Department of War Seeks Solutions for Emerging Counter-UAS Mission 

Real-world Drone Attacks Demonstrate Imperative for an Integrated Command and Control Structure 

Recent years have demonstrated the growing prevalence of drones in surveillance and military operations. In 2024, unidentified drones flew over a military base in Langley, Virginia. In 2025, Israel used drones to take out Iranian air defense systems in a coordinated attack, while Ukraine launched “Operation Spiderweb,” using drones to damage and destroy aircraft deep within Russian territory. But a new Department of Defense Inspector General report uncovered a series of challenges for defending the United States’ military installations from similar drone incursions or attacks. These potential vulnerabilities have prompted the Joint Interagency Task Force 401, an Army-led organization tasked with the counter-Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) mission, to release updated policy guidance that requires military installation commanders to prepare their own counter-UAS defense plans within the next 60 days.  

“The Ukrainians’ and the Israelis’ use of small UAS’s showed how effective drones can be as part of a large, complex military operation,” said Lt. Gen. (Ret) David “Abu” Nahom, President of Elara Nova’s Aeronautics & Mission Systems sector. “That’s something we’ve got to be very attuned to now, especially when we had small UAS’s around Langley Air Force base a few years ago. We need to be able to quickly identify where they are, who they are and then apply a countermeasure to neutralize it.” 

This series of escalating events demonstrates not only how UAS’s are changing the nature of military operations, but also the imperative to find new and innovative solutions to address the emerging counter-UAS mission.  

The Air Force categorizes small UAS’s in five different groups based on size, operating altitude, and weight. However, despite these classifications identifying the source, capabilities and intent of each UAS is a complex task, particularly when it comes to determining the appropriate counter measure for an incursion or attack. 

“Group classification is important because a weapon that could take out a Group One drone may not be effective against a Group Three drone,” said Col (Ret) JP “Spear” Mintz, Managing Director of the Aeronautics & Mission Systems sector at Elara Nova. “Size matters because a larger drone is easier to detect and a higher operating altitude often means higher speeds. Weight is particularly important for the collateral risk, because taking out a 1,300-lb. drone laden with explosives is vastly different from a 1/2-lb. quadcopter with a camera.” 

Government Seeks New and Innovative Solutions 

One emerging solution is the DroneHunter F700, a reusable, low-collateral counter drone system that launches tethered nets to capture intruding drones. The Joint Interagency Task Force 401 recently contracted for two of these DroneHunters for further operational testing. 

Another potential solution may come from repurposing weapon systems the Department of War already has, namely, the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS). While originally designed for air-to-ground strikes, APKWS has proven effective in air-to-air combat in Ukraine. 

This led the Air Force to consider ideas for how APKWS might be launched from a ground system to counter Group One to Group Three drone threats.  

“There’s both a dollar and an inventory cost to using high-end, exquisite weapon systems like AMRAMM versus something like the APKWS for smaller threats,” Mintz said. “APKWS was not originally designed to target airborne threats, but it’s proven to be effective as a low-cost response to UAS’s. So instead of a fighter aircraft carrying the APKWS for the counter-UAS mission, the RFI wants to explore what a ground-based launcher for APKWS would look like.” 

Lowering the Cost-Curve, Risk for Collateral Damage 

While the RFI does not guarantee a contract for a ground-based APKWS launcher will materialize, it does demonstrate how the Air Force is considering lower-cost alternatives compared to other missile defense systems like the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAMM), the AIM-9X Sidewinder or the Phased Array Tracking Radar for Intercept on Target (PATRIOT). 

“Previously, we were using expensive missiles on a very inexpensive UAS, and that’s a cost curve that we’re never going to win against,” Nahom said. “So if we can figure out a low-cost solution that can fire many rounds with low-collateral damage, this would make a lot of sense instead of having to launch an expensive and destructive PATRIOT missile. Rather, we can save the PATRIOT for something it was truly designed to defend against, like a theater ballistic missile. This RFI will help the Air Force get after that problem set.” 

Minimizing collateral damage is a significant consideration when developing counter-UAS technologies, particularly because some military installations bases and airports are in close proximity to cities and civilian populations.  

“Non-kinetic solutions, like GPS denial, cyber attacks, or directed energy can be used to shut a UAS down with less collateral damage,” Mintz said. “But even then, you have to think about what air traffic might be flying overhead or nearby because a directed energy laser can run the risk of inadvertantly affecting a commercial airliner. So even as these counter-UAS technologies develop, we’ll continue to see these other challenges emerge.” 

The Command and Control Imperative 

Determining the appropriate response, whether kinetically or non-kinetically, reinforces the imperative for a clear and effective command and control structure that can identify and respond to drone incursions or attacks in near real-time. 

“Drone warfare underscores the absolute importance of being able to detect a threat, identify it, determine its intent, behind it and the command and control structure to match effectors to the targets,” Mintz said. “But to make that happen in such a fast manner, like in immediate-threat scenarios like Operation Spiderweb where decision times are reduced to near zero, really challenges the current air defense paradigm.” 

Similarly, command and control was the publicly-stated number one priority for General Mike Guetlein, who has been tasked with orchestrating the Golden Dome for America.  

“Golden Dome intends to defend the homeland against more conventional attacks like ballistic and cruise missiles, hyperglide vehicles and even weapons emanating from space, but it also has to account for threats from other domains,” Nahom said. “But like we saw with the Israeli strikes on Iran, UAS’s could be part of a complex and coordinated attack on our homeland. So Golden Dome’s command and control structure needs to be seamless across domains and that’s a great indicator for industry to focus on not just Golden Dome, but the counter-UAS fight, as well.”   

Counter-UAS Solutions as a Dual-Use Technology 

The need for counter-UAS technologies, and a command and control system to accommodate them, goes beyond just military applications. In 2019, a drone incursion at a nearby airport disrupted air traffic at Newark Liberty International Airport in New Jersey, while in 2025 a drone collision grounded and severely damaged a Canadian firefighting aircraft responding to the devastating Palisades wildfire. 

The dual-use nature of counter-UAS technologies, particularly non-kinetic ones, could enable new entrants in the market for the government to work with. 

“The small, cheap and proliferated nature of the drone threats means a lot of nontraditional and emerging companies can now compete in this market,” Mintz said. “In the past, nontraditional companies couldn’t really compete because of the exquisite, expensive, deeply technical nature of conventional threats. But the counter-UAS mission inherently encourages innovation from the smaller, nontraditional defense companies, particularly because this mission is not just a military challenge, it’s a law enforcement and a public safety challenge, as well.” 

So while the Department of War seeks to go “commercial first” as part of its acquisition reform overhaul, the same opportunities apply to acquiring solutions for the emerging counter-UAS mission. 

“If industry can come up with a way to keep UAS’s away from a busy airport in a downtown area like Newark Airport in New Jersey, the government can probably use that similar counter-UAS technology at Anderson Airbase in Guam,” Nahom said. “But that’s also where the ‘Valley of Death’ becomes very real for these companies. Government funding efforts like SBIRS and STRATFI present opportunities for small companies to find money to develop new and innovative technologies for things like counter-UAS. But since there’s both a commercial and military application for this technology, that means the technology is going to advance that much quicker.” 

The Valley of Death, however, will continue to pose a significant challenge for these smaller, nontraditional companies to develop and deliver counter-UAS solutions to the government. But that’s also where the expertise of Elara Nova’s Aeronautics & Missions Systems sector can enable and empower these new entrants to sustainability.  

“Elara Nova can be quite effective in helping these companies manage the Valley of Death,” Nahom said. “Evaluating solutions like pairing with another company or looking for other funding avenues to stay solvent while making sure the government recognizes how valuable and affordable their technology is to this fight is important because the secret sauce to the c-UAS mission is going to be in these small companies and their amazing technologies.” 

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