track all these satellites and if I knew where the commercial satellites were, and they told me where they were, then I wouldn’t have to track them and I could focus on that adversary.” This allowed DOD assets to be focused on the adversary and be able to coordinate and share information with commercial partners. 

13:55 – 13:59 

And in what ways is TraCSS different from that traditional approach to space traffic management? 

14:00 – 16:34 

We think about the capabilities that we have today from the infrastructure, cloud-based, being able to do agile software development, being able to field iterative upgrades and capabilities, and being able to do that on a modern infrastructure is huge.That’s what they’re trying to do in ATLAS and it’s taken them a long time because they’ve had to take those legacy systems, make sure everything works before you transition over from legacy to a modern system.  

Whereas TraCSS could start from ground one and build it up, a lot easier so they’re able to ingest that data from the DOD. But also bring in that commercial data, in order to supplement and be able to have that 24/7 coverage and tracking capability. And so today, as you mentioned in the beginning, they have a minimal viable product. They have beta users on it, [it] started in September of ‘24 and now they’ll start to actually onboard other owner-operators. 

The Office of Space Commerce has taken a very, I would say methodical and iterative approach to putting out the capability. They had Pathfinders with commercial data providers and they went out to the customer, the commercial satellite owner-operators: What do you need as this basic service? 

And I think that was brilliant. Anybody that’s selling a product goes out and finds out from the customer, what do you need? Now I will tell you, most satellite owner operators don’t want to pay for things. They want it for free. They’ve been given the data for free and so defining that basic service was a give and take. 

You know, what are we going to continue to do as a basic service for spaceflight safety?  And then what are we going to, you know, what do you as a satellite owner-operator, if you want more data and more analytics, you’re going to have to pay for that, and you’re going to have to go to, you know, a company and, and get that additional [information]. 

So as TraCSS has iteratively built this capability, it will be the same. They are able to today do what we call ‘all versus all.’ So think about all the satellites in space. You take all their data and be able to say, ‘Do analysis against all of those satellites against all the others. And where’s my risk? Where are the riskiest collisions that are going to happen.’  

And then they would spit out a conjunction data message to those operators. ‘Hey, there’s a close conjunction happening and you probably need to maneuver.’ But it really isn’t their decision to maneuver. It’s up to the operator to take that data in and do that maneuver on their own.  

16:35 – 16:48 

Now, realistically speaking, how many of these satellites on-orbit today, have the capacity to maneuver on their own? Can you speak to how TraCSS being built out iteratively might get to a future where this becomes a reality? 

16:49 – 18:58 

It’s a great point. And it’s kind of scary to think of how many satellites are able to launch and they have no maneuver capability. I mean, in other words: they have no propulsion, they have no gas, and they’re not able to maneuver.  

And should that policy or those regulations change? Probably. You know, at least in today’s environment, you should have some kind of capability to do a maneuver if a close approach is coming up, just because as we talked about. If there’s a collision in space, this is a massive impact to everybody that’s operating in space and to everything we depend on space for. So you need to be able to have that maneuverability and be able to move out of the way if there is a close conjunction.  

So most people, you hear you’re traveling at 17,500 mph and you think, “Wow, that must feel like zip, zip—bling, bling, right? And really in space, it’s actually more like moving incredibly fast in slow motion. Because there’s no atmosphere and everything is relative, things happen gradually. So even though you’re speeding around the Earth, you typically get plenty of warning—usually a seven day advance notice or a three day if there’s a close conjunction—and that buffer gives you time to plan and actually execute that maneuver safely, which is crucial in the space environment. 

But some of the other challenges from an Office of Space Commerce perspective, they were stood up under SPD-3. The Office of Space Commerce is actually under NOAA, that causes complications when they’re trying to let contracts because they have to do it under NOAA’s rules and they can’t do it under really Department of Commerce rules. 

The other issue is that SPD-3 is a policy. It’s not a law. Policies can be changed. And so really that formal authorization of having that infrastructure for TraCSS needs to be elevated out of NOAA and into the Department of Commerce. There is some law that has been introduced on the floor called the Safe Orbit Act that would actually do this and formally create and appropriate the funds to do that, which is super important. 

18:59 – 19:03 

In what ways is the space traffic management mission suitable for commercial space opportunities? 

19:04 – 21:00 

The Office of Space Commerce has brought in commercial data companies and also a commercial vendor to build that infrastructure. So it’s been commercial from day one and they’re ingesting the DOD data, but it really is supporting the space commercial ecosystem. And when TraCSS is fully operational, which is expected in early 2026; the intent is to bring down spacetrack.org site, the original DOD space traffic management system, which – if you’ll remember – was instituted after the 2009 collision. 

So from data augmenting the commercial vendor for the infrastructure and then also even the data layer, presentation layer as they are calling it is a commercial vendor, and they’re building it in such a way that it’s modular so that they don’t have vendor lock. They can bring in somebody else from an infrastructure perspective. A new innovative data provider could come in and say, ‘Hey, I have this new capability and we have better data than the other ones have,’ and that data could be bought. 

The balance to me is you provide that infrastructure, from a government kind of perspective. But then you buy commercial sources to augment and sometime in the future, it may be that commercial actually has better capability than the government. 

But from a Space Force perspective, you know, they don’t want to have to be able to build everything that’s costly when they can actually get it from a commercial perspective. So I think it’s in line with both from a national security perspective, but also from an economic perspective and a commercial perspective. 

It’s using the commercial innovativeness that we have, to supplement and provide that warning to those commercial space operators. So fundamentally build the infrastructure? Government. Like air traffic control – and then provide the data, buy the commercial data in order to supplement that and use commercial resources to keep it going. 

21:01 – 21:09 

Now, we’ve discussed the influx of civil, commercial and U.S. government assets in space, but how do international space assets factor into this effort?  

21:09 – 23:16 

Yeah. Super important because space is global, right? And it’s not like you have this contained airspace. And so as we’ve talked about, it’s got civil, commercial and government and that includes anybody internationally. It’s not just U.S assets that are flying in space. The Office of Space Commerce actually engages internationally. 

And that’s one of their roles and because of that Office being established, they bring that credibility from a U.S. space leadership perspective. [That] doesn’t mean that you’re not engaging with other countries, which they are and they, it’s actually interesting. I was fortunate enough to participate in what they call Track 1.5, and it used to be that it would just be government-to-government meetings. 

Well, between the National Space Council, during the Biden administration and then with the Office of Space Commerce, they actually said, ‘Hey, commercial is so important to this, we need to have these Track 1.5 meetings. And so it was government and commercial coming together to engage international partners.’ And I was fortunate to be a part of that for France and Japan 

But they’ve continued that with other countries within the EU, the United Kingdom, India, Australia and others. Being able to engage on a government level, but also on a commercial level with these international partners is very important: one for them to understand the capability that TraCSS brings. What are those capabilities? What are you going to get for free to be able to have safety of flight, but then to also partner with others that want to build similar systems? 

And the one that comes to mind is within the EU. They have a SST. So Space Surveillance and Tracking system and it is similar to TraCSS. And it takes in national military data, but also commercial data. So kind of the same model. That coordination between what EUSST is doing and what TraCSS is doing is a great example of that collaboration internationally.

23:17 – 23:34 

Now, Ma’am, you mentioned that the United States has TraCSS and the EU has SST. But do they have the same standardized data?  

If they don’t, how do they reconcile those differences in how they format and share that data? And what might that mean for the imperative of good communication between these two partners? 

23:35 – 24:36 

I don’t think we’re there yet. I think that we’re close and that’s part of the conversation, that needs to happen. And even when an owner-operator shares their ephemeris, you know, their location, with whether it’s the Department of Defense or Department of Commerce for TraCSS. 

Even that format had to be adjudicated and agreed on. Like, ‘Well, how am I going to send that to you?’ Because they all have different systems and so that data format is really important, but part of this is those conversations between the Office of Space Commerce and EUSST is what is that data format that we want to agree on from an international perspective. 

There are commercial companies that do validation and verification of space data. So if you have two different data sources, you want to be able to determine quickly, which data is more accurate. This is going to be critical and something that the Office of Space Commerce knows and needs to be incorporated into TraCSS at a future date.

24:37 – 24:46 

What about this idea of a universal, internationally recognized space traffic management system.  

Can you elaborate on the possibilities that exist there, but also on the challenges in making that a reality?  

24:47 – 27:04 

From Charlie’s perspective, in a world of space is global, would it be nice to have one international system like air traffic control? Yes. But I think because of the dual-nature of space between civil and let’s just say government national security, that’s going to be hard to do because people are not going to want to be sharing all that data. They’re going to want it to remain a national prerogative. Do I share that data or do I not? Because there’s something going on in space. 

From a space safety perspective. You’re going to have, at least to begin with, these regional, whether it’s EUSST, or TraCSS, or maybe Japan sets up their own system regionally, and so they’re going to have to be able to collaborate and coordinate amongst themselves. 

And so it gets to the data standard that we talked about, what’s the adoption of the technical SSA standards that we need? How are we actually going to share that information? And what’s the direct engagement with those spacecraft operators? 

An example, I would use is if you have a Japanese satellite, do they give their data to the Japanese, you know, whatever that entity is and then that data is shared? They don’t actually have to share it with both TraCSS and EUSST, and you want to make it simple, because once the data is in there, you can share it broadly. And then it is that making sure that you work closely amongst the different players and I think that globally many people want space capabilities. 

An individual country, it’s like a coming out party. It’s like a debutante if you have space capabilities and so being able to actually share that information is super important.  

You talk about a one system, I just don’t see that happening anytime in the near future. Russia has kind of put something on the plate to propose a single centralized SSA system. But let’s be clear, China doesn’t share their information with us today. The only way to track where their satellites are, are through the capabilities that we have today. There is no sharing going on. 

So you would have to come to the table and say, ‘Globally we are all going to share and we’re all going to follow these norms of behavior and these rules.’ And I think we’re a little far off from that.

27:05 – 27:11 

And how does that speak to the imperative that the United States be the one to take a leadership role in space traffic management? 

27:12 – 27:59 

I mean, there are other nations that are taking a leadership role. Probably a few years ago, the UK actually came out with some very strong norms of behavior policy that they introduced to the UN. Amazing to see that leadership come out from the UK. 

From a US perspective, we have been the leader, we have had the global space traffic system and so we need to continue to be that leader, both from an economic and a national security perspective. 

That engagement with the commercial owner-operators in the norms of behavior. TraCSS has been a huge proponent of that, whether it’s their engagement with the commercial side and the commercial owner-operators or it’s with governments, or with the UN. They’ve really been pushing this standard from day one. 

28:00 – 28:12 

In the meantime, the TraCSS program also recently sought feedback on its Collision Avoidance or COLA Pathfinder program? How does this COLA Pathfinder program fit into this broader TraCSS effort? 

28:13 – 30:25 

When TraCSS first started, this was one of the areas that DOD, it was one of their highest priorities, not just to offload space traffic, space safety part of it, but also collision avoidance.  

Let’s go through that mission a little bit so people understand it. You have a launch. And you could have one or 60 [satellites.] And so the hardest part is tracking and cataloging those objects once they’ve been released from the rocket. From a DOD perspective, that was taking a lot of time in order for them to do that. 

Because when you have that many objects, it’s hard to discern which object is which? Is it satellite 1000 or is it satellite 1002? Being able to do what they call COLA, is cataloging those satellites. Being able to bring in commercial capability to fill that gap, is huge because obviously from a safety perspective, you want to catalog them as quickly as possible. 

You know, detect them, identify them and catalog them right after they’re deployed and that takes a very focused capability, in order to do that. And I actually think this is a great mission for the commercial sector to be able to do.  

They can do it much quicker than DOD can because of the additional capabilities that they have. And I’ll be honest, because they don’t have legacy systems. They’re able to get it in quickly and see it. And it’s normally, sometimes they have capability where the DOD doesn’t have capability, like they have an optical telescope, maybe where the DOD doesn’t have an optical telescope in order to see that. 

So from a commercial company, I can now have those capabilities to have broader coverage across the globe. Commercial can put capabilities maybe where the DOD hasn’t been able to put capability. You could put capabilities in Asia and Australia, capabilities in Chile and South Africa. 

Whereas DOD has to go government-to-government and go, ‘Okay, can I? It’s like having a base, right? Can I have basing rights in your country?’ Commercial – it’s a transaction. So you can add that capability. 

30:26 – 30:37 

And so what are some of the other capabilities that the DOD can look to the commercial space industry to provide solutions for? And how does TraCSS lay the foundation for those future capabilities to come to fruition? 

30:38 – 31:46 

Obviously, the space safety. They’re able to add data. I think this COLA mission. I also believe we’re not quite there yet, but we’re getting there from an innovation perspective from a in-space assembling and manufacturing. 

You know, so being able to actually re-gas or have mobile propulsion for a satellite. So now you’re not actually limited to the propulsion that was on the satellite when it launched. Or being able to maneuver a satellite from one position to another or being able to fix a satellite. And I actually see in a future where you could maybe capture the debris in some way. That’ll change the dynamic of how we operate in space. 

TraCSS is the first step of getting to that future, because you have to know where those objects are in space in order to have that capability to do what we call an RPO rendezvous in proximity [operation] – like to be able to have another satellite come up to another satellite – is not a simple mission.  

You have to have very exquisite data in order to be able to do that. TraCSS is the foundation to be able to bring those additional capabilities and that innovation to space.

31:47 – 32:00 

And Ma’am, from your perspective as a partner, what role can Elara Nova and its broad team of partners and consultants serve in supporting the government and its commercial and international partners for the purpose of space traffic management? 

32:01 – 33:02 

Elara Nova brings that voice to all the conversations that we have, whether it’s in the commercial sector or the government sector, or civil. And whether you’re engaging, and having those conversations, on The Hill or with international partners.  

From my perspective, Elara Nova can help commercial businesses understand what TraCSS is about and the capabilities that it provides? And how do they actually integrate with that capability? Whether you’re building a propulsion system or whether you’re launching satellites, you need to understand this and where you are in that ecosystem. Everybody has a role in keeping space safe, no matter where you are in the ecosystem. 

And then from a government or international perspective, it’s being that voice that, ‘Hey, we do need this infrastructure. We do need this foundation from a TraCSS system for U.S. leadership, not only for our economy, but also for national security, and being that bridge, especially on the international side of bringing partners together.’

33:03 – 33:40 

This has been an episode of The Elara Edge: Expert Insights on Space Security. As a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space domain, Elara Nova is your source for expertise and guidance in space security. 

If you liked what you heard today, please subscribe to our channel and leave us a rating. Music for this podcast was created by Patrick Watkins of PW Audio. This episode was edited and produced by Regia Multimedia Services. I’m your host, Scott King, and join us next time at the Elara Edge. 

Episode 30: Orbital Watch to Enable Sharing of Classified Threat Information

The Elara Edge Podcast

Host: Scott King 

SME: Charlie McGillis, Elara Nova partner, former Director of Intelligence at 14th Air Force (Space); former Senior Vice President at Slingshot Aerospace; TraCSS Independent Review Board member 

00:02 – 01:27 

In today’s congested and contested space environment, commercial space companies must now prepare for a variety of threats that can compromise their systems on-orbit: from incidental collisions with space debris, to counterspace threats like cyber and electronic warfare attacks, as well as kinetic strikes. 

Meanwhile, the inherently dual-use nature of space systems, which often support both national security and economic purposes, further reinforces the imperative that the United States Space Force communicates threat information with its industry partners to ensure resiliency of our nation’s space capabilities. Now, a new Space Force program, Orbital Watch, aims to do just that: facilitate greater information-sharing with industry partners for both unclassified and classified threats.  

Welcome to the Elara Edge! Returning to the show today is retired Colonel Charlie McGillis. As the former Director of Intelligence at 14th Air Force (Space), Charlie provided tailored, responsive, local, and global space effects in support of national and Combatant Commander objectives. She is also the former senior vice president at Slingshot Aerospace and is a currently serving member of the independent review board for the Traffic Coordination System for Space (or TraCSS) which we’ve previously discussed on the show. 

Ma’am, welcome back!

01:28 – 01:29 

Thank you. It’s great to be here with you. 

01:30 – 01:43 

Thanks for making time to join us again today. 

Now, Space Systems Command first announced the Orbital Watch program in April of this year. So let’s start there: what is Orbital Watch? And what problem is it aiming to solve? 

01:44 – 04:11 

Let’s start with the problem first, because I think that’s really important. But there are threats to the US national security interests that are actually happening in space today. Those actions are being taken by our adversaries, and that can impact space operations. And it doesn’t matter whether you’re a military, civil or commercial spacecraft. So that’s the problem that they’re trying to solve.  

SSC Front Door, which now is the U.S Space Force Front Door, began an initiative to communicate unclassified threat information to commercial vendors to help them make decisions on risk management. 

They’ve announced two specific phases and so first a vendor has to register with the Front Door and you can share an idea, product or service and so basically the Front Door is using this what I would call a Rolodex of ‘Who do I need to talk to? And potentially who do I need to buy capabilities from?’ 

For Orbital Watch, it only requires a basic registration. Sending in this information. The company doesn’t have to do any kind of training and no specific information controls are needed. This first phase is just a distribution. A one way. They’re going to send information out to the vendors that have registered with the Front Door and so they disseminate an unclassified threat fact sheet prepared by Headquarters Space Force Intelligence to over 900 companies because they are operating in this domain with all the other space operators and they could be impacted by this threat.  

But it is important to note: it doesn’t give the vendors an opportunity to ask questions like they see something in the threat assessment and they go, ‘Oh, well, I’d like to know more about that?’ There’s no opportunity to do that. So it’s really just a one-way direction. 

In phase two, what they’ve announced is that they will actually introduce a secure Commercial Portal that will enable that two-way information flow of sharing. If that commercial satellite got an indication something happened to them, they could actually share that information then with the Space Force. I also believe that in this two-way portal, the Space Force could share information with these operators if they saw something.  

So I think it’s significant to have a two-way portal so that the commercial company can ask questions. It’s not just a one-way street. So the commercial company may be the one that first detects that threat, they can actually give that information to the military and it could be disseminated more broadly. So that’s why the two-way portal is certainly significant.

04:12 – 04:17 

And so why is it important for Orbital Watch to be rolled out in this kind of phased and iterative approach? 

04:18 – 06:21 

I think it’s important one: because they need to share the information with the space operators that are out there. They’re the clearinghouse. They are the ones that are getting all the companies coming in and registering with them so they kind of have the rolodex. But it’s also important in this phased approach, because they are going to have to figure out how to share the classified information, and that’s going to take time. It’s not insurmountable, but it’s also complicated. 

First of all, let’s talk about what does it take for a company to get a security clearance or an individual like myself. So that company actually has to get a facility clearance level to even get individuals cleared. 

My understanding when the incident happened with Viasat, when they experienced this jamming, the Space Force deemed, ‘Hey, there’s some other operators around that probably should know that information.’ So they were actually able to do what we call a one-time read on of classified information to inform those other space operators that, ‘Hey, there is this threat, you need to be aware of it.’ So you can do that, but it’s not normal.  

The next phase would be to set up a cadence of that dissemination that matches almost in near real-time or close to it. There was a threat. You may have not much time in order to respond to it, and so they need to be able to get that information out quickly.  

But it’s also important to note that not all vendors can process or store that classified information, even at CUI data – controlled unclassified information – you need to be able to have special permissions and so what’s not clear to me is how the Space Force is going to enable this for commercial space operators who don’t actually have an existing contract or what we call a DD254. It’s a form that says, ‘Hey, you’re on contract with the Space Force. You now, because of the contract and the work that you’re doing, you need access to classified information.’ 

If you don’t have that, I’m not sure how the government is going to go through sponsoring these companies to have access to classified information.

06:21 – 06:33 

Can you share how threats in space have evolved over time and why better information-sharing, particularly at the classified level, is required to both prepare for and respond to these evolving threats?  

06:34 – 10:02 

So really, over that last ten years or so, we’ve really seen China rapidly field space and counterspace capabilities. ISR. So intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance satellites, Satcom – how you communicate? Also large constellations. And we’ve really witnessed more advanced maneuvering and the willingness to expend fuel to conduct rapid maneuvers demonstrating tactics, techniques and procedures that could be used for space warfighting.  

Some examples: China maneuvered two satellites, the Sinjan-21 and the Sinjan-25, into extremely close proximity, where they conducted a probable satellite refueling experiment in GEO. And then also there’s a series of satellites called the TJS series of experimental satellites that analysts believe carry out classified missions including signals intelligence, early warning missions and satellite inspection activities to support the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Now some TJS satellites have demonstrated the ability to maneuver in orbit and inspect or approach other satellites, potentially for surveillance, interference and counterspace operations. 

And we saw this back in 2018 when TJS-3 maneuvered close to a US ISR satellite.   Now, some may say, ‘Well, those could be commercial use as well.’ That is true. But they can also be modified to serve a counterspace purpose. 

So especially for RPOs, if you do a rendezvous in proximity op, you could be doing it to refuel. You could be doing it to actually look at the satellite. Is there something wrong with it? If I have an anomaly with a satellite. But you could also be looking at it. What is that satellite? Taking pictures of that satellite from on orbit. Or maybe you’re listening – it’s a SIGINT kind of capability. So just being close to another satellite, you can kind of use it for military purposes.  

And the other piece besides these large maneuvers, increase in satellites on orbit. There has been widespread jamming and spoofing of GPS signals in and around specifically conflict zones. So think about Ukraine. We’ve seen this explicitly with Russia, but also in the Middle East.  

Commercial satellites are being targeted, and in fact, in many cases, the commercial satellite could know something is happening before the military. They could actually be the indications and warning. 

The other one is we know in unclassified sources and threat assessments that are out there that Russia and China have a laser capability. So they could actually lase a imaging satellite, and that satellite would know that that is happening as well. That would be another indicator that something is happening in the space domain.  

And so Russia’s been very vocal about this and about its intention to consider commercial assets used by the U.S. military as legitimate targets because of this.  

This is why it’s so important to understand the behaviors that these satellites are doing and is it showing intent to do harm, or is it really just for a commercial use? And so you really have to watch that pattern of behavior and what are those satellites actually doing on orbit? 

This is why it is so important to share this information not only at the non-classified level, but also the classified level to commercial operators, especially those that are in service to the US government for military purposes as it may impact their space operations. 

10:03 – 10:14 

I’d like to go back to an example you brought up with the 2022 cyberattack on ViaSat. Can you expand about how that attack offers something of an example of how a program like Orbital Watch would work?  

10:15 – 11:26 

Yes to be more specific, on the Viasat example that happened at the beginning of Russia invading Ukraine, the Viasat satellite experienced that cyberattack that you mentioned. They are part of the Commercial Integration Cell and so I’m sure that they shared this information with the CSpoC the Combined Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Space Force Base, who has the responsibility to execute operational command and control (C2) of space forces to achieve both theater and global objectives. 

And so this is a good example because when Viasat experienced this, it was kind of like an indication warning: something is happening or going to happen. CSpOC would have the responsibility to share this information with EUCOM (the actual Combatant Command responsible for supporting Ukraine. And in this case, the cyber attack was part of the Russians coordinated offense to effect Ukraine’s command and control during the invasion. Now simultaneously, the CSpOC could simultaneously tell other space operators that they can anticipate this kind of action through Orbital Watch so other space operators would know that if they experience a similar attack that it might be intentional and not incidental. 

11:27 – 11:46 

Now, Ma’am, you just reference another information-sharing effort: that being the Commercial Integration Cell. But there are other efforts as well, including the Joint Commercial Operations Cell (JCO) and the Space Warfighting and Analysis Center (Space ISAC). 

What’s the difference between Orbital Watch and some of these other information-sharing programs?

 11:47 – 15:39 

It’s super important to understand the difference between these because it really depends on where you are as a commercial company and where you are participating. 

Now Orbital Watch is this basic service. It’s with the Space Force that are disseminating threat information one way, today, and these are usually members that aren’t part of the Commercial Integration Cell. They don’t have a contract – that DD254 – with the Space Force, so it’s one-way communication.  

So with the JCO. So Joint Commercial Operation cell, so that integrates commercial capabilities into the mission by supporting the protect and defend mission. When you operate through these regional cells they operate 24/7 and they’re staffed globally. Allies participate in it. But the JCO leverages this commercial data in the sensors and analytical services to provide timely, non-classified space domain awareness. 

And what they do is if they see things on orbit then they alert via what we call NOTSO or Notice to Space Operators for high-inter space activity such as these satellite maneuvers we talked about – or space launch. But if you’re part of the JCO this requires training. They have a very specific methodology. You have to onboard with the JCO and you have to do this training. So that’s one. 

The other one is the Commercial Integration Cell and you have to be invited to participate in this and I was part of this organization almost nearly at the beginning. And it actually started with what we call a CRADA. So a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement and so these CRADAs – it’s no money exchanged. 

It’s just an agreement between a company and the Space Force that allows sharing of information and it allowed them to sponsor companies to have access to classified information. Now it’s kind of progressed and so these companies do have DD254s and they can get information.They practice at exercises. They come and participate. They have a person that sits on the floor at the CSpoC that provides cooperative information sharing, but it also requires training. 

And they do contribute to military planning and to the Combatant Commands that are around. So that’s the CIC. You have to be invited. You do training. You can share classified information.  

And then last but not least is the Space ISAC. This is a ‘pay-to-play.’ If you’re a company and you want to share information, you can pay to be a member of the Space ISAC. 

Now they distribute those NOTSOs I talked about from the JCO, which adds more information sharing and concerns about everything that’s happening in the space operational environment. But the Space ISAC also focuses on cyber monitoring. They actually aggregate inputs. They have a 24/7 ops center, and if a commercial operator experiences something, they can report it to the Space ISAC ops center. Then Space-ISAC actually works within the intelligence community, reports it up, and they will try to then disseminate that information to other operators. 

They do have to be careful because sometimes there’s proprietary information in there and so they do have to kind of what I call ‘whitewash’ it, the information – so you don’t know. But that’s the role of the Space-ISAC. 

So first of all, you know, we’ll kind of go back: phase one Orbital Watch: just pushing information out at a non-classified level. JCO you have to have training. It is for space domain awareness specifically what is what’s happening in orbit? 

CIC. You have to be invited to it and you have to be able to have access and do classified information and then Space ISAC – pay to play. You can pay to play to be a member of that organization.

15:40 – 15:52 

To take that a step further – what factors should Space Force leadership consider to make sure that they’re not duplicating these information-sharing programs, but rather reinforcing collaboration between the service and its commercial partners? 

15:53 – 18:30 

So remember, the goal of these data-sharing efforts is to provide a more secure, resilient space infrastructure. So even though the government can’t tell them what to do, the more information you share – people are going to do things that make sense and that are in their interest. They don’t want to collide with the satellite. They don’t want to have a threat and so sharing that information allows them to respond to those evolving threats. 

Some would say there needs to be clear lanes in the road on what each of these efforts should share. But in reality, in Charlie’s opinion, the Space Force can’t overshare. They can’t, especially at the not classified level. Their biggest challenge has been and is removing the classification barriers. Space is still over-classified and some movement has been made, but I would say not enough. As we grow these commercial capabilities, there’s very little places to hide in space.  

I mean, we talked about the JCO. It’s all commercial capability that can look up, have space domain awareness, and so everybody can see it. We need to emphasize that this coordination needs to happen and needs to be integrated among the government, commercial and Allied partners to remove the unnecessary classification barriers.  

I did hear recently the same comment at the AFA conference. There was an international panel and we need to remove some of these barriers to be able to share information not just with our commercial partners, but with our Allied partners as well. 

And the other thing I like to bring up here is: this is a great effort by the Space Force, but there’s always been other organizations for many years that have been sharing what’s going on in the space operational environment.  

CSIS, Center for Strategic and International Studies, CASI, China Aerospace Studies Institute, ISR Integrity puts out a I think it’s bi weekly something they call Integrity Flash. You can go look it up and get on their website and get specific information about what’s going on in the space environment from a threat perspective.  

DIA Space Threat Assessment, the Secure World Foundation does a Global Counterspace Capabilities Report, and DNI actually does an annual threat assessment as well that includes space. So there’s a lot of information out there already at the unclassified level. 

But it does take expertise to be able to read the information and understand what’s going on. This effort with the Space Force, with Orbital Watch, is trying to get it to a place where everybody can understand really what’s going on in the space environment.

18:31 – 18:41 

Now with that in mind, what are some of the current challenges that need to be overcome or other risks to be considered when it comes to implementing a program like Orbital Watch, effectively? 

18:42 – 21:21 

Yes. So this is not a small endeavor. We kind of talked about. This is going to be a huge undertaking by the Space Force in order to do this. So first they need to establish how to give a commercial partner access that doesn’t require them to have a contract.  

Now, let’s step back for a minute. So with sharing classified information is not easy. You have to be on a secure line. You have to be in a specific place. You have to have the need to know and you have to have those clearances. 

This is, in my opinion, going to be key: who are they going to share this information with and who can they get that done?  

So recently there was actually a DARPA program called BRIDGES, and they provided 19 companies clearances without having that contract and very successful, it was launched to solve the dilemma of why can we not share information with these companies?  

And it gave them that clearance so that they could then continue to produce the technology that they were doing and understand the ‘why’ behind it. What capability is it going to bring to the warfighter? It did identify that this program is a great start to what the Space Force needs to do.  

They’re actually working with the Commercial Space Office (COMSO) to expand this, but my concern is scalability. How are they going to be able to scale this? They talked about 900 vendors for sending out this information. How are you going to rack and stack who gets first and who’s last?  

So we talked about how getting the clearances is one thing, but actually having the facility to share that information is also important. So they do that normally in these facilities, especially at the higher classification levels in a place called a SCIF. Not every company is going to have the money to build their own SCIF and so you need a way to be able to share that information [and] have it accessible. And what I will say on that is there are companies that because they saw this as a pain point, companies don’t have the money in order to invest in this. 

So they’ve actually started basically where you can buy space, rent space at a SCIF for your company. So you don’t actually have to do that huge investment that will be helpful and the Space Force should consider this. Maybe it’s a way to share that information in a better way. So think about if you have a portal, you’re able to walk into a secure facility and actually log on and get this information. 

And maybe there’s a person on the other end that, Hey, you have a little chat and you can go, Hey, I have some information, or I want to be able to ask you a question about something that was shared, but you got to have those facilities in order to be able to do that to make sure the information is secure.

21:22 – 21:45 

On this concern for the scalability issue: you mentioned that there’s already 900 vendors receiving unclassified information in phase one of Orbital Watch. 

At the same time, we’re continuing to see unprecedented growth in a space economy that is further projected to reach $1.8 trillion by 2035 – so can you elaborate on this challenge within the context of the growing commercial space economy today? 

21:46 – 22:47 

Yeah, the commercial space economy is booming. We’re seeing new entrants every day, and it’s just crazy to me the amount of innovation and people that want to be involved in space. 

And you’re seeing that continually climb. And so when I talk about that 900 number, that’s what the Front Door said, that they sent out to 900 vendors this unclassified threat assessment and so being able to scale that – now, let’s say all 900 don’t have to be U.S. companies either. There could be Allied companies in there that are also interested in providing those capabilities. 

But to be able to scale that and provide those clearances, they’re going to have to decide quickly which capabilities do I want to continue to have this innovation and continue to build? They’re probably going to be the first ones: being able to scale this at a large number like 900. It’s going to be tough, and there’s going to be some, in Charlie’s terms, ‘haves and have nots.’ 

22:48 – 22:52 

And going back to the Front Door program – why is it appropriate for Orbital Watch to be part of that effort? 

22:53 – 24:23 

So the Front Door program, it really allows commercial companies. It’s a one stop shop. If you want to do business with the Space Force and you’re a company and you have an innovative idea, it’s really important for space startup companies to be able to come in and go, ‘Hey, I have this neat, innovative idea. I want to tell you about it and how it can help you.’  

And so it gives them a method, a way to be able to register with the Space Force. And then the Front Door actually takes that information. They read it and they take the ones that they think really could apply those capabilities and help the Space Force. 

And they basically go and share this information with the PEOs. The PEOs are trying to build the programs and get the capabilities to the warfighter as quickly as they can and the Front Door is used as that one stop shop. That clearinghouse.  

So I think it’s because they do have this capability to basically have the rolodex and the clearinghouse for industry and make sure that then they are connected and I know a lot of the PEOs take briefings from some of these companies and go, ‘Yes, this is how I can use it.’  

Now, what I will say is, I also know that there are companies that don’t have those clearances, and they are developing capabilities that could help on the classified side. So that’s why I think this program is so important to get to that classified level, because they will now be able to share that information and have those more meaningful conversations.  

24:24 – 24:43 

We’ve also seen a series of strategy documents get released during the tenure of General B. Chance Saltzman – the Space Force’s Chief of Space Operations. Namely, the DOD Commercial Space Integration Strategy and the Space Force’s Commercial Space Strategy. 

In what ways does the Orbital Watch program align with these strategy documents? 

24:44 – 26:31 

Orbital Watch aligns with both of those documents. I’ve heard General Saltzman say in his remarks at AMOS and also in his remarks at the AFA conference recently, that he can’t do it without those partnerships. In the DoD strategy, it actually outlined department wide guidance on policy and procedures, whereas in the Space Force one, it really focused on the service specific use cases, and it needs to foster that effective collaboration and integration between government and industry.  

By sharing the unclassified threat information – it allows these commercial partners to build and operate secure, resilient space systems that are integrated into these national security architectures.  

So let’s be clear. There are commercial space satellites that are used by our military today and so fostering this rapid response will ensure that the warfighters have what they need based on the threats that we’re seeing.  

I also believe that it’s really about situational awareness. Industry needs to understand what is going on in the space environment if they are going to support government, US and our Allies, and it is making sure that the commercial providers become active players in our national defense.  

And it is about two-way sharing. We talked about commercial maybe being that first line of defense. They’re going to get the indications and warning that something’s happening and so they need to be able to have a mechanism to be able to share that information. And so I really believe Orbital Watch operationalizes the policies and objectives found in these strategies. And it creates a platform for real-time risk awareness and being able to share secure information and it also sets the new standards for commercial integration in the National Space Security Strategy.

26:32 – 26:42 

And say the Space Force implements both phases of the Orbital Watch program effectively – what advantages will this ultimately bring to the Space Force and its industry partners?  

26:43 – 28:53 

I see four advantages. The first one is enhanced national security and space advantage. 

General Saltzman talked about that sustained partnership that he needs with industry is crucial for that US to maintain its edge in space, but it’s also essential for both national security and how you and I actually live on Earth today. That’s how we get access. It’s how we go to the bank teller. It’s how we get gas in our car and so space isn’t just there for a warfighting perspective. It’s also there to support us here on Earth every day and so super important for space operators. They need to be able to operate freely and provide those services.  

But the US has to also know that the threat is increased – if the need arises. They need to be able to take action where needed and we are seeing that increase, as we already talked about, right, with China and accelerating its efforts. So that’s number one.  

Two is the integration of those commercial capabilities. Commercial gets to decide whether it’s going to maneuver or not based on a threat that it has, you still need to be able to share that information. 

And if you have that collaboration and now the government knows that, hey, this commercial asset is or isn’t going to maneuver, they can then make better decisions based on that. So you have to be able to integrate those commercial capabilities.  

And that actually improves the third one which is operational effectiveness. So commercial partners can fill key mission gaps, especially like satellite communication, imagery and the Space Force has really moved to this model of ‘buy before you build it.’ Commercial is filling that gap and bringing those additional capabilities that they need.  

And then lastly is clear role distinction. So government will retain control over inherently government missions such as defensive and offensive space control. But where they can include commercial capabilities, it really alleviates the government from having to do that for their mission – being able to do those four things are kind of the advantages that I see for the Space Force today.

28:54 – 29:11 

Thank you, Ma’am. Now I’d like to take a moment and look back on the last time you joined us on The Elara Edge – when we discussed the Traffic Coordination System for Space, otherwise known as TraCSS. How might a program like TraCSS benefit from, or if at all, collaborate with something like the Orbital Watch program?  

29:12 – 31:56 

TraCCS is for civil space safety and we kind of talked about that in the earlier podcast. It just provides that positional data, making sure that space operators are safe in space, almost like air traffic control – so they don’t collide. 

Now, previously I mentioned the difference between that positional data and threat information and we kind of went through that. But let’s reiterate it here for those that didn’t have that opportunity: positional data is where that satellite is in space. It’s where it is. It doesn’t tell me anything about that satellite. Like what does it do? What is its function? 

And so the threat information is going to not only include that positional data, but it’s going to provide an assessment of that intent – based on the capabilities of that satellite. So in other words, why is that satellite maneuvering to a new location and why would that be a threat to a commercial satellite. So it really provides the ‘so what?’ 

So that’s kind of the difference between what TraCSS – very positional [and] what Orbital Watch is trying to do with providing that so what? Now TraCSS in the future I think could ensure based on what they’re doing – sharing that positional data with the Space Force. They might have other data sources actually that Space Force doesn’t have because they’re buying commercial data, and that could be taken into account for those threat assessments. 

And what they would inform space operators of is maybe debris-causing events. Now this could be a collision. Two satellites collided. I have to tell you about the debris that’s there flying in space. It could be nothing nefarious happened. Two satellites didn’t collide, but something caused some debris. And then it could be an offensive action, like, say, an ASAT missile gets launched and it actually hits a satellite, which has happened in the past. China has done it, Russia has done it. India has done it. Blown up their own satellite and it’s caused debris. A lot of the debris is still up there in space. 

So those could be things that TraCSS does. But for these unclassified threat assessment, I could imagine the Office of Space Commerce kind of putting a hot button, as I would call it, right on TraCSS to help disseminate that information. But what I don’t see is the Office of Space Commerce playing a role in producing these threat assessments. That’s not their mission. 

Their mission, based on the SPD-3, is to really do space safety, not from a threat perspective. That’s the Space Force’s mission. And they provide that to make sure that space capabilities are provided to the joint force. And so I do see the joint force, like U.S. Space Command, its mission is to deter aggression, defend national interests, which could actually be commercial and civil satellites. They need to maybe defend those national interests, and when necessary, they’re going to defeat those threats.

31:57 – 32:08 

And then as a partner with Elara Nova, how can the strategic advisory firm serve as a facilitator between the Space Force and industry partners seeking to participate in programs like Orbital Watch? 

32:09 – 33:30 

I believe Elara Nova can act as a critical bridge between the Space Force and the commercial partners by advocating for and enabling this improved data-sharing framework, and it considers both current operational needs and based on the historical classification challenge we have had. I see Elara Nova as a facilitator for data-sharing and understanding that collaboration.  

We can help advise companies in order to make sure that they get registered with the Space Force Front Door and what it might take to actually navigate that facility clearance and the personnel clearance requirements and we can help guide them to be responsible space operators.  

Now, as we work with maybe some new entrants to the space economy, those space operators need to realize that there is norms of behavior that need to be followed as a space operator and so we can help educate them on that.  

The other one is on policy advocacy. I know Elara Nova does a lot of this already. But we can continue to advocate and support these initiatives and really to reduce that over classification. And it’s really important to do that so that we can share information not only with our Allies, right? Who we are operating [with] day in and day out, but also with our commercial partners that we’re doing this with.

33:31 – 34:07 

This has been an episode of The Elara Edge. As a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space and aeronautical domains, Elara Nova is your source for expertise and guidance in national security. 

If you liked what you heard today, please subscribe to our channel and leave us a rating. Music for this podcast was created by Patrick Watkins of PW Audio. This episode was edited and produced by Regia Multimedia Services. I’m your host, Scott King, and join us next time at the Elara Edge.

Orbital Watch to Enable Sharing of Classified Threat Information

Space Force Front Door Facilitating Engagement Across Commercial Space Industry

An increasingly congested and contested space domain means that commercial space companies must now protect their on-orbit systems from a variety of threats. Today’s space operators must not only account for incidental collisions with space debris, but also prepare for a series of counterspace threats ranging from cyber and electronic warfare attacks to kinetic strikes. Meanwhile, the inherently dual-use nature of space systems, which often support both national security and economic purposes, further reinforces the imperative that the United States Space Force communicates with its industry partners to ensure resiliency of our nation’s space capabilities. Now a new Space Force program, Orbital Watch, aims to facilitate greater information-sharing of both classified and unclassified threats with industry partners.  

“Orbital Watch is an initiative to communicate threat information with commercial vendors to help them manage risks to their on-orbit assets, ” said Elara Nova partner Col (Ret) Charlie McGillis, the former Director of Intelligence at 14^th Air Force (Space). “The first phase of the program is a one-way communication channel where a commercial company can register to receive unclassified threat information. But this first phase doesn’t allow vendors to ask questions about – or contribute to – that threat assessment. So in phase two, Orbital Watch will have a secure ‘Commercial Portal’ that will further enable a two-way flow of classified information where commercial providers can not only ask those follow-up questions, but actually share threat information that they’re seeing with the Space Force.” 

Originally announced in April, Orbital Watch already disseminated an unclassified threat fact sheet to over 900 companies in phase one. But as the threat environment rapidly advances, so too does the imperative for the Space Force and its industry partners to reach phase two of the program. That’s why Space Force officials recently announced a “Tiger Team” that is collaborating with space industry stakeholders to develop the phase two Commercial Portal to facilitate secure, two-way information-sharing of classified threats. 

“If industry partners are going to support the U.S. government and our Allies, they need to understand what is going on in the space environment,” McGillis said. “At the same time, commercial space companies can also warn the Space Force if an attack is happening to their systems. But they need a mechanism to share that information and phase two of the Orbital Watch program will be that mechanism.” 

A Lesson Learned from a Real-World Attack 

The need for a program like Orbital Watch was recognized in part by Russia’s cyberattack against ViaSat’s KA-SAT satellite communications network at the start of its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The cyberattack, deployed as a “denial-of-service” attack one hour before the invasion, essentially overwhelmed the commercial network the Ukrainian army relied on to communicate.

But according to the CyberPeace Institute, the cyberattack also affected commercial companies, as well. A German energy company lost access to over 5,800 wind turbines and a French internet service provider’s nearly 9,000 subscribers lost service. Another roughly 13,000 internet users also lost access across Europe in Hungary, Greece, Italy and Poland, as well. The wide-ranging effect of the cyberattack demonstrates the dual-use nature of satellites for not only military, but also commercial purposes.   

“When Viasat’s satellites experienced jamming at the start of the invasion, that provided an early indication or warning that something nefarious was happening,” McGillis said.  “Even though ViaSat is a member of the Commercial Integration Cell, a program like Orbital Watch would disseminate this information to a far broader audience of commercial space operators informing them of the attack so that any jamming they experience might not be incidental.” 

Now, threats in space are continuing to evolve. Dynamic space operations rely on capabilities like rapid and unpredictable maneuverability, advanced propulsion, on-orbit re-fueling, modular upgrades and enhanced command and control. Chinese satellites have been seen conducting complex “dogfighting” maneuvers in low Earth orbit, with groups of satellites spiraling, braking and repositioning around each other and other nations’ satellites to practice counterspace tactics.  

“China maneuvered two satellites, the Shijan-21 and Shijan-25, into extremely close proximity to each other in what was probably a satellite refueling experiment in GEO,” McGillis said. “Then their TJ-S series of experimental spacecraft conducted a similar rendezvous and proximity operation near a U.S. intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance satellite. China might say these capabilities are intended to serve an economic purpose, but these capabilities can certainly be modified to serve a counterspace purpose as well.” 

Information-Sharing Opportunities and Challenges  

In response to this heightened threat environment in space, Orbital Watch is just one of the latest programs the Space Force is using to share threat information with commercial space providers. Other programs include the Joint Commercial Operation Cell (JCO) and the Commercial Integration Cell (CIC). Further, the USSF collaborates closely with the commercially driven Space Information and Warfighting Analysis Center (Space ISAC) to share information.   

While each program serves a unique purpose, all together they present a wide-ranging set of solutions to facilitate better information-sharing. 

“Phase one of Orbital Watch is providing a basic, one-way sharing of unclassified threat information with commercial space companies,” McGillis said. “The JCO goes one step further, requiring training to receive unclassified space domain awareness information for companies supporting national security space missions. Then there’s the CIC, which is an invite-only opportunity for commercial companies already on-contract with the Space Force to receive classified threat information as they support Combatant Commands. Meanwhile, the Space ISAC is a ‘pay-to-play’ model where member companies can provide or receive sensitive, but unclassified information with each other.” 

But when the secure Commercial Portal is rolled out in phase two of Orbital Watch, it will provide the most direct and comprehensive platform for companies to engage the Space Force about classified threats. Until it is fully implemented, however, a series of challenges still need to be overcome. 

“Sharing classified information is not easy: you have to be on a secure line, in a specific place and have relevant security clearances,” McGillis said. “Not all vendors can store that classified information, either – that requires special permissions. So the Space Force needs to figure out how to communicate threat information with commercial space operators who don’t have an existing DD254 contract, which essentially grants a company’s access to classified information.” 

But once done effectively, Orbital Watch will bring about four distinct advantages for the Space Force, according to McGillis. 

“The first advantage is enhanced national security and space capabilities, because sustained partnerships with industry is crucial for the U.S to maintain its edge in space for both national security and economic purposes. The second advantage is greater commercial integration into national security space architectures, which will directly improve the third advantage of increasing the overall operational effectiveness of those architectures. Lastly, the fourth advantage is a clear role distinction between government-controlled missions and commercial-supported missions.” 

Orbital Watch Demonstrates Strategy in Action 

Orbital Watch is being stood up through Space System Command’s (SSC) Front Door program, which was first created in 2023 as a means for commercial space companies to initiate contact with SSC about their capability needs. Now, after more than 14,000 companies have engaged SSC through this effort, Front Door has been re-launched as Space Force Front Door to serve as the industry’s first point of contact across the entire service, as well.  

“The Front Door program is a one-stop shop for commercial space companies that want to do business with the Space Force,” said McGillis. “It’s appropriate for Orbital Watch to be part of the Front Door because they have the rolodex of space companies. Some of these companies may not have classified security clearances yet, but are developing capabilities that could still support the Space Force on classified missions. That’s why it’s important to get Orbital Watch to a phase two classified level, which will enable better information-sharing and more meaningful conversations.” 

Orbital Watch, and the broader Front Door initiative, further reflects the revitalized effort by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Space Force to better integrate with its industry partners – as signaled in the DOD’s Commercial Space Integration Strategy and the Space Force’s Commercial Space Strategy. 

“Orbital Watch aligns with both strategies,” McGillis said. “General Saltzman frequently says he can’t accomplish his mission without the commercial partnerships outlined in the DOD strategy, whereas the Space Force strategy focuses on service-specific use cases to foster effective collaboration and integration between government and industry through unclassified threat information-sharing. Orbital Watch will allow these commercial partners to integrate and operate their secure, resilient space systems into our national security space architectures.” 

Now, as more and more companies look to enter the projected $1.8 trillion space economy, the Front Door and Orbital Watch programs will also have to grow. That’s where Elara Nova, with its portfolio of military and commercial space experts, can help established and emerging space companies better engage the Space Force.  

“Elara Nova can act as a critical bridge between the Space Force and the commercial partners by enabling this improved data sharing framework, particularly considering current operational needs and the historical challenge with classification in the space domain,” McGillis said. “It’s important for the Space Force to share threat information with our commercial partners. So Elara Nova can help companies navigate the security clearance process so they can become responsible space operators in support of Space Force missions.” 

Elara Nova is a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space and aeronautics domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/.