Chinese AI Closing Gap in Cybersecurity Vulnerability Detection

Export Control Disruption Sharpens the Case for Faster Government-Industry AI Partnership

The race to artificial intelligence supremacy appears to be getting tighter. Earlier this summer, a Chinese AI model known as Z.ai was found to match Anthropic’s Mythos at discovering cybersecurity vulnerabilities despite trailing U.S. models on other tasks. The development carries real national security implications as the cyber domain increasingly operates at machine speed, while heightening the imperative for the U.S. government and commercial industry to partner together to streamline development and adoption of secure and reliable AI tools.  

“It’s no surprise that the Chinese are advancing their AI technology through whatever means necessary, whether it’s through the chips that they are developing or procuring or their models exfiltrating and learning from our most advanced models,” said Mike Robbins, a retired U.S. Air Force colonel and the former Director of the USSPACECOM Joint Cyber Center and Joint Ops Center, who is now a Partner at Elara Nova. “What’s more concerning is the cost of entry into the cyber domain is lowering, because as the Chinese advance their AI models they make those models available to whoever will work with them in whatever way they want. That creates a greater national security problem because more people will be trying to hack into our systems.” 

Cyber operators are prepared to address cybersecurity attacks in real time, but an AI-enabled cybersecurity environment accelerates the need to leverage new tools as they become available to achieve the mission.  

“Your job at an ops center is to get information in, identify the things you can exploit and make a decision that keeps you one step ahead of your adversary,” Robbins said. “In cybersecurity, the biggest risk is finding a zero-day exploit on zero day or before zero day, which means you’re already at a disadvantage. While the tools operators use might change and increasingly move at machine speeds, it’s still about the OODA loop. If we’re not using AI to help synthesize data and help commanders in their OODA loop decision-making, then we’re already behind the power curve.” 

Non-Deterministic AI Demands Continuous Validation  

However, adopting innovative tools carries its own set of risks, particularly when the technology’s development outpaces an institution’s capacity to thoroughly vet and authorize its use. 

“At the end of the day, the commander is responsible for understanding and managing the risk,” said Lt. Gen. (Ret) Bob Skinner, an Executive Partner at Elara Nova and the former Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and Commander of the Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN). “AI is going to give you a non-deterministic answer, which means you can have the same input and put it in twice but get two different answers. So leveraging AI isn’t necessarily going to give you the right answer that you need for the problem that you’re trying to solve. That can be devastating for national security when lives are on the line.” 

At the same time, as China’s AI-enabled cybersecurity advancements demonstrate, there’s an opportunity cost that comes with failing to adopt cutting-edge technologies like artificial intelligence fast enough.  

“Commanders have to decide what their objectives are and understand how AI technology can help them achieve those objectives,” said Maj. Gen. (Ret) Kim Crider, Founding Partner at Elara Nova and the former Chief Technology and Innovation Officer at the United States Space Force. “But we also have to leverage AI at scale, with the whole operational enterprise and the infrastructure that supports the operator: the acquirers, the policy makers and the defense industrial base are all required to drive this technology into our operations to maximum effect.” 

The first step toward this end starts with the U.S. government and industry jointly validating and auditing these models.  

“Every model has a different success rate when it comes to answering prompts, so you need a testing mechanism to validate the answers you’re receiving in a way that builds confidence that the system is providing the right information,” Skinner said. “There is always a risk for periodic inaccuracies, but managing that risk is the responsibility of the commander. So we must establish continuous monitoring, continuous validation and continuous auditing to ensure that the models are operating nominally, and our allies and industry partners can help the Department with that.” 

Continuous validation becomes even more critical if an adversary manages to compromise or influence a model’s outputs. 

“You can’t afford to have your model exposed to where an adversary can inject [false information or inaccurate data] to change what the model is looking at,” Robbins said. “The U.S. commercial industry is the only one that can develop a model at the speed and the scale necessary to work in a fully secure environment. An operator working on a classified system cannot have their model access the ‘dirty’ internet [where misinformation and disinformation is prevalent], it has to be able to work within its controlled data environment.” 

The same imperative applies to space systems, as well, which are equally dependent on cyber capabilities to function.  

“Space systems have an extensive attack surface, because they’re an interconnected system that includes the spacecraft, the ground segment, the links between them, the user terminals and any extended cloud infrastructure and supply chain that may be connected to that,” Crider said. “When a traditional IT enterprise is hacked, there’s a recovery process that involves isolating the attack, rebuilding a server and restoring data from a backup. But a compromised space system might also gradually deteriorate and degrade over time in a manner that may not be noticed right away, which heightens the stakes due to the Joint Force’s dependency on space capabilities.” 

Export Control Order Reveals Need for AI Resilience Planning 

But while commercially available AI tools developed by U.S. industry partners significantly enhance the opportunity to discover and proactively patch cybersecurity bugs, the ability to adopt those tools and integrate them into the network in an effective and timely manner comes with its own set of challenges.  

In June, the Department of Commerce placed an export control order on Anthropic’s Mythos 5 model after citing a national security concern, a ruling which the company publicly disputed. Nevertheless, Anthropic revoked access to its Mythos 5 model to comply with the order, which meant key government agencies like the National Security Agency also lost access to a leading AI-enabled cybersecurity tool.  

“Senior leaders understand the risk calculus for adopting innovative technologies, whether it’s an internal authorization from DISA or an external export control order from the Department of Commerce, so they’re continually working through that as part of their risk management,” Skinner said. “From an operational standpoint, this example drives home the need to always have a Primary, Alternate, Contingency and Emergency (PACE) plan. You have to have resilience in your cyber operations and be able to adapt as necessary to accomplish the mission.” 

However, the need for resilience is a discipline already familiar to operators across the Joint Force. 

“If you’re in the Navy and lose reliable access to GPS, this might mean you go back to using a sextant,” Robbins said. “It’s no different with AI models. You have to be prepared to do your own analysis if you lose access to an AI model. But an authorizing official can unknowingly take that choice away from an operational commander entirely, so the government has to ensure authorizing officials recognize that the best commercial model is the model the Department needs to win.” 

Government-Industry Partnership Critical to Faster AI Adoption 

To overcome this challenge and manage that risk, increased communication and collaboration between the U.S. government and its industry partners will help streamline the authorization and adoption of cutting-edge AI tools as they’re developed.  

“AI needs to be built and adopted in a partnership, where there’s an active dialogue on policy so that authorizing officials can understand the model’s importance to the mission and the risk of certain controls to the mission, so they can work through those challenges together,” Crider said. “Industry can be a part of those conversations and the joint exercises to think through how the AI capability can be applied. But it’s also important for industry to recognize that their AI capability may not always be something the Department would employ for any number of reasons.” 

That partnership also needs to extend to international allies and partners as well, who will also be part of the broader warfighting coalition.  

“Every international partner has a different set of legal authorities, privacy rules and security processes, but we can establish a common set of mission assurance standards that they will abide by,” Crider said. “So it comes down to working toward that outcome through a degree of federated trust. This enables our international partners to maintain sovereignty in their approaches, while ensuring interoperability as we employ these emerging technologies effectively in our coalition operations.” 

That’s the gap Elara Nova is built to close. 

“Elara Nova is really about bringing a variety of perspectives, our partner portfolio consists of experts in mission operations, technology development, systems acquisition and policy writing,” Crider said. “With experts from all of these disciplines and careers, we can help bring these entities together so that government can more fully leverage these technologies and that industry is adept at conveying their message on how their innovative technologies can be used to meet mission needs.” 

Elara Nova is the trusted global security partner delivering decisive advantage. Learn more at elaranova.com   

NATO Ankara Summit Creates a Call-to-Action for Defense Industrial Base

Alliance Seeks Meaningful Progress on Last Year’s Defense Spending Pledge

Heads of State and Government from 32 nations will gather at this month’s NATO Summit in Ankara, Türkiye, looking to accelerate progress toward the goals agreed at The Hague Summit last year. The declaration pledged to strengthen collective defense by committing member nations to spend 5% of annual GDP on defense by 2035, deepen transatlantic defense industrial cooperation and reaffirmed support for Ukraine. Now, several factors are also heightening the stakes of the Ankara Summit: Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, recent conflicts in the Middle East and “NATO 3.0,” or the increased pressure on and intention of allies to take on greater defense investment and burden-sharing responsibilities. In response, there is growing momentum as NATO nations increasingly invest in defense capabilities, which presents an unprecedented call-to-action for the defense industrial base to respond in kind. 

“At this critical intersection, NATO nations see a more aggressive Russia, a more unpredictable America and a more challenging China, and those dynamics are driving allies to make decisions and take action,” said Tom Goffus, Executive Partner for Global Security at Elara Nova and the former Assistant Secretary General for Operations at NATO. “There will be three big focus areas at the NATO Summit in Ankara: implementing last year’s defense spending pledge, expanding defense industrial production and executing the NATO 3.0 concept.” 

In Washington DC at the Atlantic Council on 25 June, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte summarized the key themes of the Ankara Summit as: “Transformation in defence investment; revolution in defence industry; and affirmation of our enduring support to Ukraine.”  

Within this construct, he asserted that the major overhaul of defense spending and defense industry will deliver a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO – his NATO 3.0 definition.   

The Defense Spending Challenge

The Hague Summit’s 5% defense spending pledge can be broken down into two parts: 3.5% of spending for core defense requirements like plans, tanks and ships, and 1.5% on defense-related requirements like critical infrastructure, the defense industrial base and resilience.  

NATO’s framework for defense spending is known as the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP), a five-step process that occurs every four years in which threats are identified, operational plans are developed and capability targets are determined. The NDPP was most recently updated in 2025, which means the next set of capability targets won’t come until 2029. 

But as the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have shown, capability needs are rapidly evolving as technologies advance. 

“There will be several new capability targets for 2029, that I believe will include space, autonomous systems and Arctic-specific capabilities,” Goffus said. “And at the Ankara Summit, we can expect positive announcements on spending plans for several NATO nations. Poland and the Baltic nations could be at 5% as early as this year, Germany and Sweden are looking to reach 3.5% years ahead of the 2035 timeline.”  

Defense spending by NATO nations is accelerating. According to the Secretary General of NATO, Mark Rutte, European allies and Canada have invested $90 billion more in defense spending in 2025 compared to 2024, a roughly 20% single year increase.  

Defense Industrial Production and Integration by Design 

Along side growing calls for greater investments under the NATO 3.0 concept and these substantive increases in defense spending, the defense industrial base must also expand to be able to accommodate this increased demand with greater production. One acute example is air and missile defense, a mission area where Secretary General Rutte called for a 400% increase in investment by NATO nations. 

“Our defense industrial base is not currently structured to produce what NATO needs at the volume and pace required for the threat,” Goffus said. “So NATO has announced that the Defense Industry Forum connected to the Ankara Summit will be the largest industrial event in NATO’s history. But increasing transatlantic defense production capacity takes time, that’s why NATO is also expected to officially launch its ‘Front Door’ for industry at the summit which will be a single portal where contractors can upload their innovative solutions.”  

This is one of many initiatives designed to answer the Secretary General’s call “To scale up production, spark innovation, and outsmart our competitors.” 

There’s also an inherent challenge of coordinating investments made by NATO nations in a cohesive way, so members are not duplicating capabilities or investing in ones that don’t directly benefit the alliance. 

“NATO needs to spend that money wisely in a way that’s integrated by design,” said Gen (Ret) James “Scorch” Hecker, a Senior Principal Advisor at Elara Nova and the former Commander of U.S. Air Forces Europe, U.S. Air Forces Africa and Allied Air Command at NATO. “To use the air and missile defense example, when each NATO nation would traditionally buy an individual air defense system, they often weren’t integrated with one another. This created a huge disparity between NATO’s ‘Critical Asset List’ of things that need to be defended, compared to its ‘Defended Asset List’ of what was actually defended.” 

Complicating matters further is the growing complexity and urgency of the air and missile threat. But even still, NATO can address this complexity if the alliance coordinates their investments appropriately.   

“We need to make sure that all 32 nations providing air and missile defense systems can address three different threats: ballistic missiles from space, air threats like fighters and cruise missiles and one-way attack vehicles like drones,” Hecker said. “While not every nation can afford a PAC-3 battery, several nations can buy the less exquisite anti-aircraft artillery necessary to respond to one-way attack vehicles. Yet all of these capabilities must still be integrated with a resilient space-based ISR and command and control architecture.” 

Calls for a Space Investment Framework 

Coherent space capability invesmtent and development is another emerging imperative for NATO, which first declared space an operational domain in 2019. This coincides with growth to a projected $1.8 trillion space economy by 2035. This presents an opportunity for NATO nations to meet their defense spending pledge by investing in space capabilities necessary for the alliance.  

“NATO nations are coming to the Ankara Summit with specific plans that show how they’re going to get to 5% by 2035,” said Brad Head, Executive Partner for Global Growth at Elara Nova and the former Chief of Defense Planning at the U.S. Mission to NATO. “But NATO as a collective defense alliance doesn’t actually own and operate most of its capabilities, which are instead provided to the alliance by the individual NATO nations. So what NATO can and should do is provide that overarching framework that would allow countries to invest their resources in a coherent way, so that the capabilities provided to the alliance are interoperable and additive.” 

While NATO released its own commercial space strategy in 2025, the alliance has yet to articulate capability targets for space in the NATO Defense Planning Process. But that’s also where NATO can look to recent actions from the United States Space Force to create a vision and a demand signal that the commercial space economy can respond to. 

“The NATO Commercial Space Strategy is largely in line with the Space Force’s Commercial Space Strategy, whose approach is to exploit what you have, buy what you can and build only what you must,” Head said. “General Saltzman also recently unveiled the Space Force’s Objective Force 2040 baseline to clearly articulate its capability needs by mission area and geography, with a classified annex, to coherently drive the service’s investments. NATO could provide a similar framework to coordinate Allied investment dollars in a coherent way and develop real value-add space capabilities. There are real operational challenges in space today, and commercial providers are preparing to respond.” 

The Digital Foundation Imperative 

Underpinning all of the capability investments of NATO nations, from air and missile defense to space capabilities, is a digital architecture to synchronize and coordinate the exchange of data and information that has become foundational to any modern fight.  

One primary example that puts this challenge into context is Secretary General Rutte’s projection that NATO will have over 700 F-35 fighter jets available to the alliance by 2032. A single F-35 can generate around a terabyte of data during every flight, which is equivalent to 500 hours of high definition video. 

Consequently, this creates an imperative for NATO to ensure that the hundreds of F-35s provided by its member nations can operate together and exchange data in an integrated fashion. 

“There’s a modernization challenge NATO has where advanced platforms are trying to operate on legacy networks,” said Brig Gen (Ret) Chad Raduege, President of the Cyber, Data and Communications sector at Elara Nova and former Chief Information Officer at Headquarters, U.S. European Command. “NATO needs to create a framework for a digital architecture that will connect all of these platforms. At the same time, NATO’s communications infrastructure is not designed to operate in a contested digital environment that defines modern warfare. So NATO’s biggest operational vulnerability, and threat to the alliance, is that every investment NATO makes is dependent on its digital foundation.” 

Likewise, NATO will require a command and control architecture that will be resilient in the face of the threat. This reality is evident in light of Russia’s cyberattack on a commercial satellite system Ukraine relied upon for command and control at the onset of its 2022 invasion. 

“As it stands today, NATO’s alliance-wide command and control architecture remains fragile,” Raduege said. “Resilient command and control means multiple pathways, such as satellite, terrestrial, airborne or radio frequency means as part of the Primary Alternate Contingency Emergency (PACE) communications plan. This PACE plan requires a zero-trust architecture that always assumes the network is compromised and has pre-delegated authorities for commanders to act upon when connectivity is degraded.”  

As the operating environment evolves across domains, the NATO Summit in Ankara will be a surefire indication of how the alliance intends to respond. It will then be up to the defense industrial base to position themselves accordingly, and that’s where Elara Nova is similarly prepared to support. 

“Right now, there’s a real opportunity because Europe has a desire to grow its defense industrial production,” Goffus said. “So despite the political shin-kicking that’s going on, there’s a lot of American companies that can work with European companies and support NATO nations in achieving their capability targets. One of the things Elara Nova can do is help companies determine which countries and companies to partner with so that NATO nations can spend their growing defense investments wisely.” 

Elara Nova is the trusted global security partner delivering decisive advantage. Learn more at elaranova.com  

From NASA to the Pentagon, Commercial Space Takes Center Stage in “Rocket Dreams”

New Book Explores the Commercial Dynamics and Geopolitical Tensions of the Modern Day Space Race 

America was watching when NASA’s Artemis II crew splashed down in the Pacific Ocean after their record-setting mission around the moon. An estimated 27.17 million people across six of the nation’s largest television networks tuned in to follow Artemis II’s return to Earth, while another 650,000 followed along on NASA’s YouTube livestream. The Artemis II mission was a precursor to America’s actual return to landing on the moon, but it was aptly timed for Christian Davenport’s new book, Rocket Dreams: Musk, Bezos, and the Inside Story of the New, Trillion-Dollar Space Race, which chronicles the commercial dynamics and geopolitical tensions defining the modern day space race against China. 

“The central tension of the narrative is the lunar lander competition for NASA’s Artemis program,” Davenport said. “Initially, SpaceX won the lunar lander competition when they beat out Blue Origin. But because of concerns over delays with SpaceX’s Starship vehicle, NASA reopened [the competition]. Now, the next Artemis mission will test the docking mechanism of one or both of the lunar landers in low-Earth orbit in 2027, before an eventual lunar landing in 2028.”  

This evolving commercial space dynamic follows Davenport’s 2018 book The Space Barons, which recounts the emerging ambitions of America’s commercial space sector backed by billionaires like SpaceX’s Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos’ Blue Origin. 

“Space Barons posed the question on whether the public-private partnership between commercial space companies and NASA was actually viable,” Davenport said. “The answer in Rocket Dreams is clearly a ‘Yes.’ Astronauts are now being put on rockets and spacecraft that are owned and operated not by the U.S. government, but the private sector. That’s a big deal.” 

Bridenstine and NASA’s Artemis Program 

A key figure in Rocket Dreams is Jim Bridenstine, the NASA administrator from the first Trump administration, who was tasked with overseeing NASA’s Commercial Crew program just as SpaceX was preparing to fly astronauts from U.S. soil for the first time since the space shuttle was retired in 2011. 

“Bridenstine’s first memory of space was the Challenger explosion, so he goes out of his way to hold SpaceX accountable over their parachutes, abort systems, etc.,” Davenport said. “At the same time, SpaceX was developing its Dragon spacecraft to dock on the International Space Station. But the ISS’s docking mechanism had six mechanical arms, each with their own motor and software system that essentially created six potential points of failure. SpaceX rejected that legacy design in favor of their own that used springs from a motor bike, while having to overcome NASA’s skepticism in the process.” 

The Artemis program was originally designed to deliver NASA astronauts and their Orion spacecraft to the moon through the Space Launch System (SLS), which is an expendable, single-use rocket. But this intention was counter to the emerging re-usable rockets the commercial industry was developing, namely SpaceX’s Falcon 9 and Blue Origin’s New Glenn. 

These re-usable rockets created an opportunity for NASA to leverage commercial solutions in their ambitious return to the moon. 

“At one point, Bridenstine even tried to sideline the SLS until Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama [intervened],” Davenport said. “But now, there’s widespread recognition that we need to move fast and use the resources we have to beat China back to the moon. So while the near-term solution is to use both SLS and reusable rockets, [current NASA administrator] Jared Isaacman has said that when commercial alternatives are less expensive, reusable and more efficient, that NASA would go toward those and away from SLS.”  

Ensuring the Continuity of Artemis 

The success of the recent Artemis II mission was only possible, in part, by the actions Bridenstine took to insulate the NASA program from the political whims of changing presidential administrations.  

“George W. Bush said we’re going to the moon, only for Barack Obama to switch gears to focus on an asteroid or Mars,” Davenport said. “When Trump came in and returned focus to the moon, Bridenstine wanted to create a program that would survive [a change of administrations]. So he created the Artemis Accords and brought in international partners by casting this program as a key tenet in the space race between the United States and China.” 

Similarly, the United States Space Force has also received bipartisan support through recent administration changes since its inception during the first Trump administration.  

“Two of President Trump’s policies that President Biden continued were the Artemis program and the Space Force, because he recognized their importance,” Davenport said. “China also has ambitions for cislunar space, the lunar South Pole and Mars, all of which have national security implications. They have already demonstrated docking maneuvers and even potentially refueling in geostationary orbit, years after they already grappled a defunct Biedou satellite and moved it to a graveyard orbit. ” 

The Space Force and Commercial Engagement 

Likewise, the emerging Chinese threat in space and the opportunity to leverage innovative solutions from the commercial space industry has captured the attention of the Space Force. 

“In order to achieve space superiority, the Space Force needs to rely on the commercial space sector for the kinds of technologies that we need: reusable rockets, maneuverable satellites, on-orbit refueling,” Davenport said. “Space Force officials are now openly talking about weapons in space, [ranging from] anti-satellite tests to more subtle attacks like jamming and spoofing. All of those capabilities are necessary for space superiority and a lot of companies are currently working on that.” 

That’s why the Space Force has been engaging its commercial partners publicly, particularly through published documents like the 2024 Commercial Space Strategy. 

“From the beginning, the Space Force has aimed to be more nimble, efficient and avoid the government procurement debacles that Senator McCain used to turn into theater in the Senate Armed Services Committee,” Davenport said. “The motivation to incorporate commercial partners is there. One significant action they’ve taken is bringing [industry] into war-gaming scenarios, like the one focused on Russia’s development of a space-based nuclear weapon, so they can better understand the challenges and threats.” 

Despite the emerging relevance of potential solutions and capabilities provided by commercial space companies, questions still remain. 

“SpaceX is launching the Falcon Nine once every two or three days, showing that reusability is real,” Davenport said. “But they’re also going to have to show that [Starship] can be launched and refueled in orbit, which will require a fleet of tankers. Meanwhile, Blue Origin is also set to land their uncrewed Mark 1 lunar lander on the moon later this year. But while Blue Origin has had some success with its New Glenn rocket, can they resolve its recent second stage engine anomaly and get their launch cadence up?” 

The success of U.S. ambitions in space, for both NASA and the Space Force, will be contingent in part on their commercial partners. But the implications for national security space will be a narrative that Davenport intends to pursue in his next project. 

 “The American public doesn’t fully understand the Space Force and its importance in facing the rising threats from China, Russia and others,” Davenport said. “But the national security space problem isn’t new, either. It didn’t suddenly appear when President Trump created the Space Force in 2019, there’s a long history that goes back decades and that’s only going to accelerate in the years ahead.” 

Translating Public Interest into Financial Backing 

So while space captivated the American public’s attention for the ten-days of Artemis II, the responsibility now falls on the leaders of NASA and the Space Force alike to translate that public interest into sustainable financial backing for their mission-critical space programs.  

“We saw the American public’s attention fade away after the Apollo 11 moon landing,” Davenport said. “After the Artemis II mission, NASA has momentum behind a return to the moon for the first time since those Apollo missions. So NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman is going to have to keep not only the American public engaged, but also Congress engaged to fund the new space race against China.” 

The dual-use potential of commercial space systems seems to have captured the attention of the investor community. SpaceX is seeking a $1.75 trillion valuation for its initial public offering (IPO) later this year, one that some estimates suggest could raise $75 billion. 

“SpaceX is one of the biggest stories of American entrepreneurship of the last 100 years, moving from building rockets to [operating] a constellation of 10,000 internet satellites,” Davenport said. “Now they’re looking ahead to orbital data centers and artificial intelligence. But the Pentagon also has a real desire for alternatives in the space launch market – they need New Glenn to work, Neutron from Rocket Lab, Stoke Space to stand up, all of these companies and their capabilities need to come to fruition. The need is proliferating, so the potential for greater investments is a rising tide that can lift all boats.” 

However, it remains to be seen if the growing public interest will likewise be met with financial backing from the U.S. government. While the Space Force has put forward a record-setting budget proposal of $71.1 billion for FY2027, how much will be appropriated from Congress remains to be seen. 

NASA, on the other hand, is looking at an $18.8 billion budget — a 23% reduction from the prior year despite a renewed emphasis on human exploration through programs like Artemis. 

“The United States is always going to defend its values and assets in any new frontier,” Davenport said. “But even with a huge increase in the Space Force budget, threats in space will only accelerate with the proliferation of spacecraft and our reliance on them. If the United States doesn’t have a presence in low-Earth orbit, cislunar space or the moon, we would cede all of that to China.  

Elara Nova is the trusted global security partner delivering decisive advantage. Learn more at elaranova.com 

Space Force Initiates a “Campaign of Learning” to Develop its Objective Force

New Documents Offer Unique Transparency into the Space Force’s Needs

This past spring the United States Space Force published two highly anticipated, forward-looking documents: Future Operating Environment 2040 and Objective Force 2040. When Chief of Space Operations General B. Chance Saltzman unveiled these documents at this year’s Space Symposium, he declared the service’s intention was for them to “drive questions, not provide answers.” As such, Guardians, the Joint Force and the Space Force’s international and industry partners were encouraged to engage, debate and provide feedback in a ‘campaign of learning’ to evaluate what the future space domain might look like and define the Space Force’s future force design requirements.  

“This campaign of learning is centered on transparency, where these documents are out in the public for everyone to read and see,” said Mike Dickey, Founding Partner at Elara Nova and former Chief Architect of the United States Space Force. “It signals to the defense industrial base what the service is thinking, which enables them to think strategically about applying research dollars and engaging capital markets to create the capabilities that the Space Force needs. Now industry can better present their product or service as a solution to the national security space problems that need to be addressed.”  

Force designs for any military service can be understood in three ways: its fielded force, its programmed force and its objective force.  

“Our fielded force includes all of the people, hardware and software that is delivering space capabilities on behalf of the nation,” said Bill Liquori, Executive Partner at Elara Nova and the first Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Strategy, Plans, Programs, and Analysis for the United States Space Force. “Our programmed force accounts for what will be fielded through the program objective memorandum that outlines the next five fiscal years, in addition to the president’s budget. But together, these two force designs still don’t meet all of the Space Force’s future requirements, that’s why these two documents present the objective force that the Space Force will need to build toward for the future.” 

But in order to develop that objective force, the Space Force first needs to understand what the future operating environment might look like. That’s why these documents were released in tandem: so that the Space Force’s partners can not only understand what the operating environment is expected to look like, but also the steps the service is taking to organize itself to achieve its mission. 

“These documents present a baseline for how the Space Force thinks about the space environment and how the service will evolve into 2040,” Liquori said. “Our force designs traditionally focused on hardware and software, but it takes more than just capabilities to deliver a space effect on behalf of the nation. These documents recognize we need organizational constructs and hybrid architectures to enable future success across mission areas, which means the Space Force also needs the infrastructure – with the appropriate staffing, testing and training – to employ those capabilities successfully.”  

A Decade-Long Journey in a Rapidly Evolving Environment 

The public release of these documents can be traced back to over a decade ago and marks the latest iteration of how the Department of War is responding to a rapidly evolving space environment. 

“These documents reflect a compilation of actions that began with General John Hyten’s appearance on an April 2015 episode of 60 Minutes to speak to the American public about the emerging threat environment in space,” Dickey said. “A year later, the Air Force published a study called the ‘Space Enterprise Vision,’ which thought conceptually about the military space architecture that would be needed to operate in the face of the emerging threat. Then the Space Force was formed in December 2019, followed by the Space Warfighting Analysis Center in 2021 to develop its force design.” 

Both documents look ahead to 2040 on a 15-year time horizon. But the space domain is quickly evolving in unexpected ways, particularly as technologies advance. That’s why the Space Force has stood up a new SF/S9 Force Design and Analysis staff group to re-evaluate and update these projections on five-year intervals.   

“The S9 office will oversee the life cycle of these force designs in a three-step process,” Dickey said. “By bringing together some existing pockets of talent, they will first develop conceptual approaches to how the Space Force can solve operational challenges. Second, they’ll test those concepts in wargames, tabletop exercises and computer simulations to evaluate their potential effectiveness. Step three will see the Space Warfighting Analysis Center model and build a more specific set of technical capabilities that becomes the objective force design.” 

Regularly re-evaluating these documents will enable the Space Force to accommodate and address unexpected changes in the space domain. 

“The Future Operating Environment 2040 document explores the strategic arc of potential future military and geopolitical states but cannot predict specific threats and capabilities,” said Dickey. “For example,  AI and China’s deployment of a 21,000 satellite networking constellation weren’t in the Space Enterprise Vision that was published over ten years ago, which demonstrates how quickly space is changing in ways we can’t predict. So the Space Force created this new S9 office to make changes to the architecture and the forces they field on a more frequent basis.” 

Mission Area Expansion and Projected Budget Growth 

Both documents come at a time when the Department of the Air Force recently put forward a record-setting $71.1 billion budget request for the Space Force, while officials also call to double the service’s personnel by 2030. 

“These two documents allow the Space Force to signal to Congress what threats the country is facing in space and the budget request starts that conversation,” Dickey said. “The emerging threat environment will require new capabilities, so the FY27 budget – no matter how much will ultimately be appropriated – will be a down payment for incorporating all of these new mission areas that the Space Force will inevitably have to grow into.” 

While the Space Force was founded as an intentionally lean and digital first military service, its anticipated growth in personnel and resources reflects the growing demands being placed on the service.  

“The nation is asking the Space Force to do more than it was asked to do when it was founded in December of 2019,” Dickey said. “The Department is talking about tracking ground and airborne moving targets from space, a mission set largely accomplished in the air domain today.  Golden Dome will have a space-based interceptor layer in space that has to be managed and operated. As these mission areas expand, so too does the need for additional personnel and resources. At the same time, doubling the size of the Space Force doesn’t relieve the service of doing things in an efficient way.”  

Creating Opportunities for Proactive Partner Engagement 

In order to effectively deliver on these increasing demands and wide-ranging missions, the Space Force will need to leverage capabilities provided by its international and industry partners. That’s where these documents will play an integral role. 

“Two groups of people routinely engage with our Space Force at senior levels: international and industry partners,” Liquori said. “They often want to know what they should spend their money on to develop or acquire capabilities that will be most beneficial to the service. These documents will enable a more informed starting point for them to develop and test capabilities that will ultimately provide resiliency, redundancy and the ability to reconstitute the Space Force’s capabilities.” 

As the Space Force incorporates the feedback it receives from stakeholders across the national security space enterprise, the service is initiating this campaign of learning to facilitate better engagements moving forward.  

“These documents are a good indicator of the Space Force’s continued progress, but success in the future takes several forms,” Liquori said. “Success means whoever the senior leaders of the Space Force are in five or 10 years from now, will be enjoying more fulsome conversations with their allies and industry counterparts. Success means there might be some proposed answers to the questions posed in these documents that are then wargamed and tested out. But ultimately, success means that our guardians will continue to be more informed, more capable and more recognized for what they do to secure the nation’s interests in, to and from space.” 

This cross-functional collaboration, however, also requires the expertise and connections available to streamline the development of the Space Force’s future objective force. That’s where Elara Nova exists to help the Space Force and its international and industry partners achieve that end goal. 

“Elara Nova is full of the leaders who have been involved in these force design conversations, debates and decisions since these conversations started a decade ago,” Dickey said. “These are the people that have been enabling the core functions across key mission areas. They have all the scar tissue from the successes and failures of previous efforts, which is necessary to help the government, strengthen the industrial base, and empower our international partners to contribute their own space capabilities.” 

Elara Nova is a trusted guiding partner that builds tailored teams to illuminate unseen opportunities and deliver impact across every domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/  

New Enterprise C2 Program Office to Enhance Commander Decision-Making

Enterprise C2 Suite to Better Implement Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control Strategy 

As emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) are increasingly adopted to streamline and enhance command and control, the Department of War is expected to announce a new program office that will coalesce and coordinate information and communication pipelines that will empower commanders to make more timely and effective decisions. While an official announcement from the Department of War is forthcoming, DefenseScoop recently reported that the new Enterprise Command and Control (C2) Program Office will oversee current AI and data platforms like Maven Smart System and Edge Data Mesh as part of a pending program of record for Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2). Collectively, this “Enterprise C2 Suite” will provide the latest iteration of technologies and tools available to commanders for command and control.

Air Vice Marshal (Ret) Mark Chappell, Executive Partner at Elara Nova, said “Systems that facilitate command and control have evolved over time to help warfighters in an ever complicated battlefield. Now, modern technology like artificial intelligence and machine learning can effectively harness and process terabytes of data to improve the real-time understanding and decision-making for a commander.”

The Evolution of Multi-Domain Operations

Up until the 20th century, commanders oversaw military operations within a single domain. But as technologies advanced and operational domains became more integrated, commanders had to adapt.

“Blitzkrieg tactics in World War II changed the nature of command and control as multi-domain operations emerged,” Chappell said. “This increased during the Cold War when the Soviet forces outnumbered Western allies, so the Army and the Air Force had to develop new intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance technologies to identify enemy locations, concentrate firepower and limit an adversary’s numerical advantage. Over time, these new systems also brought in the other domains to include space and cyber as the operational spheres expanded.”

Effective use of systems and technologies to facilitate command and control goes beyond just gathering information on the adversary.

“Our ability to sense what is going on across domains has become fundamental to how we operate,” Chappell said. “But that’s only the starting point: once you get all of that data, it needs to be processed quickly such that a commander can use that timely and high quality information effectively to make better, quicker decisions.

JADC2 and the Need for Integrated C2 Networks

Toward this end, each military service began developing their own tactical network to facilitate command and control. But each network was not necessarily compatible with those of the other services.

So in early 2021, the Department of War announced the Joint All-Domain Command and Control Strategy (JADC2) to better coordinate information-sharing and command and control functions across the Pentagon.

“The JADC2 concept was created to connect sensors from all of the military services into a single network across the 11 Combatant Commands to ‘sense, make sense and act,’” Chappell said. “It’s critical that all domains and services can communicate with each other effectively given the way we fight today. So this new JADC2 network further connects sensors with weapon systems while also using artificial intelligence algorithms to help improve decision-making for commanders.”

The JADC2 strategy lays out five Lines of Effort.

1. Data Enterprise
2. Human Enterprise
3. Technology Enterprise
4. Integrating with Nuclear C2 and C3
5. Modernizing Mission Partner Information Sharing

“Data Enterprise is about the need to discover and access data from all warfighting domains at all levels of warfare, which brings with it a significant standardization challenge,” Chappell said. “The Human Enterprise means commanders within the military need training to fully harness the Technical Enterprise, which enhances information-sharing and cross-domain awareness in what’s often referred to as ‘the single pane of glass.’ The nuclear enterprise will naturally have to be included, and then modernizing mission partner information-sharing is required for effective joint force and coalition operations.”

Further, the complexity of effective command and control is increasingly expanding to include coalition partners from other nations, as well. Consequently, even the JADC2 concept has had to evolve.

“While JADC2 was initially conceived as a U.S.-only concept, it has inevitably changed to Combined JADC2 to acknowledge the integration of different nations into a coalition force,” Chappell said. “Different coalition partners will bring different capabilities to the fight, but they’ll also have different policy permissions delegated by their government. The best way that we can address those challenges is to exercise and operate together using the systems that we’re going to fight together with.”

Emerging Technologies: Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning

Altogether, the effort to address the complex challenge of collecting, digitizing, standardizing, processing and visualizing information for a commander on operational timelines is what Chappell refers to as ‘digitized C2.’ It’s also where emerging technologies like AI/ML can both improve and accelerate decision-making.

This imperative prompted the Department of War to initiate one of its earliest artificial intelligence programs in 2017, Project Maven.

“The central motivation to Project Maven was to use AI to sense and process the massive volumes of data to support human intelligence analysts working in targeting flows,” Chappell said. “Known as Maven Smart Systems today, it’s become a scalable and deployable AI system which works across multiple missions and data types. So rather than just be an assistant to an analyst, MSS now embeds AI across the whole enterprise.”

Another innovative capability is the Edge Data Mesh (EDM) technology stack, which completed its first successful demonstration in an exercise last year.

“EDM facilitates access to a cloud-like environment where the data is processed to deliver results,” Chappell said. “There’s also built-in resiliency within it: it will have multiple lanes of communication such as a SATCOM link, a 5G link and a suite of transmission systems to get around jamming and other disruptions at the tactical frontline, which is increasingly being referred to as ‘the edge.’ The warfighter needs to access all of this information just like a commander does, so EDM is experimenting on how that [capability] might be delivered given that warfighting is going to be conducted in a heavily degraded environment.”

These tools will be essential to any modern or future military conflict, not unlike the one that has played out in recent weeks in the Middle East.

“In what has essentially been an ‘Air Tasking Order’ war in the Middle East, AI capability is central to identifying targets and determining how to most effectively and efficiently prosecute them,” Chappell said. “But with all the benefits that come from automation and AI within warfighting, it also brings a degree of risk and we need to make sure that we understand and manage that risk properly by keeping a human in that decision-making loop.”

The Forthcoming Enterprise C2 Suite

Now, both Maven Smart System and EDM will be combined and expanded under the
under the new “Enterprise C2 Suite,” a forthcoming Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control program of record. The Enterprise C2 Suite will be under the purview of the future Enterprise C2 Program Office.

“The Enterprise C2 Program Office will be able to better integrate the more fragmented elements of command and control to improve the coherence of its outputs,” Chappell said. “It’s also going to place CJADC2 and AI-supported warfare strategies onto a program of record, which will include governance structure and funding to bring that forward. The growing focus on real-time analysis and AI integration sets the stage for a more dynamic and responsive military strategy in the face of what is a proliferation of more complex and challenging threats. Ultimately, this is about commanders making better decisions at a faster pace.”

But in order to develop and deliver these systems that will enable better command and control, the Department of War will have to communicate and collaborate directly with its industry partners.

“We always need resilient systems that can improve a commander’s decision-making, especially because a battlefield is not a permissive operating environment,” Chappell said. “In a digitized battlespace, standardization of disparate information is going to be key and the Enterprise C2 Program Office is exactly what is needed for this task. It will provide industry direction, along with the necessary funding to make this cohesion and integration of information systems possible.”

That’s also where Elara Nova’s Aeronautics & Mission Systems (AMS) sector has direct experience in both government and industry that can better support the development and adoption of systems for command and control.

“Elara Nova’s AMS sector is uniquely placed to assist both industry and governments to maximize the potential that comes with digitized C2 and that vaunted single pane of glass,” Chappell said. “Elara Nova’s AMS partners know firsthand the challenges and decisions faced by the warfighter every day. So we can guide industry partners in the development of their systems, and similarly assist governments in developing their digitized C2 policies, architectures and the tactics, techniques and procedures to go with it.”

Elara Nova is a trusted guiding partner that builds tailored teams to illuminate unseen opportunities and deliver impact across every domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/

Executive Orders, Organizational Realignment to Streamline Acquisition Process

When a foreign country seeks a military technology from a defense contractor in the United States, there are two ways for them to acquire that capability: Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Under DCS, the foreign country negotiates directly with the contractor. Under FMS, the U.S. government manages the sale with training and sustainment included. Which process is used depends on the technology, the partner nation and the policy considerations involved. But a recent surge in demand is challenging the current FMS process, resulting in two recent executive orders aiming to reform and modernize the program. 

“There’s been FMS reform initiatives before, but what’s unique now is the executive orders are coming directly from the President,” said Heidi Grant, Executive Partner at Elara Nova and the former Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA), and former Director of both the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA).  

One key advantage of FMS over DCS is what Grant calls the “total package approach,” where the U.S. government ensures the sale includes training and sustainment across the lifecycle of the capability. 

While many critics, including senior U.S. leaders, have characterized the system as “broken,” the reality is more nuanced. The Foreign Military Sales process was deliberately designed to be thorough, ensuring that each transfer aligns with U.S. strategic, security and foreign policy interests. The challenge is not that the system fails to function, but that it was not built for the scale, speed and technological complexity of current demand. 

How the FMS Process Works 

The FMS process begins at U.S. embassies, where trained security cooperation officials, known as military groups or “milgroups,” help partner nations determine whether FMS is required and initiate the process. 

“DSCA — the Pentagon agency that administers the entire FMS enterprise — routes the request to the appropriate implementing agency,” Grant said. “For Air Force or Space Force, that agency is the Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA), who coordinates with the defense contractor to add the order to an existing production line, apply any required configurations and manage the delivery.” 

Brad Head, Managing Director of International Partnerships at Elara Nova, saw this process firsthand as Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation in Brussels.  

“Belgium selected F-35s to replace its F-16s with a 5th-generation capability,” Head said. “DSCA sent that request to the F-35 Joint Program Office, which coordinated with Lockheed Martin to add Belgium’s order to the existing production run with Belgium’s unique configuration. Then the U.S. government took ownership of the jets and transferred them to Belgium with the appropriate training and sustainment package.” 

Belgium acquired a world-class capability with the support needed to sustain it. NATO’s collective defense posture was strengthened, and adding partner demand to the production program helped reduce costs for the United States. 

Why the System is Struggling to Keep Pace 

Allies and partners are seeking not only traditional weapons systems, but also emerging technologies in areas like unmanned systems, cyber and space. The Brussels-based think tank Bruegel found that European FMS cases reached a record $76 billion in 2024, roughly four times the European average since 2008. This surge is challenging the FMS program in several ways. 

First, the Defense, State and Commerce departments must agree the transfer serves U.S. strategic interests. Each brings a different lens, and when they cannot reach agreement, decisions can stall or escalate to the Cabinet level.  

Second, export control regimes add complexity. ITAR and EAR govern defense and dual-use technology transfers, while multilateral agreements like the MTCR impose additional restrictions. These controls protect sensitive technologies, but they can also restrict capabilities that did not exist when the regulations were written. Even a single restricted component embedded in an otherwise releasable system can prevent a sale. 

Third, contractors must balance U.S. production requirements against surging international demand.  

“Industry cannot invest in additional production capacity until a firm order justifies it,” Grant said. “A partner may place an order for a critical system, only to learn the delivery timeline is seven years because the production line is already committed. Munitions offer a clear example — demand has surged beyond what current production lines can support.”  

These challenges compound. Delays in interagency decisions slow export licensing, which creates uncertainty for industry and limits investment in production capacity. Friction at each stage reinforces the next, extending timelines even for cases aligned with U.S. strategic priorities. 

Executive Orders to Reform the Process 

The first executive order, signed in April 2025, targets several of these bottlenecks directly. 

The order directs Defense, State and Commerce to create a joint priority list for partners and end-items, establishing shared priorities up front and calls for a review of the MTCR to reclassify certain technologies. 

“The ‘exportability by design’ mandate is significant,” Grant said. “It directs the defense industrial base to build capabilities eligible for export from the outset, rather than requiring costly modifications after the fact.”  

The order also streamlines congressional notifications and creates an electronic tracking system giving foreign buyers and U.S. industry visibility into where a case stands. 

Separately, the Air Force is also accelerating approvals through the “STAR Baseline,” a classified document that pre-determines which technologies the U.S. is willing to export. 

“The STAR Baseline short-circuits the process,” Head said. “It decides ahead of time what we are willing to export to a country, so that the U.S. doesn’t have to start a review from scratch every time an FMS request comes in. Technologies not covered by the baseline still require a broader interagency review that can take weeks or months.” 

A second executive order, signed in February 2026, aims to shape the demand signal that drives sales in the first place.  

“This executive order directs the Defense, State and Commerce secretaries to develop a prioritized sales catalog, or a proactive menu of capabilities reflecting both the industrial and strategic priorities of the U.S.,” Grant said. “This catalog signals to allies what the U.S. would like them to buy, while a new Promoting American Military Sales Task Force and mandatory quarterly performance data will increase accountability.” 

This reflects a broader shift: rather than responding to partner demand as it emerges, the U.S. is signaling preferred capabilities and partners in advance, shaping demand to align with its strategic and industrial priorities. 

Organizational Realignment to Empower Acquisition Officials 

The U.S. government’s reform efforts extend beyond executive orders. DSCA and DTSA — previously under the Pentagon’s policy directorate — will now move under the acquisition and sustainment directorate. This reflects a shift from FMS as primarily a foreign policy tool to a core function of the defense industrial enterprise. 

“The head of acquisition will now be responsible for managing FMS timelines and resolving trade-offs between U.S. and international deliveries against current demands,” Grant said. “This also gives senior leaders from partner nations a single point of entry, rather than having to navigate between the policy and acquisition sides of the Pentagon.” 

The move will carry strategic implications for future military programs that require allied support.  

“The U.S. is acknowledging that it can’t do everything, everywhere,” Head said. “As the U.S. builds global architectures like Golden Dome, allies and partners will be required to contribute systems based in their own countries. Allied acquisition will be central going forward and placing those agencies under the same leadership that manages U.S. acquisition ensures those two tracks can be coordinated.” 

The Unique Challenge of Space Security Cooperation 

These challenges are most acute in space, where demand is accelerating and the supporting processes are least mature.  

“Until recently, space was the exclusive domain of a handful of nations,” Head said. “But with launch costs coming down and the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East underscoring space as a critical component of multi-domain operations, allied demand is surging.” 

Unlike mature FMS programs for fighter jets or air defense systems, the U.S. does not have a well-established catalog of space capabilities it is actively offering to allies. Outside of a few existing programs like Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS), most space cooperation is what Head described as “a handmade wooden shoe” — or a custom-made capability. 

U.S. embassies also lack space-smart personnel to guide partner nations.  

“You either need a list of things you’re selling or you need experts on the front line, and we currently don’t have either one,” Head said. 

Likewise, the space domain also faces a funding challenge. A surcharge on every FMS sale funds the personnel, training programs and institutional support that underpins the security cooperation process. But there is currently not enough space cases to generate the revenue needed to sustain a space-focused workforce, leading SAF/IA and DSCA to identify seed funding to address this problem. 

Grant noted this tension is not without precedent.  

“When we were selling F-15s to partner nations, uniformed pilots were needed in U.S. cockpits and couldn’t be spared for international training missions,” she said. “The solution was contracted training support. It’s the same tension right now with guardians. We need them working U.S. priorities, and at the same time we need to build enough of them to support the international business.” 

In this sense, space is not an exception to the FMS system, but rather an early indicator of where the entire enterprise is heading. As demand for advanced, rapidly evolving technologies grows across domains, the challenges seen in space today are likely to emerge more broadly across the security cooperation landscape. 

How Elara Nova Supports the Process 

As the FMS system evolves, the challenge will be translating reform into execution across government, industry and international partners. Elara Nova brings experience from within the security cooperation enterprise, including leadership roles at DSCA, SAF/IA and on the front lines of defense cooperation. 

For the U.S. government, the firm helps fill capacity gaps where the security cooperation workforce is stretched thin. For allies and partners, it translates requirements into cases the system can act on. For industry, it maps the export control landscape before companies invest in markets they may not be accessible. Elara Nova provides the insight to navigate the system and the experience to deliver results. 

Elara Nova is a trusted guiding partner that builds tailored teams to illuminate unseen opportunities and deliver impact across every domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/ 

Digital Infrastructure Modernization to Lay Foundation for Zero Trust, AI

An Upgraded Network to Better Integrate Emerging Technologies, Counter Evolving Threats

The Department of War (DOW) kick-started the year with a series of steps to enhance the resiliency and reliability of the digital infrastructure underpinning military operations. In early January, the United States Space Force announced it will be overhauling computer networks at all 14 of its bases under the Base Infrastructure Modernization program. Then the National Security Agency released the first two products of its Zero Trust Implementation Guidelines, while the DOW launched its Artificial Intelligence Acceleration Strategy. Altogether, these actions demonstrate the growing imperative to prepare the DOW’s digital infrastructure to take advantage of emerging technologies and counter evolving threats. 

“Space and cyberspace are inextricably linked: the foundation of warfighting in space is dependent on having a secure digital infrastructure on the ground,” said Gen (Ret) Tim Haugh, a Senior Principal Advisor at Elara Nova and the former Commander of United States Cyber Command. “Digital infrastructure is the computing infrastructure that every Guardian and Airman leverages when they connect to the Department of War networks. If the Department doesn’t upgrade these systems, they can become vulnerable where a vendor can no longer support them, which adds risk through technology debt, less functionality and an inability to integrate weapon systems into national security architectures.” 

According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, “digital infrastructure” is defined as ​​”the ability to store and exchange data through a centralized communication system.” As such, the Base Infrastructure Modernization program aims to create a unified and secure network and communication system across all Air Force and Space Force bases worldwide.  

“Whether it’s to conduct space operations or air operations on the flight line, those capabilities require a digital infrastructure that is powerful enough to win the fight and provide a user experience that enables success,” Gen (Ret) Haugh said. “This investment is critical because it sets a clear set of standards for the defense industrial base to build and field new capabilities as the threat environment changes. Modernizing the digital infrastructure will also lay the foundation for integrating future capabilities like artificial intelligence and establishing the compute power required at the network edge.” 

The Vulnerabilities of an Aging Digital Infrastructure 

Space Force leaders recognize that threats in cyberspace are constantly emerging and evolving, heightening the imperative for resilient and reliable systems. General Stephen Whiting, Commander of United States Space Command, once referred to cybersecurity as the “soft underbelly” of space operations. 

“One of the key elements adversaries would exploit are vulnerable and aging systems, and that’s why upgrading them is critically important,” Gen (Ret) Haugh said. “China has shown that if vulnerabilities exist, they will take advantage of them. We would likely see similar attacks on our military bases that we’ve seen China take against critical infrastructure in the United States: going after infrastructure like water treatment, energy generation and critical functions inside of telecommunications or networks.” 

The task order for the Space Force’s modernization efforts, to the tune of $12.5 billion, follows a similar task order for Air Force bases to receive advanced wired and wireless technology upgrades that will enhance connectivity, cybersecurity, interoperability and data readiness at bases across the Pacific theater. It will be processed as an Enterprise-IT-as-a-Service solution through an Indefinite Delivery-Indefinite Quantity contract designed to streamline modernization to adapt to a quickly and constantly evolving threat. 

“The idea behind Enterprise-IT-as-a-Service is to leverage industry expertise to bring in current technology to build and maintain our digital infrastructure, allowing Airmen and Guardians to focus on other critical warfighting operations and missions,” Gen (Ret) Haugh said. “The first component to these upgrades is to provide the foundation to meet the mission needs of the Space Force and the Air Force and ensure the network can support their operations. Then the second component is to ensure the architecture is defendable and in compliance with Department of War policies for cybersecurity.” 

An aging digital infrastructure also increases the vulnerability of a “zero-day” attack that can be difficult to detect and often lead to data breaches and compromises, much like the recent disclosure by Ivanti that affected several government agencies and Allied partners.  

“Increasingly enabled by artificial intelligence, adversaries are going to be looking for vulnerabilities at every one of these networks and they will take advantage of them if they see them,” Gen (Ret) Haugh said. “Once inside a network, adversaries will look to compromise the identity of key system administrators that have privileged accounts to move laterally and ensure that they would retain deep access to our networks for future targeting. This is the reality of today’s operating environment, so it’s critical to upgrade our digital infrastructure and implement zero trust to defeat or complicate their ability to take on different identities within DOW networks.” 

A Foundation for Zero Trust and AI 

The modernization effort will also lay the foundation for implementing a new zero trust framework to enhance the resiliency and reliability of the Department of War’s network.  

“Zero trust is an approach that is founded on the assumption that your perimeter is going to be breached,” Gen (Ret) Haugh said. “Zero trust creates an operating environment with the least privileged access, which means only giving access to data, applications, tools and infrastructure to an authorized individual only during the period of time in which they’re authorized to operate.  

This approach makes sure that not only are you secure and resilient at the network edge, because you still won’t lose security of the entire network if one of your team members is compromised.” 

Toward this end, the National Security Agency (NSA) recently unveiled its Zero Trust Implementation Guidelines, beginning with its two initial phases: Primer and Discovery Phase. 

“NSA has coordinated all the necessary activities to implement a zero trust architecture into five parts,” Haugh said, who previously served as the Director of the National Security Agency. “The first phase, Primer, helps organizations understand which modules to begin with for laying out zero trust implementation to meet the Department’s expectations. The Discovery Phase is about creating visibility and understanding the data, applications and the assets that are within your architecture.” 

A fully implemented zero trust architecture can then create pathways for integrating emerging technologies like artificial intelligence in a way that will be reliable and secure. That’s in part why the DOW simultaneously released its Artificial Intelligence Acceleration Strategy that laid out seven “Pace-Setting Projects” across three mission areas: Warfighting, Intelligence, and Enterprise. 

“The Department’s strategy requires a secure and capable digital infrastructure to grow the compute capacity needed for greater implementation of artificial intelligence,” Gen (Ret) Haugh said. Gen (Ret) Haugh said. “Everything AI does – from running algorithms or using agents and autonomous capabilities – requires the power to compute. You can get that compute through on-base servers and data centers or cloud providers that are part of the overall architecture. This strategy intends to make that compute available to every Guardian and every Airman, regardless of the type of contested environment they’re in.”  

Digital Infrastructure and Golden Dome 

Artificial intelligence and the autonomous processing of trusted, effective and secure data will also be instrumental to future military operations, particularly for homeland defense initiatives like Golden Dome.   

“The biggest challenge for Golden Dome is the diversity of threats: the Department is prepared for specific scenarios of certain threats, but the nature and speed of those threats are diversifying,” Gen (Ret) Haugh said. “But Golden Dome demands a command and control structure that is always on, always available and integrated with the right data sources to have situational awareness that can provide the right data to the decision-maker, enabling the ability to execute command and control in real-time to mitigate and defeat those threats. The digital infrastructure is what will tie every sensor, base and shooter to deliver the command and control structure necessary for Golden Dome.” 

General Mike Guetlein, the Director of Golden Dome, has expressed that command and control is his first priority. Like all space and military operations, command and control requires a trusted and secure digital infrastructure at its foundation. That’s why Elara Nova has now established its Cyber, Data & Communications business sector to support industry in delivering the secure and trusted solutions that will empower the warfighter to deliver on mission requirements across domains.  

“Elara Nova offers a deep portfolio of cyber experts that have served across all elements of our intelligence community and military services,” Gen (Ret) Haugh said. “When combined with all of the air and space experts in our portfolio, Elara Nova brings a unique set of talents to bear on hard, cross-domain problems like Golden Dome. Our experts have served in both the Department and industry, which makes them an invaluable resource to accelerating integration of data and emerging technologies in a way that will produce a successful outcome for our nation.” 

Elara Nova is a trusted guiding partner that builds tailored teams to illuminate unseen opportunities and deliver impact across every domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/.    

Department of Defense Budget Must Realign to Space-Based Threats

Resourcing Strong and Capable Space Force Begins with Budget Reform

The United States Space Force requested $29.4 billion for Fiscal Year 2025 (FY25), a two percent drop from the previous year. The final budget, however, has yet to be passed as the federal government is operating under a continuing resolution that expires in mid-March. While the Space Force was foundedin response to the actions of near-peer competitors in space that threatened the United States’ national and economic security, declines in funding for the Space Force, compounded by the inherent restrictions of continuing resolutions and the financial burdens of legacy defense programs, are compromising the Space Force’s ability to effectively resource against the space-based threat. 

“A continuing resolution means we don’t have a budget for this fiscal year, and so we have to comply with last year’s budget limits and existing programs,” said General (Ret) John E. Hyten, Senior Principal Advisor at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy. “This means no new start programs can begin and any other programs that require a budget increase to deliver a needed capability can’t be executed. Therefore, several space programs are consistently delayed and this inefficiency wastes billions of taxpayer dollars.” 

The Space Force has been in existence for a little over five years, or about 60 months. For roughly half that time, the Space Force has been operating under a continuing resolution. This can provide significant barriers for a new military service seeking to adopt rapidly evolving technologies. 

An Underfunded Space Force 

But even if a budget for FY25 was passed by now, the traditional approach to developing the Department of Defense (DOD) budget means the Space Force would still only receive a marginal amount of funding it needs. 

“Traditionally, the DOD budget is typically carved out in thirds,” said Lieutenant General (Ret) Nina Armagno, executive director of international partnerships at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy. “One third goes to the Department of the Army, another to the Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps, and a final third to the Department of the Air Force, which includes funding for the Space Force and the intelligence community. But this approach means the Space Force only garners about three percent of the overall DoD budget – that’s harmful to our national security.” 

Space capabilities underpin joint force and military operations in other domains, and recent adversarial actions demonstrate they are developing their own space capabilities to threaten the United States’ national and economic security. That’s why, in a recent Opinion Editorial co-written by Gen Hyten and Gen Armagno published by SpaceNews, they argued it’s time for the DOD budget to refocus away from outdated legacy programs to reflect the modern, space-based threat. 

“The defense budget should be all about responding to the threats right now, and the most significant threat is China building strategic air and space capabilities to challenge the United States in the Pacific,” Gen Hyten said. “The second is Russia, which is probably even more concerning in the near-term. Russia has realized the American way of war depends on space capabilities and that’s why President Vladimir Putin has threatened to deploy and perhaps employ a nuclear weapon in low-Earth orbit.” 

A Changing Threat Landscape in Space 

Russia’s threat to deploy a nuclear weapon in space comes in response to the United States’ shift toward proliferated architectures in the domain.  

“Russia spent an enormous amount of treasure and time building a direct ascent anti-satellite [ASAT] capability that would take out one satellite,” Gen Hyten said. “But then in the early stages of the Ukranian conflict, a commercial company with a proliferated satellite architecture essentially rendered the ASAT capability useless. Now, Putin has to threaten that capability with a nuclear weapon because he’s got nothing else in the inventory, so we need to pay attention to what our adversaries are doing to fill any voids.” 

Therefore, as the nature of warfare and the threat landscape has changed, so too should the budgeting process. 

“The first thing an adversary will do is take out the ‘eyes and ears’ of the United States in space,” Gen Hyten said. “This will be followed by cyber influence and chemical or biological warfare that will insert doubt into the American population about our military’s ability to achieve its objectives. Then an adversary will challenge the United States with military force because now the doubt is across the American people. That’s how conflict could start and defending ourselves against those threats should be the highest priorities reflected in the budget.” 

Defense Spending Declines Undercut Strategy 

Further exacerbating this shortfall in necessary funding, however, is the broader decline in recent defense spending by the United States Congress. In 2022, U.S. defense spending came in at just over 3.4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the Congressional Budget Office forecasts this decrease will continue toward 2.5% GDP by 2034. For context, these percentages are lower than the running 4.2% average for total defense spending in the United States over the past half-century.  

“The FY25 budget request being essentially flat was a huge failure, and even Former Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall said the Space Force budget should probably double,” Gen Armagno said. “Every indication is that the Space Force budget needs to grow, because the Space Force is acquiring new capabilities and new technologies for new missions. Any delay to those Space Force programs is significant, particularly for its support to the entire joint force.” 

The budget process begins with developing a strategy based on the threat, but when there is not enough funding to acquire the capabilities needed to fulfill the strategy’s broader goals, difficult decisions must be made on prioritizing certain programs or capabilities. This results in program cuts that can compromise the joint force. 

“We learned in the early days of standing up the Space Force that there were tough choices for funding the new service,” Gen Armagno said. “For example, we prioritized Space Domain Awareness under a strategy called ‘Pivot to SDA.’ But we soon realized that there were competing space priorities and requirements from the other military services and Congress, against limited available funding. Without the appropriate funding, our budgets for ground-based radars and optical telescopes necessary for SDA got cut.” 

DOD, Congress Can Overcome Budget Challenges 

However, solutions exist for Congress and the DOD to effectively adapt its budget and force structure so that the United States can secure its national and economic security interests in space. 

“Congress writes the law that the president signs into action, but any law can be changed,” Gen Hyten said. “People think the acquisition program is inflexible. But the Federal Acquisition Regulations are the compilation of all the laws that have passed over the decades, and Congress can change the law for the benefit of the country. If the DOD educates Congress on what they’re trying to accomplish, Congress will do their utmost best to include those imperatives in the budget.” 

Gen Armagno points to two recent examples that reflect how the DOD and Congress previously worked together to overcome budget challenges to acquire necessary space capabilities: the Space Force’s Silent Barker program and former Secretary Kendall’s request for “Quick Start” approval for Resilient-GPS under a continuing resolution.  

“When I worked space programs in the Air Force, we successfully communicated with Congress and their staffers regarding a space-based situational awareness program called ‘Silent Barker,’ so Congress understood its priority and the acquisition strategy before the program was even announced,” Gen Armagno said. “Then another example is former Secretary Kendall working with Congress to get an exception to the ‘no new start’ rule under a continuing resolution for Resilient-GPS in the FY24 budget. It was a great idea, and more of that work needs to happen in working with the Hill, because laws can be changed.” 

Iron Dome Highlights Need to Fund Space Imperatives 

Now, a recently issued executive order from the Trump administration, “The Iron Dome for America,” will also require significant investment in space-based capabilities that must be incorporated into the Space Force budget. This new effort only strengthens the imperative for adapting the DOD’s budget and force structure according to the modern threat environment.  

“You can’t shoot anything you can’t see, so the first priority will be to build an integrated terrestrial and space-based surveillance system to see and characterize all the ballistic and hypersonic cruise missiles that threaten America,” Gen Hyten said. “Then you have to build a capability to attack multiple targets with ground-based, naval-based and air-based systems to neutralize those incoming threats, so you don’t have to respond in kind with nuclear weapons.”  

General Hyten points to further solutions already proposed in the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States in 2023. 

“The Missile Defense Agency needs to divest itself of all production and sustainment programs to the appropriate Military Departments. This means the Missile Defense Agency can just focus on the research and development for the long-term missile defense capabilities of the future. This can be done in the FY26 budget, but not if a majority of the MDA is focused on production sustainment and not on innovative moves toward the future.” 

Balancing the national security needs against the threat, so that they’re reflected in the budget, represents the complex problems Elara Nova and its partners are prepared to provide solutions for.  

“The budget must reflect the threat that’s out there today, and we need Space Force Guardians that understand the entire space enterprise,” Gen Hyten said.  “Elara Nova partners fill a critical void in providing that experience, expertise and analytic capability to developing the enterprise approach necessary for establishing the United States’ national and economic security in space.” 

Elara Nova is a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/. 

SPAR Institute Begins Latest Effort to Develop Nuclear Propulsion for Space

Maneuver Without Regret, In-Space Assembly and Manufacturing Among Potential Use Cases

In late 2024, the United States Space Force established the Space Power & Propulsion for Agility, Responsiveness & Resilience (SPAR) Institute with $35 million to develop nuclear-powered systems for spacecraft propulsion. The initiative demonstrates the latest effort by the Space Force, in partnership with the Air Force Reserarch Laboratory (AFRL), eight universities and 14 industry partners, to explore nuclear fission as an energy source in space. If successfully developed and deployed, nuclear-powered systems can unlock a broad range of capabilities: from ”maneuvering without regret” and in-space assembly and manufacturing (ISAM), to orbital clean-up and natural resource extraction. 

“Retired Lieutenant General John Shaw’s catchphrase ‘maneuver without regret,’ means we need to operate and maneuver satellites without compromising the satellite’s lifetime energy supply,” said Tom Cooley, PhD, partner at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy and former Chief Scientist at AFRL. “The current energy consumption costs of maneuvering space assets adversely affect the Space Force’s long-term capabilities. Nuclear energy has long been considered a potential solution, and the SPAR Institute will explore its viability.” 

Traditionally, maneuvering in space has been generated through electric or chemical propulsion. But both approaches have their respective limitations. 

“While electric propulsion is extremely efficient, it can’t generate enough power to change an orbit quickly, so it tends to be used for lower impulse per unit time activities like station-keeping,” said Brad Tousley, PhD, partner at Elara Nova and former director for the Tactical Technology Office at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). “Meanwhile, chemical propulsion rockets have greater impulse per unit time, but fuel is volume and weight-constrained by the spacecraft. So chemical propulsion requires the Space Force to address on-orbit refueling and logistical challenges.” 

Alternatively, nuclear fission carries both high-impulse thrust and low-consumption rate qualities. Nuclear fission works by splitting an atom’s nucleus within a controlled reactor to generate energy in a way that could revolutionize dynamic space operations.   

“Nuclear fission’s latent energy is simply far more per unit volume compared to electric or chemical power sources,” Dr. Tousley said. “Regulatory and safety issues still exist that can inhibit nuclear development and deployment. But from a physics and energy density perspective, nuclear power can change how we approach building resilient architectures and systems in space.” 

Therefore, nuclear-powered spacecraft are an attractive endeavor for both national security and civil space applications. 

“The Space Force is interested in nuclear energy because maneuvering to change orbits requires a lot of energy,” Dr. Cooley said. “Maneuverability can also enable in-space logistics, like on-orbit refueling or conducting maintenance repairs on a spacecraft. Then for NASA, human habitation on the moon requires a reliable source of energy, especially during the two-week lunar ‘night.’” 

Nuclear-Powered Systems vs. Nuclear Weapons 

Nuclear-powered systems are not nuclear weapons. Whereas a nuclear weapon splits an uranium or plutonium atom in an uncontrolled manner to maximize energy consumption, a nuclear reactor can house this same atom-splitting process in a way that generates a low-carbon, long-term energy source.  

It’s the same technological process leveraged by nuclear power plants and even the United States Navy. 

“There’s no better analogy for using nuclear power in space than how it changed the U.S. Navy’s global operations,” Dr. Tousley said. “The Navy went to nuclear-powered aircraft carriers because the infrastructure to supply carriers with conventional fossil fuels was burdened by long-distance deployments. So today’s Navy depends on nuclear energy for their global power projection.” 

To this end, developing and deploying similar nuclear reactor technology for space is legally within the bounds of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.  

“The 1967 Outer Space Treaty is clear that we must not put nuclear weapons in space,” Dr. Cooley said. “But a nuclear reactor simply uses nuclear technology to generate electricity. Some of the most successful NASA programs used radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs), which similarly leveraged nuclear technology for deep space or interplanetary exploration.” 

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion Programs 

Historically, the United States has embarked on a series of research and development programs for nuclear energy in space. Nuclear-powered systems can be delineated in two ways, the first of which is nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP). In an NTP system, hydrogen fuel is used to split a uranium atom within a nuclear reactor to generate heat, which can create thrust. 

One of the earliest NTP efforts was the Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Application (NERVA) program, overseen by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). 

“NERVA aimed to develop an upper-stage rocket engine using nuclear thermal propulsion, because the heat generated by a nuclear reactor is much greater than the heat you get from a chemical reaction,” Donna Dickey, Elara Nova partner and aerospace engineer, formerly of AFRL and now supporting DARPA. “The NTP process generates twice the efficiency, while maintaining the thrust levels of a traditional chemical rocket – so it’s the best of both worlds. The NERVA program developed several nuclear reactors to be integrated into a rocket engine, and even started testing before the program ended in 1973.” 

While the nuclear-powered rocket engine NERVA developed was never launched into space, the program has been considered a successful proof of concept for nuclear thermal propulsion.  

Today, similarly-inspired DARPA programs have emerged, like the Demonstration Rocket for Agile Cislunar Operations (DRACO) and LunA-10 programs.  

“DRACO is focused on demonstrating nuclear thermal propulsion technology on-orbit,” Dr. Tousley said. “Effectively managing the excess heat a nuclear reaction generates continues to be a technical challenge that DARPA and NASA are working through, but the program is an effective example of how we can develop nuclear technology in a way that adheres to the Outer Space Treaty. Meanwhile, LunA-10 was a capability study of the lunar economy and how shared systems could benefit everyone, including nuclear power and propulsion.” 

Nuclear Electric Propulsion 

The second way to leverage nuclear energy is known as nuclear electric propulsion (NEP), which uses nuclear fission to create electricity that generates the magnetic fields used to accelerate and expel gas propellants like xenon and krypton. The NEP process provides a lower amount of thrust compared to its NTP counterpart, but it can still efficiently propel a spacecraft for extended periods of time.  

That’s been the focus of the Joint Emergent Technology Supplying On-Orbit Nuclear High Power (JETSON) program, overseen by AFRL. JETSON emerged after the Kilopower Reactor Using Stirling Technology (KRUSTY) experiment, led by NASA and the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, safely demonstrated NEP capability. 

“KRUSTY created a relatively small nuclear reactor and used that to generate electricity,” Dr. Cooley said. “Now, JETSON gets back to powering an ion thruster with that electric energy, but the hard part is getting the nuclear reactor into space safely.” 

Remaining Challenges and Terrestrial-Driven Solutions 

Launch presents one of many remaining challenges needed to be overcome before the government, with its industry and academic partners, can successfully adopt nuclear-powered systems for spacecraft propulsion. 

“The biggest concern is not launching the reactor structure, but rather the nuclear material itself,” Dr. Tousley said. “But launching the reactor structure on one rocket and the nuclear material on a smaller, more reliable rocket before assembling it in space is one example of how we can creatively reduce the risk of an accident or reentry. Although we would still need mission assurance during the system’s lifetime, and a means for appropriately disposing it at end of life.” 

But similar, land-based nuclear energy efforts may in turn facilitate solutions for getting a nuclear reactor to space. For example, the Strategic Capabilities Office’s Project Pele aims to develop a mobile nuclear reactor to power remote military bases.  

“It’s difficult to get fossil fuel sources to places like Eilson Air Force Base in Alaska, where winter limits opportunities to resupply,” Dr. Tousley said. So Project Pele’s investment in  nuclear research and development for terrestrial power purposes can advance similar technologies for space.” 

Land-based applications for nuclear power systems are also drawing the attention, and investment, of technology companies and their private equity partners.  

“Companies are developing small nuclear reactor concepts to meet the growing nationwide energy demands of data centers,” Dr. Tousley said. “So nuclear developments may not start with space, but the government is still going to benefit from private capital investments in developing advanced reactors and power systems for terrestrial purposes.” 

Enabling the Future of Nuclear in Space 

If successful, these programs could enable the development of other space-based capabilities, like in-space assembly and manufacturing (ISAM), orbital clean-up, recycling and even natural resource extraction in space.  

“Nuclear energy can solve two problems at once: building the future infrastructure in space, while cleaning up the old one,” Dr. Cooley said. “Nuclear power systems can maneuver space debris into remote orbits, or recylce and manufacture debris into new material. But all of these capabilities would require tremendous amounts of energy that nuclear-powered systems can uniquely provide, and the United States needs to take that risk and invest in these capabilities now if we are going to lead that change.” 

However, the government must also make the appropriate regulatory and policy changes if it’s to overcome the risk-averse mindset triggered by nuclear accidents like Three Mile Island. 

“Japan, France and the United States led the free world in nuclear power development for electric generation purposes before the 1979 partial nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island,” Dr. Tousley said. “That accident impacted U.S. public policy and set us back in nuclear development for decades, while Japan and France continued forward. Likewise, we need to be more risk-tolerant in order to make progress because the physics don’t lie – nuclear energy is incredibly efficient.  

The complex challenges facing the SPAR Institute and other nuclear energy programs require the type of intersecting technology, human capital, regulatory and policy-driven solutions Elara Nova partners are prepared to provide. 

“The SPAR Institute is funding graduate students to work in nuclear development, an area that is critical to the United States,” Dr. Tousley said. “These students will likely go on to work in industry or start their own companies in support of the U.S. government’s nuclear development efforts. That’s where Elara Nova can support them, by bridging the gap between policy and technical challenges to enable their company’s success.” 

Elara Nova is a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/. 

The Rise of Commercial Space in Christian Davenport’s “The Space Barons”

Washington Post Reporter to Release New Book, “Rocket Dreams,” in 2025

Christian Davenport, a space industry and NASA reporter for The Washington Post, has announced a forthcoming book: “Rocket Dreams: Musk, Bezos, and the Inside Story of the New, Trillion-Dollar Space Race.” The new book, set to be released in the fall of 2025, picks up where his previous book “The Space Barons: Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos and the Quest to Colonize the Cosmos,” concluded seven years ago. While his journalism career began as a metropolitan reporter and editor covering local politics in Washington, D.C., it was Davenport’s experience as an embedded reporter in Iraq and Kuwait that enabled him to recognize a unique story idea that led to writing “The Space Barons,” during a 2014 press conference. 

“I was assigned to cover the military-industrial complex when, in 2014, Elon Musk held a press conference at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., to announce he was filing a lawsuit against the Pentagon, specifically the Air Force, for the right to compete for national security launch contracts,” Christian Davenport said. “But Musk started the press conference by talking about building a re-usable launch vehicle that would bring the booster back by catching it. I wrote the story about the lawsuit, but during my research into SpaceX’s efforts to develop reusable rockets I found that Jeff Bezos and Blue Origin were trying to do that, too.” 

At the time, the idea of a re-usable launch vehicle that would return to Earth was unproven. But Davenport took to heart an old journalism mantra that harkens back to Watergate: “Follow the money.” 

“If the richest people in the world are investing their money in space exploration and advancing state of the art launch technology, then we should be paying more attention to that,” Davenport said. “So I interviewed Elon, Jeff, as well as Richard Branson and Paul Allen, for ‘The Space Barons.’ But while each of them approached their space companies with very different mindsets, there is a common thread through all of them: to lower the cost of access to space.” 

A Starting Point for Commercial Space 

The billionaires’ ambitions were diverse: Musk wanted to colonize Mars, Bezos wanted to reduce human impact on the Earth and Branson licensed technology from Allen’s StarShipOne to establish suborbital tourism. Each of them self-funded their space company’s efforts to varying degrees, but it was Allen’s original aspirations to win the Ansari X prize that today is viewed as a catalyzing moment for commercial space. 

“The Ansari X Prize was a contest to see if a commercial venture can send a vehicle to the edge of space and back – twice – without government money,” Davenport said. “When Paul Allen and Burt Rutan, the famous inventor and aerospace engineer, came up with SpaceShipOne and won the Ansari X Prize, it was heralded at the time as a breakthrough moment for commercial space. But while it showed it could be done, we don’t have regular people going to the edge of space like originally envisioned.” 

Davenport’s “The Space Barons” also takes readers inside a 2006 Valentine’s Day conference where the billionaires gathered together to brainstorm how to move the commercial space industry forward.  

“Back then, it would have been fair to look at these space barons and say, ‘Commercial space is never going to happen,’” Davenport said. “Space is such an expensive and difficult proposition that requires immense expertise. So there were a lot of skeptics who thought space was always going to be an exclusively government enterprise. Yet, over time, the space barons persisted.” 

The motives behind the Valentine’s Day conference meeting have clear repercussions that still resonate today. 

“In a sense, they posed a question: ‘Is there a commercial space industry?’” Davenport said. “Well, the next book, Rocket Dreams, answers that question with a resounding ‘Yes,’ because anytime you put human beings in a commercially owned and operated rocket is a big deal. Today, we’re seeing a proliferation of a space market and a space economy beyond just the billionaires.”  

The Government’s Role in Commercial Space Growth 

A key shift in making today’s space market possible, however, was the actions government agencies made to facilitate the commercial space industry’s growth.  

“There was a willingness from the government, from NASA and the Pentagon, to outsource some tasks and space missions to the private sector,” Davenport said. “Today, that outsourcing seems routine, but that was a revolutionary change to trust the private sector with vital space missions that had always been part of the national enterprise. That was a significant paradigm shift that enabled the space industry to take off.”  

It took key government figures like NASA’s Mike Griffin or DARPA’s Tony Tether and Steve Walker to advocate for the government to embrace what was – at the time – a budding space industry.  

“In the context of the time, there were two space shuttle disasters and the end of the space shuttle program, which meant the United States government would rely solely on Russia to get our astronauts to the International Space Station,” Davenport said. “So government officials began thinking about doing something radically different to access space. It started with industry partners flying cargo and supplies to the International Space Station before flying astronauts – but it was an incremental approach that developed over time.” 

The Modern Commercial Space Industry 

Today, that once-emerging commercial space market has established itself as a projected $1.8 trillion space industry by 2035. As such, government agencies will be looking more and more to their commercial partners for a variety of space missions. 

“We’re seeing the space enterprise understand that if the commercial sector can fly astronauts to the space station, then maybe they should be the ones who land astronauts on the moon and build uncrewed spacecraft for scouting missions,” Davenport said. “The government can also get investors involved to help subsidize the cost of these missions. However, the commercial sector works by experimenting to move faster, which means at times they’re going to fail. So it will be interesting to see what the government tolerance level is for that.” 

The balance of success and failure can perhaps be described by two recent commercial space endeavors funded by NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) program. In early March, Firefly Aerospace landed their Blue Ghost spacecraft for a successful two-week mission, but Intuitive Machines’ Athena spacecraft had an imperfect landing that left much of its mission goals unfulfilled. 

“It’s a balance of how much risk are we willing to take, because whether it’s astronauts on-board or even the cargo and supplies needed to service those astronauts – the government requires success,” Davenport said. “Even SpaceX has recently had problems with its Falcon-9, Dragon and Starship spacecraft. So while we often celebrate the success of American innovation, some of these setbacks call into question how much government oversight there should be.”  

A New Space Race 

The government has a vested interest in the success of commercial space companies, primarily because the United States has once again found itself in a modern-day space race. 

“China has shown amazing progress for moon landings, as they are the first country to go to and bring samples back from the far side of the moon,” Davenport said. “They have a space station in low-Earth orbit and have operated a rover on Mars. But what many people don’t realize is there are no longer American flags on the moon. The flags from the Apollo era have been bleached white by the radiation and vacuum environment, meanwhile China has planted two flags: one made out of composite material specifically designed for space and another made with in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) technology so it can withstand the harsh space environment.” 

In “The Space Barons,” Davenport catalogued how the commercial space industry rose up to meet today’s space race needs by delineating the book in three sections: Impossible, Improbable, Inevitable. But now that the commercial space industry is well on its way, “Rocket Dreams” will showcase how these companies will reach their destinations and achieve their goals in the modern space race. 

“‘Impossible, Improbable, and Inevitable,’ encompass the narrative of ‘The Space Barons,’ but also the journey of space exploration in the commercial space sector,” Davenport said. “This next book, ‘Rocket Dreams,’ takes a more symbolic approach to its three sections: on the ground, on-orbit, and to the moon and beyond. The book ends more on ideas, because there’s a lot of questions being asked and certainly progress that is being made, but these unpredictable variables are what makes it an exciting time to be a part of the space industry.” 

Elara Nova is a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space domain. Learn more at https://elaranova.com/.