Defining “Counterspace” in the Theory on Competitive Endurance 

Offensive and Defensive Counterspace Capabilities to Preserve a Peaceful Space Domain 

In General B. Chance Saltzman’s “Theory on Competitive Endurance,” the Chief of Space Operations for the United States Space Force listed three core tenets of the military’s approach to the space domain: avoid operational surprise, deny first-mover advantage, and undertake responsible counterspace campaigning. Since the document’s release, the third tenet of “counterspace,” has become increasingly relevant for a warfighting domain that has traditionally approached space capabilities with restrictive classification policies and risk-averse language. But now, the imperative to both understand and define “counterspace,” reflects how potential adversaries view space capabilities as both a strategic advantage and potential vulnerability for the United States military.  

“Counterspace is the ability to deny an adversary’s use of space, and that includes both offensive or defensive measures,” said Col (Ret) Stu Pettis, Elara Nova partner and former Chief of Space Integration with the United States Space Force. “General Saltzman’s theory recognizes the Space Force needs to continually refine and develop its capabilities to ensure that we never entice an attack on our space systems. Ultimately, if we have credible offensive and defensive space capabilities and we can continually demonstrate those capabilities – it will deter a conflict in space.” 

While Gen Saltzman’s theory uses the term “competitive endurance,” instead of “strategic deterrence,” the underlying objective remains the same. 

“Deterrence is not explicitly mentioned in the theory, but it’s very much about deterring a rational actor from destroying the space environment,” said Col (Ret) Dave Morrow, Elara Nova partner and former Director of Testing and Evaluation with the United States Space Force. “Competitive endurance is about preserving the space environment so that it can be used by all. The first mover almost always wins in space, so counterspace must have both offensive and defensive capabilities to achieve space superiority.” 

As such, the Space Force must account for a variety of counterspace threats that include both kinetic and non-kinetic means of warfare. Specifically, the Congressional Research Service classifies counterspace weapons in four categories: 

1. Kinetic: direct-ascent or co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon 

2. Non-kinetic: directed energy lasers or microwaves 

3. Electronic: jamming or spoofing using the electromagnetic spectrum to disrupt satellite signals 

4. Cyber: compromising a satellite’s computer networks 

Kinetic Counterspace Weapons 

Kinetic warfare, primarily through ASATs launched from Earth (direct-ascent) or from a shared orbit in space (co-orbital), means destroying a satellite with a fired missile or other projectile. This approach, however, has significant implications for the space domain. 

“Kinetic attacks create a nightmare scenario called ‘The Kessler Syndrome,’ where you create so much debris that it starts impacting other pieces of debris, which creates more debris in a cascading bad effect,” Col Pettis said. “Space is a shared resource. It’s not just potential combatants like China, Russia and the United States that would be affected. Every nation uses satellites or leverages space capabilities in some way.” 

The repercussions of kinetic attacks in space would also carry significant impacts on Earth, particularly considering the prevalent role of space in our way of life. 

“Space has been a military domain since the early 1960s, but it has evolved into a far more economic domain since then,” Col Morrow said. “Space capabilities drive the world’s economy. Every single banking transaction worldwide is based off of a very precise timestamp that’s provided through GPS. If that capability alone is compromised, the global economic system will collapse and we cannot allow that to happen.” 

That’s why it’s assumed that a rational state actor, one who also relies on space capabilities for military and economic objectives, would likely recognize that a kinetic strike in space would in some respects be self-defeating. However, that hasn’t stopped potential adversaries from conducting their own direct-ascent ASAT tests. 

General Saltzman has referred to China’s 2007 direct-ascent ASAT test, which created more than 3,000 pieces of orbital debris, a ‘pivot point’ in space operations. Meanwhile, Russia conducted a direct-ascent ASAT in 2021 that created more than 1,500 pieces of orbital debris and was even found to be developing a nuclear weapon for space.  

Then there’s also the possibility that an irrational actor, particularly one who does not rely on space capabilities, may seek to compromise the space domain through a kinetic attack. 

“We must also be prepared for an irrational actor,” Col Morrow said. “For example, North Korea has enough of a rocket ability to put a crude nuclear weapon into orbit. This would destroy the space environment for everybody. But North Korea is not reliant on space, so that can level the playing field for their conventional army quite rapidy.” 

Non-Kinetic Counterspace Weapons 

At the same time, the potentially devastating effects of kinetic warfare also means a growing prevalence of non-kinetic warfare like directed energy, electronic warfare and cyber attacks.  

“A laser takes directed energy and focuses it on a very specific point to burn a hole in something,” Col Morrow said. “It’s as though you were directing the sun’s energy through a magnifying glass to a specific point on your hand: it burns. So laser weapons use directed energy to deceive, degrade, deny, disrupt, or destroy a satellite’s capability.”  

Electronic warfare, meanwhile, leverages the electromagnetic spectrum to jam or spoof a satellite’s downlink or uplink signals.  

“Satellites need a discrete frequency to communicate with a ground station,” Col Pettis said. “Jamming means overwhelming that frequency with noise, whether that be the information a ground station is receiving from the satellite’s downlink or preventing the ground station from communicating with the satellite through its uplink. Spoofing is more specialized in that it emulates a ground station’s communication signal or command to compromise the information a satellite is receiving. Both would effectively deny a satellite’s capability.” 

Joint Force operations in other warfighting domains are strategically reliant on accurate data, particuarly for targeting information provided by space systems like GPS. But transmitting that targeting data is also reliant on the Internet, which means the threat of cyber attacks can directly compromise a military action.  

“Cyberattacks reinforce the imperative that you must have reliable and accurate data,” Col Morrow said. “The first thing an adversary will want to do is make you believe your data wasn’t accurate, because you want to be absolutely certain of your target coordinates before you shoot. At the same time, the cost of entry into cyberspace is a computer and an Internet connection, so it doesn’t take much to disrupt a network. That’s why our cyber professionals are baked into every space capability.” 

Space Domain Awareness and Norms of Behavior 

The variety of these counterspace threats also reinforces that space domain awareness, or the ability to identify and understand the location, capabilities and intent of other space systems, is the foundational element to successful space operations. 

“The most deadly punch is the one you don’t see coming,” Col Morrow said. “A rendezvous and proximity operation, or RPO, is a very calculated approach that enables one satellite to dock with another is the exact same science a satellite can use to kinetically or non-kinetically compromise one of our space assets. So this gets back to defining and demonstrating acceptable norms of behavior in space.” 

The imperative to establish responsible norms of behavior is becoming significantly more important as the space domain becomes more populated with not only government systems, but also commercial systems, as well. Furthermore, the inherently dual-use nature of space systems means that the Space Force’s commercial space partners must also be prepared for counterspace threats.  

“The biggest strength of the U.S. military today is how fast we can operate,” Col Pettis said. “That’s enabled by space. So even though today’s U.S. military does not have massive amounts of military forces deployed forward, they are all still one satellite communications signal from getting whatever support they need. But if the military is using commercial satellite communications for military command and control, then that commercial satellite also becomes a valid military target. Our adversaries have had more than 20 years to recognize and identify this – so we need to be prepared to address that threat.”  

This growing recognition applies across the commercial space economy, whether contractors are supporting the Space Force with satellite imagery, launch, weather or navigation services. Now, Gen Saltzman’s Theory on Competitive Endurance is signaling a broader shift toward more openness about discussing counterspace threats and capabilities so the Space Force’s partners can fully understand a dynamically changing space environment. 

That’s also where Elara Nova, with its portfolio of partners steeped in military and commercial space experience, can help define and understand the emerging terms being used to describe the rapidly evolving space domain. 

“One of the big challenges the Space Force has is telling its story,” Col Pettis said. “Elara Nova was created in part to help commercial space companies understand the meaning of terms like ‘counterspace.’ But General Saltzman’s Theory on Competitive Endurance should allay some fears in that we’re not militarizing space. We’re just trying to preserve it for peaceful purposes, and so Elara Nova can help clearly articulate the Space Force’s approach for their commercial space partners.” 

Elara Nova is a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/.