Episode 44: Air Force Engages Industry for New Air Mobility Solutions

The Elara Edge

Host: Scott King (SK) 

SME: Gen (Ret) Jackie Van Ovost, Senior Principal Advisor at Elara Nova (JVO) 

Lt Gen (Ret) Rick Moore, Executive Partner at Elara Nova (RM)  

Lt Gen (Ret) Ty Thomas, Executive Partner at Elara Nova (TT) 

00:02 – 01:27 

For over 75 years, the United States Air Force has been able to deploy and sustain forces at a time and place of its choosing, but a series of converging challenges have undermined that ability. Key mobility platforms like the C-5 and C-17 are aging, parts are harder to come by and the long legs required to cover the Pacific theater consume flight hours faster, shortening the time between maintenance cycles. Meanwhile, integrating new capabilities to outpace an accelerating threat demands additional downtime the fleet can ill afford. 

In response, the Air Force has initiated two efforts set against ambitious timelines. In June, the Air Force published a Request for Information to acquire a Next-Generation Airlift (or NGAL) platform to replace both the C-5 and C-17. At the same time, the Air Force is putting funds toward a new research and development program, Large Aircraft Survivability Systems (or LASS) to equip airlifters and aerial refuelers with their own defensive weapon systems. 

Welcome to The Elara Edge! We have three guests today, here to discuss these efforts to revitalize and modernize the Air Force’s mobility fleet. First, we have retired General Jackie Van Ovost, a Senior Principal Advisor at Elara Nova and the former Commander of Air Force Mobility Command and U.S. Transportation Command. 

Ma’am, welcome to the show!

01:27 – 01:29  

(JVO): Thanks. Great to be here. 

01:29 – 01:41 

(SK): Also joining us is retired Lieutenant General Rick Moore. Now an Executive Partner at Elara Nova, General Moore retired as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs at U.S. Air Force Headquarters.  

Sir, welcome to the show! 

01:42 – 01:43 

(RM): Thanks, Scott. Appreciate the invite.  

01:44 – 01:59 

(SK): And then we have retired Lieutenant General Jon “Ty” Thomas. General Thomas is also an Executive Partner at Elara Nova, and previously served as the Deputy Commander of Air Mobility Command and Pacific Air Forces.  

Sir, thanks for taking the time to join us today! 

02:00 – 02:01 

(TT): Happy to be here, Scott.  

02:02 – 02:22 

(SK): Let’s start today’s discussion with the Air Force’s RFI for a Next Generation Airlift platform, or NGAL. The primary mobility platforms the Air Force uses for its airlift mission is currently the C-5 and C-17.  

But what is the current status of those airlifters? And how has the threat landscape evolved to prompt the Air Force to put forward this RFI?

02:23 – 03:37 

(RM): Yeah. So the C-5M fleet is a little bit challenged these days. The mission capable rate is in the high 30s. Right now, it’s about 37%. Without giving a specific number, the plans call for something dramatically higher than that, which means that the amount of C-5 capability and capacity that TRANSCOM counts on – it’s not there. 

The C-17 fleet is faring a pretty good bit better. The C-17 MC rate is in the mid 70s. Right now it’s about 75%. That’s down about 7% from pre-COVID. And the C-17 MC rate seems to kind of be drifting down by about 1% a year. As the fleet ages, more parts get obsolete, it becomes more difficult to keep the supply chain intact as just technology leaves the C-17 behind. 

So the plan from Air Mobility Command that you see in the Request for Information is for a single airplane to replace both of those. The C-5 replacements will start in about 2050, and the C-17 replacements should finish by about 2075. The plan is to have Next Gen Airlifter ready to fly by 2038, and initial operational capability by 2041. 

That is quite far away if you consider that the C-5 now are languishing in the high 30s for mission capable rate. 

03:38 – 04:57 

(JVO): When we think about our ability to maneuver anywhere in the world and sustain operations for the joint force, the first thing you think about is air mobility. 

Now, we have a lot of great other modal capabilities with sea and land. But I tell you, when I think about our most consequential theater in the Pacific, it is an air and sea fight. And we do not have the capabilities for airfields and road networks and even sea networks, if you will, and river networks that we had even in Europe. 

So we cannot execute our national strategy without this capability. So it is critical that we spend the time to analyze what is the real requirement of the transformed force for maneuver and sustainment, and how are we going to supply that?

There are some great movement trying to get some funding for parts and sustainment to resurrect these airplanes and get them higher. But the bottom line is: this is the consequence of an aging fleet, the consequence of not recapping early and the consequence of old technology. 

We’ll have an opportunity to talk about software and software defined and agile updates. But when we look at the declining MC rates, it is way too far out there. We just do not have a coherent strategy to get us, even if we can meet these accelerated timelines for the Next Generation Airlift.  

04:58 – 05:35 

(RM): Yeah and Scott you asked about how the threat landscape has evolved and how that impacts the air mobility fleet. We’ve been at war in the desert for 35 years now. We have not yet had to contend with contested lines of logistics. We’ve been able to move everything to and through Europe and on to the Middle East without our supply lines being contested. 

That will almost assuredly not be the case in the event we find ourselves in conflict in the Pacific. The air mobility fleet that we have today is designed to protect itself from some threats, but its ability to to handle itself with truly contested supply supply lines – it’s just not there. 

05:36 – 05:53 

(TT): Scott, the one thought that I would add that comes to mind is so we remember our 21st chief of staff who used to talk about mobility as like oxygen. When you’re breathing, it’s there and you never even think about it until you don’t have it and then that’s all you think about. That’s what mobility is for and what it does.  

05:54 – 06:01 

(SK): And so how will the NGAL, as a single platform, be a solution for replacing both the C-5 and C-17? 

06:02 – 07:00 

(RM): I think you’re going to find that a single platform to replace the C-17 and the C-5 is likely to look a lot more like a C-17 than a C-5. And if you consider the distances that we have to operate over in the Pacific, the RFI called for just a marginal increase in range over the C-17. Then I think when you start looking at numbers: 274 airplanes is about what the RFI envisions to replace an equal-sized fleet, 222 C-17s and 52 C-5s. 

I think you’re going to be challenged with an airplane with a similar cargo box to the C-17. Marginally more range to equal what we have in the two fleets today. The one thing that is the equalizer is the mission capable rate of the C-5. If you can have an airplane with a high mission capable rate, you can probably be okay there. 

But the Pacific is a remarkably challenging environment to operate in. There are a few alternates. The legs are really, really long and the requirement for lift is really high.

07:01 – 08:19 

(JVO): Can I add that US TRANSCOM does something called a Mobility Capability Requirement Study (MCRS), and that is being refreshed right now. And some of these requirements from the RFI look a lot like MCRS-16 in 2016. 

You’re at 160,000 pounds, which is roughly when you think about maxing out a pallet at 10,000 pounds. You know, it’s 16 pounds pallets. C-17 has 18 and that 2500 nautical mile unrefueled range. And as we refresh the MCRS, we have to have a better understanding of what the joint force is going to be using. The entire joint force is transforming to do distributed operations. 

So the 160,000 and the double-wide sounds like heavy armor. And we just need to make sure that as we’re moving munitions, moving drones and other things, that we’re actually creating a box and a capability that’s going to move that most effectively and provide options to the Combatant Commander. So I am looking forward to the MCRS as it develops out – and that’s a classified study. 

But there should be some work done with industry to understand what the capabilities are and what the services to see what they’re developing and their concepts of operations out into the future.  

08:20 – 08:37 

(SK): Thank you, Ma’am. Now at the time of the RFI’s release, Air Force leaders indicated an opennes to having NGAL as a crewed or uncrewed platform. Or in other words, fully autonomous.  

What are some of the advantages and disadvantages of using autonomous technologies for the airlift mission? 

08:38 – 09:39 

(JVO): From the COCOM perspective, I would say that autonomous capabilities are part of the mobility enterprise and must be.  

It gives us an option in the fight to make a decision, like if this is optionally crewed to to not use a crew going forward for a particular hazard that’s out there. That said, these are not attritable airplanes, so we still have to have some defensive capability and the C2 architecture to support even autonomous airplanes like NGAL at that level is totally separate when you’re talking about something that’s moving 1,000 pounds. 

But when you’re looking at NGAL, it’s really not meant to be attritable. So it does provide options. And we want to be able to get an airplane into a higher threat region without and do the mission when it makes sense from an autonomous standpoint. 

Certainly, of course additional reps and sets. You could fly the airplane longer. You don’t have the crew. Not only are you not concerned about crew safety, but I’m not concerned about running them dry or running on a crew duty day. So you have more use out of it, but you want to use it in that capability when it makes the most sense. 

09:40 – 10:26 

(TT): Yeah, it doesn’t surprise me that they’re calling for that in the RFI. I mean, to some extent, though, especially the term optional, it almost puts you in the worst of all worlds in the sense that you’ve got to make design provisions for a full up crew, and that costs you weight, that costs you payload, that costs you fuel, costs you all kinds of things in the design of the aircraft while also needing to provision for the aircraft to operate autonomously with the digital backbone and all of the things that we have now with modern aircraft, it you should be able to insert that in.  

But to be able to have both is going to increase the cost of the aircraft. And we should, carefully examine: do we need to have all that optionality? Industry will come back and say this is how you can do it. Ultimately it’s going to become a design requirement or not, and then that’ll drive trade-offs that occur.

10:27 – 11:06 

(RM): We typically think of grey tails as cargo aircraft. But if you get into competition and then into conflict, gray tails, maybe the only way that you have to get troops all the way forward in the battle and an autonomous cargo aircraft there probably is a pretty fair amount of appetite for that. 

When you start putting people on it and you start talking about moving passengers, even combat troops in an autonomous aircraft, I’m not sure we’re quite there yet that we’re willing to put a couple hundred folks on an airplane and send them off into the night without some folks in the cockpit that can recover if something goes wrong.  

If nothing goes wrong, everything’s fine. But as soon as something does, then you have the potential for a very serious problem.  

11:07 – 11:19 

(SK): And General Thomas, given the cost challenges you mentioned, can you walk us through how an innovative concept like NGAL could be realistically funded and sustained – particularly in a congressional environment where continuing resolutions have become the norm? 

11:20 – 13:42 

(TT): Well, maybe I’ll build it up this way and just kind of get to a number. And I’ll start with Rick did a great job of laying out what’s in the recapitalization memo. Kind of the dates, key milestones at 2038, 2041, 2075. So if you look at that and if you just kind of set aside the front end developmental costs, which are consequential and big, but we can come back to that. 

Starting with FY26 dollars, it’s probably an all up cost of an NGAL. I would argue about $350 million. That’s not just the airframe itself. That’s all the spares. That’s ground support equipment, that’s training systems. All the things to actually like this is a machine that’s a fielded capability, that’s got all the things that are necessary to last for the decades that we’re going to expect to do it. 

Okay. So maybe you get a couple aircraft out of the developmental program and then your first squadron, let’s say Jackie’s successor says IOC is going to be one squadron of 12 airplanes. Okay. So you get to that at 2041. And then basically you’re making those airplanes all the way through about 2068 or so. And it’s about ten airplanes a year.  

So it’s $3.5 billion FY26 a year. This is a $100 billion aircraft production program just in and of itself. If you push the developmental cost there in front of it, I venture it’s probably a $20 billion developmental program. If this is a full clean sheet design, not based on any commercial derivative or a modification of existing military assets. 

And then you go back to what is life like in building a program and then defending it with OSD and then getting it over through the gates and the Hill to end up in an appropriation. This is going to scream having a multi-year. That would be the only way that you can have assurance that a program of this length, when it’s recapping at only ten airplanes a year is going to have the continuity that it requires. 

And actually, if I’m in industry, ten airplanes a year is a really low rate. 12 airplanes minimum? Companies that are building tankers right now would like to go from the existing 15 to 18 or 24 because they know the efficiencies on the line that come from the higher production rates. 

So to me, that’s just kind of the basic math. And there’s going to have to be a long  commitment that locks in funds in the Air Force generally doesn’t like to do that if they don’t have to, because you want to maintain that budget flexibility because the programmer always has to create offsets.  

13:43 – 15:12 

(RM): I agree absolutely with Ty’s assessment. An optionally manned aircraft – that’s a marginal cost that you’re talking about. It’s not a question about whether that can fit in the budget. The highest risk for the NGAL program overall is the time when C-5 and C-17s are still flying and NGAL is in development. $20 billion is about what we spent on C-17 development in the late 80s. 

And so development costs could actually be fairly substantially higher than that. Trying to fit all of that in the budget, that’s the highest risk to the program. If you wanted to de-risk the program, you would look outside the Air Force to see what kind of capacity absorbers are out there, so that you could start to bring the C-5 fleet down before NGAL starts to deliver, or certainly not a one-for-one tail replacement. 

If the requirement is that NGAL and C-5 and then C-17 have to shake hands with each other one-for-one replacement, I think there’s great risk that that won’t even fit in the budget. You’ve got to find a way to bring down that spike of non-recurring engineering, NRE and C-17 ops and C-5 ops. 

And if you’re going to start to bring the C-5 fleet down, we spend about a billion and a quarter dollars a year on C-5s. The real money is in the depot. It’s not in the airplanes. So what you have to do is figure out how you can let the fleet degrade gracefully without a depot, and let that be a shock absorber for the NRE for NGAL. 

Then you have to use outside capacity to fill in the gap. Otherwise, I’m not convinced that NGAL actually fits in the Air Force budget.

15:13 – 16:59 

(JVO): Absolutely, spot on for both of them. That bridge strategy is critical. There is no funding to bring the C-5 back up to where it needs to be. That really should be critically looked at. And what commercial capability is out there? What are we actually using the airplanes for?  

As we remember during Afghanistan, we really focused on the C-17 in theater, and we use the C-5 around the globe to clean up issues. It performed well, but it still didn’t perform at the level that we had expected after we did that major modification to the airplanes, we made the revised C-5M. 

Let me also go back to what Ty talked about with the respect to the acquisition strategy. Yeah, I would say more than 20 billion because of what we’re trying to do here and it is a clean sheet so far. There are some other thoughts about C-17s but pretty much just a clean sheet if you’re going to walk away from a tube and wing. But how we do it right? We all think, oh, it’s the magic button. Is it OTAs or using new acquisition strategies? 

You know, maybe there’s a tweener out there where we can accelerate the development through another strategy. But that would take a handshake with industry certainly, and partnerships and consortiums to probably do that. And then, yes, we expect that when you have a hot production line that you can get efficiencies by accelerating it. 

We see at a smaller level here with munitions and whatnot that we just some of the capacity issues, the materials issues, the second and third tier supplier issues, may be what really stops us from putting out something more than ten a year. And that’s what we absolutely have to do that.  

And I agree a multi-year strategy. And you’re seeing it more with this administration really understanding we have to have a commitment to industry so that they will invest in what it takes, automation, the materials to produce faster so that we can get a better copy – one – and two – reduced risk on the bridge strategy.

17:00 – 17:12 

(SK): Say the Air Force is able to overcome these budgetary challenges and deliver NGAL on these ambitious timelines with all the funding required: what would that NGAL capability look like in a theoretical future fight in the Pacific?  

17:13 – 19:24 

(JVO): The Pacific theater is the most operationally restrictive theater that we deal with. Whereas Europe is land and air, the Pacific is air and sea, and we just do not have the nodes, the multi-modal routes that we’ve defined over the years and years of dealing with NATO and then the logistics depth in Europe, and frankly, even in the Middle East right now, than what we what we have right now in the Pacific. 

So I would say that as we’ve been talking about it as a huge theater. The challenge is not just distance. It is the logistics depth across that theater that really can bite us. And when I think about the 2500 unrefueled distance, certainly you can get from northern Australia to most of the first and second island chain, certainly from Japan down to the first and second chain. 

We start talking about Alaska and Hawaii and the Konas. It’s going to require augmentation by tankers or some sort of a cross-load strategy with our commercial partners. And certainly we’re going to be depending on our allies and partners. They have some of the depth for what they need, but not for a major theater fight and that’s what we really have to be looking hard at. 

So it’s not just an NGAL, it is the mobility enterprise system, which is air, land and sea. And we’re going to have to depend more on intra-theater sealift. So we’d have to resurrect some of the capabilities we have or use as a service with our commercial partners or joint ventures out into the Pacific.   

I’m hoping that the MCRS that TRANSCOM is working on is going to help develop some of those concepts and put pressure on the services to deliver all of those capabilities so that the entire enterprise, which also has to be C2 fuzed in sensors and see the entire picture, that’s air land and sea mobilization capability, that they’re all together so that we can have options to move across different modes to meet the requirements.  

And we’re going to use NGAL for what NGAL can exclusively do, which is that high threat area. And then we’re going to use all the rest of the capabilities so that we can keep NGAL focused on what it does best. 

19:25 – 19:47 

(RM): It’s interesting that the range at 2500 nautical miles, it’s only 100 miles more than the C-17. The question is, does the NGAL design under this RFI drive a tanker requirement that we would like to engineer ourselves out of?  

There could be an opportunity here to reduce the requirement for tankers based on the design of NGAL, but I don’t see that that’s what the RFI intends. 

19:48 – 22:31 

(TT): And I would submit that this is no longer unique to the Pacific, although we’ve traditionally focused on the Pacific and this is in a combat environment: it’s getting off the X. But getting off the X in the CENTCOM AOR is important right now. And getting off the X in Europe is going to be really important if we ever get down to it over there. So there’s part of it in the RFI that gets to an element of getting off the X, which is the ability to upload and download cargo and passengers without any support equipment. So that’s going to have to be a fundamental requirement. So good on the RFI for capturing that. 

There’s a couple of things as I went back through it that puzzled me a little bit. The first one is there’s actually no question that asks about receiver AR capability on the NGAL. Maybe that was intentional. I’m not sure. But I would think that particularly for the Pacific, NGAL is going to need to be able to receive fuel from a tanker. 

There are other mission sets, by the way, where we’ve had to move people across the world or things across the world, and there was no stop between where it started and somewhere in the United States of America. And NGAL is going to need to be able to do that. So I think receiver refueling is maybe a critical miss in the RFI. 

The second one is the RFI talks about defensive systems, but that’s actually one of the most troubling things because it immediately goes to, ‘What are the things that are on the airplane that could handle some kind of engagement, whether it’s a terminal airfield or maybe something in the air?’ But the question I would submit that we need to be asking is: what is the signature management approach of the system? Of the aircraft as a platform and how it interfaces with the system as we have it?  

 There’s lots of ways to manage signature. We have historically struggled with focusing first on the platform and its RF signature in response to an active RF sensor that is merely just one part of it. So maybe we’ll get to that. Maybe that’ll become part of the industry discussions. But because if the opponent never finds you or struggles to find you, they’re not going to necessarily be able to target you. And if we can do that and pull it to the left, we’re going to be winning.  

The last one is a little bit more mundane, and it’s not necessarily related to getting off the X, but I think it’s particularly important going back to the long term: how do you have this system in our Air Force? 

And there was no question about aircrew and maintenance training systems, which will be a critical part. And the OEM has to bring that – it can be followed up and maybe provided to the services itself by somebody else. But putting thought right at the front-end to the air crew and maintenance training systems is going to be an important part of NGAL. 

But going back to the Pacific, we got to get off the X, we got to get off the X everywhere in a time of conflict. And there’s a few things that are worth talking about that aren’t in there.  

22:32 – 23:13 

(SK): During this same period of time, the Air Force has requested and put funding toward a new research and development program, Large Aircraft Survivability Systems, which would explore defensive weapon systems for air-refuelers and airlifters.  

Meanwhile, the House Armed Services Committee has also formally adopted language in the FY 2027 National Defense Authorization Act, requiring the Air Force to report on its plan to field LASS by 2031, explicitly stating Operation Midnight Hammer as proof that air-refuelers require some sort of defense mechanism. 

General Moore, if you wouldn’t mind starting us off with this one, why is the Air Force taking a revitalized approach to “survivability” for these larger aircraft? 

3:14 – 24:06 

(RM): I think it’s particularly important as you start looking at logistics over contested supply lines, you have to make sure that your airlift fleet is survivable. As Jackie said in the first part, these are not going to be attritable aircraft. Every single one of them that’s lost, is the loss of a national treasure. 

And certainly LASS is one way to think about large aircraft survivability. I would also add that one of the things that Air Mobility Command is looking really hard at is the survivability feature is connectivity. One of the things that you can do with a large aircraft is at least let them know where the threat is and what they need to do in order to avoid it and that’s kind of the first step.  

LASS then comes in or large aircraft infrared countermeasures. LARICM on the fleets that we have now, those come in in the event that that doesn’t work. But I think the first step is actually connectivity, so that you don’t get yourself in a situation where you have to use LARICM or LASS.

24:07 – 25:53 

(JVO): Scott, as Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury have shown that tankers and the airlift, tactical and strategic, are all vulnerable to air-to-air and air-to-ground. Obviously, we’ve seen some reports of battle damage out there, so we absolutely have to plan for, as the name Large Aircraft Survivability Systems portends, we actually need systems that are interoperable for defensive, and we need it not to be a single point system. 

It’s got to be much like: this is a kill web with sensors from space and airplanes and effectors that can come from different locations. We have to have a defensive web in layers around both types of airplanes. As Rick mentioned earlier, there is some defensive capability on C-17s, but that’s not the type of weapon that is really the reigning weapon right now. 

So we have to think about kinetic and non-kinetic and layered. And that’s what LASS looks at on the layered side. Ideally, you have CCAs that are out in front or drones that are out in front that are providing a layer for not just a tanker or an airlift, but for all aircraft followed by sensors on board that can see everything that to alert the crew to scram if they have to, or to maneuver to reduce the threat or reduce the signature, followed by electronic warfare capability, followed by a last chance kinetic effector. 

And does that have to come from that airplane? It all depends. But it’s a layered effect to get after the web because these are not single shot issues anymore. This is a complex web multi-domain, and we have to defeat that multi-domain threat both for airlift and tankers. 

25:54 – 27:13 

(TT): Scott the the only thing that I would add as well and it goes back to like thinking of this as a holistic system. And Jackie just laid out a really coherent: what’s it going to take particularly oriented on the high value airborne asset? Because it’s exactly right. It’s just as important for the rivet joints and if it ends up being an E-7 or whatever it is, the various other platforms, but it’s also the rest of the assets in the joint fight. 

So it really got my attention as a mobility airman, actually, when we just became public that there’s a few air-to-air weapons with a stick of 250 nautical miles plus now in our inventory. Red has to respect that. So when red is forced to respect that, just like they’re trying to push us back, that’s pushing them back as well. 

That’s winning for us in large aircraft survivability. You got to have the sensing, you got to be able to close your own kill chain on the red assets. But all of that works together. There’s no sole mobility solution. There’s no sole combat Air Force solution that fits into this. It’s all of it together that counters the red threat, enhances our survivability, lets us do the mission. 

And as long as there’s an Air Force and as a joint force, we’re thinking it through that way, we’ll find the right solution. So LASS is a piece of something that’s really much larger and has to be pulled together all the way through it. 

27:14 – 27:32 

(SK): The Air Force has requested to fund the LASS program to the tune of $508 million, and so far four different industry partners have been contracted to take part in the study. 

But what is the role of industry studies like this, particularly as the Air Force looks to develop novel and innovative capabilities necessary for the future fight?

27:33 – 28:16 

(RM): So we saw with Collaborative Combat Aircraft that the Air Force took a different approach than we’ve taken before. Rather than define a requirement and pass it to industry and ask them to build to the requirement. We asked industry what would be possible if we gave them the opportunity to build CCAs and let them come back with what their thoughts were. 

These industry studies are part of the way we’re letting that happen right now, rather than developing a requirement, which, by the way, invariably leads to technology that’s been available for quite some time. I suppose that’s not always the case, but that tends to be what happens. If we ask industry a question and give them a chance to do some studies and come back with an answer that wasn’t already predefined, the chances that we get something truly innovative are actually pretty high.

28:17 – 29:27 

(JVO): Yeah, I would say that how we used to treat studies and now how we treat studies are really different? A decade and a half ago, we were looking at kinetic effects for defense on large aircraft. But study after study that we didn’t get very far. We didn’t drop a requirement down. We didn’t fund it.  

There was some thought on test for a small weapon, but we never got there. And now, clearly the operations are showing that we have to have it and we need it soon. So when Congress said, ‘Hey, show me a plan, they must have been thinking, ‘You know, I haven’t seen a plan.’ 

Or maybe the briefs that they got that were unsatisfying. And that’s going to add a little pressure to ‘What’s the plan?’ But we have to have resources for the plan. And the amount of resources does not seem like it’s going to be enough for the fleet. And that’s just, I mean, LASS starts with tankers, but it is like you mentioned, this is about all heavy airplanes we need that effect for C-17 as part of the bridge strategy to 2075. You know, in 2040, the multi-domain threat, the kill webs that are out there are very complex and we have got to have a capability by then that addresses the complexity of that web.

29:28 – 30:16 

(TT): Yeah. Scott on that my comment would be 500 million is a drop in the bucket. If you’re talking about fielding some type of endgame effector on the mobility platform, if that’s the number that you end up with, I’d much rather see industry be asked for options to. Rick touched on it and they’re moving out on it with [sic]. But increased connectivity to the platform, increase the situational awareness of the crew as well as the C2 system that’s supporting it, and then manage the signature in ways which are mostly passive. 

You can do that less expensive than hanging things on the airplane that have to go out and go boom. If we approach it maybe in that order, which is increase situational awareness, understanding connectivity and then reduce signatures through passive means, we can make a lot of progress within a smaller budget. 

30:17 – 30:32 

(SK): And to continue on the thread of budget constraints – what opportunities  exist for the Air Force and its industry partners to incorporate or leverage private capital to either facilitate additional funding or offset some of these costs in order to deliver these capabilities into our Airmen’s hands? 

30:33 – 31:38 

(RM): I think probably the most powerful way that that’s happening right now at large scale is the Office of Strategic Capital. And they have the authority to put out something like $250 billion of guaranteed loans. That is, in my opinion, the most profound impact on the requirement for research and development to be funded by the government. 

It still takes time. You can’t rush the engineering and you can’t necessarily buy your way out of it. But what you’re seeing is the current administration. They understand private capital. They understand how to leverage it. It’s important to them. The Dep SecWar has said he would like to see something between one third and two thirds of the development costs of new things that are coming to the department funded by industry. 

When you get into some niche capabilities that aren’t used universally and there’s no commercial application for them, like LASS, you have a little bit more difficulty. But if you’re looking at something like simply airlift capacity, then you can see that there’s applicability outside the DOW you have dual-use capability. And then I think that’s a place where the Office of Strategic Capital can come in and make a really big difference.

31:39 – 32:57 

(JVO): Absolutely. What Rick was saying that the dual use potential for components for airlift and tankers that we can use for efficiency and effectiveness. And for C2, as airlines, they see to their forces. Well, they see in transit visibility of the stuff that’s moving around that they’re moving around. And they’ve been very effective with that.  

And frankly, all the way out to doing autonomous operations and dropping packages, we could learn and use a lot of that to leverage as much of that as possible into the system and leave as minimal as possible for the military requirement. But there’s no doubt the military requirement is not an easy one to address. 

Although when you think about what is different between a C-17 and an F-35 on some of the systems that it uses to understand itself, to sense and whatnot. So there are some components there that we could use from across, not just us, by the way, but our allies and partners who are willing to go there. And then on the allies and partners side, obviously, if we have capability that we need to be interoperable with them.

And that’s just not the airplanes themselves in the C2 piece, but the offload and unload, the minimum MHE or minimum handling equipment, minimum people doing servicing on the ground, but also flat out selling those and being able to scale that way and reduce the unit cost for the aircraft that we’re going to be buying. 

32:58 – 33:37 

(TT): Two words that I think is what attracts private capital. Intellectual property rights. Okay. So if you’re going to make an investment you’ve got to own the rights. The government may have its own unlimited rights, but you’ve got to have the rights to be able to use it as you see fit. And it’s an assumption like Rick made on his first comment that there’s a market out there for you to use that intellectual property, right?

And then the other one is run rate. Okay. So what’s the demand? So out there is a government man that’s going to manifest as a commercial demand that’s going to manifest? But if you’re going to bring capital to bear, you’ve got to know that there is good confidence, not 100%, that you’re going to get a return and a decent return. And if you don’t see it, you’re not going to bring it. Those two. 

33:38 – 34:59 

(RM): We mentioned continuing resolution before, but we didn’t spend too much time on it. But continuing resolution is probably the biggest threat to defense modernization that’s out there. On average, we spend four months out of every year in continuing resolution. Essentially, we’re giving the Chinese four months of head start every single year because we’re waiting for an appropriation to come to the Department of War. It’s truly challenging.  

 First of all, in a time when defense budgets are going up, typically continuing resolution is based on last year’s budget, and usually it’s something like 80% of last year’s budget. But if the budget was accelerating, then you don’t feel any of that acceleration until the continuing resolution is replaced by an appropriation. And continuing resolutions almost always include a provision that there can be no new starts. That means you can’t start a new program, and it also means you can’t transition from research and development into procurement for most programs that are out there, which means you just have to wait until it’s over. 

And this is why I say we’re giving away four months of modernization space every single year. Continuing resolutions also include multiple provisions for things that would be automatic in a normal appropriation cycle that have to be individually approved under the continuing resolution. And it’s just become completely commonplace. But it is a dramatic damper on the ability to move quickly with respect to defense modernization. 

35:00 – 35:10 

(SK): And what are some of the challenges that industry leaders might be facing that the U.S. government might not be aware of? And in what ways should the government be engaging those industry partners to get in front of those seen or unseen hurdles? 

35:11 – 36:03 

(RM): I think with NGAL, a particular hurdle for industry is going to be the timeline that we think this is going to happen on. I think having a first flight by 2038, the RFI is on the street in FY26, but there’s not even money for analysis of alternatives in 26. There is $8.9 million in 27 if it makes it through the appropriations process. After a continuing resolution, because it’s new money.  

But I mean, just if you look at what it takes to actually get things like this moving, I don’t see that there’s going to be a first flight by 2038. I don’t see that industry can cross that rubicon. If we were doing a commercial derivative, that would still be challenging to meet. I don’t see with a fresh design, a clean sheet design that there’s any way that’s going to happen.  

With LASS, it’s great that the House asked for a plan to put this in place by 2031. I just don’t see that. I don’t see that being feasible. I don’t see that it can happen that quickly. I don’t think industry can get over that hurdle. 

36:03 – 37:33 

(TT): There’s either some assumption on the part of the writers of the RFI and the recapitalization memo that we don’t know, or there’s a little pixie dust laid in there, and it’s probably the latter. What I would add on this one is particular to NGAL.  

If you go on the website the Sam.gov and there’s industry questions and one of the industry questions was about airworthiness and certification and what I would offer to industry and to the Air Force as well is that: unless you must, like there’s no alternative unless to get civil certification. Don’t. Don’t attempt it. The reason why is not because anybody on either side is necessarily so much better than one or the other. The incentives are different.  

So for the FAA, for our civil regulatory authority, their incentives are for safety. So is ours on the military. But on the military, there are also other incentives, other mission imperatives that that airworthiness authority has to take into account. And so what you end up getting is it just is simply a different approach. 

Neither one is right nor wrong. But if you are building a machine to go to the places and do the things that we’ve talked about in this call – that calls for military airworthiness. Unless you’re starting with a civil already type certified design. And I can just tell you a little bit about this, because right now I’m in a world where we’re flying a military designed aircraft with no type certification and attempting to have a civil airworthiness certificate. 

This is not easy, so I would suggest not attempting to do it from the very beginning unless you have to. 

37:34 – 38:51 

(JVO): Well taken, right? I’ve been in that world as well, that if you do propose something that for the military and you can get data off of that for future FAA certification for civilian cargo or passenger movement or using the airplanes for something else, then there may be a lot of data, but that has to be mapped out early. 

And so I’m hoping that digital twinning will show the difference against the FAA certification requirements versus what we’re trying to do in the mil-standard to support safe military operations.  

I’d also add that requirements change. I have yet to see a large airplane that didn’t have some requirements change. Even in the B-21. There may be some requirements changes there. And it’s been very successful, don’t get me wrong, but we don’t yet have an updated what the joint force needs given the environment, how we’re going to fight, which is really radically different than what we did even 15 years ago. 

So I would look to see and partner with TRANSCOM on the MCRS and the services to try to get a better understanding of how we’re doing it. We’ve published things on distributed operations, but what’s the final thing that we’re trying to do? And work with us on that and focus those industry studies on the areas that are the deltas that they’re out there.

38:52 – 39:04 

(SK): Now, we’ve discussed two separate, but tangential efforts today in NGAL and LASS, both of which have pretty ambitious timelines set against them.  

What do you see as the common thread that ties these two efforts together? 

39:05 – 40:11 

(JVO): So let me just start at the strategic level. These are not platform programs per se. I talked about the enterprise. They are real statement and an urgency associated with this because we want to maintain the ability to deploy and sustain forces around the globe at a time and place of our choosing. 

We have been doing that for 75 years and we’ve not had an issue. We now have an issue. The environment has changed. And this is not a future problem. This is a today problem. That’s why that bridge strategy is so important. Timelines are a little questionable. 

And I think that we have to look at risk over time and risk to the strategies that we’re saying we’re going to use out in the Pacific and around the globe, frankly, when it deals in denied environments. So we need to have these systems, whatever it is, whether it’s an actual platform or its software that all has to be interoperable.

We have to have sensors everywhere. The information has to be integrated for the joint force so that we can see and react to how the joint force is morphing around the globe. And that includes, the use of drones, and how we’re using that data to ensure we can do the mission of deployment and sustainment. 

40:12 – 40:38 

(RM): So I think you have to look at two things here. I think you have to look at what the Air Force is studying and looking at, and what they’ve actually committed to do in the budget. You can see with both of these that there’s a commitment to a study and there’s a commitment to exploration, but with neither of them is there a commitment to procurement and installation. 

So I think it’s obvious that we’ve acknowledged that there’s a battlefield that we’re not prepared to fight on necessarily. But I don’t see that we’ve acknowledged that we’re going to make that become true. 

40:39 – 41:27 

(TT): Yeah. And that presents to industry a gigantic risk, because the Air Force and Air Mobility Command, in particular, has asked repeatedly: invest your time and effort into answering these RFIs or participating in this AOA or fill in the blank, and those don’t come for free. You know, it’s not the same as a capital investment in setting up a production line and so on and so forth. 

But the Air Force has to show that it is serious about this problem that Jackie identified is not optional. This is a problem that has to be solved, should have been solved in the past, needs to be solved now. But the way that you’re going to convince industry to dig in and commit more resources is to first show that the government is serious about it. And with a couple of the other things we talk about, about what incentivizes private capital, I think it could be done. But it has to start at the beginning.  

41:28 – 41:44 

(SK): Now, each of you represent Elara Nova in different capacities as part of its Aeronautics & Mission Systems sector. How does Elara Nova and its AMS team in particular, fit into this ecosystem at a time when the Air Force has set lofty goals, set against ambitious targets for its mobility fleet? 

41:45 – 43:05 

(TT): I’ll hop on that one first. I mean, in this case helping the government on the front end. Like for example, this RFI, I don’t know if they asked somebody to come help that was outside what used to be building 1600, I don’t think they moved back into it at Scott Air Force Base. If they didn’t, that was a swing and a miss.  

If they did, then great. Congratulations and good job. Keep doing it. But there’s a lot of talent and industry experience that could be just brought into, ‘Hey did you consider this?’ That makes the RFI better, makes the RFP better quite frankly, and then closes the times faster on what needs to be done. But if you don’t ask the question and you don’t bring the additional team member on board, you miss the opportunity.

And the other part I would just add throughout the process. I think if I’m out there in industry, I think that the capabilities that Elara Nova brings very much helps them in the response and identifying where the opportunities are.  

There’s just a deep portfolio on this call right here. And I’m not talking about myself. I’m talking about the other two – that just know how the system works, have been out there and flown the aircraft, and if you’re able to craft a better, more coherent and innovative response just because of that then I think it’s absolutely worth ringing the phone and calling us. 

It’s not quite a cheat code, but it certainly can help to move in that direction. 

43:06 – 43:45 

(RM): So I think Elara Nova has certainly all of those traditional things to offer that Ty talked about. I think there are a couple of nontraditional things that we offer as well, which are important. The first one is we have partnerships that allow us to help companies navigate the Office of Strategic Capital. There’s a potentially strong role for OSC to play in this process.

And we also have a team that focuses on NATO and international partners, and I think that could be key here as well. If you look at just the development costs that we’ve talked about, the ability to share those across some allies and partners and to count on procurement from other than just the U.S. Air Force, that could be an important way to get the program across the line, and certainly we can help with that.

43:46 – 44:51 

(JVO): And I think Rick is spot on there. Both you and Ty. I think Ty mentioned being the interpreter. Understanding the deep experience that we have. We can interpret what the signals are, what the language is. And then we have experience possibly doing that exact process, but also contacts that are doing the process right now and are trying to help and they’re trying to translate themselves. 

And how do we sit at the table on both sides and help industry and help the government speak to each other in a clear language? And absolutely on the finance part, not just only the finance division, but the OSC and the opportunities that are there, and frankly, seeing the tech that’s out there, because all of us also do and work with other various companies in various sectors and trying to apply that technology and how that might work for aeronautical mission systems or anywhere else for the Department of War. 

We’re all keen to it because we all want to help. We’re not wearing the blue suits anymore, but we all want to help be part of the Department of War and be the success arm and root on our Airmen out into the future. This is our way of giving back.

44:52 – 35:28 

(SK): This has been an episode of The Elara Edge. Elara Nova is the trusted global security partner delivering decisive advantage.  

As a strategic advisory firm, Elara Nova builds expert teams uniquely tailored for client needs to deliver actionable results. With the trusted insight to deliver your decisive edge, Elara Nova is your source for expertise and guidance in global security. 

If you liked what you heard today, please subscribe to our channel and leave us a rating. Music for this podcast was created by Patrick Watkins of PW Audio. I’m your host, Scott King, and join us next time at the Elara Edge. 

Episode 35: Department of War Seeks Solutions for Emerging Counter-UAS Mission

The Elara Edge Podcast

Host: Scott King 

SME: Lt. Gen. (Ret) David “Abu” Nahom, President of Aeronautics & Missions Systems sector at Elara Nova (DN) 

Col (Ret) JP “Spear” Mintz, Managing Director of Aeronautics & Missions Systems sector at Elara Nova (JPM) 

00:02 – 01:40 

A series of escalating events in recent years has demonstrated the growing prevalence of drones in surveillance and military operations. In 2024, unidentified drones flew over a military base in Langley, Virgina. In 2025, Israel used drones to take out Iranian air defense systems in a coordinated attack, while Ukraine launched “Operation Spiderweb,” using drones to damage and destroy aircraft deep within Russian territory. 

Now, a new report from the Department of Defense Inspector General uncovered a series of challenges for defending the United States’ military installations from similar drone incursions or attacks. The report coincides with updated guidance from the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force 401, an Army-led organization tasked with the counter-Unmanned Aerial System (or UAS) mission. The updated guidance requires military installation commanders to prepare their own counter-UAS plans within the next 60 days. 

As part of this effort, the Department of War is actively seeking new and innovative solutions for the counter-UAS mission. 

Welcome to “The Elara Edge,” we have two guests today, joining us to discuss the inherent challenges of the emerging counter-UAS mission, as well as some of the solutions that are being considered. 

First, we have retired Lieutenant General David “Abu” Nahom, President of Elara Nova’s Aeronautics & Mission Systems Sector. General Nahom previously served for 36 years with the United States Air Force, culminating in his roles as Commander of Alaskan Command, the Alaskan NORAD Region, and the Eleventh Air Force. 

Sir, welcome back to the show! 

01:41 – 01:42 

(DN): Great to be here, thanks again Scott.  

01:43 – 02:02 

Also joining us is the Managing Director of the AMS sector, Dr. JP “Spear” Mintz. Recently retired from the Air Force, then-Colonel Mintz commanded in the Air Force’s Spectrum Warfare Wing and also served as a Special Advisor to multiple senior leaders including at NORAD and US Northern Command, among others. 

Sir, welcome to the show! 

02:03 – 02:05  

(JPM): Thanks Scott. Appreciate you setting this up for us. 

02:06 – 02:24 

Thank you both for taking the time to join us today.  

Now, when it comes to Unmanned Aerial Systems, or UAS’s, the United States Air Force already has a well-established means of identifying and categorizing these drones – specifically by Group Numbers. 

Can you walk us through these group numbers and how we understand the differences between them? 

02:25 – 05:36 

(JPM): Yeah, you bet. So the group classification here, at least as it references Group One to Group Three. It’s based on, a couple of things: size, weight, it’s operating altitude above ground level. So a Group One drone, 20 pounds or less, flies at less than 1200 feet above ground level or AGL. What you’re thinking about really here is your hobbyist quadcopter types, the kind of things nearly anybody could buy off the internet. 

The next group, Group Two, the size is up to between 21 and 55 pounds, flies up to about 3500ft above ground level. And that’s your mid-sized drones thinking of things like a ScanEagle, etc. These are usually going to be things that have a military or state-backed flavor, because although some of the hobbyist ones could potentially reach this category, the cost and proliferation of these Group Two drones is not nearly as much as it is with Group One.   

And then Group Three, which is up to 1,320 pounds and up to a flight level of 180. So you really think of these as smaller unmanned aircraft and not normally what you might think of as a drone in traditional parlance.  

And these groups matter here because of a number of things. So one is size. So at least from a radar cross-section perspective, it’s a lot easier to detect a larger UAS, a larger drone than a smaller one. And then of course, the larger the UAS, the more fuel and payloads they can carry over a much larger distance.  

The second what matters is the altitude at which they fly, because in radar, the closer it is to the ground, the more interference you have from things like trees, ground clutter, buildings, etc. and not only that, but you might also reduce your ability to actually detect the UAS just from a purely line of sight perspective. And then also, operating altitude is important because at higher altitudes you generally have higher speeds, right?  

And then third weight matters when it comes to the collateral risk of engagements with these things. Because a larger UAS, a 1,300 pound drone laden with explosive crashes into a populated area, it’s very different than a 18 ounce quadcopter that has nothing on it except for a camera. 

And so all of these factors matter. Also, in terms of identification. [If] you want to identify a UAS. You do that in order to make some assumptions about its intent. Is it a large one traveling at high speeds, pointed at a target you might consider critical on the blue side? So you think maybe it’s weaponized?  

Or is it a child operating their quadcopter they got for the holidays around an airbase because, you know, he or she loves the Air Force, that it just wants to fly or curious about what’s at the base or wherever it is. 

And this identification and intent are important because you have to decide what you want to do about it. Do you want to use a weapon against it? Do you want to do nothing about it? Do you want to make a phone call? And when you think about engaging this with a weapon, something that could take out a smaller Group One drone may not be effective against one of the larger Group Three drones and vice versa. 

And the inherent challenge lies here in a similar situation of a car driving along the side of an airbase, right? You don’t know who’s in there, what’s in there, what they’re doing. It could be just some people showing up to the base, some tourists looking at something they’ve never seen before, or you could be developing a problem there. 

So you can’t always assume intent from simply the size or shape or speed or even position of an aircraft. So you have to be ready to respond and I think that’s a really important topic to get into.

05:37 – 06:11 

(DN):Yeah, [with] the types, what’s interesting, too. Is that how you control them, too. These smaller ones that are less, they’re less sophisticated. They may be line of sight where the person actually controlling it is in some kind of visual of the actual system. 

When you get to these larger ones, these could be beyond line of sight, whether that is through some kind of a satellite feed or some kind of other network that has been established. 

And usually as you go up the groups, you’ll see more of the beyond line of sight and the ability to control these things at further away distances. But I actually have to have somebody inside of the quadcopter itself for the Group One.

06:12 – 06:15 

So how can the Air Force respond to a drone incursion or attack? 

06:16 – 08:45 

(JPM): Well, Scott, there’s a couple of ways to think about this. And it’s not as simple as a scaling problem. Just thinking about the number of shots you have to take or how you might engage this to defeat one or more of these, including a swarm. You have to take into consideration what laws are in place. Policy and regulations are needed to make sure that these UAS’s aren’t proliferated out into the wild, and so anybody can get their hands on them at any time. 

 Some of those are clearly civilian dual-use technology, so you can’t put limits on that. But some of the bigger ones of course, you can. You want to have some of those technologies retained for military use. 

Another thing to consider is defending forward. So if this were a standard military operation in which you were protecting a base or a location from an air attack, you’re going to conduct intelligence operations to try to figure out who’s out there, do a threat assessment of why they want to attack you, how they’re going to do it, what are their capabilities to do so, etc.. And what can you do really, is to defend against those threats forward. Can you take out their capabilities forward, whether that’s kinetically, non-kinetically or in some other way?  

There’s also, of course, what you would think of as deterrence. You can deter your adversary from doing something by showing them they’re not going to succeed in their drone attack or their drone swarm operations, or at least if they do something, it’s not going to be effective or cost effective to them if they go ahead and conduct this operation.  

 I think the cost-effective nature of this is really important, too. If we have these small, cheap drones making attacks or incursions into our airspace, it’s not cost effective from our perspective to expend exquisite expensive AMRAMMs, Patriot missiles, etc. to take them out. Those weapons are best used for the targets they were designed for. 

That’s why they’re so exquisite and expensive, because they’re very good at what they do. But if we have something like the APKWS which can be modified to achieve the same results at a much lower cost without having to waste our expensive weapons, that’s a real benefit. So there’s also non-kinetic means of responding, but we can get into that in a bit. 

But what I wanted to say is that it’s you’re not just going to go straight to shooting something. You have to detect and then determine intent, right? You detect, identify you have to determine intent. You have to make a decision on what you’re going to do about that, and you’re going to pair an effector to it, meaning to match a shooter and a target. 

If you decide you are going to shoot it, then you have to actually use the effector, right? You have to shoot whatever you’re going to shoot or however you take this down. And that all takes time. And that whole process from detect to shoot and even assess whether or not your shot was effective, is part of what we think of as a command and control structure that needs to happen and put all of those things together. 

Sir, do you have anything to add on that?

08:46 – 10:26 

(DN):One thing Spear hit on is the command control piece is going to be one of the hardest pieces. And you think about what Golden Dome and Joint Task Force 401 and some of the things that are coming forward right now in terms of homeland defense.  

But when you look at that command and control piece, think about what the size that Spear talked about for a type three. It’s not much different than a small general aviation aircraft. And how do you discern between one and the other? 

And so that piece, that’s where that command and control is going to be so key about what is a threat? What is not a threat? And be able to do that in a timely manner, where then you can pair the weapon like Spear talked about and take offensive action if that’s what’s needed. 

I think in my experience and my background of working with NORAD. I think that’s going to be the hardest part. And especially in a homeland about that command and control piece, discerning what is a threat and then getting after it in a timely manner.  

And I’ll tell you, the other part of that, too, is policy piece, too. What can you do in the homeland? If it’s just a hobbyist just trying to stir things up. What is America willing to put up with, with collateral damage when you start shooting weapons over an American city and shrapnel and things start falling down? What can we do? What can we not do? I think these are important things. 

And then when Spear talked about the non-kinetic piece. A lot of the non-kinetic, is also going to have an effect on air travel and other things we do, like cell phone service and a number of things that we rely on every day as a society. 

What are we going to be willing to do without, in terms of the electromagnetic spectrum? Whether that’s G.P.S.? Imagine in a city we shut down GPS to avoid a swarm. Well there goes all the Ubers and the Waymos, and you think about everything else we rely on every day in society. 

So, these will be important questions moving forward. Spear back to you. 

10:27 – 13:27 

(JPM): Yeah. Thanks, Abu and so, Scott, to kind of move on to your question about defeating these systems, we do have non-kinetic mechanisms, like Abu suggested: things like denying GPS, potential cyber attacks against whoever is controlling the drones, [it] could be responding in the RF spectrum or even network hacking these systems. Abu also mentioned the Joint Interagency Task Force 401, or JIATF 401, and it was just announced that, JIATF 401 contracted for two of these DroneHunter F700 counter drone systems. 

These DroneHunters can deploy a tethered net to go capture a drone or UAS, intruding in airspace in a way that minimizes the potential for collateral damage. And oh, by the way, they’re reusable. So in some situations and again, some drones, that will make a lot more sense than firing an AMRAMM or a Patriot missile. 

And then when you think about non-kinetic effects, one of the benefits is because there’s also less collateral damage on those. You don’t have two systems out there exploding and then causing debris to fall on civilian populations. But you also have to consider who has the authorities to use these particular actions anyway? And this is because the counter-UAS problem, especially in the US, but in many countries, is a problem that lies in the seams of law enforcement and military operations. 

Traditionally, lines are very well codified in law and for good reason about what the military can do and what law enforcement needs to be doing. And we want to make sure that the appropriate authorities are being used to detect, identify and respond to whatever potential threat that we’re talking about here so that you can achieve the desired outcome, while making sure that we’re protecting our civilian populace in the ways that the Constitution intended. 

So if you look at the kinetic side, there are times when you will need to use the kinetic side, because you either may not have a non-kinetic option, or the non-kinetic option may just not be as effective. And in some cases, you may get an indication that an attack is coming until the very last second. So you have to find ways to absolutely make a stop to whatever’s coming into your airspace. 

A kinetic effector you can think of as a gun that could be a handheld shotgun to an actual military style weapon, like a 20 millimeter that is carried on an aircraft, 30 millimeter aircraft. Or it could be a modified rocket like the APKWS. And there are other emerging technologies like we just talked about, can be sent out to go in and not only take these things out, but also just track them down and figure out what it is that they’re doing. 

And then there’s another solution which kind of spans what I’d say is there’s a seam or gap between the idea of a kinetic solution and a non-kinetic solution, and that’s directed energy which is now starting to come into its own. There are lots of systems out there that use RF energy, microwave energy, or even laser energy to shut these things down or damage them, right? 

But even those come with really important collateral damage considerations. And so while in some ways they may be better than launching a big heavy explosive missile over a populated areas. And in other ways, they’re not. Because if you think about the air traffic that might be behind your target flying, you know, behind it. And if you’re trying to lase a drone and accidentally lays the pilots of an airliner passing overhead, that could have some serious negative implications. We don’t want to be doing that. 

So you also have to consider how directed energy has potential collateral damage as well. So as these technologies develop, we’ll continue to see those things emerge.

13:28 – 16:01 

(DN):Yeah, I think the good thing is an industry is being unleashed on this problem set. And you’re seeing solutions every day come about that, even a couple of years ago, I would have never imagined. We’ve realized as a nation what a problem this is. 

We’ve certainly seen some of the cases. I know, Scott, you said you want to get into later on, talk about what went on with Ukraine with that complex attack using small UAS’s. But there’s also been a lot of cases in America that garner attention, like the swarms that were over in New Jersey, not too long ago. We certainly had a problem at Langley Air Force Base a few years back as well, with drone swarms.  

You’ve seen other small things where airliners have hit drones and done damage, and that’s garnered some attention. You saw where you had the California wildfires last year, and they had two very effective Canadian firefighting aircraft. 

One was grounded for a long time because it hit a hobbyist drone, and the drone was just watching the wildfires. And so people are starting to realize that these are a problem, not just for military use, but the proliferation, actually you can get on the internet or go down to Best Buy, and buy this type one UAS’s for almost nothing, and you can fly them just because you’re curious, and you could be a huge impediment to a firefighting operation or a police response with helicopters or, any number of things. 

And so I think, now that it’s getting a lot of notoriety, I think that’s good. And I think, industry is responding, and I think the technology will be there.  

Some of the response of those UAS’s in New Jersey. I mean, they’re right in the approach corridor of Newark Airport. What do you do at that point? And I’ll tell you from the ground, especially when it’s nighttime and you look up – you don’t know the difference. You see a red light. That could be a drone 100 yards away, or that could be an airplane ten miles away. And that light will look the same.  

 Again, it goes back to that command and control about what is the threat. And then what do you do about it? Because some of the things Spear went into, are absolutely spot on. When you look at the homeland, it’s such a complex area, but I think a lot of the areas we’re going to operate in are going to be equally as complex, whether that’s a European theater. 

Certainly, many of the South Pacific areas, when you’re talking about in Japan and Korea Guam and some of these places that have quite dense populations and busy airports. These will be challenges that the technology is going to have to solve because, it was very easy to put these quadcopters up there. 

And I think even easier to make these swarms and some of these things that are so impressive. You see, it’s amazing when you’re watching swarms where there is at halftime of a football game or whether that’s in some kind of a military operation, like you saw that the Ukrainians use and the Israelis use in their complex attacks in Iran, but now it’s time to figure out how to counter that one when necessary and I think that’s where we are. 

16:02 – 16:11 

I’d like to dig deeper into the emerging role of UAS’s in military operations. Can you elaborate on this role, particularly with recent examples like Ukraine’s “Operation Spiderweb?” 

16:12 – 17:17 

(JPM): Yeah, absolutely. I mean, Operation Spider Web, from what we can gather from open source reporting, was a June 2025 surprise drone attack on Russian air bases using small UAS’s. And by using special operations forces, the Ukrainians were able to position these small one-way attack drones near the edges of these Russian strategic air bases and then launched attacks on the aircraft there while they were on the ground. 

You look at this from a cost perspective. You get a number of small, relatively cheap one-way attack drones that took out several strategic Russian aircraft, probably hundreds of millions or billions of dollars. And from an asymmetry perspective, there’s a lot to be gained from that.  

The other thing that’s really important, that operation, and I sort of alluded to this earlier, but it’s this idea of reduced tactical warning time. If you position these drones around the edges of an airbase, you no longer have minutes, much less hours to react, to detect, to identify, determine intent, facilitate the command and control we talked about, select the effectors and then time to even make the intercept. You have seconds to react at best. And so now we need to find ways to close that entire kill chain in the counter UAS mission so much more rapidly.

17:18 – 20:37 

(DN):One other interesting thing to get from the open source. If you look at where these attacks were, these were not airbases right around Ukraine. These were air bases in the heartland of Russia, very, very far away from the fight. Where more than likely they thought they were fairly safe from any kind of attacks from the Ukrainians because they weren’t really going that deep. 

So, I think it was a huge surprise, a huge wake up, not just for the Russians, but I think the rest of the world, too. Where you can think you have these airbases with very expensive, exquisite equipment that you’re sheltering there and they became vulnerable very quickly.  

And you look at what the Ukrainians, attacked. They attacked nuclear capable strategic bombers. And they damaged and destroyed quite a few of them, which is significant to the Russian strategic defense of their nation. To me, what I took from it was a wake up call. 

And like Spear said, maybe you put something, a critical element a couple hundred miles from your border because you think you’re safe from attack. But next thing you know, you have a swarm of drones that comes out of a garbage can or a truck, right outside your gate. And seconds later, you’ve lost some really key element to your defense or a key power grid or something very critical to your nation. 

And so I think as you look at the defense against these swarms, again, they don’t carry much weaponry or if they’re small, but put it in the right place at the right time could be very significant. And I thought even though Spider Web was an amazing example of what the Ukrainians were able to achieve.  

I still think the Israeli example about how they use small UAS’s, in conjunction with more conventional forces like F-35s and, and F-15s and other was very unique because these small UAS’s were able to really enable a very complex attack very far from home.  

In the case of Israelis, you really had a complex operation that involved something as simple as a quadcopter and something as complex as an F-35 really in the same operation. And I think they really showed how effective these could be to do, some things as part of an operation, like maybe take out an air defense system or take out a key communication node, or take out maybe a city power grid, something that you could do with a swarm of small drones, especially if you can get it in close. 

And I think that’s what both the Israelis and the Ukrainians were able to achieve. They were able to figure out using, frankly, special operations to get these things close into the fight and actually have them be part of the more conventional fight and I think that’s something we’ve got to be very attuned to.

Now, it may be different in the Pacific because the distances are different with all the oceans, but it doesn’t mean you couldn’t float some of this over on a ship. There’s plenty of ways that people who say that these don’t apply to the Pacific, I think, are missing some of the broader point. This was, to me, was a display of how you use something that you wouldn’t expect to be part of a complex operation and really enhance what they were able to do. 

And in the case of the Israelis shutting down the air defense systems that the Iranians had and then they were able to bring in much more conventional firepower in because, you know, as effective as these swarms can be, as impressive as they look, these small quadcopters, these type one UAS’s don’t carry a lot of firepower. 

But in the right place at the at the right time can be quite effective because in the case of the F-15’s that came in pretty quickly after with a lot of firepower, were able to get through and do quite a bit of damage, neutralize the air defense systems and allow Israel to achieve their objectives pretty quickly.  

If you think about the distances from Israel to Iran and what they’re able to achieve. It was just nothing short of amazing.

20:38 – 21:29 

(JPM): Yeah, I mean, this really comes down to the asymmetry in air warfare. If you think in the past there’s an air base that has aircraft that can just take off, fly for minutes to hours to get to their targets, then perhaps go attack another airbase. There was a lot of parity there in terms of operational timelines, but what we saw in Operation Spiderweb is that the decision time was reduced to near zero. 

If you have minutes or hours to prepare, you can detect, you can identify, determine intent, you can harden your defenses. You’re going to reposition aircraft and you can launch. But when you only have seconds to respond, it underscores the absolute importance of a number of things [that] we talked about the speed at which you can detect this threat, determine what it is, assume or determine the intent behind it, and then being able to command and control, match effectors to targets, and then use them with the appropriate authorities to make that response happen in a fast enough manner. It’s really challenging the current air defense paradigm. 

21:30 – 21:55 

Okay, so let’s get into some of the solutions. At the end of last year, the Air Force put out an RFI, or a Request for Information, for technology that would modify an Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (or APKWS) that would be capable of taking down Group 1 to Group 3 drones. 

Spear, you referenced the APKWS earlier, so maybe you can start us off with this: what is APKWS? And how has its use evolved over time?

21:56 – 22:20 

(JPM): Yeah, so the APKWS, or the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System, it’s a laser guidance kit that converts a 2.75in rocket into a precision guided munition. It was originally developed as the AGR 20 for US service, and it’s got a laser guidance section. And then the rocket, motor, warhead and fuze are drawn from existing inventory. So you think of this as like an add-on kit that can use an older, cheaper weapon in a new way. 

22:21 – 24:38 

(DN): I was actually in the desert back in 2016, 2017, 2018, in Qatar, working at the [sic], when we started using this on our aircraft and really, what it boils down to is the ability to get after targets in a very, very cost effective manner. We call it “the right side of the cost curve.” 

You know, when you’re taking out a target that the enemy may have built up. You’re talking about maybe a $10,000 car, and you’re using a $2 million missile to take it out. This got us on the better side of the cost curve where we could do things very cheap and at mass. You could put quite a few of these things on an aircraft, and you could load them very quickly. 

And we found them to be very accurate, especially in low risk areas, where the aircraft could get pretty close to their targets, which was at the time when we were in the counter-ISIS fight, with what was going on in Iraq and Syria and Afghanistan at the time. These were extremely useful, in that air to ground. 

What happened over this time as we’ll get into the RFI, is we figured out that you can use these things and other things that are moving slow like UAS’s. You know, when you look at what you’re defending and you think about the ground, it just completely makes sense.  

Let’s get away from Europe or the homeland. Let’s start talking about the Pacific, where what we’re defending is air bases and other key nodes and islands and other places around the Pacific. 

We know what the enemy is aiming at. We know where we got to be with our defensive systems. And that’s on the ground right next to these air bases and other locations that we’re defending. It’s the hockey analogy. We know the opposing team wants to put the puck in the net. So you put the goalie in front of the net.  

So if we can figure out how to use something like this, that low cost, many rounds, low collateral damage, because even on these islands [there] are collateral damage issues. If you think about some of the places that we are stationed around the Pacific, there are cities and there are quite a bit of urban sprawl in some of these islands. So you are concerned with the low collateral as well.

If you could figure out how to do this on the ground, this would make a lot of sense for getting after that and not having to launch a very expensive Patriot missile, for instance, against a very low cost UAS. Rather, save the Patriot for a theater ballistic missile or something that it was truly designed against coming at your airbase or your area in the Pacific.  

And again, very, very inexpensive UAS’s, and we were using very expensive missiles on them. It’s that cost curve that we’re never going to win against. This really helps us get after that. 

24:39 – 26:11 

(JPM): I mean, if you think about it, APKWS it was originally designed not to target airborne threats, but now it’s being used to target those new low-cost airborne UAS threats. There’s a couple things that are really important about this. We talked about the cost of these both high end exquisite weapon systems like the AMRAMM versus the APKWS. 

But think also about the opportunity cost of using those AMRAMMs, or Patriots other exquisite weapon systems to target drones. When we think about inventory and replacement of those shots. Like, I would rather have my fighter aircraft save their AMRAMMs for what they’re really needed for to target other fighter aircraft or other large aircraft. So in addition to the cost differential here, there’s an inventory advantage as well. 

The other thing this does is it provides as a new launcher opportunity. So instead of a fighter aircraft carrying these APKWS, we might have a different form factor available, like a ground base launchers, including ones that the RFI is asking about.

And then finally, this presents an opportunity for a lower collateral damage weapon. So instead of something large, like an AMRAMM, especially if you’re near a place where there’s a higher risk for civilian population, something like an APKWS, would be lower collateral damage, certainly not zero. 

But if you’re in an empty area where there’s no civilian population around or population around at all, then collateral damage considerations might be a little less important.   

But as we know, there are a lot of these kind of UAS incursions around very populated areas and airports, houses nearby, etc. so providing a lower or zero collateral damage weapon is extremely important to the future of countering these sort of threats. 

26:12 – 27:19 

(DN):The first time I saw this technology being used in the Middle East, it was amazing. Because if you look at the rocket technology that they’re using, other than the guidance packages, which Spear, talk to you earlier, I mean, the technology that goes back to the Vietnam War. 

We’ve been having rockets and the launchers that use it very similar to that for a long time. It’s just something we had never thought of. And it really was a mix of operators and engineers coming together, figuring out a very effective, a very cheap way. And the cheap is important, because, again, when the enemy can put up thousands of these targets, we can’t be shooting millions of missiles at all of them. 

At some point, we’ll run out of those missiles and we will run out of money, too. It was such a huge thing to get into our aircraft for air to ground and it was really the innovation to bring it in air to air, by some test pilots and engineers in the test world, and then operationally, it was proven out in the deserts in Syria. 

And now you look at a ground-based version of it. Then again, what’s the next thing for APKWS? Maybe there’s something that we can go even further to enhance our base defense and our and eventually our homeland defense as well. 

27:20 – 27:22 

And so what makes an RFI like this important? 

27:23 – 28:47 

(JPM): So let’s talk just for a second about what an RFI is. It’s a Request for Information. It’s an exploration of what’s out there and what’s in the market. What it’s not is a request for proposal. It does not signal that there is a direct impending contract coming out of this. But I think that’s important because it’s asking about the same precision guided, 70 millimeter rocket concept for a ground launch and then aimed at Group One and Group Three UAS’s. 

So these small drones think DJI quadcopter all the way through tactical UAS, which are really just small aircraft. And now the RFI just came out in November and the responses were due at the end of 2025. So I think right now the Air Force is chomping on the information that they received.  

So I think this RFI is important for another reason, which is that it’s signaling that the Air Force is coming into its own about this idea of base defense and investing in air base defense. 

And I think that’s important and good in a way, because the counter-UAS fight is really an air superiority problem. And while a lot of history would show that air base defense is a very small part of that, clearly this new UAS threat is proliferating and causing that particular style of threat causing threat to air bases is so much bigger part of air superiority now. 

And of course, the Air Force has air superiority is one of its core functions. And this conversation goes to show that air superiority is not just fighter jets fighting over a large swath of water 50 miles away from each other or more. It goes all the way from small UAS’s all the way up to hypersonics, ICBMs and beyond. 

28:48 – 31:44 

(DN):Well, there’s other reasons too. If you’re going to defend a base – to be airborne, you can’t be airborne forever. You have to actually get the airplane in the air. It’s going to have to be in some kind of a position where it can intercept. If you can do it from the ground, it is much more efficient to do that.

If you know we have a critical base let’s say on a South Pacific island and we know that that is vulnerable. We put what’s defending it on the ground. We don’t have to have the airplane airborne, with gas and with tankers.  

We put it on the ground and it’s a cheaper, more efficient way to actually defend a point. Now, the difference is what if I have to defend a very large area. That’s why you’re going to want things airborne as well. There is a mix of that. 

When you look at the air base defense piece and what Spear’s alluded to is we’re going to be in many places. And I keep going back to the Pacific fight because that’s certainly a fight we center on in how we look at investment across the Air Force. We’re going to be in many places.

We’re going to be getting there very quickly. And we may not be able to rely on anyone else to provide the air base air defense. So we may have to bring something in and we can bring in light quickly. Very effective. Defend these locations against all myriad of threats. And, the type one, two and three. 

So a relatively small aircraft right on down to the quadcopter. You can go buy it out at Best Buy or Walmart. These things can and very, very cheap enter into this world, as you’ve seen in the Middle East and other places, and the ability to mass these things in locations that can be very not helpful to air operations, even whether they have offensive weapons or not. 

You put a swarm of these things near an air base. It’s really hard to operate airplanes. We have problems just with physical birds, let alone birds that are made of metal like this around an air base. And so as we move throughout the Pacific and we move quickly, thinking about the ACE concept and how we’d actually operate, the ability to defend our own air bases, it’s going to be more and more important as we get further and as more of this proliferates. 

And it’s not just about a small non-state actor using something like this. It could be a state actor. And this is a part of a more elaborate, complex attack using very small UAS’s, and at the same time maybe theater ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and other things to use in concert with each other.  

And you certainly see that in the homeland. You’re going to hear them talk about critical infrastructure and what needs to be defended in the homeland as we go further down this Golden Dome conversation. So it will be important to have some kind of ground-based interceptor system like we have around the National Capital Region right now.  

But at the same time, America is very large. And you’re going to have to have systems like this that have the ability to get up and move and go from point to point very fast, to defend large swaths of our nation. Certainly when you start thinking about Alaska and the Pacific, Hawaii, Guam and all the areas that we would have to defend, we couldn’t just be on the ground. It would be very difficult. That said, we know there’s the critical places we’re going to have to defend, like the National Capital Region or other critical locations for our nation. 

31:45 – 31:58 

The rising need to address the counter-UAS mission also coincides with the United States’ renewed emphasis on homeland defense, namely through the Golden Dome initiative.    

So what role and relevance do drones and UAS’s have to the Golden Dome conversation? 

31:59 – 33:55 

(JPM): With Golden Dome, if we back up for a moment, this idea of defending the homeland against air and missile attacks is something that has a long history in NORAD and in U.S. Northern Command.  

And the systems that we have now, were because we produce capabilities. So the threats that existed at the time and the priorities that we had in terms of funding and the technologies that we had available. If you go back and read the executive order for Golden Dome, it’s now an idea of how do we focus not only on ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, advanced cruise missiles, next generation aerial attacks, and as a homeland defense type of initiative? 

And so the counter-UAS flight is absolutely relevant to Golden Dome, but it’s certainly not the entirety of it.  

 But there are really there are overlaps. And these overlaps are really important because Golden Dome will be a layered system or system of systems, and not just from a physics perspective in terms of what areas you might be defending, but also how you might do this, because you’re going to need capabilities that will overlap in terms of what we talked about earlier in the detection, identifying, determining intent, command and control, selecting and responding with effectors is going to apply across the board there.  

Even if those detection mechanisms and the effector mechanisms may be very different depending on the type of threat. And so what you’re going to need are systems that can be integrated together, or a system that can detect hypersonic threats and ballistic missile threats, as well as systems that can detect these small UAS drone threats, in order that a greater and more integrated command and control system can help the authorities and operators decide. 

What should we do about this? What can we do about this? What timelines do we have?, What authorities do we need? And then of course, at the end game, what are we going to do against this thing? Is this going to be a kinetic kill? Is it going to be a hand off to law enforcement? Is it going to be something else? 

So as we look at this, some of the questions that Golden Dome is going to have to ask and answer and is asking about authorities, about collateral risk, collateral damage systems, they’re going to apply to this counter-UAS mission. And I think it’s going to require a collaborative approach among all the teams that are looking at this problem set.

Sir, over to you. 

33:56 – 34:57 

(DN):Yeah. I think I’ll just kind of narrow in on the that the C2 aspect, the command control aspect, and it really is great to see that the Joint Interagency Task Force, JIATF-401, is working with the Golden Dome team in terms of the command and control, because it’s going to have to be seamless across all domains. 

Where I think Golden Dome really, again, go back to the executive order. We’re thinking about ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hyper glide vehicles, some of these even space weapons coming from and emanating from space. There are attacks that could be more conventional. Right on down to, even cyber and really any domain, and if we’re truly going to be safe as a nation – what Golden Dome intends.

The counter small UAS fight could be something just that specifically, or in the case of if you go back to, we talked about, the Israeli case in Iran, it could be part of a complex attack on our homeland and so the command and control structures are going to have to be seamless across and I think that’s a great indicator to industry, about where they focus their technologies because they’re going to have to have to be able to be seamlessly integrated across all domains. 

34:58 – 35:05 

Now, moving forward, what should industry’s takeaways be from the growing relevance of counter-UAS as part of these homeland defense conversations? 

35:06 – 36:33 

(JPM): Yeah, that’s a great question, Scott. I think the biggest thing that industry should take from this – is this is a real need. It’s not just a passing fad. It’s an emerging threat that’s not only causing real problems today, but it’s going to continue to emerge and evolve.  

And so looking not only at this RFI, but the wider Golden Dome initiative and what’s going on around the world, industry should take this time to start investing in and exploring ways that they can contribute to the counter-UAS flight, and whether that be in detection, in identification, command and control, or some kind of effector as well.

And there are a lot of new technologies out there. And I think that’s what’s interesting about this mission set, is because of the small, cheap, proliferated nature of these threat drones themselves.  

What you’ll find is that a lot of nontraditional companies can and are putting offerings into this space where in the past they didn’t or couldn’t compete because traditional air defense technologies were very expensive, required a lot of R&D just because of the nature of the threat, needing a missile to go many, many, many miles and detect high fast targets. 

But now this new threat in this new space allows for greater and faster innovation from smaller defense companies, and also nontraditional and nondefense companies. Because, again, it’s not just a military challenge. This is also a law enforcement challenge. So it’s a civil air space. It’s a public safety challenge. And so there’s opportunities for companies both in the U.S., outside the US for defense and non-defense, large and small, to be working on these technologies. 

And they’re not working on a military technology. Maybe they’re working on a law enforcement, public safety technology because they’re going to need this as well.

36:34 – 38:57 

(DN):I think the challenge we have for some of these companies, too, is that, as they develop technology, is how you bring this into some kind of a program where they, these small companies can have the steady stream of money that they’re going to need to stay in business. 

You know, many companies are coming up with an amazing technology. But if it doesn’t get adopted, that company can’t stay in business if they’re not able to sell it. So I think that will be a challenge, of the government, finding the right technologies and bringing it into a program where you can keep these companies moving forward. 

 And then in many cases, some of these small companies will merge with larger companies are merging their small companies. That’s so they can continue on. But that’s where the Valley of Death is very real when there is actually money and small business innovation efforts, SBIR I, SBIR II, other places, STRATFI, that small companies can find money to continue to develop their products. 

But then to get to that point to some kind of a program award, sometimes it’s a very large leap. It’s very hard for these small companies. So I think that’s something for us to watch. I think that’s something where Elara Nova can be quite effective as we help some of these companies manage that Valley of Death. 

 And whether that’s pairing up with a company or whether that’s looking for other avenues for funding so they can stay alive and then making sure that the government sees their technology and sees how applicable that can be to this fight because, the secret sauce is really going to be in some of these small companies and some of it’s just amazing technology as we bring it forward, it’s not always going to be a large companies.  

But in many cases, the large companies, like the Lockheed Martin’s and Northrop’s, the BAE’s and others are very important because they do have the ability, to extend the funding and have the structures to not only, to continue to develop the technology, but then to scale it, at the necessary speed that the Department of War is going to need moving forward. 

 And I think the industry is so far, doing a pretty good job responding and so I look forward to more indications from the government of exactly what they’re looking for, so industry can stay focused. We do have the best industry in the world. And we will figure out how you can make this command and control, where you have a handful of small UAS’s around an airbase like we had at Langley a few years ago, and we’re able to quickly identify where they are, who they are, and then apply the countermeasure to neutralize it if it is truly a threat or if it’s not a threat – let it go, or if it turns out to be a manned general aviation airplane that just wandered into the wrong airspace, you let it go, and then there you deal with it in terms of a civil matter. We’re not there yet, but I think we’re getting there very fast and it’s great to see that the country is focused on this.

38:58 – 39:09 

In what ways does the dual-use implications for counter-UAS mission, also present a unique opportunity for the government to establish a public-private partnership that would accelerate the development of counter-UAS technologies? 

39:10 – 40:50 

(JPM): Yeah, so I think if you think of this as a dual-use technology or a dual-use technology space, there’s of course the military applications. And particularly in the U.S., we’ve seen opportunities to spend money on countering this threat, both for US air bases, for U.S. air bases overseas, etc. but that’s still a relatively small subset of what this problem space could look like. 

If you think about every police department in the country, every police department perhaps in the world needing something like this system or something to counter threats in this space from both local and national safety objectives. I mean, just from a counter-UAS perspective, the need to detect, identify and determine what you’re going to do about it is not simply a military application, right? 

You need to do that in law enforcement and public safety, as well. And so this need is going to be proliferated across the globe if it’s not already there. And any place where these drones could cause problems. And there’ll be different ways of handling them as well. We don’t need to get into this discussion about whether every police department’s going to have something that can shoot down a drone because they may take a different approach. It’s not really us to say what’s going to be, but they are going to need something to detect, identify and then make a decision on what they’re going to do about it.

But it also does beg the question about what types of law or policy we need that are essentially the equivalent of a police officer pulling over somebody that’s speeding, right?A drone not where it’s supposed to be or approaching someplace it’s not supposed to be. It’s kind of like somebody’s speeding. So what’s the counter-UAS equivalent of a police officer putting their blue lights on to pull somebody over.  

So as the U.S. technology evolves, policy evolves and norms evolve. How we think about these aircraft and how they operate in the national and international airspace, we’re going to have to rethink how we work together from a civil and military perspective, so that we can take advantage of these new technologies while also keeping our population safe. 

40:51 – 42:25 

(DN):I think the dual-use is actually really going to be very effective because for the same reason Newark Airport is not going to want to have small UAS’s flying around the final approach corridor. They’re going to want a way to detect those small UAS’s and get them away. 

And whether that is some kind of a non-kinetic effect where they can actually move them away, or whether they physically take the things down, because there is a need in both the commercial and military sector, I think the technology is going to advance that much quicker because, on the commercial side, they come up with a way to keep UAS’s away from a busy airport in a downtown area like Newark Airport, New Jersey. 

Then we probably can use that very similar technology at Anderson Airbase in Guam. And for an offensive drone swarm there’s probably some various similarities in that technology.  

So I think that’s probably a good thing that this is a problem both in military and civil area, and you saw that, last year with those devastating wildfires in LA County, when they had that problem with drone swarms, some of them were good because they were police departments and others. Others were not. 

They’re just a hobbyist wanting to see the fires. And next thing you know, you were having impacts with small drones with aircraft and causing a lot of damage to those aircraft that were trying to fight the fires. And you’re also seeing in places like say the Super Bowl. 

Well, they’ll put a TFR or a Temporary Flight Restriction over the Super Bowl. So, aircraft don’t fly near it for security reasons. We’ve done that since 9/11 with large events like that. What about the drones and the hobbyists? And then and all the other things that are taking place around an event like that. And so I think the dual-use nature of the dual-use problem is going to help us solve this quicker for both sides. Spear, anything else on that? 

42:26 – 43:08 

(JPM): Yeah, I mean, if you look at similar technology advances, there were times when, for example, the Global Positioning System, the GPS, and specifically the receiver that you needed to figure out where you were, it used to be huge. And then you have organizations like DARPA that miniaturized it to make it more usable on the battlefield. But since then, I mean, you’ve got GPS receivers on everything to include your watch, your phone, etc. so the continued miniaturization of that, due to the commercial applications of GPS, the military now gets to take advantage of the fact that those receivers are now so much cheaper and so much smaller.  

And I think the same thing is going to happen with a lot of these technologies. So it’s really beneficial to the military and the civilian world that there’s a dual-use nature to this because it’s going to help accelerate, bring down the cost and size of all of these things.

43:09 – 43:18 

As the respective leaders of Elara Nova’s Aeronautics & Mission Systems sector, how can Elara Nova support the development and acquisition of counter-UAS technologies? 

43:19 – 45:04 

(DN):Our intention for the Aeronautics and Mission System, the AMS side of Elara Nova is to help these companies navigate, not only the government side of things and working through the innovation efforts as well as getting into programs. 

But as well as helping them tell a story about if they have a technology, where that can be used and how – present that technology, whether it’s to another company. If they’re going to be paired up with another company, or if it’s to the government or to an international partner as well. 

I think that’s one thing we do well, in AMS – is we have a lot of operational experts, and we can help them tell that story really well. We can also help them navigate, whether they’re looking for that SBIR I effort, that SBIR II effort they’re looking for. How do they get in front of the right person at the Department of War or whether that’s one of the Combatant Commanders? 

Who is that right person you need to get in front of? And when they get in front of that person, what story should they tell? And I think that’s something we’ll be very effective at.  

And then looking at the larger piece of the Golden Dome, we’re very involved with Golden Dome. I know a lot of it is on the space side. General Guetlein and his team, many of them came from the Space Force, but it is an all-domain effort. When you look at how you’re going to defend the nation and much of Golden Dome is going to be outside of the space sector, we talked a little bit about it right here about the integration with JIATF 401, the command and control networks, etc. 

Many of these small companies are coming to us with questions about Golden Dome, about how would they fit in? How could they become part of a broader consortium as part of this large-scale effort to defend the homeland? And I think we’re putting ourselves in a great position to help these companies tell their story, figure out how they can integrate, figure out how they can get funded and ultimately get into some kind of a program of record, and then proceed from there. Spear, anything else on that? 

45:05 – 45:34 

(JPM): Yeah, absolutely. I mean, this counter-UAS mission poses a great question for us to figure out how the Aeronautics and Mission Systems sector can provide complementary expertise or a high quality outside look to these companies developing these technologies. I mean, these companies are already staffed with brilliant people that developed awesome technologies, and they have great operational depth. And the answer we believe that AMS can provide them with expertise that can complement and leverage the strengths they already have within their company to ultimately get capability into the hands of those that need it. 

45:35 – 46:14 

This has been an episode of The Elara Edge. As a strategic advisory firm, Elara Nova is the trusted guiding partner that builds tailored teams to illuminate unseen opportunities and deliver impact across every domain.  

With the trusted insight to deliver your decisive edge, Elara Nova is your source for expertise and guidance in national security. 

If you liked what you heard today, please subscribe to our channel and leave us a rating. Music for this podcast was created by Patrick Watkins of PW Audio. This episode was edited and produced by Regia Multimedia Services. I’m your host, Scott King, and join us next time at the Elara Edge.

Department of War Seeks Solutions for Emerging Counter-UAS Mission

Real-world Drone Attacks Demonstrate Imperative for an Integrated Command and Control Structure

Recent years have demonstrated the growing prevalence of drones in surveillance and military operations. In 2024, unidentified drones flew over a military base in Langley, Virginia. In 2025, Israel used drones to take out Iranian air defense systems in a coordinated attack, while Ukraine launched “Operation Spiderweb,” using drones to damage and destroy aircraft deep within Russian territory. But a new Department of Defense Inspector General report uncovered a series of challenges for defending the United States’ military installations from similar drone incursions or attacks. These potential vulnerabilities have prompted the Joint Interagency Task Force 401, an Army-led organization tasked with the counter-Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) mission, to release updated policy guidance that requires military installation commanders to prepare their own counter-UAS defense plans within the next 60 days.  

“The Ukrainians’ and the Israelis’ use of small UAS’s showed how effective drones can be as part of a large, complex military operation,” said Lt. Gen. (Ret) David “Abu” Nahom, President of Elara Nova’s Aeronautics & Mission Systems sector. “That’s something we’ve got to be very attuned to now, especially when we had small UAS’s around Langley Air Force base a few years ago. We need to be able to quickly identify where they are, who they are and then apply a countermeasure to neutralize it.” 

This series of escalating events demonstrates not only how UAS’s are changing the nature of military operations, but also the imperative to find new and innovative solutions to address the emerging counter-UAS mission.  

The Air Force categorizes small UAS’s in five different groups based on size, operating altitude, and weight. However, despite these classifications identifying the source, capabilities and intent of each UAS is a complex task, particularly when it comes to determining the appropriate counter measure for an incursion or attack. 

“Group classification is important because a weapon that could take out a Group One drone may not be effective against a Group Three drone,” said Col (Ret) JP “Spear” Mintz, Managing Director of the Aeronautics & Mission Systems sector at Elara Nova. “Size matters because a larger drone is easier to detect and a higher operating altitude often means higher speeds. Weight is particularly important for the collateral risk, because taking out a 1,300-lb. drone laden with explosives is vastly different from a 1/2-lb. quadcopter with a camera.” 

Government Seeks New and Innovative Solutions 

One emerging solution is the DroneHunter F700, a reusable, low-collateral counter drone system that launches tethered nets to capture intruding drones. The Joint Interagency Task Force 401 recently contracted for two of these DroneHunters for further operational testing. 

Another potential solution may come from repurposing weapon systems the Department of War already has, namely, the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS). While originally designed for air-to-ground strikes, APKWS has proven effective in air-to-air combat in Ukraine. 

This led the Air Force to consider ideas for how APKWS might be launched from a ground system to counter Group One to Group Three drone threats.  

“There’s both a dollar and an inventory cost to using high-end, exquisite weapon systems like AMRAMM versus something like the APKWS for smaller threats,” Mintz said. “APKWS was not originally designed to target airborne threats, but it’s proven to be effective as a low-cost response to UAS’s. So instead of a fighter aircraft carrying the APKWS for the counter-UAS mission, the RFI wants to explore what a ground-based launcher for APKWS would look like.” 

Lowering the Cost-Curve, Risk for Collateral Damage 

While the RFI does not guarantee a contract for a ground-based APKWS launcher will materialize, it does demonstrate how the Air Force is considering lower-cost alternatives compared to other missile defense systems like the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAMM), the AIM-9X Sidewinder or the Phased Array Tracking Radar for Intercept on Target (PATRIOT). 

“Previously, we were using expensive missiles on a very inexpensive UAS, and that’s a cost curve that we’re never going to win against,” Nahom said. “So if we can figure out a low-cost solution that can fire many rounds with low-collateral damage, this would make a lot of sense instead of having to launch an expensive and destructive PATRIOT missile. Rather, we can save the PATRIOT for something it was truly designed to defend against, like a theater ballistic missile. This RFI will help the Air Force get after that problem set.” 

Minimizing collateral damage is a significant consideration when developing counter-UAS technologies, particularly because some military installations bases and airports are in close proximity to cities and civilian populations.  

“Non-kinetic solutions, like GPS denial, cyber attacks, or directed energy can be used to shut a UAS down with less collateral damage,” Mintz said. “But even then, you have to think about what air traffic might be flying overhead or nearby because a directed energy laser can run the risk of inadvertantly affecting a commercial airliner. So even as these counter-UAS technologies develop, we’ll continue to see these other challenges emerge.” 

The Command and Control Imperative 

Determining the appropriate response, whether kinetically or non-kinetically, reinforces the imperative for a clear and effective command and control structure that can identify and respond to drone incursions or attacks in near real-time. 

“Drone warfare underscores the absolute importance of being able to detect a threat, identify it, determine its intent, behind it and the command and control structure to match effectors to the targets,” Mintz said. “But to make that happen in such a fast manner, like in immediate-threat scenarios like Operation Spiderweb where decision times are reduced to near zero, really challenges the current air defense paradigm.” 

Similarly, command and control was the publicly-stated number one priority for General Mike Guetlein, who has been tasked with orchestrating the Golden Dome for America.  

“Golden Dome intends to defend the homeland against more conventional attacks like ballistic and cruise missiles, hyperglide vehicles and even weapons emanating from space, but it also has to account for threats from other domains,” Nahom said. “But like we saw with the Israeli strikes on Iran, UAS’s could be part of a complex and coordinated attack on our homeland. So Golden Dome’s command and control structure needs to be seamless across domains and that’s a great indicator for industry to focus on not just Golden Dome, but the counter-UAS fight, as well.”   

Counter-UAS Solutions as a Dual-Use Technology 

The need for counter-UAS technologies, and a command and control system to accommodate them, goes beyond just military applications. In 2019, a drone incursion at a nearby airport disrupted air traffic at Newark Liberty International Airport in New Jersey, while in 2025 a drone collision grounded and severely damaged a Canadian firefighting aircraft responding to the devastating Palisades wildfire. 

The dual-use nature of counter-UAS technologies, particularly non-kinetic ones, could enable new entrants in the market for the government to work with. 

“The small, cheap and proliferated nature of the drone threats means a lot of nontraditional and emerging companies can now compete in this market,” Mintz said. “In the past, nontraditional companies couldn’t really compete because of the exquisite, expensive, deeply technical nature of conventional threats. But the counter-UAS mission inherently encourages innovation from the smaller, nontraditional defense companies, particularly because this mission is not just a military challenge, it’s a law enforcement and a public safety challenge, as well.” 

So while the Department of War seeks to go “commercial first” as part of its acquisition reform overhaul, the same opportunities apply to acquiring solutions for the emerging counter-UAS mission. 

“If industry can come up with a way to keep UAS’s away from a busy airport in a downtown area like Newark Airport in New Jersey, the government can probably use that similar counter-UAS technology at Anderson Airbase in Guam,” Nahom said. “But that’s also where the ‘Valley of Death’ becomes very real for these companies. Government funding efforts like SBIRS and STRATFI present opportunities for small companies to find money to develop new and innovative technologies for things like counter-UAS. But since there’s both a commercial and military application for this technology, that means the technology is going to advance that much quicker.” 

The Valley of Death, however, will continue to pose a significant challenge for these smaller, nontraditional companies to develop and deliver counter-UAS solutions to the government. But that’s also where the expertise of Elara Nova’s Aeronautics & Missions Systems sector can enable and empower these new entrants to sustainability.  

“Elara Nova can be quite effective in helping these companies manage the Valley of Death,” Nahom said. “Evaluating solutions like pairing with another company or looking for other funding avenues to stay solvent while making sure the government recognizes how valuable and affordable their technology is to this fight is important because the secret sauce to the c-UAS mission is going to be in these small companies and their amazing technologies.” 

Elara Nova is a trusted guiding partner that builds tailored teams to illuminate unseen opportunities and deliver impact across every domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/.   

CCA Testing Kickstarts the Next Generation of Air Dominance

Unmanned Platforms to Embrace Agile Combat Employment Concept of Operations

In a little over a year since the program’s announcement, two prototypes of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) have started ground testing and are expected to fly in the coming months. The achievement marks an impressive timeline for the aircraft’s development, which is designed to be an unmanned platform that will fly in tandem with, and in support of, manned platforms like the F-22, F-35 and the future B-21 and F-47. While the two prototype CCAs, being produced by Anduril and General Atomics respectively, will eventually be down-selected to one platform, they are expected to be a force multiplier for the warfighter by bringing a futuristic vision of manned-unmanned teaming to air warfare. 

“In terms of aircraft development, the CCAs’ progress has been lightning fast,” said Lt Gen (Ret) David “Abu” Nahom, executive director of Elara Nova’s Aeronautics and Mission Systems sector. “Next generation air dominance will take more than just manned platforms, it will require collaborative unmanned platforms equipped with missiles, sensors or even electronic attack capabilities that can overwhelm an enemy’s capacity for decision-making. CCAs will be one part of a next generation family of systems that will ensure we have freedom of the skies in a future conflict.” 

The growing prevalence of drones and unmanned platforms in the Russia-Ukraine conflict indicate the nature of warfare is changing rapidly as technologies advance in real time. Adopting and integrating innovative technologies into new and existing platforms will remain a vital component to securing air dominance.  

CCAs are seen as a solution to support manned platforms with additional capabilities, while also being able to engage enemy aircraft on their own. 

“The technology for manned-unmanned teaming is here,” Gen Nahom, whose 36-year Air Force career culminated with roles such as Commander, Alaskan Command; Alaskan NORAD Region; and Eleventh Air Force. “CCAs will have the ability to collaborate directly with manned platforms and/or other unmanned platforms. This technology is truly game-changing: an airborne network of manned-unmanned will be integral in securing the freedom to maneuver in the skies.” 

CCAs Mark the Next Evolution of Unmanned Platforms 

The adoption of CCAs will revolutionize how the Air Force flies and operates unmanned platforms. Once fully developed, multiple CCAs may be deployed alongside a single manned platform. This would mark a significant evolution from some of the first unmanned platforms to be deployed by the U.S. military: the MQ-1 and MQ-9. 

“We often deployed the MQ-1 and MQ-9 with one pilot to one platform, today’s technology allows for so much more,” Gen Nahom said. “Whether that operator is in a manned aircraft or in a ground station remains to be seen, but the technology has advanced to where one operator can control a network of unmanned platforms, the CCA development is part of that evolution.” 

CCAs also bring a series of distinct advantages to military operations that a manned platform could not provide on its own.  

“Given the nature of the evolving threat, an uncrewed team of vehicles could be very powerful in a battlespace because these uncrewed platforms could be attritable and go places where we wouldn’t want to risk a manned aircraft,” Gen Nahom said. “Manned platforms are usually more expensive for many reasons, including the need to provide life support capability for the pilot, whereas you can save weight and money by not having that requirement on an unmanned platform. It is our hope that CCAs come in at a much lower price point so the risk of loss in a battle is acceptable.” 

Further, CCAs are designed to be semi-autonomous and equipped with artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) capabilities. But it’s still unclear to what extent CCAs will leverage these emerging technologies. 

“Artificial intelligence and machine learning will be a part of CCAs,” Gen Nahom. “However, it’s important to note that these emerging technologies will not be taking over the mission, but enhancing the mission by enabling the operator to do many things at once. These unmanned platforms will certainly be controlled by a human, but AI/ML capabilities will allow that operator to do more with these platforms than he or she otherwise would have been able to do in the past.” 

Increment 1 to Lay Foundation for Future Increments 

The two prototypes are being developed under Increment 1 of the program, which is designed to prioritize speed, flexibility and cost-effectiveness of unmanned platforms. To that end, Air Force officials indicate the service may acquire up to 1,000 CCAs by the end of the decade. But whereas the Increment 1 CCA platform is expected to be cheaper and more attritable, the program will potentially lay the foundation for a more exquisite and expensive platform in follow-on increments.   

“The lessons learned from Increment 1 will help undoubtably inform the next increment’s requirements,” Gen Nahom said. “One of the benefits of a CCA network is elevating the number of aircraft, missiles and sensors to complicate an enemy’s decision-making. This is where cost can be a critical factor; if the uncrewed aircraft become too expensive we may not be able to get the numbers airborne that will be required in future conflict. 

Testing and Training for Agile Combat Employment 

The testing and training procedures will also be done according to the Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept of operations, which was unveiled in 2022 as a framework for coordinating air operations in a future joint fight. 

“The days of mustering all your aircraft at one location are likely over as that may leave you vulnerable,” Gen Nahom said. “ACE looks at generating combat power from many different locations. That might seem simple, but becomes complicated quickly because it spreads out resources like maintenance, spare parts, personnel and pilots.” 

The logistical challenge of ACE will be further compounded by the austerity of many of the locations in the South China Sea, as well as the range between airfields.  

“The South China Sea would be ‘The ultimate away game,’” Gen Nahom said. “The great distances between landmasses will be a daunting challenge to overcome in achieving a military objective. It starts with getting an aircraft on a runway or launch platform, fueled, armed and ready to take off in the right position. But then an aircraft has to be synchronized with all the other capabilities assigned to the mission. This has always been a challenge with manned platforms and it’s going to be an even greater challenge CCA teams.”  

The Air Force has already begun implementing ACE into large-scale exercises in the Pacific, including one that was held last month: Resolute Force Pacific 2025 (REFORPAC). Once fielded, it will only be a matter of time before CCAs are incorporated into these training exercises. 

The potential use cases for CCAs, however, can also go beyond the Air Force.

“There are other military services and even other nations interested in the outcome of CCA development,” Gen Nahom said. “The Air Force is looking at CCAs to solve the need for next generation air dominance teams that can be deployed in far-away places. But that’s not necessarily the same problem another nation may be trying to solve, which might be using manned-unmanned teaming for homeland defense, maritime surveillance or humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. So there’s not only opportunity to apply the technology to the Air Force’s goals and objectives, but there’s opportunities for different platforms and collaborative missions out there, as well.” 

This broad range of applications will generate continued opportunities for industry partners to continue developing CCA platforms and their adjacent technology.  

Elara Nova Evolving to Meet Industry Demands 

In recent months Elara Nova began evolving to meet the growing demand in the aeronautics domain. The consultancy has launched a new business sector to support this type of effort: Aeronautics and Mission Systems. 

“There’s been a growing demand for Elara Nova’s expertise beyond the space industry,” Gen Nahom said. “The Aeronautics and Mission Systems sector provides expertise on aeronautics and other mission system applications like command and control networks, base defense and virtual and live training systems. Another emerging mission area is Golden Dome. Elara Nova is well-positioned to assist companies and government partners on how some of these technologies and networks can come together between the air and space domains.” 

Elara Nova is a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space and aeronautics domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/. 

Episode 28: CCA Testing Kickstarts Next Generation of Air Dominance

The Elara Edge Podcast

Host: Scott King 

SME: Lt Gen (Ret) David Nahom, Executive Director of Elara Nova Aeronautics and Missions Systems 

00:02 – 01:29 

Two prototypes of the Collaborative Combat Aircraft, or CCAs, have started ground testing and are expected to fly in the coming months. This comes after the United States Air Force first announced the program a little over a year and a half ago. The achievement marks an impressive timeline for the aircraft’s development, which is designed to be an unmanned platform that will fly in tandem with, and in support of, manned platforms like the F-22, F-35 and the future B-21 and F-47. While the two prototype CCAs, being produced by Anduril and General Atomics respectively, will eventually be down-selected to one platform, they are expected to be a force multiplier for the warfighter by bringing a futuristic vision of manned-unmanned teaming to air warfare. 

Welcome to the Elara Edge. Today’s episode on Collaborative Combat Aircraft, coincides with the launch of a new business sector within Elara Nova: Aeronautics and Mission Systems or AMS. Joining us today is the executive director of AMS: retired Lt Gen David Nahom. General Nahom previously served for 36 years with the United States Air Force, which culminated in high-profile positions such as Commander of Alaskan Command; Alaskan NORAD Region; and the Eleventh Air Force. 

Together, we’ll break down how CCA testing marks the beginning of a next generation of air dominance for the United States Air Force, before learning more about the vision of Elara Nova’s new AMS team.  

Sir, welcome to the show! 

01:30 – 01:31 

Thank you. Great to be here.  

01:31 – 01:50 

Now, the CCA program is a revolutionary approach that – once adopted – is projected to significantly change how the Air Force operates.  

But as we get started here: can you introduce our audience what CCAs are and what role they intend to serve in supporting military operations for the Air Force? 

01:52 – 03:21 

CCAs are going to, over the years, they are going to take on many forms. But it’s essentially an uncrewed vehicle that’s going to collaborate, maybe with other uncrewed vehicles. But initially we’re talking about collaborating with manned crewed vehicles. In basic terms, you’d have a fighter or some other kind of manned craft with one or many unmanned aircrafts that it that it’s working in collaboration with. 

You’re going to have a family of systems to get after the next generation of air dominance: the ability to ensure we have freedom of the skies. And it’s going to take more than just manned platforms.  

There’s going to have to be unmanned platforms to do things, to be in places that you wouldn’t necessarily want to put a manned platform. And that would be because of the threat, or because you want to get the numbers up because these unmanned vehicles are apparently going to come in at a much lower price point. 

So you could have many more of them airborne, complicating an enemy’s decisions, as well as adding things like additional missiles or adding some kind of electronic attack or any number of things, a sensor as part of a mesh network. There’s any number of things an unmanned vehicle could do as part of a family of systems. 

And truly, it’s about making sure that we have freedom of the skies. As we look into recent history with what’s going on in Russia [and] Ukraine, you see the results of not having freedom in the skies in both the Ukrainians and the Russians are certainly paying the price for not having that. 

And then even more recently, you see what freedom of the skies does for an event like Iran, with Israel and certainly our bomber aircraft as well when you have freedom of maneuver in the skies. It certainly changes the nature of war. 

03:22 – 03:30 

With that in mind, Sir, can you elaborate on some of the advantages these manned- unmanned teaming platforms, like CCAs, will bring to the fight? 

03:31 – 04:13 

In its cheapest form, the uncrewed unmanned platform could be attritable. Maybe we don’t care that it comes back. It could be where you can put many of them up, with a single person and a single platform controlling them, where you can do other things like have additional missiles, additional sensors, additional electronic attack complicating the enemy’s decisions. There’s all kinds of advantages to having that kind of a network airborne. In some of these locations where you’re going to put a platform, you wouldn’t necessarily want to have a person in there because it could be a great risk. 

And, as well as, manned platforms are expensive because you have to do things like, provide for life support for the person in the platform, whereas in an unmanned platform, you certainly save weight and money by not having to do that.

04:14 – 04:20 

Do we know which aircraft CCAs will fly with? And what would that collaborative relationship look like in a warfighting scenario? 

04:21 – 05:06 

I think you’re going to see all modern aircraft have some ability to collaborate and certainly the Air Force is doing tests on all different kinds of aircraft. What was announced very recently was that the Air Force is intending on using the F-22, for the initial test with collaborative combat vehicles. 

That makes a lot of sense because that is our air dominance platform right now is the F-22 and it will be for the next decade as we wait for the F-47 to come on and take over that role. Certainly you’ll see F-35s, and you’ll see other platforms be able to collaborate with these uncrewed platforms potentially someday, maybe not even a flying platform. 

Maybe it collaborates from a ground position, a ship, maybe a large surveillance plane. There could be all kinds of ways that you could collaborate with these unmanned platforms that’s not necessarily an air-to-air fighter. 

05:07 – 05:17 

Now, the CCA program is being developed in Increments. These two prototypes are part of Increment 1. Can you describe what the requirements are for Increment 1 and its current status today? 

05:18 – 06:20 

Well, there’s still a lot of unknowns. The two companies that were selected to compete were Anduril and General Atomics. They’re just completing their prototypes and they’re just starting their testing and that starts in the lab and it goes to the ground and then goes in the air and they’re progressing. I believe they’re starting to fly this summer.   

From what I read, which is all, as I’m retired now, most of what I read is open source. Both companies are doing well, and they’re both just phenomenal technological advancements – both aircraft. And it’s just going to be fascinating to watch, as they get airborne in the air space and the test community starts integrating these aircraft and to see which one is most suitable to be that Increment one CCA platform. 

And then there will be a further down-select to one of those aircraft. Probably, from what I understand, in the next 6 to 8 months. Now, those dates always move a little bit. But it’ll be fascinating to watch as these aircraft get flying and integrating and as they do the work out West to which aircraft is going to be most suitable for Increment one and the objectives and the challenges that the Air Force is trying to solve right now.

06:21 – 06:25 

And Sir, what can we anticipate about the upcoming Increment 2 requirements? 

06:26 – 07:52 

It’s still a little bit early. I’ve heard a lot of statements out of the Air Force about what they’re looking at and I know the data is already out to the companies, and so they’re looking at it and without going into details about the data, I also think some of that is going to be informed by what they see in Increment 1 in the testing.  

I don’t know that for sure. Again, I’m on the outside looking in. But certainly if they learned some things that work and don’t work in Increment 1, it’s likely to inform the next Increment before there’s a down select to a platform and to a capability. It’ll be interesting to see what the price points come in. As a previous Air Force A-8, when I had to balance the POM and balance the books for the Air Force’s budget, at times it becomes all about the money, because there is a limit to what the Air Force can and can’t do, based on the resources. 

So with Increment 1, as these aircraft come in and they further refine what the price point is, I’m sure that will inform Increment 2, as well. Because [there] may need to be some compromise or some changes to get the numbers because, again, if you look at it like we talked about earlier, if these CCAs, one of the benefits of having CCAs is being able to have those numbers up to complicate the enemy’s decision space, to bring other missiles and other sensors airborne, to be able to have those additional aircraft airborne. If they’re too expensive and you can’t get a number of them airborne. It doesn’t seem to be too useful and so I know that the Air Force is very sensitive to that and so it’ll be interesting to follow them. 

All my eyes are on Increment one and the competition. Where we’re at we’ll see Anduril and General Atomics going with their two platforms that they’ve already developed.

07:53 – 08:08 

Now, the CCA program was first announced in January of 2024. That means these prototypes have been designed, developed and have begun testing in a little over a year and a half. 

What does this demonstrate about the progress being made on the CCA program?  

08:09 – 09:03 

In terms of aircraft development, that’s lightning fast. The Air Force has stayed true to that this is going to be a very fast development and they want to get these things airborne. The technology is here. These companies can do this. What they’re already doing is amazing and the ability to collaborate between manned and unmanned platforms in a meaningful way to achieve an objective that technology is right there in front of us. 

Now we have to just make sure we choose the correct platform and we integrate it into the fleets. As fast as that is going, my hope is that they get through this competition and they get these things developed and they get them out to the field because this technology is game-changing. It really is.  

And having done a lot of air defense, too, if I’m on the other side of this thing and there’s a whole wall of aircraft coming at me, and most of them are unmanned, which means there’s a level of risk that unmanned platforms are able to take. This is very complicated. And so, if we’re able to achieve this, which I know we are, and we’re able to do it in very short order – it’s going to be a game changing. 

09:04 – 09:08 

And Sir, when you say that the technology is here. Can you elaborate on what you mean by that? 

09:09 – 10:19 

Well, if you look at General Atomics, I mean, General Atomics has been flying unmanned platforms for a long time. MQ-1, MQ-9, and many other platforms that they’ve prepared for, not only the U.S, but many of our partner ally countries as well. This is not something new to General Atomics and the CCA is really just the next evolution of what they’ve already been doing for years for our nation and some of the things that you go back to 20-25 years ago, and I don’t have the exact date, but when we saw the first bomb on an MQ-1, I think it was a Hellfire. And the world was like, ‘That just changed everything.’ And now think about how we actually used MQ-1s and MQ-9s over the last two decades in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and many of the counter-insurgency fights. 

These things were the critical platforms for both conventional and special operations. So, you think about that company now. Now, they’re in this space with the CCA, and it’s just to me, it’s the next evolution, and certainly Anduril with the Fury – I don’t know the particulars.  

Who’s got the advantage? What aircrafts better? But there’s certain things I’m sure the Air Force is looking at right now. And, they’ll make a good down-select, but from what I’ve read, both just phenomenal aircraft and phenomenal technology. 

10:20 – 10:30 

And on that note: what do you think are some of the lessons learned from the MQ-1 and MQ-9 that the Air Force can apply toward CCAs and similar technology moving forward?

10:31 – 11:26 

Yeah, I think you know, a lot of times we did with uncrewed platforms, we were doing like one pilot-one platform. What you’re seeing now with the technology, you’re seeing one operator with many platforms and I think that that’s part of the evolution.  

Now, whether that person is on the ground, in a ground control station or in the air, in an aircraft controlling it, there certainly is an evolution about having networks of uncrewed vehicles, not just one pilot-one vehicle. 

The other one, obviously, it’s a little easier to train now because, when we first were flying uncrewed vehicles, it was very difficult to fly these things in the U.S., in our air route control structure. Now, we actually have proven this a very reliable technology. We’ve worked with the FAA for certain areas, we can train corridors, etc., and we’re able to train and test and develop in ways that were really more difficult in the past.  

So, it’s certainly a whole different ball game. When you saw the first MQ-1 to what you’re seeing now, and then when you start seeing teams of these together, I think it’s going to be just remarkable what they’re gonna be able to do. 

11:27 – 11:30 

And Sir, what will the command and control structure look like for CCAs?

  11:31 – 12:06 

I think it’s to be determined. I think there’s going to be the ability, just like we have ground control stations for many of our uncrewed vehicles, whether that’s the RQ-4, the large global Hawks or the MQ-9s, we have these ground control stations that control one vehicle with the ability to control several vehicles in certain circumstances. 

Whether these CCAs will someday be controlled from the ground, from a command and control platform from a fighter, from a bomber. I think the idea is – the answer is ‘Yes. All of the above.’ And to give the combatant commander and the air component commander, the options to do what he or she needs to do to piece this thing together to achieve an objective. 

12:07 – 12:13 

And what role, if any, will emerging technologies like artificial intelligence or machine learning play in CCAs? 

12:14 – 12:47 

As we advance in AI and machine learning, it’s going to be a huge part of this – not to take over the mission, but to enhance the mission, to allow the operator of many systems to be able to do many things at once. 

And I think that, certainly, technology is going to have to be able to allow us to do that. Again, these aren’t going to be unmanned systems going off and achieving a mission by themselves. These will be certainly controlled by a human, but using AI machine learning is going to allow that human to do more with these platforms and certainly with maybe many more platforms than he or she would have in the past. 

12:48 – 12:55 

Now, moving forward, what are some of the remaining challenges that the Air Force needs to overcome before making CCAs a reality? 

12:56 – 15:38 

You’re going to have the same challenges you have with manned platforms. And one of the challenges, especially when you look at some of the most difficult military problems, which really are in the South China Sea. It starts with logistics. Getting an aircraft on a runway or some kind of launch platform, fueled up, armed up, ready to take off, to be in the right position with all the other aircraft so you can synchronize the mission. This is very difficult.  

As you look at the South China Sea and you look at that landscape, it is, what we call ‘The ultimate away game.’ It’s great distances between landmasses and we’re going to have to go great distances to achieve a military objective. 

This is the reason why we in the Air Force do very large-scale exercises like red flags, where we practice bringing this all together, where the aircraft get airborne, maybe from many different locations. 

They show up at the same piece of sky. It’s all coordinated, and you move forward. Now, if you can imagine doing that with unmanned vehicles that are coming from several different locations, this is not going to be an easy undertaking for those that pull this all together and that is going to have to be something that may get into some of the technology of these vehicles. 

The range, the ability to take off from certain locations, smaller runways, maybe runway independent, maybe air launch, all kinds of ways that these collaborative combat vehicles can make their way into the battlespace.  

But so often you see these pictures of crewed-uncrewed teaming, and it shows a battle. It shows them all together. They’re operating together. One of the biggest challenges is how did they get there and how did it all come together? This is a challenge with manned vehicles and I think it’s going to be an even greater challenge. We have manned-unmanned vehicles together.  

We in the U.S. Air Force do it better than anybody. We will pull it together, it’s going to be pulled together and everyone’s going to go ‘That’s amazing.’ And they’re not going to realize how much work went into actually orchestrating that. And that’s why you’re seeing some of the moves the Air Force is making. Like setting up a test unit in the Nevada desert, out of Creech, so they can actually start looking at, for lack of a better word, how are we going to ‘operationalize’ this?  

Because I truly believe that’s where the hard work, the technology’s amazing. The technology is right here. Now, how are we going to actually make this achieve the military objectives we need to achieve? And that’s where I think a lot of the work is going to be. 

As well as, a lot of it is the nature of the threat. And certainly I’ve spent a lot of time in the Pacific looking at the threat, and it’s daunting. What the Chinese are building to and what they’re prepared to do.  

When you look at the threat, and you look at how difficult it is, there’s going to be places you’re not going to want to put a manned platform, and having an unmanned platform that could do some of the missions in concert with the manned platforms, that collaboration between manned and unmanned medium and platforms is going to be something that’s gonna be quite useful in a high end warfare that you could potentially see in the South China Sea. 

15:39 – 16:02 

And Sir, these challenges also speak to the Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment – or ACE – concept of operations. This is the relatively new approach that was initially unveiled by the service in 2022. 

But for those of our listeners who are not yet familiar with ACE. Can you introduce us to this concept and how CCA’s are in some ways, designed exactly for this type of approach? 

16:03 – 18:44 

Yeah. CCA’s are going to have to fit into how we are actually going to fight because the days of mustering all your aircraft at one location could make you very vulnerable. So as you, as you look at ACE it really is: as we look at how we’re going to generate combat power, let’s spread out and do this for many locations. 

That sounds really simple. It’s very, very complicated because it splits out maintenance, it splits out spare parts, it splits out key personnel. You know, if you only have a certain amount of pilots in one location and one goes down for an illness, well, how do I get them to their location to get an airplane? 

There’s just a lot of challenges with ACE, and we exercise this quite often. We do this, in fact, in July of this year, the Air Force is undergoing an exercise called REFORPAC, which is a large-scale exercise in the Pacific that is using ACE concepts and how we’re actually going to employ airpower in a very difficult scenario like a counter-China scenario. 

If you add unmanned vehicles in there, it will complicate it a bit because where are these vehicles launching from? Do they have the same range of the aircraft? Are they air-refuelable? Because very often we take off from the locations and the first thing our aircraft have to do, especially in the South China Sea, is get some gas to get to the fight, they may have to get gas a second time to get to the fight, depending where they’re coming from or maybe even a third time.  

Are these vehicles, these CCAs, are they air-refuelable or do they have to be stationed closer or do they come off rails? There’s a lot of technology out there, where they’re rail-launched, there’s technology where they’re air-launched, comes off large bombers and large aircraft, those are some of the things that will have to be worked out depending on where the Air Force goes. 

Now, the two CCA variants that are competing for the CCA Increment 1 are both, runway-launched, runway-recovered. But then again, where are they going to launch and recover from? Do they have the range to get there? The refueling to get there. Where are the tankers going to be? Again, this is a very complex undertaking to get that beautiful picture that we all see, all the airplanes lined up together doing their mission. 

There’s a lot of work, in fact, in large exercises, the ones that I’ve flown in when we’re all lined up and we’re ready to go, and you hear the big words on the radio that says “Fights on, fights on.” And the big, large-scale air war is going to go like a red flag – that’s usually the easiest part of the day.  

The most difficult part of the day already happened. Getting everyone airborne, getting everyone into the tanker tracks, getting everyone gassed, getting everyone lined up on time. And then once, they say, “Go, go fight.”  It’s something, which is something we, we grew up doing in the fighter world, certainly the bomber pilots and all the other support aircraft, as well. 

But, the work to getting there and I believe in ACE, when people come from all different locations with the uncrewed vehicles, it’ll be complex. It’s absolutely something we can do. But it’s something we’re gonna have to work out and exercise often.

18:45 – 18:57 

With respect to these large-scale exercises, there’s also the question of how the Air Force intends to integrate CCAs with other operational aircraft across the other services, and even with international partners. 

What would that look like? 

18:58 – 20:24 

And I tell you that’s where I think a lot of the work is for the Air Force. Obviously, the industry has got a huge play, whatever company selected and, I can’t say enough about the U.S industry and what they are able to do, what they’re able to achieve. It’s just remarkable.  

But when these things get to the Air Force, how we integrate them, where we integrate them, how we train to this, how we piece this thing together, how do we get all these aircraft lined up in the right place at the right time, so we can achieve our objective? This is going to be a challenge.  

It’s a great challenge, though. And I think the Air Force is making all the right steps right now, especially with that training test unit that they’re setting up out in the Nevada desert. That’s the first step. That’s where, when you look at how we take any technology industry gives us and how do we integrate it into the field? 

[It] very often starts in the Nevada desert, and usually with our operational test units that are already there, this is a big step and these are the brightest minds we have in our Air Force, and the Air Warfare Center. And, they will figure out how we’re going to integrate it, and then they will train, they will use what they learn and train the field about how this integration is going to work, and then it’ll spread out. 

This will be – because this is very different. And it will be a challenge – look at our fighter squadrons in our fighter units around the world, you don’t have unmanned platforms parked next to the fighters right now. So how are you gonna get these fighters that are based in Europe, in Alaska and in Japan. How are they going to get to the fight with their unmanned vehicles?  

Piecing that together is going to be one of the challenges, that’s gonna be very exciting to watch and work through. And they’ll work through it very fast. But there’s a lot – it will be a lot of work to do that. 

20:25 – 20:29 

Thank you, Sir. So what’s next for the CCA program? What can we expect next? 

20:30 – 22:27 

Yeah. I think we’re all watching for the Increment 1 selection. Obviously, also, watching for the Increment 2 and how that develops out. To me, those are probably the two big things right now and I know the industry is watching very closely as well.  

Because beyond Anduril and General Atomics, there’re many other companies that are very interested in getting into this space or getting back into this space to develop the next round, and there will be opportunities for  other companies to come in on the following Increments. 

I think that’s one of the exciting parts about this. It’s not going to be announced like one company, and they will develop these airplanes for the next 10-15-20 years. That was not the intent. And so, it’ll be very interesting to watch over the next probably year. 

As well as, it’s not just the U.S. Air Force that is interested. There’s other services interested, there’s other nations interested. So there’s going to be opportunities, even the follow on increments, if you look at what the Air Force is looking for, if you look at the problem we’re trying to solve in making sure that we can have these next generation air dominance teams, teams of teams, potentially in very faraway places. 

That’s not necessarily the same problem set another nation’s trying to solve. Maybe what they’re looking for is unmanned platforms to team with their manned platforms for homeland defense or a maritime surveillance mission, or there could be a lot of other reasons. So I think there’s not only opportunity with technology that the U.S. Air Force is looking at, but there’s opportunities for different platforms and different kinds of collaboration for other missions that are out there. 

It may be HA/DR humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, maybe there could be all kinds of ways that manned-unmanned teaming could be applied to different places besides the United States Air Force. And I think that offers a huge opportunity to industry to not only track very closely what’s going on in Increment 1, Increment 2, but also for the technology the Air Force is not selecting where could that apply to other places around the world, because I think there’s a lot of places that are not going to be looking for exactly what the U.S. Air Force is looking for in this Increment 1 competition.

22:28 – 22:49 

Now, our listeners are used to hearing from Elara Nova on matters related to national security space. 

But today’s program has been focused on the air domain. And this coincides with a recent development for Elara Nova that you’ve been tasked with leading. So, Sir, can you introduce our audience to the goals and objectives of Elara Nova’s new business sector: Aeronautics and Mission Systems? 

22:50 – 23:57 

This really came out of a lot of conversations over the last, obviously 4 to 6 months with the Founding Partners. I came onto Elara Nova, several months ago, to help them out with some of the non-space related aspects of some of their contracts.  

I don’t have a space background, although I’ve been in and around the space applications my entire career. So I understand quite a bit what space brings to the battlefield and what we need and don’t need in the battle space. 

That said, over the last month or two, there’s been a growing demand for what Elara Nova already is providing on the space side in some non-space related areas and so as we bring on the Aeronautics and Mission Systems is that incredible product that Elara Nova is already providing for companies on the space side. 

We can provide the same thing on aeronautics and some of the mission systems and mission applications. And this could be anything from command and control networks, base defense. It could be training systems, in the virtual and the live training systems, there’s many places that we are going to bring the expertise to provide that same incredible product Elara Nova’s brought on the space sector to other places, to our other defense partners’ needs.

23:58 – 24:06 

And then how does Elara Nova’s expansion with this new AMS sector reflect the inherent interoperability of the air and space domains today?  

24:07 – 24:54 

I think one of the places where it’s going to bring us together is a lot of the work the industry is going to be doing in the coming years with Golden Dome. I think you’re going to see space and non-space come together. And I think Elara Nova is going to be very well poised to assist companies, and even some of our government partners, on how some of these technologies come together, and where some of these markets are, because if you look at defending the homeland, much of that is going to be space-based. 

Certainly a lot of the sensors. A lot of the networks, a lot of the command control architecture and even some of the interceptors, but a lot of it’s going to be in the air domain, as well. There will be sensors and networks that are not in space, as well as the ability to shoot down what could be threatening our nation. 

So I think, when you look at Golden Dome, I think you’re seeing an incredible example of space and aeronautics coming together and I think Elara Nova is very well-positioned to assist our clients in that space.  

24:55 – 25:04 

And how can and will Elara Nova’s AMS team support both established and emerging industry partners that are interested in contributing to Air Force programs like the CCA and others like it? 

25:05 – 27:10 

Well certainly with newer industry partners coming on [with] emerging technology, I think we’re in a good position to assist them, to show them where the markets are, make the introductions, make the connections, whether it’s with the government or with other industry partners that they can marry up with. With some of the more established: certainly, they’re always looking for where the next thing is.  

At Elara Nova, we’re bringing on the experts, many with very recent military experience and industry experience, that know where some of these markets are and I think we can even help some of these established companies, some of the larger, aerospace industry partners, where the next technology, where the next market is, where the next big bet is. We want to provide the same incredible product that Elara Nova has been providing to their space to their space customers over the last two years.  

One of the first challenges which we’ve already overcome is assembling the right team, and we’re bringing on initially, about ten, just incredible people, men and women, that have established themselves in the military have recently retired, have led at large-scale, have been part of acquisition, have been part of the DC world in terms of how the budgets come together and I think we’re going to be in a very good position with our initial customers to provide them that same incredible product that Elara Nova’s been known for.  

That’s the mark. What Elara Nova has been doing the last two years, is we’ve got to be able to provide that level of support to our clients. That’s what they’re expecting, because I believe that’s what’s going to make us different. There are a lot of other companies out there that can consult and advise.  

We’re gonna be, just like on the space side. we’re going to be that next level much with incredible individuals. And, and the ability to get in there, get our hands dirty and help these companies with whatever their needs are, whether it’s getting to the next technology, whether it’s merging with a larger or smaller company or whether it’s the relationships with the government or other nations. We want to make sure we’re in a good position. In fact, one of the partners we already brought on the aeronautics side was a recently retired Royal Air Force two-star, just because we want to make sure that we have the ability to get these companies married up with not only other government contacts in the States, but also with other nations, as well. 

27:10 – 27:46 

This has been an episode of The Elara Edge. As a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space and aeronautical domains, Elara Nova is your source for expertise and guidance in national security. 

If you liked what you heard today, please subscribe to our channel and leave us a rating. Music for this podcast was created by Patrick Watkins of PW Audio. This episode was edited and produced by Regia Multimedia Services. I’m your host, Scott King, and join us next time at the Elara Edge.