NATO investing in space capabilities to enhance multi-domain operations, establish deterrence  

Air Marshall Stringer reflects on NATO’s journey since declaring space an operational domain in 2019 

Since declaring space an operational domain in 2019, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has sought to reinforce its multinational alliance with space capabilities. Toward this end, NATO has released an Overarching Space Policy, founded the NATO Space Operations Centre and published a Commercial Space Strategy. Each element lays a foundation from which NATO leaders can acquire the space capabilities they need for a future conflict. But for Air Marshal Sir Johnny Stringer, the retiring Deputy Commander of NATO’s Allied Air Command, implementing these plans is more critical now than ever before. 

“Strategies are great, but you’ve got to implement them,” Stringer said. “There is a real need and urgency for space capabilities, but we’re still playing catch-up even six years later. A few NATO nations have spending power to acquire space capabilities and that creates a fantastic environment for the commercial space sector to develop, sell and compete in. But for those nations that don’t have that spending power, space is a dual-use domain that offers one of the most vibrant, commercial-public alliance ecosystems we can still exploit.” 

NATO’s decision to declare space an operational domain stems from an urgency to overcome what Stringer calls “the two long shadows” that loom over the military alliance today. 

“The first long shadow began with the peace dividend, the conscious decision not to invest in defense after the Cold War,” Stringer said. “This led to the second long shadow: counterinsurgency operations against adversaries with little to no counter-air or space capability, electronic warfare or spectrum dominance. That is, until Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. But even then, the rising threat goes back further to Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 and Georgia in 2008.” 

Planning for space in a future conflict 

Every four years, NATO follows a framework known as the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), to align Allies’ defense plans with the NATO’s capability requirements.  The most recent cycle began in 2023. 

“We’re just now getting into phase four of the five-phase space domain implementation plan,” Stringer said. “The campaign plan sets a chart for us in three key areas: establishing a unified space command and control, enhancing our capabilities on space domain awareness and space based-ISR and developing the ability to deliver combat space effects. But the reality is that while some individual NATO nations have long-established combat space effect capability, those that don’t can now contract for it from commercial providers.” 

The challenges NATO has in acquiring space capabilities, however, is not unique solely to the space domain. It parallels a broader, historical challenge in that the military alliance itself does not own warfighting capabilities.  

This is a challenge Brad Head, Managing Director of International Partnerships at Elara Nova, witnessed firsthand during his time in uniform at NATO’s STEADFAST DEFENDER exercise a few years ago. 

“General Christopher Cavoli, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe at the time, asked at the start of STEADFAST DEFENDER exercise about what space capabilities NATO had,” Head said. “But the Army lieutenant colonel who was leading the exercise’s space efforts told him, ‘NATO doesn’t have any space capabilities because member nations retain their sovereign space capabilities and will only provide it to NATO if it’s needed and available.’” 

Assuring access to space capabilities 

While this challenge is not unique to NATO’s space capabilities – the alliance itself doesn’t own assets like fighter jets, tanks or naval destroyers, either – today’s commercial space industry presents new opportunities for NATO to access the space capabilities it requires. 

“NATO’s lacking physical ownership of space capabilities doesn’t worry me, but the assured access to those capabilities definitely does,” Stringer said. “But the commercial driver in space has been there for decades: satellite communications were being driven by commercial providers since 1991, and the cost per kilo of putting payloads on orbit is cheaper now compared to where it was ten years ago. What is changing for the better, though, is a better educated middle and senior echelon that recognizes not just our reliance on space, but also the different opportunities to get the space capabilities we need.” 

That’s why moving forward, Stringer identifies two space priorities for NATO to continue building toward to ensure that NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), a role currently held by General Alexus G. Grynkewich, will have the space capabilities needed to accomplish a given mission. 

“Our first priority is to rapidly develop the space cadre of our member nations because that means nations can put more people into the NATO space enterprise,” Stringer said. “That includes developing our overall space education and training capability in member nations to a multinational set of standards. The second priority is ensuring we continually refine NATO’s family of plans and making sure the space capabilities identified in those plans are assured to the SACEUR.” 

Responding to a rising space threat 

Preparing for a future space fight is not only necessary – it’s vital. There is greater competition in space today that threatens to undermine the relative homogeneity of Western military dominance over the past few decades. This is in part because rising competitors, namely Russia and China, have been able to study the West’s military playbook throughout that same period of time. 

”We have enjoyed an unnaturally long period of relative peace in Europe, but we must prepare for war if we want to maintain that peace,” Stringer said. “We’re in an era of stealth technology, precision-guided munitions and the exploitation of space-based capabilities and militarized systems, which was first realized during the First Gulf War in 1991. Our combination of the 5 T’s – technology, thinking, tactics, training, and theory of victory – was phenomenal in 1991, but looked remarkably the same in 2021. Meanwhile, we disinvested in some key areas like integrated air and missile defense, and our competitors have now sought to turn our approach to warfare against us.” 

As a result, NATO is making a renewed and greater investment into acquiring warfighting capabilities.  

“NATO nations committed to spending five percent of their GDP on defense at The Hague Summit,” Head said. “This means nations are going to be investing significantly and space capabilities will be a key part of that conversation. That means NATO is now in a position to clearly articulate their priorities to their member nations and industry partners.” 

One of the highest priorities will be taking the necessary steps to achieve not only space superiority, but the air superiority that will inherently come with it.  

“All of NATO’s components must be able to exploit the freedom of access and freedom of maneuver that space-based systems and air superiority provides, but that’s also one of the key elements our opponents have sought to neutralize,” Stringer said. “This means one of our key missions is counter anti-access and area denial, which is not solely to free up access and maneuver for NATO’s air component, but to ensure freedom of access and maneuver for everybody.” 

NATO’s imperative for multi-domain operations 

This vital intersection of air and space superiority further reflects the multi-domain operations that will be critical to a future fight, but particularly challenging for a multinational alliance like NATO. 

“Even with the recognition of space and cyber as being operational domains in their own right, there is more to multi-domain operations than just the three military domains of land, air and maritime,” Stringer said. “Multi-domain operations include all instruments of alliance power. This means fusing intelligence and economic warfare with both traditional military and non-military means across domains within a protracted campaign.” 

According to Stringer, laying the groundwork for successful multi-domain operations requires a thoughtful approach that goes beyond acquiring the latest space technologies.  

“Multi-domain operations places a premium on two things: how does your command and control system function across nations and how do you empower your commanders and their staff to excel?’” Stringer said. “If you don’t have those two things, all the flashy equipment you might have is not going to perform as you need it to. This is where the space workforce is really important, because otherwise you’re not going to get the maximum return on your investment.” 

Establishing and maintaining deterrence 

Now, looking ahead, it’s more than just creating an alliance that can deter a future threat, but defeat it.  

“You don’t build forces to deter, you build forces to win,” Stringer said. “Therefore, you must have the military forces that can demonstrably win in all five of the operational domains recognized by NATO. Therefore, building the capabilities you need to assure deterrence is important, because if anyone that threatens you will end up significantly worse.” 

Deterrence, established and reinforced by a multinational force like NATO, will be pivotal to keeping space open and free for countries around the world. 

“It doesn’t matter whether you feel space should be preserved as a sanctified area,” Stringer said. “That decision was made for us when nations were going to space with the rapid expansions of military and commercial space technologies. Space has underpinned our way in warfare to a basic, tactical level. We come back to a classic: ‘Imagine a day without space,’ but now it’s a real challenge that we have to recognize.” 

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